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A
VIEW
OF THE
FORMATION, DISCIPLINE AND ECONOMY
OF
ARMIES.

A
VIEW
OF THE
FORMATION, DISCIPLINE AND ECONOMY
OF
ARMIES;

WITH
AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING HINTS FOR MEDICAL ARRANGEMENT
IN ACTUAL WAR.

BY ROBERT JACKSON, M D.

A New Edition, much enlarged.

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Advertisement.

THE present work was offered to the public,—to be printed by subscription. A considerable number of names were given in—and it was put to the Press. The printing is now finished, and the Book is sent to the Military Library, (Egerton) White-hall, London—to be delivered to order. The Director-General and the Medical Officers of the British Army are entitled to the Author's warmest acknowledgements on this occasion. The countenance, which they gave to the work in prospect, is cherished by him as a testimony of good opinion; and, if their approbation descend to it in substance, he will be much gratified, as he considers them competent to judge—from their experience of war and their acquaintance with the powers of the human constitution.

PREFACE.

THE Author of the present volume takes leave to inform the reader, that he published a work in the year 1804, entitled “A View of the Formation, Discipline and Economy of Armies.” The matter of the work was thought, by a few of the Military who took the trouble to peruse it, to be good, that is, true in fact, and not without utility. The manner of putting it together was not graceful; and, from that or other cause, it did not obtain the notice of the public. It slept in its cradle for twenty years. It is now raised up from it—grown in size considerably and somewhat differently fashioned; but not yet so fashioned as to give expectation of a good reception in the world. The schoolmaster, who read lectures on the Art of War to Hannibal, was ridiculed as a pedant speaking to a master; and it is not probable that the physician, who ventures to give instruction on the mode of forming, training and maintaining the instrument of War in discipline and efficiency, will escape with lighter censure from the tribunals of the present time. The attempt will be deemed an en-

encroachment on the military province—it is not so in fact. An estimate of materials is primary to the erection of the military as well as other fabric; and, as medical men are, or ought, from the nature of their studies, to be better acquainted with the materials of which armies are composed than men of other professions, the author is not disposed to admit the charge of encroachment, not even to allow that he has exceeded the limit of his station in doing what he has done. He desires to be useful. He has no pretension to the talent which commands distinction; but he has common sense like other men, and he does not presume to offer any thing, on the present occasion, beyond what common sense has pointed out to him in a wide field of experience. That his experience has been wide will not be denied, when it is known that he is in his 74th year, that he has served in three British wars, that he has often been near the scene of service; and moreover that he has had the opportunity of seeing, so as to observe and minutely to look into, the condition of most of the armies of the military powers of Europe. He has thus seen how things are brought together, how they are put together, and how they are kept together; and, taking these things into consideration, he does not regard himself as altogether incompetent to the task which he has assumed, viz. that of laying down the fundamental beams of a military structure, not that of adorning the structure for the *coup d'œil* of parade, or of manœuvring it, when formed, for hostile contact in the field of combat. These belong to Princes or Commanders *ex-*

officio; and no attempt is made, in the present case, to take the office out of their hands.

The materials of armies are collected in different ways. They are collected for instance by conscription or general levy, by purchase with money as commodities of traffic, and sometimes by force and fraud, vulgarly called kidnapping. The conscript may be supposed to be reluctant to arms, the mercenary has no attachment beyond the value of his hire, and the inveigled or kidnapped is necessarily repugnant. It is evident to any one, who takes the trouble to consider things in their true relations, that an army, formed of materials so heterogeneous as those alluded to, cannot, without the infusion of an extra spirit of activity, move consistently in its course, or strike energetically in its act. The several parts of the structure tend by their natural inclinations or acquired habits to different developments; they counteract each other in their movements, consequently produce a jarring or imperfect effect. As the materials of armies are collected variously, so they are put together superficially, that is, by size and external resemblance, not by power or capacity; and, as size and power are not connected by an undeviating law of nature, the act of the product is not, as now said, consistent in its manner of proceeding, or efficient in its effect as the act of a body united scientifically by internal power. This, which might be supposed *a priori*, is proved in experience by trial. The evil, arising from the rule commonly adopted in tactical arrangement, is serious and impor-

tant; and, as the writer is desirous to do good, he has, with all due deference to the masters of the military art, taken the liberty of suggesting an expedient, through the well considered application of which, the inconveniences complained of may be in some degree obviated. The expedient is simple. It merely implies the examination of properties and the substantiation of powers, prior to the act of combining or putting together. Correspondence in power, rather than size and external resemblance is here assumed as the rule of arrangement. The rule comprehends no mystery; and, if it be properly understood and correctly executed, it is reasonable to suppose that the movements of the military body thence arising will generally be in harmony, the result of the act effective as a result of correct combination. The measure proposed, fanciful and absurd as it may be thought to be, promises union in action, in so far as depends on physical capacity; and it thus goes a great way in bringing military operations under rules of scientific calculation.

The value of augmenting the force of the military instrument, by a scientific adaptation of its several parts to one another, is evident to the commonest understanding; the value of animating the instrument so formed, by the influence of a strong and consistent principle of action, is not less obvious, but it is not so easily attained. The impression of fear *a tergo* is the ostensible engine employed to move, or to regulate the movement of military force; but, as the impression of fear acts by aversions, no certain calculation can be made of the

effect of its operation. Human nature recoils from danger wherever it presents itself; and, in spite of the drillings of tacticians, human nature retains its propensity to fly from the greater evil. The soldier, according to this principle, recoils from the danger which threatens to destroy his life. He advances to encounter it, as urged by a cause of paramount force acting on the rear, or as attracted by something connected with the danger in front which his soul covets. The tactician assumes the impression of fear as the engine of military movement; but he does not, in the writer's opinion, assume it on grounds that are correctly founded in the true constitution of man's nature. It is the object of the tactician's labour to make the soldier brave: it is a solecism in reason to attempt to do so by acting on the cowardly ingredient which attaches to the human condition. Where fear moves the act, there is no exercise of judgment; and, as there is no independence of mind within in such case, there can be no calculation of the acts that are without. The impression of fear restrains from retrograde where it is placed in the rear, it does not stimulate to a forward course except by collision; and, as acts from collision are blind acts of force, the military act thence originating is necessarily at random, the fortune of war thrown entirely on a table of chances. But while the engine here assumed, as the mover of military action, is degrading to human nature in its principle, it is not true in its act as judged by human experience. It is not capable of forcing an army to overcome a strong obstacle; for it is a

fundamental law in the constitution, as now said, that man, acted on by fear and by fear only, recoils from the greater danger; he thus fluctuates between fears,—and is not a soldier in the true sense of the word, for he has not a principle of action within him.

If the impression of fear *a tergo* be insufficient to move, or to sustain military force in movement in the face of strong danger, the tactician, who forms an army for practical use, will, it is presumed, seek for other means of animation through which he may hope to attain his purpose.—The attachment, which the human race forms for the soil on which it draws its first breath, is one of the most general and perhaps one of the strongest of the attachments which characterise the human species. It is an instinctive feeling of independence,—a primary and constitutional injunction to maintain the constituted sphere against the encroachments of external force. The earth is the inheritance of man; and man clings, by constitutional instinct, to the defence of his inheritance. He claims independence for himself; and, by an act of instinctive kindness and generosity, he desires to maintain the independence of the weaker parts of the creation that are planted within his circle. The mind is ennobled by assuming the office of protection; and, while ennobled by the expanding idea, it is filled with gratitude to the Creator for the benefits which itself enjoys, and for the power which it possesses of affording the benefit of protection to others. The simple son of the earth is a patriot by what may be called innate propensity; and he is

a generous patriot in his primitive or unadulterated condition. He is the material of a national army; but he is a material not to be found in what is called the civilized world; or, if found by chance, he is so managed and moulded by art that national sentiment, oppressed by assumed authority, is suffocated and ultimately extinguished.

In defect of national military sentiment, or in counteraction of its operations, a phantom of military glory is called up by tacticians to animate military force to exertion; but it is only a feeble and an uncertain substitute, after all the pains that are or can be employed in bringing it out. The operation of military glory moves in all its steps by the transgression of moral justice, and as such is an unhallowed motive to be applied to the animation of an army; but even if hallowed, it is not of extensive influence on the military mass. It rarely touches the common man, unless by a species of phrenzy under that universal and radical revolution, which extinguishing artificial distinctions and formal institutions, leaves the country open to the common eye, as the common object of attachment. The operation is then energetic; but it is seldom of long duration.

The springs of military action alluded to not existing in the military recruit, or not being stable and calculable in effect, the tactician is forced to seek for others more common, or of more dependence. Patriotism, or love of country is a legitimate principle in war, in as

much as it implies defence of the native soil, as the rightful inheritance of the inhabitant. It is legitimate; but it scarcely has an existence among the nations of Europe at the present time. Military glory is a phantom which acts on the imagination, and as such cannot be calculated in its operations. The desire of aggrandizing the condition by force and fraud is unjust in itself, and unhallowed as a motive for war; it is notwithstanding the common motive for collecting armies, and it is the principal motive which keeps armies in activity. The passion of cupidity is an aggrandizing passion. It has a forward course; and, in this forward course, it amasses materials and organizes them into armies, by a process that may in some manner be called instinctive. The desire of money to buy bread fills the military ranks; the hopes of spoil stimulate to exertion. The man of arms is purchasable as a commodity of traffic and applicable to all uses; consequently an instrument of unhallowed purposes for a bribe in money. Money becomes, in this manner, the moving engine of armies; and, in the language of Statesmen, it is the sinews of war. It is not denied that it is the sinews of predatory or royal war; it is the canker-worm of national war, that is, war undertaken for the defence of the native soil, and the general and individual independence of the native subject. If we permit ourselves to look at the question with the eye of the philosopher, money will be found to have a corrupting and enslaving influence every where, in as much as it

uniformly, and more effectually than any other engine, brings man under the dominion of the most sordid of the human passions. This is proved in every page of human history.*

* In looking at the radical operation of money on the military instrument, it will be difficult to find an instance, in the whole field of contentions, where human liberty has been vindicated, and a true form of Government established through the aid of money. This remark, which may seem to be irrelevant, is elicited by looking at the situation of the Greeks, who are now contending in arms for the vindication of their liberty and the sovereignty of the soil which covers the ashes of their fathers. The Turk is the sovereign of Greece arbitrary and cruel,—and the Greek abhors him. Besides abhorrence of tyranny, the Greeks have a feeling of the free condition of human nature, stronger and more radical, in so far as appeared to the writer, than any other people in Europe. They were oppressed, and rose up against oppression. Many of the wealthy and generous of the English nation desired to give them pecuniary aid, as believing pecuniary aid to be a remedy for all evils. They meant well, but they did not act wisely; for they did not consider that the operation of money is radically corruptive, that it acts partially on society and, by acting partially, dissevers the social or national union which rests on a basis of equality and common good; consequently that it can not do otherwise than act sinistrously on the affairs of Greece. Where foreign gold glances on the eye, the lustre of liberty is obscured, and the edge of the patriot sword is blunted. A poison is secretly conveyed in the money donation of the generous, the patriot spirit and independent mind being insulted by it, as by a tender of charity. It is different with foreigners, who have taken a place in the ranks, and identified themselves with the cause of the Greeks;—these are friends in reality entitled to wear the patriot laurel.

The Greek cause strongly engages the sympathies of mankind. It is a noble cause; but we must not conceal from ourselves that the issue of it is yet doubtful. The dangers

Besides suggestions, on the selection of military materials and the modes of animating the military ranks when mechanically formed, the

are considerable ; but they do not arise from want of money. They arise from want of union ; and, want of union, even discord, instead of being diminished, is likely to be increased by the operations of money, particularly by foreign donations. A leader of paramount force of genius, capable of attracting every eye and rivetting every exertion to one point, is the desideratum of Greece ; and, in so far as we can judge, it has not yet appeared as a native product, except in the late Marco Bozarris, who appeared to have been a fit leader in a cause of liberty. The noble Englishman, who recently attached himself to the Greek standard, possessed the quality which Greece wanted : his presence threw a brilliant ray of hope on an otherwise dark prospect. Lord Byron's original mind, electric genius and patriot spirit, as of the first excellence, promised much. He had an intimate knowledge of human nature, and of the motives of human action, however disguised. The exquisite tact of discernment and the ardour of spirit which he possessed enabled, or would have enabled him to animate the torpid to exertion, and his judgment, which was sound in all great things, could not, together with the force of his character, have failed to convince the Greek, that the nation, which seeks to be free, must achieve its freedom by its own arm and its own pecuniary means. Foreign aid is of no real dependence ; and foreign donations of money, instead of rousing, have a direct tendency to lull, benumb or vitiate the patriot spirit. Lord Byron was not bred a soldier, and soldiers will think that his value, as a presumptive military leader, is over-rated. If not bred a soldier, he was born a man of genius ; and a man of genius becomes a General, in a contest for liberty, on grounds superior to the drillings of the Prussian school, even if Frederick himself were drill-master. The hopes anticipated from the exertions of this sublime spirit and heroic man are now gone, and the independence of Greece is in danger.—It is not denied that foreign gold may expedite the expulsion of the Turk from the Greek territory ; but it may be added at the same time that foreign gold will introduce a master, not less inimical to true liberty than the Turk himself.

writer has added such remarks on training, discipline and economy as occurred to him in a course of long observation. His view of training and discipline will be deemed severe by those who have been nursed in the lap of luxury;—it will *not* bear hard on those who possess the powers of a healthy constitution. The primary rule in training and discipline consists in trying and measuring powers of exertion, in matching them, and in exercising them when matched, in such a manner that the exerted act of the whole be comparatively as the act of one. This is the point to be worked: and it is an attainable point, but it is not easy to be attained.

The economical rules of the present tract will be deemed equally harsh as the rules of training and discipline. They may be harsh, but they are not impracticable. Heat and cold, hunger, thirst and other privations, not inferior in degree to those which fall to the lot of soldiers in the service of the field, are not unknown to the writer; and, though his physical powers never stood high in a scale of comparison, he rarely yielded to the hardships under which stronger men complained or sunk. The sufferings of the common mass were sometimes great in the scenes where he has been; but when the causes were examined correctly, the sufferings were found for the most part to be owing to bad management, rather than to real physical necessity. If a commander be without knowledge, that is, without correct knowledge of the physical powers and moral dispositions of the troops which he leads into a field of difficulty, their

safety may be compromised to his ignorance, and he justly blamed for the evils which ensue. On the other hand, if the troops themselves have not foresight and discretion as a fruit of training and experience, they will suffer hardship through their own defects, in spite of the care and intelligence of the commander.

A sketch of the military character of the nations which are, or which have been most eminent in war, is thrust, by way of digression, into the pages of the present volume. The execution is defective; but should the younger class of military readers be induced, by the perusal of it, to study the grounds of military science, that is, to analyze the records of history and to seek for the principle which gives success to arms, the undertaking will not be altogether useless. It is important that the young officer know the character and power of the instrument with which he acts, as well as the nature and character of that against which he is destined to act. Some part of this, it is presumed, may be attained by a close study of military character as it stands in the records of national history; and, with a desire to contribute a mite towards the attainment of an object so important as that alluded to, the writer has brought the principal armies of ancient and modern times under view, considering the view as grounds on which the young military mind may reflect with advantage.

The subject of the present work has been under the author's consideration for upwards of twenty years. He has looked at it without prepossession, as desirous to ascertain the truth. He believes that

many of the hints which have occurred to him would tend, if properly understood, to diminish the miseries which are common in military life; and, in that belief he has put them together, and now presents them to the public,—gratified if they do good, at any rate satisfied with himself, as acquitted of a duty which he conceives to belong to the station in which he has acted.

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CORRECTION.

To be *added*, page 396, line 16, had not then, and perhaps.

A VIEW
OF THE
FORMATION, DISCIPLINE, AND ECONOMY
OF
ARMIES.

PART I.
ESTIMATE OF QUALITIES, AND SELECTION OF
MILITARY RECRUITS.

THE selection of persons, who are possessed of intellectual and physical capacity for the practice of war, and the systematic instruction of persons so selected in approved forms of discipline for the accomplishment of purposes, may be regarded as an object of high national concern. It conduces to the preservation of national independence from the aggressions of foreign force; and, on this ground, it demands the deepest attention of patriotic statesmen, and the closest study of scientific soldiers.

The properly united action of the several parts of military force, constituting an army, is the main hinge of success in the field of

Purpose of
tactic.

battle ; hence military tactic, which is the science of estimating power, and of arranging separate and independent parts into a whole, so as to concenter the force of many, and to render the force so concentered capable of being applied to a given point of attack with precise effect, cannot be otherwise regarded than an important science, not only with those who aim at conquest or the subjugation of others, but with those who desire simply to maintain a given station, and to assert independence in their own circle. Every human being, who inhabits the earth, has a sphere and station assigned to it by the Creator of the universe ; and every one has, moreover, an innate desire to move in that sphere, with a given quantity of force allotted to the maintaining of the movement. The condition is primary in man's constitutional organization ; and it is important as comprising a precise rule of individual ~~physical independence~~. But, besides the physical independence belonging to the individual, masses of men, when contingently brought together in the business of life, tend, by what may be called almost an instinctive propensity, to form associations and to combine powers, sometimes ~~offensively~~—for conquest or extension of the common sphere, sometimes defensively for the maintaining a common station against the real or supposed aggression of others. The act which results from this combination is artificial and political. Whether it be directed to assert independence against the encroachments of external force, or to extend its own sphere by applying combined force to the oppression of neighbours, it is the condition to which tactic and the military art are rendered subservient.

Principle of
tactic.

Whatever be the object of organizing a military force, whether defence or conquest, it is obvious, in order that it be of dependence when applied to purpose, that the base be laid on sure grounds, and that all the subsequent steps bear directly on the base. The principle commonly assumed by tacticians, as the base on which the

military instrument is formed, is a factitious one; that is, an appearance presumptive only of the reality. That which is here assumed is real, as implying in its conditions that nothing be admitted into it which has not been tried and proved by experiment to be sound and suitable. The ordinary tactician assumes the idea that human materials are capable of being accurately estimated by appearance; and, on this idea, he proceeds to arrange them in the military fabric according to their external resemblances. In so doing, it is no arrogance to say that he commits a fundamental error. A fabric, constructed by the external resemblance of parts, is pleasing to the eye by superficial uniformity; it is even impressive on common observers, in the presumption that strength and beauty combine by innate correspondence. There is fallacy in the assumption. Appearance is not reality: strength in the field and uniformity on the parade are not the same thing; nor are they to be judged by the same rule. The useful, consequently the desirable arrangement of military materials consists, it will be admitted by the unprejudiced, in the order and union which result from the movement of the instrument under all forms and degrees of exerted action. Every soldier of experience knows that the extent of exertion, and the endurance of toil cannot be measured and calculated by external appearance, viz: the height of the stature and the symmetry of the limbs; and hence, if that rule be assumed as the principle of arrangement and acted upon as an admitted truth, there is no cause for surprise, if the act be discordant when the powers are exerted; or that the machine actually separate and fall to pieces under rude trials. On the contrary, if the materials be arranged according to measure of actual force as ascertained by experiment, rather than according to the quantity and appearance of the animal mass as it strikes the eye of the observer, a firm and permanent mechanical connexion will be

assured under every possible form of exertion that can arise; in as much as a place is given in the fabric to every individual part according to the power which it is known to possess, and the endurance which it is qualified to sustain. The physical capacities are here supposed to have been tried, and to have been proved to be equal, or nearly equal to one another; hence if, with this equality of capacity, the sensibility to the principle of action be equally prominent in every individual part of the machine, there are grounds to believe that, as the power of every part is balanced justly, so the movement will be justly correct throughout,—united and irresistible in its effect according to the measure of its power.—An army so formed may be killed entire;—it cannot be routed.

Qualifications
of the tac-
tician.

It will not be disputed by any one that a preliminary knowledge of the structure of the animal body, and of the laws which regulate its economy is, under all views of the case, an indispensable requisite for those who select the materials of armies, assign to the parts their several stations in the fabric, and superintend the movement of the fabric which they form through all its tactical evolutions. Such knowledge is important, but it is only to be attained by scientific study; and, on this ground, it is presumed that every person, who assumes the office of tactician, will previously instruct himself in the science of anatomy, and make himself acquainted with the common laws of animal economy, so that he do not, when he proceeds to act, put things of opposite natures together through ignorance. It is from this source only that he can be qualified to know correctly how an animal body acts, and what it is capable of enduring before it fail in its action. The rudiment of the science is presented to the student in the school of anatomy. It is an important rudiment; but it is not all that the tactician requires. A knowledge of military history, particularly of the revolutionary history of nations, where

the mind appears in all its native vigour, is mainly necessary to enable him to act scientifically in his proceedings. As he is taught by the science of anatomy and physiology to calculate what man may do; so he learns from this form of history what he has actually done.

What is now mentioned may be considered as preliminary science. It is of value; but, notwithstanding its value, the tactician will still be defective without practical experience of war in all its forms and aspects. It is necessary to guard against the influence of opinions built upon hypothetical foundations; and for this reason, it is proper that those who train troops, or who prescribe rules for the training of troops should know, by experience, what are the effects which change of climate, vicissitude of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, rest and idleness, activity or exertion, produce on the body of man. The tactician must therefore have actually experienced a soldier's life in the various conditions of service, eaten of his bread, and slept under the covering of his blanket, to be competent to speak precisely on the subject of what is the best military regimen, or to what extent privations and toils may be endured without injuring health; that is, without destroying the capacity in the individual of preserving an effective place in the military fabric. These are important points to be known and ascertained; and it is presumed that, from the sources of knowledge and experience hereafter stated, those persons, who reflect upon the connexions of cause and effect, will know precisely to what extent a soldier may bear and suffer without being disabled; and, in what manner, and to what extent his powers and capacity for war may be improved by education and discipline so as to be rendered superior. The knowledge is comprehensive:—complex in appearance, it turns upon a simple hinge.

Experience in
war necessary.

The prompt application of superior force upon given points of an enemy's position decides the fate of battle. The power of conduct-

Author's task.

ing this part of the military duty belongs exclusively to the military officer. The province of the author extends no further than to furnish suggestions for a scientific preparation of the instrument; that is, to aid in forming a structure, from a mixed mass of materials, which may be firm in itself, and capable of maintaining a regular and consistent movement in all its evolutions in the face of opposing force. As the duty of the author is confined to the preparation of the instrument, an estimate of the properties of the materials becomes the first step in the undertaking. The quality of the materials may be viewed under six different heads, viz.

1. According to race.
2. Latitude of climate.
3. Soil and local situation.
4. Age and period of life.
5. Stage of society,—pursuits and occupations; and, lastly,
6. Estimate of powers and capacities, as existing in the actual constitution of the individual.

SECTION I.

PECULIARTIES ACCORDING TO RACE.

Race. PHILOSOPHERS have speculated, and continue to speculate respecting the modes, through which contingent causes operate, or have operated in producing the distinctions of race which now obtain among mankind; but they have not attained to a satisfactory conclusion. There is an imitative power in Nature, which acts, and appears to propagate as specific, forms which were produced originally by force, error, or deviation. But though this be admitted as an apparent fact,

it is not known, nor can any idea be formed of the nature or force of the contingency, which first transmuted a white man to a negro, or a negro to a white man,—on the supposition that all men derive from a common parent. Man is various in appearance; but, however various he may be, he is the same animal wherever he is found, propagated in the same manner, attaining maturity through a similar process, possessing nearly equal physical power, and nearly an equal term of physical duration, moved to act by similar desires, and restrained from acting by similar impediments. Such is the general base of man's common nature; but, with this common base, there are distinctions of race which, though they may have been at first produced contingently and artificially, have at last so grown into habit, and have become so ingrafted in animal organism that they are ultimately considered as peculiar and primitive. The speculative discussion of the subject is left to professed physiologists. It belongs to the author's province simply to state the fact; viz. that certain classes of men possess certain distinctions of character physically and morally, and that the combination and proper adjustment of the classes, in an army or military instrument according to their properties, deserve the attention of the tactician and military commander in an especial manner. Races differ, and new forms result from the combination, or union of those that are opposite. The change consists generally in a mean between extremes. But besides the neutral effect here noticed, an extension of size or stature, elegance of figure, symmetry of limbs, ease and grace in movement are more striking in the mixed class than in the original. The mixture produces a species of culture or physical improvement; which is capable, if well directed, of being carried to great extent and of attaining great perfection. On the contrary, in those who religiously preserve their blood free from foreign mixture, the external appearance is less varied, less brilliant, and less attractive; and, in

spite of the controuling influence of political causes, the features of the mind have always a strong resemblance. It is thus that a Jew maintains the Jewish character, whether in Asia or Europe,—presumptively from his blood, as well as from the moral institutions of his nation.

Those classes of the human race which preserve their blood free from mixture with strangers, while they have less variety in external appearance and perhaps less variety in the scope of mental capacity than those who cross and recross at pleasure, have more endurance in action, firmer attachments to purposes and less desultory impetuosity. This is a physical truth. The explanation of it is difficult; but it may be illustrated and comprehended in some degree by those who study the animal fabric, and who are acquainted with the laws of animal economy. In brute animals,—horses, sheep and cattle, the mixture of different races is observed to change the qualities, to improve the beauty, and to enlarge the size: it diminishes the hardness and the security of the physical health. In man, the mixture of different races improves beauty, augments the volume of the bodily organs and even perhaps expands the sphere of intellect. It diminishes the power of enduring toil; and it renders the habit more susceptible of the action of the causes of disease. As stability of health and endurance of toil are more particularly connected with the races of men which are least mixed; a ticklish balance of system, rapid and desultory action more peculiar to the product of opposite natures, so from the one may be selected soldiers capable of enduring hardships and fatigues, of resisting the action of the causes of disease, and of persevering firmly in purposes: from the other soldiers, of quicker perceptions, more animated but less steady action,—such, for instance, as results from impulse rather than sentiment.

Effect of tactic.

The proper arrangement of those military materials, which are opposite in their qualities to each other, is an important part of the tac-

tician's duty, but it is not an easy one. Without previous study and intimate knowledge of the character of separate parts, the fabric, formed from these parts cannot be properly put together; consequently the action cannot be expected to be consistent, uniform and effective throughout the varied scenes of war. This must be admitted; but on the other hand it is warrantable to infer that, with primary knowledge and with attention to the application of the knowledge alluded to, the act of the instrument may be rendered consistent throughout; at least to such an extent that the military officer may be enabled to bring every part to bear with its full power in the day of battle, notwithstanding the varied aspects of the scene on which the collision may take place.

SECTION II.

CLIMATE.

THE latitude of climate, in which man is born and in which he constantly lives, operates demonstrably upon the physical structure and efficiency of the corporeal frame; and, notwithstanding the controuling influence of institution, modifies in a greater or less degree the intellectual expression of the mind. Differences, as influenced by this cause, are observable among the nations which inhabit Europe, Asia, and Africa; even the aboriginal inhabitants of the western continent, though of one race radically, have, in a similar manner, shades of difference in bodily power and mental evolution according to differences in the climate which they inhabit.

The matter of heat is a general and active agent on animal life. The conditions of temperature, as marking heat and cold may be justly considered as causes through which the developement of physical powers

and mental capacities are materially accelerated or retarded. The growth, or expansion of animal bodies that are similarly constituted, is artificially accelerated by heat, and artificially repressed or retarded by cold. It is thus that the inhabitants of warm climates arrive earlier at maturity than those of temperate or cold regions. They arrive soon at maturity; but they do not perhaps attain the highest perfection of which man's nature is capable. In climates, where the temperature is uniformly hot, the atmosphere almost uniformly serene, the expressions of bodily power and mental character may be supposed to be uniform, in as much as they are moved into action by the application of a comparatively uniform cause. But, as man's physical structure possesses only a given quantity of life or irritability through which it grows and expands; and, as heat is the mover in all physical operations, the growth attains maturity at a comparative early period in hot climates in consequence of the regular application of stimulative power; but it does not exceed a given limit. On the contrary, in the frozen regions where the sun has little force, the fund of irritability not being duly excited by the application of heat, the power of expansion remains in some degree dormant: hence the inhabitant of the cold climate does not, in defect of stimulation, attain the highest point of perfection of which the constitution of his frame is capable. In the middle regions, vicissitude of heat and cold and strife of elements stimulate, repress and expand in alternate successions; and, in consequence of this exercise or alternate movement, the physical and moral powers develope with great effect. The assertion here made is an ascertained fact; the explanation of it corresponds, in a certain extent, with the operation of a regular physical law; for, as power expands and endeavours to extend its limit in action, so something is acquired in the intervals of rest which constitutes a consolidation of the artificially expanded act. Hence we

conclude that, as vicissitude in heat and cold, which gives comparatively great play to action and reaction, is necessary to carry growth to the proper point of perfection, so it is only in climates liable to such vicissitude that the highest physical perfection of the animal body is ordinarily found.—Man differs in appearance, attains maturity earlier or later, acquires perfection in a higher or lower degree in some climates than in others; but he is fundamentally the same animal in all, and possesses, through all, the same foundation of constitution on which are built his virtues or his vices. Climate operates, as now observed, in bringing forth, or in repressing his perfections, and in rendering his powers more or less effective in action; but it is to institution that moral action, viz. courage and resolution, is principally to be ascribed; and on this ground, it may be presumed that the inhabitant of the temperate region has the best chance of attaining eminence in war: it is so in general, but not universally. The favoured region may, and frequently does produce the sluggard and the coward; the least propitious produces occasionally heroes of the highest cast.

Nations, in whatever climate they may be planted, have vicissitudes of fortune; for the outline of the rule, which obtains in the organic growth of the individual, maintains itself in the combinations of the aggregate or political body. No nation,—no European nation at least has preserved, for any great length of time, a brilliant and active exertion of its powers to the full extent of the capacity. The exalted become vapid after expansion; the hour of splendour passes away, and the animating spirit moves on to illuminate another class, or another nation. Nothing is stationary in the physical world; and nothing is permanent, or even of long duration among the human contrivances which are laid on a base of animal desire, viz. ambition, avarice or sensual gratification. The body of man changes daily, and the social fabric, constructed with this changeable material, follows a similar rule.

Periodic
changes.

SECTION III.

LOCALITY.

BESIDES the differences which attach to mankind from distinction of race, and excess or defect of heat as connected with latitude of climate, there are shades of difference and resemblance among the same class of people according to the nature of the localities which they inhabit, that is, according to qualities of air, soil and situation of place under the same, or nearly the same parallels of latitude. The effect of air, as damp and heavy, dry and light, of soil, as fertile or unproductive, of locality, as flat, or hilly and mountainous, is manifest in the vegetable production, observable in the brute animal, and even perceivable in man.

Champaign
countries.

In champaign countries—of a rich soil and moist atmosphere, the animal production, whether man or beast, attains a comparatively wide range of expansion. The human race is usually tall and straight in figure; the muscles are large and full; frequently flaccid or inelastic. The animal power is of a high measure; but it is clumsy as connected with weight. Action is not energetic; and the operations of the mind, though correct and regular, are generally slow. On this ground, though power and perseverance may be looked for in troops born and bred in low and fertile countries, activity and enterprize do not belong to their nature.

Hilly.

The inhabitant of the hilly, dry and barren country rarely attains to the same height of stature as the inhabitant of the moist and fertile plain; and, while thus inferior in volume, he is also usually inferior in the quantity of actual force. But, though inferior in brute force, he for the most part possesses a firmer muscle, more energy and more

rapidity in bodily action, more vivacity of temper, and more quickness in the operations of mind.

In hilly, or rather in mountainous districts, the structure of man's frame is firm, compact and hardy; the mind is bold and steady; the ideas elevated and frequently sublime. From such properties, conferred by locality, mountaineers have a claim to be first selected for soldiers. They are ordinarily, as already said, inferior in size, and often inferior in positive force to the inhabitants of the plain. But simple force rarely decides the fate of battle; and, as the active mountaineer possesses the power of rapid movement, he is capable of promptly applying his force to the just point of attack, and has thus almost always advantages in the actual practice of war.

Comparative effects.

It is obvious to common observation, that a difference obtains among the inhabitants of mountains and plains under the same parallels of latitude; and, though it is readily admitted that impressions, connected with the modes of life usually pursued in different situations, have a share in producing differences of effect; yet it is most probable that the great and fundamental impulse, which determines the distinctive character, arises from the operation of those physical causes which act upon all, and are common to the mass of the people. The grandeur, majesty and precision, with which objects present themselves in mountainous countries, make deep impression on susceptible organism, and necessarily command attention. Cataracts, precipices, and the fury of the elements in storms of wind and rain and thunder, as they strike the imagination forcibly and awfully at the time, so they leave an impression of sublime sentiment in the mind, which grows and expands with reflection in the calm which succeeds. In tumultuous scenes, a channel is opened for the course of grand ideas; and, while the ideas are thus expanded and exalted, experience is gained of things which are common, and often formidable in war.

Causes which produce character.

The judgment is tried ; and the mind acquires confidence, because it gains knowledge. If the impression of grand objects be often repeated, lofty ideas consequent to the impression are ingrafted in the constitution physically ; and the operations of the mind, in some measure, assume a cast of the noble and dignified as the necessary impress of the original. The mind expands as the eye overlooks the extended valley ; and, while expanded, it acquires an animating sensation from its relative position, engendering sentiments of pride, freedom and independence :—an ordinary man thus becomes a hero. But, while the mind is expanded through the effect of the elevated position, its view is at the same time confined by the distinct boundary of the circle. It turns inwards upon itself, and learns to know itself ; and, as its views are compressed by narrow and distinct boundaries, objects within the boundary create a special interest in all, and thus closely unite society. The frequent repetition of grand impressions upon susceptible organs implants a physical grandeur of conception in the constitution of the frame ; while, as now said, the circumscribed boundary gives that warmth of affection to the inhabitant, and that attachment to the locality, styled love of country, which constitutes a character of virtue and heroism. But, while the objects which nature presents in mountainous countries are thus calculated to engender a strong and elevated mind ; so the more usual occupations of life are there calculated to form an active and hardy body. In climbing mountains and in descending precipices, the limbs and lungs experience an exercise which contributes to the increase of their powers ; the eye learns to judge of distance ; custom teaches the manner of managing and husbanding strength, and of measuring with precision the necessary exertion for the accomplishment of a given purpose. Mountaineers, thus bred and educated, possess constitutionally a large share of those qualities which are

essential to soldiers; and history bears testimony, in most instances, to the intrepidity, the activity, and the promptness of decision of this class of men in circumstances of difficulty and danger:—they are moreover the chief patriots among men.

SECTION IV.

AGE OR PERIOD OF LIFE.

BESIDES the differences which attach to the physical power and moral character of man from race, latitude of climate and local situation, period of life influences materially the efficiency or non-efficiency of the official act of the individual; and, as such, the age of the subject is a matter of some importance to be attended to when the materials of armies are selected and arranged in their places for military service. In youth, action is rapid, impetuous and desultory, —not steady and persevering:—desires are fierce—but changeable. Youth is thus the period of enterprize; for at that time the desire of glory captivates, and transports beyond the bounds of calculating reason. The young man is ready, even eager to attempt; but, as his acts are chiefly acts of impulse, and, as such not sure, it belongs to the judicious military commander to place the object which gives the impulse in a prominent view, and so to dispose it that it may remain prominent in all the differing conditions which the service presents. If it be veiled or obscured by accident, the mind, as not yet confident in itself, wavers and fluctuates; hence retrograde—and rout from retrograde is to be reckoned among the contingencies incident to young soldiers.

Youth.

Mature age. In mature age, action is vigorous, steady and persevering. Things are known by experience; purposes are determined with a resolute mind; and a sentiment of honour, as connected with the desire of glory, dictates the preservation of character. Hence, it is from persons who have attained mature age that the part of an army, which is destined to decide the battle by constancy of courage and the grasp of power, is to be selected. In such, the power of execution is matured; ardour of enterprise is not impaired by age; and habit in combat may be supposed to have blunted sensibility to common dangers. Ardour of enterprise abates in the advanced period of life, even power and vigour decline; but, as old age is tenacious of what it possesses, old soldiers maintain with obstinacy the honours of their past life; hence the veteran defends his position with firmness. His courage is excited by dangers; difficulties are even necessary to bring it out;—we may therefore say that his proper station is in a post of trust and responsibility.

SECTION V.

STAGE OF SOCIETY---PURSUITS AND OCCUPATIONS OF LIFE.

BESIDES the differences of power and character observable among mankind according to race, climate, local situation and period of life, the stage of social progress, and mode of daily occupation influence the qualities of the subject in a greater or less degree; consequently they affect in a corresponding manner the condition of fitness or unfitness for war.

Semibarbarious period of society. It is in the early and semibarbarious periods of society that military qualities shine forth with lustre. The mind is then ambitious and ardent in its pursuits, and bound firmly to its purposes by the ideal

phantom of glory of conquest. Glory of conquest assumes a vigorous growth in this stage of society, inasmuch as it is not marred, or distracted in its course by the variety of impressions which play on man in civilized life. The body is healthy and active, in as much as it is not pampered and enfeebled by the luxuries of the table. The mind is firm and resolute, as not rendered capricious and morbid by indulgencies; consequently the semibarbarian is the person among the sons of man, who is best capable of sustaining privations, and of enduring the fatigues of war without injury to his health.

Among civilized and polished people, where avarice of money and a desire of sensual gratification usurp the place of ambition and the desire of military glory, the predominant passion of the barbarian, the mental pursuit diverges into a multitude of channels. The physical power, rendered unduly irritable from excess of previous ease and indulgence, loses that constitutional firmness which is the basis of courage and perseverance. Hence the strength sinks under hardships incident to war; and the mind morbidly sensible at the approach of danger, as engrossed by security, ease and pleasure, revolts from scenes, where accidents, toils and privations are daily occurrences. It is thus that luxurious nations and luxurious individuals are constitutionally cowards from abhorrence of hardships and self denials. If they manifest bravery; they are usually stimulated thereto by incitements of sensual and selfish gratification,—vanity, the bribe of money, or the hopes of promotion.

Refined or civilized stage.

The human body, which is so formed as to be acted upon by external causes, and so constituted as to assume, from the action of these causes, a certain routine of movement established into habit by repetition, and capable of long supporting itself in its established routine with comparatively little fatigue and pain, in consequence of the habit so engrafted, acquires different degrees of preparatory education from

Contingent education.

Hunting. pursuits and occupations of life, which fit it generally for the purposes of war, or directly for a respective place among the component parts of an army.—Hunting, of all the pursuits or occupations of man, is most directly preparatory of war; but hunting is only a general occupation among savage or very barbarous people. Among the polished nations of Europe, it is an amusement reserved almost exclusively for the pleasures of the great. It is thus neither a general nor a common pursuit of the people; but, where it is pursued as a principal business of life, it is calculated to bring forth, and eminently to improve the military qualities of the individual:—it may be regarded in fact as a primary school of war. It confirms courage, and it sharpens address. If the object of the chase be the destruction of the ferocious and bold animals, the hunter insensibly acquires courage, intrepidity, and above all promptitude in danger. If the prey be timid and shy, he acquires address and management. His perceptions are sharpened; his thinking faculties exercised in contriving the means of entrapping it, and of thereby accomplishing his purpose. In both cases, he acquires readiness in seizing the fit opportunities for acting; and, while familiarized with the toils and the fatigues that are incident to war, he insensibly gains knowledge of ground, and learns to judge of distance,—a knowledge useful to the soldier and highly necessary to the officer.—From this class of persons, by obvious inference, sharp shooters and other irregular troops are to be selected.

Herdsmen. Herdsmen, whether employed in guarding sheep, horses or cattle, stand, as prepared by habits of life, in the next degree of fitness for war to hunters. Herdsmen are familiar with much of what occurs in the service of a campaign; viz. vicissitudes of heat and cold and changes of weather. They are generally accustomed to that frugal and homely mode of living which is essential to military excellence.

They are hardy and inured to bear bodily toil; and, they are moreover furnished with opportunities of learning, from the observation of causes which act upon their flocks, the impressions of fear or confidence which belong to position: hence the shepherd, who becomes a soldier, knows to estimate, with greater correctness than others, the advantages and disadvantages of ground. The fact is true, however humbling to human pride to acknowledge it, that causes of fear or confidence act upon flocks of sheep and armies of men by a similar rule. On this ground, the pastoral life may be regarded as a school, in which the man who is destined for a common soldier acquires some valuable properties, and in which a man destined to lead an army has an opportunity of gaining useful information respecting animal nature — by analyzing the facts of history which fall under his observation.

The mere husbandman, field labourer or rural mechanic learns little from his occupation which particularly fits him for military service. But, as causes of action are ordinarily little varied in rural life; and, as labourers are almost always in action, the daily routine, repeated through a series of years, makes a strong and characteristic impression on his frame, giving mechanical firmness to the body, and leaving a simple and paramount sentiment on the mind which constitutes courage. The husbandman is healthy, as he lives in open air and subsists on simple food: his arm is powerful, as practised in that species of field labour, which calls forth the exertion of power, and confirms it by routines of exercise. Possessed of these qualities; his station is an important one in the fabric of an army. It is that of grenadiers or reserve; the force which decides the fate of battle when the affair quivers, as it were, on a doubtful balance.

Husbandmen.

It is not easy to point out the essential primary difference of fitness or unfitness for military service among the numerous classes of artisans who abound in civilized nations, and who ordinarily fill the

Artisans.

ranks of armies in times of actual war. Some are more useful than others from what they have learned to do in their civil occupations. They are all nearly on a level in point of preparation for a military life at the time of their enlistment. Artisans have ordinarily a ready use of their hands acquired in the practice of civil arts; and, from this perhaps it is that they learn the manual exercises with more facility than others. They are accustomed to mechanical movements in their daily occupations, and, being apt scholars in exterior forms, they assume the military air speedily. But, while artisans readily acquire those mechanical or parade manœuvres, which are reckoned essential parts of the soldier's education, they are inferior to the others in the service of the field; viz. to the hunter and the shepherd in intelligence of things similar to those of war; to the husbandman in bodily strength, in endurance of toil, self denial, constancy and firmness of courage. They have notwithstanding an useful place in the composition of an army; and, as prepared by primary education, they may be best employed to fill up the battalion, or that part of the military instrument which acts principally with fire arms.

SECTION VI.

SELECTION OF THE ARMY RECRUIT, VIZ. THE RULE OF ADJUSTING HIS PLACE IN THE BATTALION, ACCORDING TO AN ESTIMATE OF HIS BODILY POWERS AND MENTAL CAPACITIES.

General rule
of selection.

SUCCESS in war, in so far as regards the mechanical soldier, depends upon possession of force and the power of prompt application; consequently force and activity must be always kept in view in the selection of persons who are destined for military service. But,

as quantity of force and the power of prompt application are not always proportionally joined in the same subject; it is a matter of importance to enquire into the properties of the materials individually, so as to be able to estimate the power of each separately and correctly, previously to fixing its place in the integral corps, or regiment.

There are tacticians who, in estimating and selecting the materials of an army, direct their attention to the qualities of the mind as well as to the figure and form of the body. There are others, and by much the greater number, who, regarding the mere quantity of the animal mass, form their judgment of power and activity by superficial signs of external configuration only. A knowledge of the previous life, under which habits are acquired, or mechanical routines of acting established, obtains consideration with one: knowledge of the previous life does not appear to engage the attention of the other, for it is not supposed to lead to any thing useful.—Such is the fact:—it is left to the reader to judge which of the two builds on the best foundation.

Man is an animal of imitation in all his steps and gradations; and animal action assumes, through frequent repetition, a constitutional habit which becomes in some degree a second nature. This happens almost invariably in the history of human life; and, if the fact rest on a general foundation, it is reasonable to suppose that the best military subjects are those, whose occupations in civil life have the nearest alliance with the business of war; and, for a similar reason that, as an army is a compound body, consisting of parts which are applied in different manners for the effecting a common purpose, the selection and arrangement of the materials in the fabric will be best directed by an estimate and knowledge of the individual parts in their previous habits, confirmed by trial in illustrative experiment. It is admitted that, though an army be only one body in the whole, it

Reasons of formation and arrangement.

is still necessary that it consist of parts of different character in detail, so that it be prepared to meet the enemy with advantage under the various presentations which a military action assumes.

The adjustment of this subject is entirely military. The author is unwilling to overstep his bounds by encroaching on it; but, as he has undertaken to examine and to estimate the radical qualities of the materials of armies, he thinks he may be allowed, without undue presumption, to state the purposes for which an army is to be prepared, and the general line of conduct which it may be expected to pursue in its endeavours to accomplish its object. It is the purpose of a military action to gain a superiority over the enemy. The points on which the success turns are various:—the following seem to be the principal. 1. A precise knowledge of what is to be done, and of the mode of doing it in the most effectual manner. This belongs to the General-in-Chief; and though the General be allowed to receive informations and to adjust preparatory measures through various means and instruments, the ultimate conclusion and plan of execution must be his own in all cases. 2. When the plan of battle is formed, the first step of progress in the action consists in the rapid occupation of such points on, or near the scene of action as command objects which are important to success, either as connected with annoyance of the enemy, or security of the selected position. 3. When the points alluded to are occupied, the direction of the mechanical power, as united by force and supported by courage for the accomplishment of the end, is the next and main object in the conflict; and, lastly, if the attack fail and the design be frustrated, the condensation and compression of what is left into the best form of security for effecting a retreat, in a deliberate and correct manner, finishes the military operation. The necessity of retreat arises from miscalculation;—to effect it with credit is the most difficult part of a soldier's duty.

The first class of military force is allotted, under proper officers, to the purposes of ascertaining the positions of the enemy, of judging of his countenance previously to action, and of meeting his various irregular presentations when he begins to advance. As such it must be active in movement, ready in forming judgement respecting ground, and skilled in the best manner of concealing its operations; for, as it must approach undiscovered, it is desirable that it retire unhurt. The practice of fowling and hunting gives a preliminary education for this part of the soldier's duty; in as much as address, similar to that which is acquired in hunting and shooting, forms the most conspicuous quality of force of this description. The force, so described, is not supposed to fight a battle; but it is of great value in covering the front and flanks of an army against surprize, or in clearing away annoyances which harrass the line or column as it advances to the scene of the main combat.

Sharp shooters.

The first step in a military action, viz. the act of seizing positions which, to a certain extent, assure the command of ground, and which have thus in some degree the power of multiplying force, is allotted to that species of troops denominated light. Light troops are supposed to be swift of foot, so as to be capable of moving with celerity over difficult ground, to be powerful in strength, so as to seize difficult posts against opposition, and bold in courage, so as to maintain the posts which they seize. Herdsmen are the persons best prepared by previous habit for this species of warfare. They are ordinarily swift, and they move with safety on rugged and uneven ground: they further endure the exertion of running without commotion, or with less commotion than others, as being more inured to it. They are armed with the firelock and bayonet, and drilled like other soldiers; but their proper drilling, it may be remarked, consists in firing at a mark in different positions and at different distances:—their manœuvres and their

Light troops.

exercises are chiefly to be directed to traverse irregular grounds in different orders of tactic, and at different rates of celerity.

Battalion. When the mode of battle is ascertained, the commanding positions being seized and occupied by light troops, the mass of the army, advancing in line or column to the grand attack, commences the close conflict by the application of mechanical power from musketry. The force is missile. The rapidity with which it is thrown, and the precision with which it is directed may be supposed to command the balance of effect; and, in so far as respects precision, the execution may perhaps be best committed to that part of the army which is drawn from artisans, as persons comparatively expert in manual operation.

Grenadier or reserve. When fire arms fail in making such impression as induces the enemy to retire; another part of the machine is ordered to advance to the combat, in the expectation of bearing down resistance by the superiority of physical force. The character of this part of the instrument, as armed with the bayonet, is power,—above all courage and perseverance. It is supposed to move under one impulse, and to live under one sentiment. Victory or death being its motto, it admits no retrograde step into its catechism.—The class of field labourers and countrymen furnish this grenadier force in greatest perfection; for, among such, the arm is usually powerful to impel, and the mind firm to maintain.

Troops for covering retreat. In arranging the different parts of which an army consists, no provision is supposed to be made expressly for the purpose of covering a retreat. The forward movement only is in the eye of the soldier; yet the retrograde is sometimes necessary; and, when necessary, it is well to know the description of troops to whom a duty, so difficult to be properly executed, can be best committed. It is not to be expected that young men and new soldiers, who are taught to look forward in war, and to keep

victory always in the eye, can be trusted to protect the dispositions that are necessary in retiring from the field. The object which engages the attention and occupies the thoughts of the soldier is forward. It changes form; and it is obscured or lost when retreat commences. The mind is then in some manner blank; so much so indeed that, if the idea of glory attached to a forward movement, and which gives activity to that movement, be lost in the unexpected retrograde, confusion arises and route ensues. It is owing to discipline and knowledge of the real nature of things, that a retreat is conducted without confusion in the face of an enemy; and, it is to experienced troops only that such duty can be safely assigned. But besides the confidence which insensibly insinuates itself into the mind of the soldier from experience of war, there is something connected with an advanced period of life which diminishes the disposition to panic and surprize, so natural to the human race at unexpected occurrences. Old men have less ardour and less constitutional irritability than young ones. They have more firmness and more patient courage: they have also a more correct experience of things, and they probably know from their experience that an enemy is most formidable to those who run away. Veterans are, on these accounts, the best qualified to support an army under the disasters incident to retreat; and, for this reason, the grenadiers, or reserve of an army ought to consist of veterans; that is, of men of mature years and actual experience in the field.—The grenadier, according to the writer's idea of a grenadier, cannot retreat from an action where he is principal: he may cover the retreat of others consistently with the character which he assumes.

An army, composed of different parts according to the suggestions here proposed, is furnished with the means of seizing advantageous positions, of estimating the designs of the enemy, of attacking him

Correspondence
of powers
the basis of
arrangement.

with adequate means of offence, or of resisting his attacks with courage and resolution. The whole power of the machine combines in action for one purpose; but, as the different parts of which it consists have different functions, it is obviously a matter of consequence to select the materials of the different parts from classes of society, which, have more or less constitutional difference in their qualities; and, when so selected, to arrange them in their places according to their relative degrees of fitness, so as to produce one uniform and consistent act in the shock of battle. It is from the effect of united action in the field, the result of union of physical power and mental energy, not from the uniform coup d'œil of a parade that the military name of a nation finds an honourable place in the page of history: and hence, as it is common sense, so it ought to be common practice that correspondence of action, rather than uniformity of appearance, be adopted as the rule by which military organization is directed.

The qualities, which are supposed to be ingrafted on animal action by habits of education and manner of life, are evidently of importance in themselves, and, may reasonably be expected to influence the opinion of the tactician, in the mode of classing the materials of individual parts of the military instrument for various purposes in actual war. Besides the qualities acquired by habit and manner of life, the properties of the individual, as they depend upon physical organization, deserve attention; and they generally obtain it, though not always on true grounds. Great strength ordinarily belongs to great bulk of body; and, where man is opposed directly to man, it is reasonable to conclude that the greater power will prevail over the lesser. But in the present time, when the fate of battle is often decided by fire-arms, to which the hand of a man of six feet gives not more power than the hand of one of five, it is not easy to see the reason of the rule which so generally influences the choice of those who

Size, advantage
and
disadvantage.

select subjects for the formation of armies. It is admitted that a column of troops, of unusual stature and great weight of body, gives an idea of comparatively great power and great execution; and it is even true that, in consequence of such idea, the young soldier is often struck with fear and leaves the field without fair trial. Such occurrence does take place; but it is only an uncertain contingency, and cannot, in fair reason, be calculated upon as a foundation for success in war. This is obvious to ordinary apprehension; but, granting that some contingent good may be expected from the impressive appearance of the bulky mass, it cannot be denied that the disadvantages naturally connected with it are real and positive,—more, it is presumed, than sufficient to counterbalance the effect of chance panic upon the imagination of the timid. It is evident, to the common sense of every one, that a body of men of unusual size presents an object of proportionally great volume; and, as it is generally known that such body moves with little comparative celerity, it necessarily suffers a comparatively great destruction, from missile force, before it reach the point of attack. But, besides the positive disadvantage of greater volume; and, from probable slow movement, comparatively long exposure to destruction from fire-arms; before the superiority of bodily power, if any such exist, can be brought to bear, it is well known to those who have seen and estimated the effect of severe campaigns that men of large size are ordinarily the first to fail under fatigues; and medical men know from observation that they commonly suffer from diseases in greater proportion than others. These are facts which cannot be disputed; and, if they be admitted to be true, it will not be attempted to maintain that bulky men are the best subjects for ordinary military service.

There is a fixed standard of height for persons who are admitted into the British army; and, as it is fixed by regulation, the writer has

Choice by configuration.

nothing to observe upon it. Besides height, the beauty and symmetry of the figure influence opinion, and determine preferences in the choice of soldiers. The idea of beauty is relative. The eye is attracted by what fashion or taste considers as such ; but, if the beautiful be separated from the useful, the judgment is biassed, and the decision is often in error. The graceful shape and form of perfect symmetry are seldom connected with power, activity, and that inexplicable fund of endurance which supports toils and fatigues with constancy and firmness. On the contrary, it is usually observed that cross made persons,—persons, whose joints are large and prominent, possess great powers of action and long endurance of toil. The observation is true, and the reason of its truth is obvious. The form of body alluded to furnishes an advantageous lever for the action of muscles ; and on this ground, bodies so constructed are patient of toil, in as much as their movements are effected with comparatively little effort. Hence, instead of grace and symmetry of form, a rosy colour and delicate texture of skin ; large joints, prominent bones, swelling muscles, rough and elastic integuments are true military properties. They are the real beauties of a soldier, as they are the surest marks of the capacity of enduring the fatigues of war ;—and, on this ground, it may be supposed that the tactician, who comprehends the principles of his art, will not fail to bear in mind that the aspect which is penetrating, bold and determined, the movements which are powerful and energetic, rather than languishing, soft and graceful, are the properties which stamp the value of the military recruit :—they constitute the beauty, as they mark the utility.

But, whatever be determined to be the standard height of the recruit, it is necessary that the condition of general health and the efficiency of the power of the limbs be correctly ascertained by examination and competent trial, so that no other than sound materials be

placed before those who are appointed to organize a military fabric for a military purpose. In order to attain this important object, it is customary to direct army recruits to be accurately inspected by army surgeons. The duty, imposed upon the surgeon in this case, is not to select what is in every way good, but to reject what is absolutely unfit. Among the points to which his attention is directed in the execution of this duty, the following are the principal. Whether the recruit be well placed, or capable of being well placed upon his haunches by art or military drilling; whether he possess the natural and full power of all his limbs, with the free and perfect motion of all his joints; whether any weaknesses remain from sprains of the joints, particularly of the knees and ancles; whether there exist any impediment to free action from hurts, fracture of bones, or other causes; whether he possess the full power of expanding the chest in all postures and attitudes; whether the eye be free from disease in its substance and in its appendages, the vision clear, and strong, and perfect at night; whether the sense of hearing be acute and distinct; the speech free and unembarrassed; the parts about the throat without disease, disposition to disease, or marks of the ravages of former disease; and whether the belly be compressed, the reins firm and elastic. Ruptured persons are proscribed by regulation from the lists of the British army; but, in young recruits, no disposition to this disease, no defect or impediment about the secret parts, of such nature as may in any degree interfere with the exertions of active service, ought to be passed over as indifferent. Ring-worm, scald head, and other loathsome deformities, which are contagious and which are not easily eradicated, should be banished from the army; for if it be desirable that an army be effective, it is not proper that any one be admitted into the ranks in whose constitution there exists an open or latent blemish. Military service often implies the neces-

sity of a rapid march ; consequently the feet and legs of the soldier are essential parts of his person ; and for this reason, the state of their efficiency and the chances of their continuing efficient ought to be correctly ascertained at enlistment. Besides the form of the leg, the power of which is ordinarily judged by the firmness of the calf and the sinewy structure of the ancle, the skin ought to be sound,—firm and elastic, free from varicose veins and other signs of congestion. The condition of the toes of the feet are by no means unimportant. Much inconvenience arises where they crowd upon each other, or where they are of such form as favours the growth of corns. The nails of the great toe are sometimes prevented with difficulty from growing into the flesh :—this ought to be looked into in the surgical examination of the recruit, for it is often a great inconvenience to the soldier.

The above are visible impediments which impair action, and which on many occasions mar the performance of military service ; but, besides these visible blemishes and impediments, of the presence of which any officer of common observation may judge, and the effects of which officers of experience may calculate, there are others which cannot be ascertained without a considerable degree of professional discernment, or properly estimated without practical experience of war. Among these may be reckoned a disposition to scrofula—without the open marks of the disease ; a disposition to consumption of the lungs ; catarrhal defluxions apt to degenerate into consumption ; adhesion of the lungs to the sides, indicated by impeded respiration under exertion ; asthma ; prominence of the stomach ; loose and flaccid reins ; mysenteric obstructions ; hæmorrhoids ; disposition to dropsy ; obstruction in the urinary passages ; and lastly, epileptic fits.

Many of the causes which impede the performance of the animal

functions are visible to the eye, and may be estimated to the full extent *a priori*; others only discover themselves upon trial in great exertions. As it is only from uniformity of power under exertion that union of action can be assured; and, as this is the point which essentially contributes to success in war; a standard, for the measure of the powers of exertion among recruits, is not less necessary in sound reasoning for the construction of a military instrument, than a standard for the measure of the height of the stature. In order to ascertain this important point of knowledge; the writer conceives it to be proper that every person who enters into the army should be brought to trial in walking, in running, in leaping, in climbing hills and traversing irregular and broken grounds. It may be fairly admitted that a full grown person, who is not capable of marching at the rate of four miles in the hour with firelock and knapsack, is not eligible for a soldier who is destined for field service. If his wind fail in walking briskly up hill, or if his joints be weak, so that he do not move with speed and safety over broken grounds, it would be unwise to enrol him on the lists of an active army. The failure of individuals on a campaign, or in a battle, by destroying union of action on which success depends, often defeats the effects of plans which are fundamentally well laid; and thereby entails a misfortune on the army which ought not to have place, as it might be avoided by foresight:—the cause is trifling in appearance; it is important in its consequences.

Examination of
powers by trial.

Besides all that can be learned from a professional examination of the state of health, and from actual trial of the powers of bodily exertion, with a view to determine the value of those persons who allot themselves to military service; a knowledge of the animating spirit of the parts individually is essential to success in action. The knowledge is important; but it is not easily attained. The qualities of the

Qualities of
mind.

human mind are various. Enterprize and intelligence, intrepidity and perseverance are the most material in military service. It does not often happen that the same person possesses the whole in equal perfection. The two first, according to the writer's observation, are most frequently found in persons of low or middle stature; the two latter, in those who exceed the common standard. The observation now made has a foundation in nature; but no one can pretend to define the limits of it, or to explain the cause of it; and, though it be admitted that the character of mind is in some degree connected with bodily appearance, and influenced by organic forms of structure; yet the precise laws are inexplicable in the present imperfect state of physiological knowledge. We are therefore forced to say that the higher progress, which is to be made in arranging the materials of armies by knowledge of mind, must be sought for at the immediate source, viz. the actual observation of the individual material at the point of application; of course, the effect produced will depend on the capacity which the person, entrusted with the high office of constructing the military fabric, possesses in reading those characters of mind which are only obscurely written.

Institution.

The root, and even the shoots of military qualities result, as already observed, from peculiar properties in the different races of the human species, from the effect of climate, period of life, habits acquired by long practice in particular forms of action; and lastly, from configuration of structure. But, while these qualities attain a certain degree of physical efficiency according to the operation of contingent causes, they are capable of being carried still further, even to something like perfection, by the results of systematic institutions,—military or political. The qualities of the soldier are thus improved by culture: they are impaired by neglect, and they are overturned, or annulled by modes of life which engender conditions

which do not endure the difficulties and hardships of war. Nations have peculiar propensities formed into character by tacit, or open institution. The institution engenders habits by a continuance of mechanical routine, it even so confirms them that they may be calculated on with some certainty of result. The Spartans, the Romans and the Swiss stand on record as the people, whose institutions were most scientifically and systematically digested for military effect. The Spartan was a soldier from necessity: he became a hero through institution. The Spartan territory still produces the same forms of organism as it did in the time of Leonidas; but the military and the moral institutions are neglected or corrupted, and the Spartan character is no longer found on the Spartan soil. The Roman nation was warlike in the early periods of the republic. Extension of territory was its object; and all the energies of man were turned into a military channel to attain the extension. Military prowess assured conquest: conquest gave riches; riches brought arts and luxury, and luxury so undermined the warlike character that the Romans lost their sovereignty over mankind, and the expansion of their faculties, as moving on the base of insulated passions, served only to multiply and expand their sensual vices. The Swiss are naturally warlike. Every Swiss is a soldier by profession as well as by inclination. The military institution of the Swiss was calculated to preserve the independence of the Swiss territory. It abstained from encroaching on the territory of others; it was thus radically just. The Swiss at one time esteemed themselves, and they had a right to do so. They were proud as soldiers, independent as a nation, and they were courted for their alliance. They are now changed; for, though they still maintain a mechanical pre-eminence in the use of arms, they are no longer regarded as arbiters among the nations of Europe. They have lost opinion in themselves by the loss of independence,—and with that

they have lost national pride; and, in a great measure, primitive moral character. They are still natives of the Alps: they are no longer the invincible Swiss of the sixteenth century, who though they received a price for military service in the field, reserved truth and honour to themselves as a property unalienable.

PART II.

A SKETCH OF NATIONAL MILITARY CHARACTER.

THE general testimony of history seems to shew that brilliancy, and what is termed grandeur among the human race, moves periodically from one class of men and from one part of the globe to another in the manner of a tide. The simple and circumscribed mind of the savage is acted on by the impression of new objects. It feels, covets and appropriates,—and thus emerges into the state of barbarism. From barbarism it advances progressively to a given point of civilization or refinement; and, in this state of refinement it developes a factitious grandeur of incalculable extent. But, though brilliant in the eye, the grandeur is not stable or of long duration. It wanes—sometimes gradually, sometimes rapidly. The faculties contract; and, if they do not contract to their original narrow sphere, they dwindle to comparative inanity and insignificance;—and it may be said with truth that the interval between artificial refinement and childish frivolity is only a narrow one.

Periodic revolution among nations.

To trace national character in its rise and progress, to mark its movement during its elevation, and to note the causes of decline and the degree of depression to which it subsequently sinks, belongs directly to the province of the historian and philosopher. The proper

investigation of it implies a labour not consistent with the design of this work, and not within the reach of the author's means and capacity. But, though circumstances do not at present permit a scientific research into this interesting field of speculation, it may still be useful to notice cursorily the nature of the principle, through which one nation exalts, or has exalted itself above another in military pre-eminence, and how it maintains itself, when so exalted, in power and splendour for a time. There is uniformity in the proceeding throughout, such as indicates that the operation depends on the action of a physical law which obtains generally, from the most rude traces of savage life to the pinnacle of grandeur and refinement, and, from the pinnacle of grandeur and refinement, to the lowest point of degeneracy and debasement.

In the purely savage state, the activity of man is confined to the act of procuring what may be called the physical wants of his nature. Man, as a mere animal, is without the ambition of conquest, even without foresight to secure provision for future subsistence: he eats when he is hungry; and he sleeps when he is done with eating. The first operations of animal life are mechanical acts of impulse, and as such merely organic. The individuals of the human race endowed with capacities of perception, but without knowledge of things attained through reflection, wander at random in the unoccupied wilds. The sensibility of organism is impressed by new objects; and new desires arise mechanically on the constitution as the consequence of new impressions. The desire of extending the sphere of action, and of consolidating the product of the extension which is contingently made, may be considered generally as marking the first operation of the civilizing mind. The savage, constituted with a propensity to appropriate, traverses the globe and seizes whatever impresses his sense as an object of desire; for, as he has no conception

of what is termed property, he is not conscious that he commits injustice when he takes for himself that which is in the possession of another.

The history of the present race of men goes no further than to a history of migrations and violences. The case is simply and uniformly conquest and colonization,—from the early periods of the piratical invasions of Greece to the modern settlements of the Spaniards and Buccaneers on the continent and islands of America. The ignorant savage widely dispersed in the woods, or the enfeebled voluptuary and debased inhabitant of the luxurious city, is thrust out and enslaved by the energetic and warlike barbarian and robber; who, enriched by his conquest, rendered luxurious by riches, and deteriorated by the indulgences of animal appetites, submits sooner or later to a similar fate from others that are less unworthy than himself.

CHAPTER I.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE SPARTAN STATE.

SPARTA furnishes a striking example of the value of law and institution in raising a nation to moral and military eminence, and in maintaining it for a length of time in respect in all the conditions of the elevated station. The Spartans, previously to the time of Lycurgus, appear to have been worse than barbarous: they were corrupt and ill governed; the rich were few and insolent; the poor were numerous and oppressed. Lycurgus, who seems to have been born with great powers of mind, and with genuine goodness of heart, saw and felt the evil; and, pitying the forlorn condition of his countrymen, he planned

Revolution by
Lycurgus.

and digested a reform in the laws, such as constituted a singular and almost incredible revolution in the scheme of human government. He eradicated and destroyed the seeds of the prevailing anarchy, and ultimately succeeded in establishing a moral and military institution, which is without parallel in the history of the world for consistency and good effect. The military institution of Sparta is the sum of military excellence. It deserves, above all others, to be studied by statesmen and generals, in as much as it develops principles of the utmost importance for the government of men and the formation of armies.

The desire of extending the sphere, and of consolidating the extension which is made, is obviously the leading desire of man, whether barbarian or civilized. The action which ensues from such desire characterizes human activity, and raises man above the mere animal. It is brilliant in its dawn; but it is precarious in its course and issue. If it be not regulated by a principle of justice, or reciprocity of action and reaction among the constituent parts, it exceeds its bounds tumultuously, and, encroaching on the sphere of others, disturbs the constitutional balance of things with one another. It assumes what may be termed an artificial centre of action; and thus forms a partial accumulation of power, which, offending the law of justice, prepares materials for change or revolution at a future time. It is probable that Lycurgus saw this truth in all its extent and relations; and, as he knew that moral or political revolution is accompanied with misery and often with danger, he, with a knowledge of things that no legislator had ever before employed, and that no one has yet effectually imitated, arrested error in its course, and formed a government which gave freedom to his country, and held out a prospect of permanent happiness to its inhabitants.

Lycurgus constructed a new system of discipline for Sparta; and,

in so doing, he must be supposed to have acted on a model. History gives no information upon what model he acted; but it may be presumed that it was the fabric and economy of the animal body, which furnished him with the idea of harmony in structure, and was guide to him in the construction of his edifice. The animal body is organic and functionary throughout its whole extent. Every part has its sphere; and, while every part preserves its sphere and executes its function, neither advancing beyond, nor falling short of its proper limit, the action of the machine is regular and consistent, and health is perfect according to its rule.—Irregular action constitutes disease; and disease terminates directly in the death of the part, and ultimately in the death of the whole. Supposed model of Lycurgus's system. Lycurgus had seen the world in the course of his travels; and, as he was a man of observation, it is fair to suppose that, viewing the animal body as a system in which there is no useless or offending part, and, taking this system as the model of his imitation, he constructed his political machine in such manner that every part of it was functionary and effective, and no excrescence or refuse was any where permitted to exist within its circle. All the parts of the animal body are only parts of one system; consequently all are necessary to its existence and well being; and though some are apparently more important than others, yet they have only one common life, which animates them equally according to the condition of their organism. Physical health consists in an equal balance of action throughout the whole extent of the animal body; hence, if there be accumulation in one part of the body beyond another, the balance is destroyed and health is interrupted. In such a case of bodily disease, it is previously necessary that local errors be rectified, or equality of balance restored between the parts, before a remedy of general operation can be supposed to act with effect, so as to excite and maintain a form of action analagous with that of health. The

body of man is a part in the system of the universe,—and it is animated according to a general rule. The political system is a creation of man, artificial in its construction, and animated artificially. It moves and acts according to the rule prescribed; but, its movements will not be correct, or its operations effective unless the animating spirit be strong and commanding, and unless all and every part within the fabric be so adjusted as to receive the influence of the spirit, and to obey its impulse on equal terms according to constitutional conditions. Lycurgus, it is presumed, was aware of this fact, and fully sensible of its importance; but he had difficulty in bringing it to bear in practice. The organization of the human race according to a general principle, that is the preparation of a condition for the operation of a general remedy, or law of equality, may be regarded as a great labour at all times;—it was Herculean at Sparta. Sparta might be considered at the time of Lycurgus as an animal body in a diseased state. It was disfigured by congestions, excrescences, and weaknesses; that is, property was in few hands: the poor were numerous; and, as there were no laws, or no laws of power and effect, injustice and oppression prevailed every where. The case was complicated; and, in such a state of complication, the remedy could only be devised by a man who was wise, and applied by one who was bold. If it be allowed to revert to first principles, and to estimate man as a part of a whole, the remedy is obvious and easy. But obvious and easy as it is in fact, and just as it would be found to be when tried by reason, no person, except Lycurgus, ever succeeded in applying it with permanent benefit. The accumulation of property in the hands of individuals here existed to an injurious extent. Such accumulation is an evident evil,—in fact, a disease in the republic of human beings, as much as the swelled liver or carbuncled face is a disease in the animal system. Every form of congestion within the animal frame must be

actual disease; in some degree, a centre of new action, or new mode of life, which counteracts the mode that is original and constitutional. In a similar manner, the accumulation of property in the hands of few forms a centre of new action, foreign to, and disposed to counteract the primary constitutional act, and proper life of the state; which consists, as already said, in reciprocal action and reaction throughout the whole extent of the fabric. In a country oppressed with the multiplied incumbrances of private property, there exist governments within government. Property is the engine of power; and, where this operates, the ostensible government only maintains its preponderance through the quantity of property which it applies to purchase; that is, to the weight of power which it draws by taxation from the mass of the people, or to the possession which holds them in submission of their funds. They thus obey in fear and trembling the lord and master whom they have themselves made. The whole operations of a state so constituted turn on a balance of influences, direct or indirect. The appearance is brilliant; but it is uncertain, in as much as the structure is unsound, containing within itself the materials of change and decay, even of revolution and death.

Lycurgus seems to have been aware that a nation could not be rendered happy, free and secure from change otherways than by placing one object in the eye of every one; and, by placing it so advantageously that every one might be attracted by it with nearly the same force. The soil or country which gives man birth, which gives him the food of his infant years, which contains the ashes of the dead whom he venerates, and the persons of the living whom he ardently loves, appeared to Lycurgus the first earthly object of man's devotion. Impressed with this idea, he constituted country, or the inviolability of the Spartan territory to be the soul and moving principle of his commonwealth; and, having established this principle as

a basis, he put every engine in motion, which he was capable of commanding, to render the force of its action irresistible. Aggrandizement, that is, extension of the sphere and substantiation of property is the first desire of man: tyranny and desire of rule is the natural consequence of acquired power and riches. Lycurgus was a man of too much discernment not to discover, that the existence of individual property creates an individual self, and that self never fails to obscure the love of country, and the duty which man owes to man as a part of the same collective body. It may be presumed that he was acquainted with the fact, that no rich nation ever defended itself long, or resisted aggression with heroism; and, as he knew the fact, it may even be supposed that he had penetrated into the cause of it; when he reduced the Spartans to a common level in respect of property, and presented them, in lieu of it, with a common country destined to command all their attention and engross all their attachments.

Division of
Spartans into
tribes.

The Spartans were divided into tribes, and the land was divided into lots, each lot calculated to return a quantity of produce sufficient for the sustenance of a Spartan and his family. The land was unalienable; and the produce of it, which was returned by a helot or slave, might be considered as a military salary—equal to furnish subsistence, not sufficient to purchase superfluity. The Spartan citizen was entirely military, and so strictly bound to the honour of arms that he did not degrade himself with labour of any kind,—not even with agricultural labour. The division of lands, or rather the appropriation of given portions of land to return an equal ration of provisions to every privileged Spartan, laid the basis of a correct and rigid economy. This, with the institution of a common mess-table, effectually precluded luxury of living. As every member of the Spartan nation was furnished with a ration of provisions according to one scale; so every one without exception was obliged to eat in

common, unless after an excursion of hunting, or after the ceremonial of sacrifice to the gods.

The institution of a common mess-table acted as a powerful cement of the Spartan policy, both in a military and moral point of view. It served to obliterate self and selfish gratification; and it had the effect,—to a certain extent at least, of uniting the whole Spartan people as one man in defence of a common country. Every individual contributed monthly one *medimnus* of meal, eight *congi* of wine, five *minæ* of cheese, and two and a half of figs,—with a small piece of money for seasonings. From the nature and amount of this contribution, some idea may be formed of the Spartan manner of living. The quantity allowed is sufficient for sustenance but not more than sufficient.—Besides the regular contribution levied from every privileged member, there were casual presents from those who sacrificed to the gods, or who were successful in hunting; but, with all these contingencies, there was nothing that could give a Spartan the means of indulging in the pleasures of the table. The quantity of Spartan diet was defined by law. The order and decorum of a Spartan mess-room were judiciously laid and rigidly conducted; and, the moral and military instruction there exhibited was important. Cleomenes, who renewed the institutions of Lycurgus, and who was perhaps the greatest of the Spartan kings, stands forward as a model for the imitation of sovereigns and warriors in the economy of his living. It was proved clearly, by his example, that true greatness does not consist in splendid entertainments; on the contrary, it may be inferred from his and other examples in well authenticated history that sumptuous living, ostentatious splendour and true greatness are scarcely compatible with each other.

Lycurgus divided the lands into equal portions, or into portions calculated to yield equal revenue, thereby precluding inequality of income. He adopted iron as the representative of money,—an ex-

Iron as money.

pedient which, while it diminished the desire of accumulating cumbersome riches, preserved Sparta from a multitude of foreign nuisances. No Sybaritic adventurer sought a country from which he could only carry away iron as the reward of his services. The Spartans were thus allowed to retain their primitive simplicity; because they had not the means of purchasing refinement and corruption from their civilized and mercenary neighbours.

Exposure of defective children

Sparta was entirely military; consequently no one was held to be of value, who did not occupy a part and perform a function in the state. The legislator excluded from his fabric what was actually useless, and in that he did wisely: he destroyed what was weak and imperfect; and in this he acted arbitrarily,—and it may even be said sacrilegiously. The law of sacrificing the imperfect offspring, even under the sanction of judges, cannot be considered in any other light than murder. But, while such in itself, it must at the same time be admitted that it was a law of high political importance to Sparta. It impressed the idea—most irresistibly on all, that the defence of the country was the object for which man lived, and that those only were valuable who were capable of acting effectively in that defence. It was by the opinion of judges that the infant was removed from the stage of life, or that it obtained a place in the political system of the state. To maintain that place worthily was the first passion planted in the breast:—it grew and expanded equally among all. The Spartans were thus proud in the consciousness of their own importance. They were submissive to the law,—and all Spartans were equally submissive to it;—no one claimed exemptions.

Rule of primary education.

The new born infant, after examination and approval, was carried home and laid upon a shield.—A spear was placed before its eye; hence it might be supposed to grow up in familiarity with arms. If so treated, its first ideas would naturally be those of war; for, as

things were so placed before it that it might acquire ideas as it were by its own observation, it would, it may be presumed, enquire into the nature and use of what it saw; and, as what it saw was an instrument of war, it may naturally be supposed that it was early acquainted with, and perhaps enamoured of a military weapon, while it was yet in the nursery. It was under no constraint; and it was acted on by no fear. It may therefore be fairly supposed that both its bodily and mental powers were speedily developed; and, as there were no bad examples before its eye, it may be easily conceived that its acts were not simply vigorous—they were also just. At the age of seven it commenced its public education; and after that period its parents had no direct controul over it. It was under the law, the magistrate, and the citizen; for every citizen was bound to instruct and correct according to law. The whole Spartan nation was thus on constant duty, superintending, and under superintendence.

One of the most respectable citizens of the republic presided over the education of the children. He divided them into two classes and placed a young person, distinguished for his discretion and courage, at the head of each of the classes. The scholar obeyed without hesitation, and submitted to punishment, where he had done wrong, without murmur. The discipline increased every day in rigour. The hair was cut short; the feet and legs were bare; and the whole body was occasionally exposed to weather in a naked state. Every one was inured to hardship,—to bear heat and cold, and to sleep hard,—any where or any how:—no one was indulged with the luxury of baths, or frictions with oil. The young Spartan was enticed to look at things with his own eyes, and to exercise his own mind on all things that regarded his own occupation;—he was in fact so trained as to become a man within himself on every point that relates to war. The system of education thus pursued kept him steadily to the point

Education of
youth.

of business: it tried and proved his temper, his obedience and his courage.—No military system, of which we have knowledge, appears to have been laid on so correct a basis as that of Sparta; and no people appear, in any period of the world, to have taken the same pains with the Spartans to improve those physical powers of the body which contribute to give it effect. The females were equal to the males in heroism of mind; and with the finest symmetry of form, they possessed the greatest energy and elasticity of muscle. Health and bodily activity were not incompatible with the Spartan idea of beauty; and hence, the young females attracted the notice of the male by the display of power in the field of exercise, rather than by the languishing graces of movement in the dance, or by the dazzling tint of colour which animate the cheek.

The Spartan youths received only a slight tincture of book learning: they were however taught to express themselves clearly and concisely on fit occasions. They were qualified to bear a part in the dance and song; and they cherished a taste for simple poetry, chiefly such as related to the history and heroic acts of their nation. The inspectors, or Ephori, visited the youth daily to mark their conduct; and they examined them occasionally to ascertain their progress. They were particularly watchful that they did not become fat. Fatness was thought to argue effeminacy,—and it is in fact unseemly in a soldier. The greater part of the time of the Spartan children was spent in the school of exercise, where the courage was tried and proved in all kinds of combat. By the exhibitions of courage and power manifested on these occasions, the chiefs of the state had an opportunity of knowing the character of the materials of the military fabric, of putting them together by a rule of science; that is, of so matching the force and temper that the whole acted in union on ordinary occasions, and even continued to act in union in the severest

shocks of battle. The Spartan youth did not know to yield, to shrink from pain, or to acknowledge a defeat :—he preferred death to a confession of weakness. The honour and independence of his country was the idol of his soul from earliest youth. The idea was constantly present in the thought,—and elevated the mind to glory.

When the Spartan youth attained the age of manhood he did not cease to learn. Education was perpetual, not terminated with any period of life. Swimming, wrestling, running, ball playing, and the other exercises of the gymnasium, besides the exercises more directly military, occupied a great portion of his time. When these exercises and the ordinary military evolutions ceased, the young men repaired to the gymnasium of the youth—to witness the amusements, games, and contentions of the junior classes;—for in these they had interest. From the gymnasium of the youth, they adjourned to the general rendezvous of the citizens, where all descriptions of people met for the sake of conversation. The young there listened with attention to the discourses of the aged; and they heard with pleasure the remarks of the wise on the history of men and nations. The object of the Spartan institution was the elevation of the Spartan character to an eminence of military and moral excellence; consequently the examples of heroes and great men only were placed before the eye of the scholar. No crooked schemes of narrow policy obtained notice; and no acts of wickedness, which disgrace human nature, were even so much as mentioned in a Spartan assembly. The Spartans were what the world regards as an illiterate people: there were in fact many among them who could not read or write. No one pursued the sciences or cultivated the arts, and no one deigned to touch an instrument of labour; yet the Spartan never was idle; and, though not book-learned, he possessed real knowledge—He acquired, from artificial presentation or from actual experience, a correct idea of all

Education of
those advanced

those things which relate to war. The physical powers of his constitution were improved to the utmost point of improvement by habitual exercise: the powers of his mind were condensed by the removal of extraneous objects; and they were often inflamed to enthusiasm by the stimulation of their paramount object—the love of country. The Spartan was presented, in the course of his education, with the most of the contingencies which happen in war; and, from this source perhaps, he often, when in action, seized the reason of a thing as it were by intuition. His country was always in his eye: it animated all his actions and absorbed his very soul. The idea of country is simple and comprehensible; and, the impression, as not obscured or blunted by the obtrusion of self, supersedes all technical instruction. The Spartans had no written laws. Their institution was a living law of discipline giving power and activity; and, contrary to what happens in written laws, not becoming a dead letter. Every part watched and superintended another; and, the machine was so joined that every one was capable of feeling, of judging and rectifying first errors. Every senior was a law to the junior, and the sacred idea of country was a law to the whole.—A political machine so animated, and so guided in its movements as the Spartan state appears to have been, was in little comparative danger of going wrong; or, if it did go wrong, it could not continue long in its course of error. The entire of the Spartan nation, like a regiment on parade, was always on duty, or under superintendence. It moved only by the word of command; but that command was inseparable from honour and duty. Honour and duty were common to all, and equal in all:—it is in such equality that freedom consists. The spirit of the Spartan constitution was directed to form and maintain good conduct: the spirit of common political constitutions is only active to inflict punishment for offences.

If soldiers could ever be termed invincible, it must have been the soldiers of Sparta. The pains which were taken to improve the physical powers were unremitting; and the principle, through which the means of improvement were applied, was well considered and well calculated to produce effect. The condensation of mind and the force of character, which were given to the Spartans by the mode of training adopted by the Spartan state, were never given to any other class of men in an equal degree of perfection. The sum of the discipline consisted in engendering a habit of obedience to superiors as organs of the law; in inculcating perseverance in toil and difficulty as a test of worthiness; and in implanting the paramount sentiment---to conquer, or die in the field of battle, as an honourable sacrifice to the country. The law of Lycurgus, which banished individual self and selfish gratification from the Spartan policy, confirmed the courage of all; for as individual selfishness is decidedly a source of fear, the penetration of the law-giver, who acted on a fact true but not generally admitted, may be considered as a determination of no ordinary mind. The courage and virtue which effected the eradication of self, against preponderating causes of opposition, must ever command the veneration of mankind, and leave Lycurgus as a law-giver unequalled.

There is some confusion among writers on the subject of the formation and division of the Spartan force. The *enomotie* or squad is the denomination of the lowest division in the Spartan army. It consists of thirty-two persons; the *penticostye* consists of four squads or *enomoties*; and the *lochos* of four penticostyes. Such was the arrangement and proportions of the Spartan army at the battle of Mantinea according to Thucydides; but Thucydides acknowledged the subject to be obscure, the Spartans studiously concealing their military principles from the observation of foreigners. Xenophon

lived at a later period than Thucydides, and lived moreover under circumstances which gave him an opportunity of being intimately acquainted with the Spartan system. The Spartan *mora*, regiment or division, according to Xenophon, consisted of four *lochi*; the *lochos* of two *pentecostyes*; the *pentecostye* of two *enomoties*. It is not possible to reconcile the difference between Thucydides and Xenophon on this head. Some may suppose that the arrangement and proportions were different at different times. Others may incline to believe that one of the writers, most probably Thucydides as he knew the Spartans only as enemies, had not been well informed. But, be that as it may, it is generally admitted that all orders descended from the commander-in-chief to the *polemarch*, or commander of the *mora*; from the *polemarch* to the *locharch*; from the *locharch* to the *pentecostarch*; from the *pentecostarch* to the *enomotarch* who passed the word to every man in his squad. Every one comprehended the force of the order; for all were intelligent in the art of war, and capable of conceiving the object of evolutions as ordered to be performed in the face of an enemy; consequently, while the will of the chief was obeyed as an order, the execution was animated as an act, in as much as the design was seen and fully appreciated by the respective parts of the executive instrument.—From this we may understand how the Spartan phalanx became irresistible in attack; or impenetrable in defence. It was cemented in its foundations by correspondence of physical power, and it was animated throughout by intelligence, and devotion to duty.

Order of arrangement for battle.

The Spartan phalanx consisted of eight files in depth. The files were at intervals of six feet from each other when disposed in open order: when disposed in close order, the distance was three; and, in locked order, one and a half. The open order was the ordinary

order for march and evolution; the close order was the order for attack; and the locked order, the order in which attack was resisted. The front rank consisted of tried and known men; the rear rank was also select; those, on whom there was the least dependence were most interior. Thus placed, they gave momentum to the machine by their weight and physical power; and they were maintained in their places, or prevented from recoiling by the support of the rear files which consisted of men of trust. The parts were classed in the phalanx according to their powers and capacities; and the covering file was matched, as nearly as possible in its qualities, to the file in front, so that, when the whole, or any part of the front failed, the second file, or an individual of the second file filled up the vacant space without occasioning disorder in the line.

The Spartans were familiar with all known and approved evolutions in war; and, it may be presumed, from the pains that were taken in matching the power in the primary arrangement, that the evolutions were performed with great precision and with great celerity. The phalanx inclined to the spear or right, to the shield or left—obliquely, and without confusion. The rear occasionally became the front, or the front the rear by the shortest and most simple operation:—the Spartans were thus qualified to engage both front and rear at the same time.

The Spartan soldier was armed with a spear, a short sword or dagger, and covered with a shield or buckler. The buckler was oval and large: it was fastened round the neck, and, at the shoulder, by means of straps. Cleomenes changed the clumsy oval buckler for the Macedonian shield originally invented by the Carians. This was fastened on the arm by a ring or handle, so as to leave the man at liberty to employ both hands in giving force and direction to the spear.—

Change of
armour.

Cleomenes was a systematic tactician:—he adopted the Macedonian pike, as well as the Carian shield.

Macedonian
and Spartan
phalanx.

It may be a question with military men, (and such only can determine) whether the arrangements of the Spartan or Macedonian phalanx are preferable. The Macedonian phalanx, from the manner of its composition and equipment, is a machine scarcely to be resisted, if it be applied with all its force; and, scarcely to be penetrated, if the position on which it is placed be good; but it is evident at the same time that, as it less easily adapts itself to broken or irregular ground, it is little manageable on such grounds as are ordinarily the theatre of military actions; it was therefore less frequently employed, even by Alexander the great than the Spartan phalanx; which he knew by experience, to be sufficiently powerful to move the feeble enemies that opposed him. The phalanx constituted the force and chief dependence of the Spartan army. It possessed the character that properly belongs to grenadiers. Solid by its arrangement and invincible in its spirit, it was only to be discomfited through the inferiority of its arms, or the superiority of the enemy in generalship. Some idea of the manner in which it acted may be learned from the instructions of Tyrtaeus.* The order of battle presented the closest

* The instructions of Tyrtaeus, while calculated by their ardour and spirit to rouse the most torpid courage, and to inspire a sentiment of heroism and resolution in every man who is susceptible of feeling, contain an admirable lesson for the conduct of the soldier in the actual shock of battle. The instruction defines the position at the point of conflict, and the force of the language rivets the mind solely to the execution of duty, through the most powerful of the motives that can be supposed to operate on man. The whole is a military catechism of the first order of excellence:—some parts of it are here subjoined:

union of force and the utmost exertion of power ; while the arrangement was calculated to bring forth the most determined spirit of per-

A. θυμῳ γῆς περὶ τῆς δὲ μαχόμεθα καὶ περὶ παιδῶν
 θνησκόμεν, ψυχῶν μῆκετι φειδομένοι.
 Ω νεοὶ, ἀλλὰ μαχεσθε παρ' ἀλλήλοισι μένοντες,
 Μῆδὲ φυγῆς αἰσχρὰς ἀρχετέ, μῆδὲ φοβού.
 Ἀλλὰ μέγαν ποιεῖτε καὶ ἀλκίμον ἐν φρεσὶ θυμόν,
 Μῆδὲ φιλοψυχεῖτ' ἀνδράσι μαρναμένοι.
 Τοὺς δὲ παλαιότερους, ὧν οὐκετι γυννατ' ἐλαφρά
 Μὴ καταλείποντες φευγετέ τοὺς γεραιούς.
 Αἰσχρὰν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο, μετὰ προμαχοῖσι πεσόντα
 Κεῖσθαι προσθε νέων ἀνδρὰ παλαιότερον,
 Ἢδὲ λευκὸν ἔχοντα κάρη πόλιον τε γενεῖον,
 θυμόν ἀποπνείουτ' ἀλκίμον ἐν κοινῇ,
 Αἱματοέντ' αἰδοῖα φίλοις ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντα.
 Αἰσχρὰ τὰ γ' ὀφθαλμοῖς, καὶ νεμεσητόν ἰδεῖν
 Καὶ χροᾶ γυμνωθέντα. νεοῖσι δὲ πάντ' ἐπεοικεν,
 Οφθ' ἀρὰ τῆς ἡβῆς ἀγλαὸν ἀνθος ἔχῃ,
 Ἀνδράσι μὲν θνητοῖσιν ἰδεῖν, ἐρατὸς δὲ γυναιξὶ
 Ζωὸς ἔων, δ' ἐν προμαχοῖσι πεσών.
 Ἀλλὰ τίς διαβάς μενετω πόδιν ἀμφοτεροῖδιν
 Ἐτηριχθεὶς ἐπὶ γῆς, χεῖλος ὁδοῦδ' ἰδὼν,

Ἀλλὰ τίς ἐν διαβάς μενετω πόσιν ἀμφοτεροῖσιν
 B. Ἐτηριχθεὶς ἐπὶ γῆς, χεῖλος ὁδοῦσι ἰδὼν,
 Μῆρους τε κνήμας τε κατὰ καὶ στερνα καὶ ὤμους
 Ἀσπίδος εὐρείης γαστρὶ καλυψάμενος,
 Δεξιτέρῃ δ' ἐν χεὶρὶ τιναῖσθαι ὀβριμὸν ἐγχὺς,
 Κινεῖται δὲ λόφον δεινὸν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς,
 Ἐρδῶν δ' ὀβριμὰ ἐργα, διδασκεσθῶ πολεμιζέειν,
 Μῆδ' ἐκτὸς βέλεων ἐστατῶ ἀσπίδ' ἔχων,
 Ἀλλὰ τίς ἐγγὺς ἰὼν αὐτοσχέδον ἐγγεῖ μακρῶ
 Ἢ ξίφει οὐταζὼν δῆριον ἀνδρ' ἐλέτω.

severance in effecting the execution of purpose. It exhibited a machine, in which every part was active and exerted to its utmost.—

*Και ποδα πας ποδι θεις, και επ' αβπιδος αβπιδ ερειδας,
Εν δε λοφον τε λοφω, κυνην κυνη,
Και στερνον δτερνω, πεπαλημενος ανδρι μαχεσθω,
Η ξιφος κωπην, η δορυ μακρον δ' ελων.
Υμεις δ' ωγυμνητες υ'π' αβπιδος αλλοθεν αλλος
Πτωδοντες, μεγαλοις υφαλλετε χερμαδιοις,
Δουραβι τε ξεστοιδιν ακοντιζοντες ες αυτους
Τοις πανοπλίοις πληθιον ισταμενοι. Edit. Klotz.*

As Tyrtoëus has described the manner in which the Spartan soldier was expected to conduct himself in the actual conflict, so Thucydides informs us, in his description of the battle of Mantinea, in what manner the manœuvre was conducted with a view to gain advantage at the onset. Some part of it is here transcribed for the satisfaction of the reader. *Και μετα ταυτα η' ξυνοδος ην. Αργειοι μεν και ο' ξυμμαχοι εντονως και οργη χωρουντες, Λακεδαιμονιοι δε βραδεως, και 'υπο αυλητων πολλων νομω εγκαθεστωτων. ου του θειου χαριν, αλλ' ινα δ'μαλως μετα ρυθμου βαινοντες προελθειεν, και μη διασπασθειη αυτοις η' ταξις. ο'περ φιλει τα μεγαλα στρατοπεδα εν τοις προοδοις ποιεν. &c.*

The force of the character of the Spartan nation, considered as the result of political institution, has perhaps no example in history. The conversation, which the banished Spartan Demaratus is stated to have had with the Persian monarch Xerxes, gives a striking instance of it: Demaratus himself was a living picture of it. “*Ερχομαι δε λεξων ου περι παντων τουςδε τους λογους, αλλα περι λακεδαιμονων μονων πρωτα μεν, ο'τι ουκ εστι δ'κως κοτε υους δεχονται λογους δουλοβυην φεροντας τη Ελλαδι, αυτις δε ως αντιωθονται τοι ες μαχην, και ην ο' αλλοι Ελληνες παντες τα υαφρονεωδι, αριθμου δε περι, μη πυθη ο'βοι τιγες εοντες ταυτα ποιεειν ο'οι τε ειδη ην τε γαρ τυχωδι εξεστρατευμενοι χιλιοι, ο'υτοι μαχηδονται τοι, ην τε ελαδονες τουτεων ην τε και πλευνες.*

——— *Εγω δε ουτε δεκα ανδρασι υ'πιόχομαι ο'ος τε ειναι μαχεσθαι, ουτε δυοιδι, ε'κων τε ειναι ουδ' αν μονομαχεοιμι ειδε αναγκαιη ειη, η μεγας τις δ'εποιρυνων αγων, μαχοιμην αν παντων ηδιυτα ενι τουτεων ανδρων, ο' Ελληνων εκαστος φησι τριων αξιος ειναι. ως δε, και λακεδαιμονιοι, κατα μεν ενα μαχεομενοι, ουδαμων ειδη κακιονες ανδρων, αλλεες δ' αριυτοι ανδρων απαντων. Ελευθεροι γαρ εο πες, ου παντα ελευθεροι ειδη. επεστι γαρ σφι δεσποτης, νομος, τον υ'ποδευμαινουδι πολλ' η επι μαλλον, η ο'βοι υε. ποιευδι γων τα αν εκεινος ανωγη. ανωγει δε τωυτο αιει, ουκ εα'ν φευγειν ουδεν πληθος ανθρωπων εκ μαχης, αλλα μενοντας εν τη ταξει, επικρατειν η απολλυσθαι. Herod, lib. vii.*

Besides the phalanx, which was the pride and confidence of Sparta, the *Scirites*, who were horsemen and drawn from a dependency of the Spartan state, always occupied one station in the army, viz. the left. Their conduct was distinguished on most occasions, and their exertions contributed on many to the success of the Spartan arms.—Light troops were employed in the Spartan army; but they were comparatively in little esteem:—they appear to have been chiefly subsidiary or mercenary.

The Spartan soldier was comparatively in a state of ease or relaxation when he entered on a campaign, or encamped in the field before the enemy; but even then the military exercises were not neglected or forgotten. After exercise, a frugal repast was spread upon the ground; and, after the repast, hymns were sung in chorus in honour of the gods. The last office may be supposed to have exalted the man within himself, and to have confirmed his courage against all the contingencies which belong to war. When the homage to the gods ceased, the Spartan reposed on his arms. His duty was always in his eye; and it may be presumed no other idea, except that of victory, presented itself to his dreams.

When the order of battle was adjusted, the phalanx with one object in view, and absorbed as it were in the idea of acquiring glory, or rather of performing duty, moved on to meet the enemy,—in accord with the sound of music. The cadence of the music contributed to preserve cadence in the step and order in the ranks; and the sentiment which it inspired, acting by a common impulse on the mind of all, denied entrance to foreign impressions. The Spartans were thus united. They were animated in action, but they were not impetuous. They considered themselves as parts of a common instrument, obedi-

Cadence in
advancing.

Obedience
in action,

peaceably on his shield, when the signal was given to stop the slaughter.

Retreat. As the Spartan phalanx advanced to meet the enemy in a cadenced step and in correct order, so it retired from the field with regularity, however reduced in number. Every man was obliged to produce his shield after battle, as a proof that he had fought, or retired as a soldier ought to do—collected and in possession of himself. If he threw away the shield, he was disgraced for ever—and all his relations were sunk in grief. The act of throwing away the shield argues fear; and fear had no place in the Spartan catechism. The Spartan mother, and the Spartan wife rejoiced, at least were proud of themselves when the son or the husband fell honorably in the field of battle:—those only were mourners whose relatives escaped from the unfortunate battle of Leuctra.

Dominion of mind. The Spartans stand alone among nations as conquerors of themselves. They attained, through the discipline of their institution, the view of a sentiment which commanded their actions to the right channel, and to the right channel only; consequently the genuine Spartan, who was a man at all times, exulted in no success and desponded in no reverse. He was always conscious of having done his duty; and he never entertained the idea that he was capable of doing more than his duty. The phalanx was the most perfect military instrument, the most correct mechanically, and animated with the best spirit of action of any force that ever appeared on the theatre of war. The Macedonian phalanx, from the length of the pike, and the greater impulse which might be given to the pike, through the manner in which the shield was fastened on the arm, was irresistible on the plain; and the Roman soldier, as covered by the shield and armed with the sword, appeared to be capable of working his way safely and successfully in irregular and broken grounds beyond all others; yet neither the Macedonian nor the

Roman, though formidable by the manner in which they were armed and in which they manœuvred, possessed the same tone of animation and the same adjustment for joint action that the Spartan phalanx possessed. The Macedonian and the Roman fought for conquest and spoil: the Spartan for justice—his own defence, or the protection of those who were unable to protect themselves. On this ground, no one can refuse to give to the Spartans a tribute of praise for their heroism in the field, and an acknowledgment of gratitude for their apparently generous conduct to defenceless neighbours. With a very small national force, the Spartans continued for centuries to be the arbiters of Greece. There is reason to think that their office was upon the whole justly administered; but their power, or perhaps their virtues excited jealousies; and they were at last considered as tyrants rather than protectors—not perhaps without cause. When state policy is influenced by ambition of power, or desire of riches, it never fails, however brilliant its course may be, to terminate prematurely and to terminate unfortunately, in as much as it moves under the influence of a passion, the act of which is in direct contradiction to the law of nature. The Spartans appear to have been impartial judges in matters of dispute between independent nations in the early periods of their history; but human institution is liable to corruption, and the virtuous Spartans appeared in process of time, perhaps from the deference that was generally paid to their decision, to assume a high tone and to dictate a will,—often without an ostensible reason. They were opposed by the Athenians. The Athenians were ambitious of power and dominion, enterprising in spirit, fertile in genius, of great comparative skill in seamanship,—and possessed of a high sense of feeling on the subject of general liberty. A war commenced between these rival states, called the Peloponnesian war, from the whole of the people in the peninsula being more or less implicated in the

contest. The Athenians were powerful at sea, and thereby had the opportunity of multiplying their offensive attacks. The Spartan force consisted in its phalanx, which was strictly speaking defensive. It was not competent, from the smallness of its numbers, to meet the desultory inroads of the enemy at all points; and under such necessity, a marine force was provided as extra aid. As Sparta did not possess the means of doing this within itself; and, as the money of the time was necessary for the provision of what was wanted, it had recourse to negotiations or bargain; it even went so far as to receive pecuniary assistance from the enemy of the Greek name, in order to effect the overthrow of the Athenian power.

The Spartans finally defeated the Athenians and deprived them of their liberty; but they lost their own institution, so as to degenerate, from just and heroic Spartans, who despised riches and renounced foreign conquest, to ambitious, avaricious and mercenary tyrants who trampled on the rights of man. Lysander may be thought to have laid the foundation of this melancholy change by shewing to his countrymen the power of money, and by permitting the luxurious habits of the East to contaminate the soldiers of the country of Lycurgus. Agesilaus finished the Spartan disgrace when he became a mercenary in Egypt; and he left an indelible stain on his country, when he sold himself to the highest bidder because he fancied it was for his country's political advantage. The Spartan character is not irreproachable; but the military arrangement is admirable. It will ever be a model of imitation for those who aim at eminence in war, or who, more strictly speaking, desire to attain perfection in tactic for the better protection of their country and its institutions.

CHAPTER II.

ATHENIAN.

THE Athenians and Spartans were rivals in power, and opposite in character. The Spartan government presents a phenomenon in the history of mankind. It was the only government in ancient or modern times which claimed a consistent basis, and which moved consistently on the basis for a length of time. The members of the Spartan community were born and educated under a rule of order; and the love of order and decorum was so engrafted on their organism by habit, as to engender a sentiment which was imperative as a law of nature. The discipline of the Spartan institution commenced at an early period of life. It was applied judiciously, and it acted effectually in establishing the dominion of mind over the appetites and desires of animal sense:—mind ruled at Sparta; the body obeyed as an instrument.*

* The character of the Athenians is contrasted with that of the Spartans in a speech made by the orator at Corinth, at a congress of the States prior to the breaking out of the Peloponesian war. Whether actually delivered by the orator in the style and manner reported, or manufactured by the historian, it is a document highly impor-

The Athenian was the converse of the Spartan. Athenian acts were acts of impulse from direct feeling. As impulses which act on animal sense are numerous and variously modified; and, as Athenian acts were the consequence of direct impulse with little modification from political institution, the effect was any thing but consistent. The Athenian acted unsteadily, and sometimes contradictorily; but he also acted generously and often heroically, in as much as his acts sprung instantaneously from the sympathies of man's common nature unfettered by insulated and selfish policy. The Athenian felt acutely on all occasions, acted promptly on many; and, fancying himself to

tant in itself. The outline is well sketched;—the leading points of difference are well marked. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι οὐκ οἶδον, καὶ ἐπιτελεῖν ἐργὰ ὅτι ἀν γινώσκουσιν. Ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπαρχόντα τε σώζειν καὶ ἐπιγινώσκοντες μηδὲν, καὶ ἐργὰ οὐδὲ τί ἀναγκαῖα ἐξικεσθαι. αὐτοὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δυνάμιν τολμῶσι καὶ γνώμην κινδυνεύουσι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐελπίδες, τοὺς δὲ ὑμῶν, τῆς τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πράττειν, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι, τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε διέσθαι ἀπολυθῆσθαι καὶ μὴν καὶ ἀσχοιοὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς μέλλοντας, καὶ ἀποδημῶσι πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, οἷον γὰρ οἱ μὲν, τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἀν τι κτασθαι ὕμεις δὲ, τῷ ἐπελθεῖν, καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν ἀν βλάψαι. κρατούντες τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται, καὶ νικώμενοι, ἐπὶ ἐλαχιστόν ἀναπιπτουσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ, τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτους ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρώμενοι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ, οὐκ οἶδον τίς ἐς τὸ πράττειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. καὶ ἂν μὲν ἀν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οὐκ οἶδον ὅπως οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἂν δὲ ἀν ἐπελθόντες κτήσονται ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράττοντες. ἦν δ' αὖτε πρὸς καὶ πείρα σφάλλουσιν ἀντελπίσαντες ἀλλὰ ἐπληρώσαν τὴν χρεῖαν. μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσιν τε καὶ ὁμοίως ἐλπίζουσιν ὅτι ἀν ἐπινοήσωσι, καὶ κινδύνων δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἵματος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλαχίστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ ἀν κτασθαι, καὶ μὴτε ἐορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τοὺς δεινὰ πράττειν. ξυμφορὴν τε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἡδύχαι ἀπραγμὸν, ἢ ἀχολίαν ἐπιπορὸν, ὥστε εἰ τις αὐτοὺς ξυμῶν φανῇ πεφυκεναι ἐπὶ τῷ μὴτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡδύχαιαν. μὴτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους εἰς ὁρθῶς ἀν εἰποι. *Thucyd. lib i.*

be the champion of liberty, he fought enthusiastically and persevered courageously under the greatest difficulties, as wholly absorbed in the idea that liberty is the common inheritance of man. It is so in fact; and it was expressly to this sentiment, and its consequent impassioned action that Greece owed her deliverance from the threatened yoke of Persia. The acts of the Athenian people were generous in most instances: they were even noble and exalted in some; but, as they arose from the direct impulse of contingent causes, they were capricious and uncertain; sometimes timid and unworthy.—History proves the fact; the explanation of it is not incomprehensible.

The Athenians were not ostensibly so much of a military people as the Spartans; but they were naturally bold and enterprising, active and intelligent, fertile in resources, ready in evolution, expert in executing combined movements, superiorly well calculated for desultory warfare, and skilled in the conduct of sieges above all other people of the time. They possessed great energy, both physical and moral; and they only required to be properly moved and skilfully directed to execute great things:—they were in fact soldiers of the first character for daring enterprise and rapid execution. The feeling, connected with the possession of liberty, was the spring which moved the Athenian to act. The suspicion that liberty was threatened with danger united the whole in common defence; and defence was then undertaken with an ardour that does not rise to the same height from any other cause. Under its domineering influence, the act was cordial; and, where the genius of a leader was capable of giving it just direction, it was irresistible.

Liberty's influence in the act.

The rigour of the institutions, under which the Spartan youth was trained and educated, continued to operate without remission, and maintained every one in his station even in advanced years. At

Power in the people.

Athens every individual was his own master. The will of the people was the sovereign. But, as the will of the people fluctuates with contingent impulses, the expression of it was only strong and consistent, where it was connected with an idea of liberty in which all participated. As the preservative power of the Spartan institution kept every one within his sphere, and urged every one to his duty through its discipline; so the Athenian preservative power, which literally resided in the people, was unstable in itself, as leaving every one master of his own act. Every Athenian was free and entitled to suffrage, consequently every one was a member of the state; and, as a member of the state, his faculties were exerted individually, or permitted to move in their own channels. Genius, as constrained by no rule of education, started up every where, and often rose to eminence from a humble source. The man of genius was encouraged at Athens, while his exertions were useful and subservient to the people. He was envied when he attained distinction; and he was feared when he became eminent. Whether dangerous or not in reality, he was often supposed to be so by elevation; and, in anticipation of the chances of evil, he was reduced to his level by fine or imprisonment, expelled from the territory by banishment, or adjudged to the punishment of death by suffrage. Many of those who were eminent in virtue were persecuted, banished, or destroyed under the pretext of preserving a balance of equality among the members of the state. This occurred often; and the occurrence confirms the remark that power is every where the same—and every where a tyrant. Monarchy permits no part in the political circle to leave its sphere so as to rise to independent eminence: democracy, jealous of usurpation, permits no one to remain eminent lest he should become a master.

Selection of
Solon for le-
gislator.

The Athenian people consisted of different tribes, inhabiting different districts of country and professing different views of arrange-

ment in political government. Prior to the time of Solon, anarchy, and oppression reigned at Athens:—contentions and quarrels were common. One tribe was violently democratic; another was presumptuously aristocratic; and a third was moderate and reasonable. Some were rich, and insolent from their riches; many were poor, and oppressed in their poverty—even reduced to slavery by the accumulation of debts. The state was in fact tumultuary; and, among the tumultuous there were, as was reasonable to expect, bold spirits who aimed at revolution, or an entire new order of things. In this perplexity; the more prudent part of the community looked to Solon, who was respectable in private character and of considerable political influence, as the person best qualified to find a remedy for this miserable political condition. Solon had visited foreign countries, partly as a merchant, but principally as a philosopher and statesman to collect information, respecting the causes which augment the happiness, or rather which diminish the miseries of mankind. He was supposed to have acquired knowledge of the subject from observation; and he was, in consequence of his supposed acquirements, constituted legislator for the Athenian community, then in a state of distraction. Solon was a man of judgment and address; and, proceeding upon the maxim (*το ισον πολεμον ου ποιει*) that equality precludes the occurrence of war, he framed laws which checked the ferment for the time, and eventually improved the moral condition of the people; but he instituted no system of education which formed a new people, as had been done at Sparta by Lycurgus. Solon possessed talent; but he was not perhaps endowed by nature with such comprehensive views, and such boldness of character as belonged to Lycurgus; and moreover, being only one of the people of Athens, he could not present himself with the same legislative authority as the founder of the Spartan institution who was royal.

He appears however to have considered things with foresight, and to have balanced them with discretion ; in so much, that the contending parties were induced to wait with patience for the result of his enactments, each in expectation of advantages to his own class or order.

Suffrage to
the people.

Solon did not, as has been observed, revolutionize the Athenian state and institute an entire new form of policy. The basis of the old organization was retained ; but a new principle was added ; which may be said to have electrified the mass of the people, and to have produced all the great men and great things which have given immortality to the Athenian name. The people, which in almost all civilized nations is the instrument of usurped power, became at Athens, through the operations of suffrage, (at first sight a trifling concession) the source and essence of power itself. In consequence of this privilege, even the lowest of the Athenian people had the right to vote on measures of policy and war. They decreed and sanctioned decrees ; and they employed all the talents within the circle of the state as instruments of execution. They were in fact sovereign ; and, the moving principle of the government adopted by them appears to have consisted in the impression, that liberty belongs to all men as a common inheritance. The position is physically and indefeasibly true ; and, while true, it is important ; for it cannot be denied that, if a system of government were laid on such a basis, the whole of the parts comprehended within the circle of the community being equally impressed with the sentiment, and every one of the parts being confined to the execution of its own function only, (without which no real liberty exists,) the nation would be strong as animated equally throughout, and it would be happy in the mutual correspondence of parts united by general sympathy and affection. Such is a desirable condition of human society ; but it ob-

tains nationally in no country in Europe in the present times ; and, if ever it did obtain at Athens, it was not of long duration.

The Athenians were acute in their perceptions beyond any people on record ; and, as first perceptions are ordinarily just, they felt strongly the impulse of what is right ; but, though they felt impressions quickly and often justly, the political organization of the state was not such as gave union, promptitude and decision to political acts. The aggregate of people has generally a just sense of common things ; and, if not sophisticated by education, or biassed by the influence of designing men, the opinion of the assembly is rarely unwise. It often it is admitted acts under the impulse of the moment, and what it decrees wisely, it sometimes forgets to execute vigorously ; for it is easily diverted from the object by the intervention of another impulse. In this manner, the Athenians of latter times, when the mind, distracted and dissipated through the refinements of art became the play thing of orators, proceeded rapidly and often precipitately to declare war and to vote the means of carrying it on :—they forgot what they had done ; so that the decree was often the whole of the act.

The general principle of Solon's policy rested on the maxim that equality, or just balance of power among the separate parts of the human race, precludes war. The whole powers of his genius were exerted in contriving the means of preserving the supposed balance ; and, as the parts were different by their orders and classes, and differed in their views and propensities, it was not easily preserved. The Athenian machine was complicated ; its movements were liable to be deranged through the solicitations of the animal appetites which urge individual aggrandizement, and against which it was difficult to find legal controul. The idea, attached to artificial balances of power, implies in itself that the parts of the state are innately hostile to each other ; that is, that the state is heterogeneous,

or discordant in its constituent materials. The composition of the state in question was in fact such. The mixture of classes and characters excited emulations which were favourable to activity; but as the activity was liable to strike into different channels, the acts were acts of union only when moved by a cause of paramount force. The energy which results from the impression that liberty is the inheritance of the mass of the people, and that all parts of the military instrument, even the most inferior, are animated with the sentiment of conscious independence was the bond of the Athenian state, and of the Athenian army. The sentiment is powerful in its operation—so powerful indeed as often to compensate for want of precision in mechanical tactic. The scope of action, connected with consciousness of liberty, embraces intelligence, activity, and enterprize. It moved the Athenians to great undertakings in speculation of advantages: it even supported them under great difficulties as earnest of success; but it did not long maintain them in a secure and steady course of conduct. The Athenians were instruments of impulse and feeling; not organs of mind and sentiment through the influence of education; hence their union was only assured by a strong cause imminent and always present; and their combined efforts could thus only be appreciated and applied to purpose by a leader of superior genius, who knows the springs of action in the human mind by something like intuition.

As the people of Athens differed in moral and political character from those of Sparta; so the principle which regulated their military arrangements was different—and, in some measure, opposite. The basis of the Spartan preeminence consisted in constancy and firmness. The mind was directed to the object exclusively; the body was trained, by force of institution, to act in one channel—in the attainment of it. The Athenian eminence consisted in the daring spirit

and energetic action of individuals, proceeding from individual feeling and conscious importance of individual independence, fostered and confirmed by the privilege of participating in national councils. The circumstances of the Athenian territory determined the mode of warfare which best suited the genius of the people; viz. maritime expedition and desultory aggression. The Athenian ships were the best of the time;—the crews the most experienced. The army excelled the armies of other nations in conducting sieges, and in connecting the duties of sea and land service for a special purpose. The intelligence, activity, quick perception and daring spirit of enterprise, for which the Athenian was distinguished among his contemporaries, rendered him formidable in desultory warfare, ready and apt in all forms of movement; in so much that Athenian light troops foiled, and, on some occasions, discomfited the renowned phalanx of Sparta. The Athenian phalanx was perhaps less impenetrable in battle array than the Spartan; it was less resistible in the charge than any other force similarly armed. The Spartans fought the battle of plain courage and discipline: the Athenians fought the battle of courage and address; and, when directed by a leader who knew to animate every part, and to concentrate the collective force to the proper point of attack, they were impassioned simultaneously,—and their efforts were beyond the efforts of the mere machine of tactic and discipline, however perfectly constructed. The Athenians were the first of the Greeks who advanced on the enemy at the accelerated pace, (*δρομος*) corresponding perhaps to what is now termed double quick time.—The expedient was adopted at the battle of Marathon; which was a master-piece of generalship on the part of the commander, and of heroic conduct on the part of the soldier.

The Athenian military force consisted of three classes, viz. 1. *δυσπλιτες*, armed with spear and dagger and covered with a shield;—reserved

for the phalanx or main battle. 2. *πελταστής*, armed with a light spear and javelin, and protected by a small shield or target ;—destined for desultory aggression ; viz. the seizing and maintaining positions for covering the important movements of the phalanx. 3. *γυμνής*, without defence from armour, provided with missile weapons for annoyance ; viz. javelins, bows and arrows, slings for stones and leaden bullets. The first is analagous to the select grenadiers of the moderns ; the second to light infantry,—and the third to riflemen or sharpshooters.

The phalanx, or main battle of the Athenians consisted of the natives of Attica. It was drawn up in battle array according to tribes or communities. In consequence of this arrangement, together with mechanical correspondence of power, there was probably a more than usually intimate union of mind arising from sympathy and affection ; there was concurrence of opinion from association in a common cause. The light armed (*πελτασταί*) were partly native, partly foreign : the slingers and archers were entirely foreign. The horse, like the phalanx were native ; and they were of a good description,—alert and enterprizing. The Athenian army, thus composed, might be considered as prepared for every species of warfare ; and no species of warfare was too arduous for its daring. If the Athenians were less firm to resist than the Spartans, who had no other sentiment but to conquer or die, they were more impetuous and more ardent in attack. They were superior in address and manœuvre ; and, as they acted from impulse, they quickly read the countenance of things, and seized the fit occasion for acting with energy, superior to the energy which proceeds from the formal command of the general. The desire of aggrandizing and extending the sphere of dominion moved the Athenian people to war : the allurements of spoil filled the military ranks and urged to exertion : the idea of liberty and

independence cemented the union of the parts, and instilled the opinion that the hostile act, as diffusing liberty and happiness where ever it went, gave to the Athenian military an importance above all other military. The Athenians were revolutionists in the act of war: they were often tyrants in the exercise of government. Few nations sustained reverses with a better courage than the people of Attica; and scarcely any were more daring in undertaking dangerous things. As gamblers, they refused no chance of fortune however high the odds might be against them; and like gamblers they were prodigal of what they gained,—more desirous to acquire than cautious to preserve.

CHAPTER III.

MACEDONIAN.

THE great Macedonian empire,—a creation of the sword, rose up in majesty in a poor and semibarbarous country. Philip, who was the founder of it, possessed talent from nature; and he improved his talent by associating with the eminent men of the age in which he lived—soldiers, statesmen and philosophers. He studied at Thebes, where he acquired a scientific view of tactic and military discipline under Epaminondas. He became a general; and he manifested skill. It is not pretended that he was original in genius; but it is undeniable that he extended the utility of tactic, and applied the knowledge which he possessed of it to the purposes which he contemplated with unprecedented precision. Lust of power and dominion was the

dominant passion of his soul. His act moved under the impulse of this aggrandizing passion; and every measure which led to its gratification was legitimate in his system of morals. As Philip formed an army expressly for conquest, he studied the properties of its several parts with mathematical precision; and he seems to have so adjusted them in their places that, the phalanx, when brought into action, was scarcely either to be penetrated or resisted. Instead of the spear, the common offensive weapon of the Greeks, Philip armed the Macedonian with a pike eighteen feet long; and he further, in imitation of the Carians, contrived to fix the shield upon the arm by means of a ring, so as to leave both hands at liberty for giving impulse and direction to the pike. It is obvious, at first sight, that the Macedonian phalanx was less penetrable and less resistible than the Spartan, in as much as it possessed a deeper mechanical connection and more force of impulse from the weight of the body which moved it. It was in fact an impregnable bulwark, or an irresistible torrent in the level plain: it was unweildy, unmanageable, and consequently feeble on broken and irregular grounds; and it was upon the whole of unnecessary force for the ordinary purposes of war. Philip did not, in constructing the phalanx, act, as already observed, on a new principle; but he so changed the face of things as to make an impression on those who opposed him that his instrument was actually a new invention. Its power was formidable both in appearance and in reality; but Philip's political arts and intrigues were still more formidable, in assuring his purposes, than the mere force of the instrument which he had thus modified in construction. The Greek nations were jealous of each other. They were divided in their views; and Philip hesitated at no means, however unhallowed, which fomented their jealousies and forwarded his own machinations. He was deep in the arts of deception; and with the

blandishment of a courtier, he often acted with the barbarity of a savage.

The Macedonian phalanx was different in some respects from the phalanx of the Greeks. It was formidable,—almost irresistible, as moved into action on proper ground, as adjusted correctly in tactical order, and as cemented scientifically by correspondence of physical power. The Macedonian nation apparently bound in feudal servitude was, prior to the time of Philip, dispersed among mountains, and principally occupied in watching herds of sheep or cattle. As pastoral, it was poor, homely in attire, and unacquainted with the arts of civilized life. It had even so little energy, and so little knowledge of war that its flocks, which were its sole property, were exposed to the daily depredation of the warlike barbarians who lived contiguous. In this state of things, Philip who was a man of talent,—a philosopher and a tactician, succeeded to the throne of Macedonia. His subjects were ignorant and credulous. He allured them from the mountains where they dwelt, collected them into towns, stimulated them to exertion by infusing into them the spirit of aggrandizement; even succeeded in persuading them that war was glory, and that robbery was an honourable employment for man. The Macedonian peasant thus deluded, and transplanted to a new soil by art or force, was marshalled in military array under sound principles of military science. A spirit of ambition, or desire for spoil was infused into him; and that spirit, aided by new arms and armour and a new mode of arrangement for battle, exalted him to a high rank among the warriors of his time. Ambition of conquest was the motive of Philip's activity, and no moral barrier, as already said, stood in the way of accomplishing his purpose. With a fine appearance, a commanding eloquence, and the quality of swallowing a large quantity of wine without beastly intoxication,

Philip was the idol of his countrymen:—he was even admired by the polished nations of Greece. He had the skill of a mathematician in combining and applying different powers to mechanical purposes; and he had the knowledge of a philosopher in discriminating characters and profiting by the prejudices and ignorances of mankind. By the help of the acquirements alluded to, he was enabled to select and organize a formidable army. The order of his arrangement was laid on a principle of science; and the materials of which he had the command were, as new men, easily moulded to his will. They were simple, as emerging from barbarism, ardent and of strong conception as men unaccustomed to the artificial refinements of civilization and the luxuries of high living;—as such, they were fit subjects for the rugged trade of war. They did not perhaps reflect or reason: they followed the impulse of the aggrandizing propensity of human nature, and credulously believed that the splendour of conquest constituted their own glory, while it was in reality that of their leader only. Philip was systematic; and, like other system framers, he permitted no genius except his own to expand and flourish; consequently Philip's officers were for the most part mere instruments of execution.

The life of the hunter and shepherd may be justly considered as a primary school of war; and, as the Macedonians were hunters and shepherds, they were good materials for the formation of an army intended for offensive operations. Philip had conquest in his eye as the end of all his pains and labours; and, as he was a deep politician, he contrived, with much address, to inspire his people with a similar passion. The brilliant period of the military glory of the states of Greece was past when Philip made his appearance in Macedonia. The moral was degenerated; and military science, though still studied systematically, had lost much of the spirit which animates and urges

to bold undertaking. The Athenians had declined in virtue and warlike energy: they still remained enterprizing and generous defenders of human liberty. The Spartans, though recently discomfited and consequently humbled, were still military, and, in point of discipline, before the other states of Greece. Philip was a man of penetration; and, ambitious of conquest as he was, he appears to have considered it to be a rash attempt to enter into direct war with the Greeks on what may be called an equal footing. He sought for artificial means to aid his purpose, and in doing so he seems to have thought and reasoned; and in consequence of thinking and reasoning, perhaps, he discovered the way of influencing the sensibilities or fears of the enemy by appearances of novelty, and at the same time of infusing confidence into his followers by modelling the tactic into a form which carried with it an air of originality. He condensed his phalanx in such a manner that it scarcely could be resisted in its forward course, or penetrated when drawn up in position. He changed or improved the armour, both for offence and defence; and, though he built his structure on the base of the Spartan phalanx, he increased the power of it in such a manner that the Spartan must, from mechanical necessity, yield at the point of conflict. With this instrument formed on knowledge of mechanical powers, directed by military skill, and aided by numerous contingencies which chance presents and genius applies, Greece submitted to his power, and Asia trembled for her safety, when his career was arrested by the hand of an assassin. Alexander succeeded to the throne.—He was young and ambitious, and prosecuted the views of his father with ardour; in fact carried them into execution with zeal, and with an éclat that is still without parallel in the history of mankind.

The eclat of the expeditions and conquests of Alexander is unparalleled. His acts so far transcend the common history of conquerors that they are considered by many as acts of romance. They are notwithstanding true. There is positive evidence that Alexander not only over ran, but that he conquered and organized in a very short time an immense tract of country between the Hellespont and the Indus; and, if we consider the perfection of the discipline, the precision of the tactic, and the devotion of the troops to a leader, who not only possessed military skill from science, but who possessed such a share of intuitive military genius as few military leaders appear to have possessed, the doubt vanishes; and the military events, however extraordinary at first sight, appear to be natural consequences of the correct measure and just application of the means employed. Many of Alexander's acts were hazardous, and some of them were rash; but the plans of his great battles were laid on a base of science, and applied in experiment with a precision that excites wonder. It requires more penetration, and more military knowledge than the writer possesses, to detect error in the combination of his great movements; and, as the plans were scientific, there is no instance of defective precision in the application of them where he was himself present. The phalanx was impenetrable. It might in fact be deemed a citadel: the archers were excellent,—expert and bold: the cavalry were the best of the time; and, while all were perfect in tactic and correct in discipline for purposes of movement, they were united as one man by exemplary devotion to their chief.

Arrian, an historian not unworthy of Alexander, describes the campaigns so circumstantially, and at the same time with so much candour and freedom, that we are enabled to form a pretty fair esti-

mate of this conqueror's character, both military and political; and also to form some idea of the perfection to which tactic, discipline and the military art had arrived in the Macedonian army at the commencement of the war with Darius. No military machine was ever better adjusted in its parts, and none, notwithstanding that it consisted of many different nations and people, was ever perhaps so well animated in all its extent as the army of Alexander. The sieges and passages of rivers shew skill, resource, constancy; in short, all the qualities that are necessary to constitute a great general. The intrepidity, perseverance and exertion of the soldiery have scarcely a parallel in history. The length of the marches on some occasions, the constancy and firmness on many were they not well authenticated could not be credited, if we allow ourselves to form judgment of probabilities by the powers and temper of the present race of men, even of the best of them.

The motive, which urged the Macedonian to invade the Persian dominions, was said to be retaliation for the insults offered to Greece at former times;—it was in reality the ambition of conquest. The enterprize was undertaken at so great apparent hazard, that military calculators of moderate capacity would probably pronounce it to be the enterprize of a madman. It was conducted in a bold and masterly manner under the highest discipline, and with the greatest ardour that was ever perhaps witnessed in war,—and it succeeded completely. The paramount power of Alexander's genius maintained the Macedonians steadily in the forward path to conquest and glory. The soldiers were credulous, superstitious and open to imposture: as a new people emerging from barbarism, they were ardent in their pursuits. Alexander, who was politic and discerning of human character, acted on their credulity, and occupied them so much in combat, or in military evolutions preparatory to combat, that they

were not permitted to think and reason. They moved in the path into which they had been conducted without reflection, and pursued the phantom of glory through many difficulties. But, taught by dear bought experience that conquest and glory do not constitute happiness, and that the ambition of their master had no limit, they recollected their homes, refused to proceed, and obliged the son of Jupiter Ammon to desist from the prosecution of undefined conquests in unknown countries. A man of less genius and less force of mind than Alexander would have lost his command, and probably his life on this occasion; but a heroism, which was beyond the measure of men's conception, assured submission, and repressed murmurs in the midst of the greatest hardships and sufferings which human nature can sustain.—Alexander died prematurely; but he lived too long for his reputation. In military science, he had perhaps no superior; and in intuitive genius and heroism he is equalled only by Charles of Sweden:—in brutality, he is not surpassed by Peter the great of Russia.

The writer has attempted to give a cursory view of the military system of the three great warlike powers among the Greeks, (viz. Spartans, Athenians and Macedonians). The spirit, or principle of the system was different in each; the execution was admirable in all according to the principle on which it was laid.

Remark.

The spirit of the Spartan military institution was just; the plan of execution correct. The protection of the country considered as unity, and, as such equally interesting to the soldier in the ranks and the sovereign on the throne, was here the ostensible motive for preparing a military instrument of defence. The materials of the instrument were put together according to knowledge of man in all his relations—physical and moral; and the structure, when complete, was applied to its purpose with skill—and generally with success, in

so much that the Spartan military system may be considered in spirit, tactic and discipline, as the basis of military institution—in fact, the sum of military excellence in so far as it goes.

The Athenian institution was original; but it was of another cast. The Spartan machine was correctly organized, and it moved according to a rule of order which maintained every part in its station; the Athenian was comparatively loose. It moved by impulses. The separate parts were susceptible, but susceptible in different degrees of perfection, the general and great political acts only appearing among the Athenians by strong and domineering causes, acting on and absorbing as it were all the sympathies in one. Every Athenian was a man in himself: he thought, reasoned and acted for himself. The combined act was often tumultuary from this cause; but, when all the parts were excited by a common impulse and directed by a common sympathy, the movement was grand and animated, and the effect was irresistible. It is to the animating spirit of liberty and pride of independence, to bodily activity and superiority of intelligence, to the desire of fraternizing, as it is termed, and diffusing liberty and happiness among other nations that the Athenians owed their success in war. They were often generous and great; sometimes dissipated and forgetful; but upon the whole they were a noble people, possessing more compass of mind and more of the sympathies of human nature than any other nation can be allowed to boast. As military, the Athenian phalanx was good—inferior only to the Spartan. The light armed, viz. target and spear-men were excellent, active and intelligent, brave and prompt. They harrassed and annoyed, and on some occasions, especially on broken and irregular ground, they discomfited the Spartan phalanx itself.

The Macedonian military instrument was different in spirit and construction from either of the former. The Spartan army was sys-

tematically organized on a constitutional basis, through observation and knowledge of the effects of correspondence among physical powers and moral propensities; and it was held in union by the sacred name of country. The Athenian was organized as it were contingently.—Its power consisted in revolutionary energy, its bond of union in love of liberty. The Macedonian was an artificial machine, the instrument of a despot, formed for the accomplishment of purposes of ambition. The parts were passive; that is, they had no action of their own, either as a consequence of individual feeling, or as a constitutional sentiment from national institution. Obedience was rigorously exacted; and it was assured by extinguishing the faculty of reflection. The talent, which is powerful to execute, found a place in the Macedonian military system, and was cherished as a subservient quality; the genius, which presumes to think, if it did appear, did not exist with safety. The physical materials of the Macedonian army were various. They were examined and tried, their powers measured, and the adjustment in the fabric made according to the measure of power. The mind, or that sense of feeling which gives animation to human acts, was studied, its perception levelled to a common standard, and its activity directed to a common channel by rigorous force. An automaton was thus formed of human materials, the action of which was mechanically correct as impelled by external impulse,—principally the fear of punishment.—The construction of this instrument, which moved solely by the voice of the leader, was the work of Philip of Macedon; at least, if he was not the first who assumed the idea, he was the first who carried it to systematic perfection on a great scale; and he is not yet perhaps equalled as a tactician by any of his numerous successors,—not even by Frederick the Second of Prussia, the most celebrated tactician of the last century.

If the Greek system of military tactic, discipline and evolution be studied and traced to its principles, it will appear to have been laid on a scientific basis, and to have been carried to as high perfection in execution as human powers can well go. No people of whom we have knowledge possessed such a share of intellect as the Greeks. They were intelligent; and their bodily powers stood high in the scale of exertion. War was their study; and, with the advantages which they derived from nature, the perfection which the art attained under their experience is not more than what might have been expected. The invention of gunpowder, and the use of fire-arms introduced changes into the mode by which man destroys his fellow man; but there is no principle, in the science of the art, yet known that was not known to the Greeks in the time of Alexander. Precision, and promptness of execution in manœuvre exceeded in perfection what the most distinguished of the moderns have yet attained. This is strongly demonstrated in the retreat of ten thousand Greeks from Persia, under the direction of the Athenian general Xenophon. The undertaking was a bold one; and, if the result were not well authenticated, we should scarcely have thought it to be a possible one; for, judging by the histories of the present time, we may safely say that the finest of our modern armies would have gone to pieces under half the difficulties that presented themselves to the ten thousand. The masterly retreat of this band, though a strong, is not the sole example of the discipline and energy of Greek soldiers. The army of Alexander performed marches and sustained fatigues with a discipline and resolution which astonishes, and which forces us to confess that we are as yet only children in the management and practice of war. The Greek nation possessed physical powers of the first order; and its armies derived advantages over the most of modern armies from the mode of their organization. The Greek force was

classed by tribes. The physical correspondence of powers, thus known by observation, were adjusted by a rule of knowledge; and the moral propensities, predominant in the tribe, were united in the common act by the tactician's foresight. Those of the Greeks who were mercenary, fought in bands, under a similar impression as the modern Swiss, or the Brigands of the middle ages. Their conduct was often heroic; and, as war was their trade, they were not only skilled in war and expert in the use of arms, but they were men of faith and honour according to their rule: as such, they were different from the mercenaries of modern times, who are levelled to an equality of brute power and held together by the external impression of fear, or bribe of money. The Greek, though a mercenary, had a sentiment of honour,—a high sense of independent military virtue, and an innate veneration for liberty. In taste and literature, the Greeks are unrivalled. In military tactic, discipline, economy, and even in manœuvre, Greek history is the school of the soldier. The picture of Spartan dignity, of Athenian spirit and generosity, warms the military mind to enthusiasm; and, while it warms it to enthusiasm, it maintains it in the path of honour by the prominence of the example to which the eye is directed.

CHAPTER IV.

ROMAN.

THE origin of the Roman empire, like the origin of most others, is veiled in obscurity. Its earlier history is a tissue of fable and truth, so interwoven with each other that they scarcely can be separated. Romulus, the founder of it, was no more in his origin than a free-

booter; but freebooting and predatory warfare being, in that age of the world, a prominent occupation of the human race, no disgrace attached to the practice of it; on the contrary, the usurpation of power and the establishment of dominion by force of arms were held to be the qualities of superior men. Romulus, as the chief of a band of adventurers, may be supposed to have been a man of great daring; and it may be concluded, from what he achieved, that he was a man of great talent. He possessed extended views of policy; and he succeeded in establishing dominion over the minds of his followers by the fascination which attaches to genius, or by intimidation, derived from the power which he had tyrannically usurped. The banks of the Tiber are regarded as the place of his birth and the cradle of his greatness. When he ripened into manhood and his destinies began to expand, he chose a position, near his native river, as a strong hold for the protection of his followers and the reception of their booty, surrounded it with a wall and dignified it with the name of *City*.

The bond, which had united Romulus with his followers in the unsettled and vagabond life of freebooters, acquired power in the new city. It there assumed the name of government; and the first record of the proceedings, as noted by the historian Livy, furnishes an example of a well digested system of military organization. Every individual of the freebooting band was efficient; and, to every individual, under the primary constitution of the organization, stations and functions were assigned. The body politic was thus a whole, constituted on a base of reciprocal connexion, and prepared to move in action through a common desire to extend the sphere by force of arms. Thus, as all parts were incorporated, all participated in the act, and all shared in the result according to rank and condition. Romulus, who was no more than the captain of the band originally, was constituted its sovereign in due form; and aiming, or suspected of

aiming at constituting himself its tyrant, he disappeared in a thunder storm,—supposed to have been murdered by his council or senate.

The Romans were little more during the life of Romulus than organized robbers. They do not appear to have acknowledged any other law in their external relations except the law of force; and they would, it may be presumed, have fallen to pieces like other robbers, had not a change been effected in their moral conduct through the institutions of Numa. Numa, who was elected sovereign at the death of Romulus, was a retired and studious man. It may be presumed that he had observed the laws of nature with care, and that he endeavoured to investigate and appreciate the causes which preserve good order and harmony among men. We conclude that he discovered, in his researches into nature, that all living things are destined to move in defined spheres, and that every egression from the sphere constitutes an error, which lays the foundation of premature destruction to the individual, or the aggregate of individuals who form political association. This balance of equality among the parts, which exists and acts by the same law in the social aggregate as in the individual frame, appears to have made impression on the mind of the newly elected king; who, while he recommended the observance of it to his subjects, gradually and with great address engaged the mind to the contemplation of the ultimate cause of it; and thus opened a view to the contemplation of the Deity as ruler of all human things. Under Romulus, the Romans were literally brigands: under Numa, they became men and citizens of the world, in as much as they were impressed with the sentiment that moral obligation, among men, is a fundamental law in the constitution of things. The impression of this sentiment on the human mind constitutes religion. It is an important impression; but it was not easy, perhaps not possible

to give it the ascendant among a rude people, accustomed to live by the sword on the spoil and plunder of their neighbours. The reason of the thing, in the simplicity of its truth, was not perhaps capable of making impression on a body of people such as the founders of Rome. Pretension, or imposture was therefore called in aid, and pretension, acting on credulity, excited an emotion which ripened into a sentiment and effected every thing. Numa, with much art and some mystery, succeeded in planting a strong and consistent sentiment in the mind, which so far regulated and controuled the moral act that, under its influence, the Romans, from lawless freebooters, became modest and moral citizens. The current of their desires was diverted from pursuits of war and plunder to the channels of right, in imitation of that general law of the Deity which maintains order and harmony in the universe. The laws of Numa, considered abstractedly, are wise and good, and dictated by a spirit of philosophy similar to that of Pythagoras. Through their influence, the environs of Rome were converted, from a scene of war, rapine and bloodshed, to peace and contentment; and the Romans, from a band of robbers, were changed to a society of brothers—religious and affectionate to each other, and respected by those who lived near them.

Of the kings who followed Numa, some were wise, some were warlike, and others were wicked and tyrannical. Tullus was more fierce than even Romulus. He was prompt in war; and, though his character was savage, we must allow him the credit, (if credit it be deemed,) of introducing the Romans into the path of systematic military science. He renewed the warlike spirit which had been for some time dormant; but he did not, by so doing, expel the sentiment of religion which had been engrafted in the mind of the people by the institutions of Numa. Tullus disappeared, after having roused the dormant spirit of war; and Ancus, one of his successors, conceiving

a plan of conquest or military progression, conducted it on a basis of science, so as to give form and stability to the Roman dominion. Colonies were planted in some cases; and in others, the conquered were removed to the metropolis. It is in this reign that the declaration of war by herald was adopted,—a declaration which constitutes an important era in the laws of military honour.

Next to Numa, Servius Tullus deserves to be regarded as the most distinguished of the Roman kings. He was eminent for his virtues and accomplishments:—he might, in fact, be considered as an enlightened prince in an enlightened age. He organized the political relations of the state with an appearance of knowledge and deep consideration; and he formed a system of equipment and preparation for war which proves him to have been a man of no mean capacity. He established a census, divided the population into classes, and adjudged military services according to the quantity of property which the individual possessed, and even made improvements in the armour, education and tactic of troops. He was not only respectable, but eminent among kings. He was murdered by his son-in-law Tarquin, at an advanced age, and while he was in the prosecution of his benevolent labours.—Tarquin assumed the sovereignty. He was one of the most insolent and vicious of tyrants in the records of history; and, such was the power of his means, the address and skill with which he applied them, that there is reason to believe he would have established absolute despotism at Rome, and reduced the Romans to the most abject of slaves, had not the conduct of his son Sextus, by outraging a sacred right in society, excited the whole mass of the people to revenge. The act,—the violation of the person of a respectable woman, wanton, as it was wicked in mode of execution, roused indignation and united patrician and plebian by common sympathy to pursue its author to punishment. Irritated by

this outrage, the senate and people decreed the expulsion of Tarquin and his family from Rome. The expulsion was effected; but it was not effected without a severe struggle. Tarquin possessed courage and military science; and he was besides a master in the address and artful policy of the Greeks. The Romans had feelings of resentment which united them, determined spirit which supported them; natural sagacity and practical knowledge in the use of arms which enabled them to measure the sword with Tarquin. They were inferior to him in the science of war, and far inferior to him in the manœuvres of politicians, but they were patriotic.

The Roman state, when first formed, might be considered as a compact between military adventurers and their leader. Here every part had a sphere and a function, so that there was no refuse within the incorporated circle. It is inherent in the nature of power, however attained, to arrogate to itself, and to encroach on the rights of others. It belongs to the constitution of man's nature to preserve its sphere, and to resist encroachment. In consequence of these innate propensities in human nature, contentions between the Roman kings and the Roman people were common. The kings usurped; the people resisted. The last appeal, even in royal times, resided in the people in things of national moment; but, as the desire of usurpation never sleeps, the opportunities for encroachment were watched assiduously and applied so successfully that liberty was nearly extinguished at Rome before the abrogation of the royal office. After the expulsion of the kings, the state was new modelled; and a system of government was framed and put in activity, which had some claim to the name of constitution, in as much as every Roman was comprehended within its prescriptions. The chiefs of the executive were elective,—and they were elected annually: the deliberative, or senate was hereditary and permanent. The supreme power, as centering in the people,

existed constitutionally at all times ; but it was only brought forward on important occasions, and it was only impressive through its weight and quantity. The executive was absolute in command,—and as a military executive imperative ; but it rigidly obeyed the constitutional law and, for a time, executed its office with modesty. The senate, in correspondence with the character which attaches to aristocratic privilege, laboured unremittingly to extend its power, or to constitute itself sovereign. The people, constitutionally a part of the state, were firm and confident, and long and strongly resisted oppression. They were even violent at times ; and they aimed on some occasions at revolution, that is, a political arrangement on a new basis. These contentions were violent ; sometimes they threatened danger to the very existence of the state ; but they were upon the whole salutary, as tending to improve the moral condition of man, to establish a basis of liberty, and to form a chain of connexion through all ranks, firm in its foundations and consistent with order and good government.

The Romans were soldiers and field labourers at the early period of their history. Their character was thus formed in the school which gives preeminence to man over his fellows, in as much as it improves physical power, and supplies the means of attaining knowledge of things that are analagous to those which occur in war. The Roman people were simple in manners, observant of good faith, and of the obligations of an oath beyond personal interests, even beyond the preservation of life. They were integral, or constituent members of the state. They claimed freedom at elections, and asserted, with firmness, the rights of their class. They resisted the oppression of the nobles ; and they obtained the means of protection through the appointment of officers to superintend their corporate concerns. These commanded the respect of the aristocracy through a cogent

argument, viz. power supported by numbers. The tribune was the legal protector of the people; but, even in spite of his protection, the tyranny of the usury laws brought many to slavery; and the insolent spirit of aristocracy otherways loaded them with grievous vexations. The noble Roman, like the noble of modern times, regarded the plebian, whatever might be his intrinsic worth, as a being made of coarser clay,—a mixture with whom, by matrimonial alliance, would contaminate the blood for ages, or for ever. This, and other insolences of the patricians, roused the spirit of the people, tried their firmness and maintained a conflict at Rome for many years. The contentions slept under external dangers: they revived when the danger passed over. They threatened revolution on many occasions. But, notwithstanding the evils which they sometimes threatened, they served to improve the mental faculties of both the patrician and plebian:—they are, in fact, to be considered as the efficient cause of the Roman præeminence. The Romans did not possess the fine genius of the Athenians, nor the self denial of the Spartans. Their object throughout was selfish aggrandizement; and they possessed, in an eminent degree, that species of sagacity which conduces most to attain it. The meanest of the plebians was proud of the Roman name: the greater number of them honoured the gods; and were religiously scrupulous in preserving their faith. If they were at any time alarmed, even panic struck by dangers which threatened their country and political constitution, they took refuge under the protecting shield of the Deity; and, thus fortified, by an appeal to the justice of heaven, their resolutions were strong and their acts determined.

The principle, on which the Roman government was laid and on which it moved, may be considered as the innate propensity of human nature to expand its sphere. The motive stimulated the original

founder to attack his neighbours. It operated with more or less force on the different kings who succeeded; and it adhered to the republic as the essence of its constitution in all its history. The desire of conquest was so organized and consolidated into system by the senate as to ensure stability, for the act was in a great measure exempted, in virtue of the corporate constitution, from the contingent weaknesses, folies and vices which attach to individuals.

The Roman state, which was a corporated military constitution formed on an aggrandizing basis, was wise in its proceedings. It was comparatively free, and for a long course of time exempted from the intoxication of power, which stupifies and sends man back to his original obscurity, or to a state even lower than obscurity. It was proud in the glory of its arms; but it was wise in the manner of manifesting it. Its ambition, it is admitted, was great; but it was more rational, and laid on a better basis than that of any other of the conquering people who stand in the page of history. The power and stability of the Roman government were laid on the liberty which belongs to election; and, in the participation which every citizen claimed in the functions of the state. This functionary importance of the people was, as now hinted, the strength of Rome. It produced a soldier who was proud and independent, in as much as he earned glory for himself and for the state, rather than for his imperious temporary commander. The senate, as a corporated aristocracy, laboured without ceasing to augment power and to extend the circle of empire. It contained, among its members, a large proportion of men of sagacity; and it learned from experience that it could only succeed in maintaining sovereignty by cultivating the powers of the mind, so as to give evidence of the superiority of mental endowments over the mass of the people. The people possessed a portion of freedom, strong natural sense and a strong sentiment of virtue and

honour. The nobles were born and educated with high sentiments of prerogative: they were commanders in prospective, and they studied the art of war with diligence. As politicians, they investigated principles, and practised the art of governing by influence of speech, as well as by the authoritative word of command. The senate was sagacious and observing; and measures, which had not been provided for by the wisdom or foresight of the first legislators, were adopted by it as occasions arose through experience or accident. Facts were noted, principles were investigated, and improvements were incorporated into the military system, or rather amalgamated with it so judiciously that it was not easy to see from whence they had been taken. Men who possess liberty are often refractory and sometimes tumultuary. The Roman had liberty, and he was not tame in spirit; but he was susceptible of national honour, and he might be led by means of it to every national enterprize; he even became devoted to the enterprize through the impression of a religious sentiment attaching him to the object. No people in the record of history understood the political power of religion better than the Roman senators, and no state applied it with more decisive effect. It is a blasphemous impiety to suppose that the Deity can be turned, by the prayers and oblations of man, to a purpose that is not right. The laws of heaven are eternal and do not change; but man is changeable, and, if in his difficulties, he fix his eye on an object of eternal truth and justice, he purifies himself and approaches to the object, animated with a new spirit and a courage beyond mere animal courage. The patriot soldier, who looks to heaven for the approbation of his conduct, enters the field of battle with confidence and trust: he executes the duty of his station as a duty enjoined by a superior being,—not dictated by the arbitrary will of a mortal, —weak and liable to error as himself. The individual, or the army

which is moved to act under the impression of a sentiment of this nature may be deemed invincible:—it may be killed entire,—it cannot be conquered.

The sovereign power often employs the religious impression of which man's nature is susceptible as an engine of state; but, as no power ever applied it to more purpose than the Romans, so none ever perhaps acted under it with greater sincerity than the military of that nation. The approbation of the gods was solicited in all great affairs; and, when obtained, it gave confidence in battle, stimulated the individual to acts of valour, and supported courage in discomfiture. It was important to obtain the sanction alluded to. It was supposed to imply a basis of what is just and right, and thus to give confidence; for it was commonly believed that fortune forsook the standards of the army which fought in an unjust cause. The Romans—patrician and plebian, were sincerely religious, observant of the obligation of an oath against worldly interest, even though the oath had been extorted through fear or coercion. The operation of this principle was the guardian of Rome for a long series of years.

If we analyze the Roman soldier, as educated and prepared for war through the influence of political institution, we at once perceive that aggrandizement, or extension of the sphere by direct power was the primary passion of the soul. It was the motive of the founder, and it subsequently acted with force on all who bore the Roman name. The innate animal desire of expansion, which was the motive of Romulus, stimulated the ordinary Roman to act; the spiritual sentiment, or impression of religion engrafted on the Roman character by the institution of Numa, cemented the act so as to give it force and permanence. The Roman was eager to undertake from animal desire, and firm to execute from spiritual institution. It is to this firmness

and constancy, proceeding from the sentiment of religion and the sacredness of the military oath, that Rome owes, in the opinion of the writer, her eminence and her long duration in empire. As the Roman people were in their own nature ambitious of power, and supported in their purpose by the application of a religious sentiment; so their domestic habits, as farmers and labourers, their frugality, and their contentment with competence acquired by the fruits of their labours, contributed eminently to maintain them in a physical and moral condition fit for the execution of their public and private duties. Few Romans,—patrician or plebian, were rich in money or valuable things in the first days of the republic; and, in these days, there were few Romans who did not love their country better than their life. The manners were chaste, the social affections strong, the domestic virtues eminent; and, as the Romans were great among nations, so it is presumed they were comparatively happy among men.

The character of the patrician received its impression from the operation of the same general cause as the plebian; but it received it with advantage. The patrician order constituted an hereditary aristocracy at Rome; and, according to the spirit of aristocratic corporations, it uniformly laboured to extend its sphere, to arrogate power to itself by encroaching on the liberties of inferiors, and to add to the general empire by encroaching on the territory of neighbouring people. The principle of aristocratic corporations is watchful—and here it never slept. The education of the patrician was strictly a political and military education, directed to the attainment of means calculated to influence opinion in the senate, and to command armies in the field. The art of speaking in public assemblies, and the art of conducting armies in the field were thus the chief studies of the higher class;—they were indeed almost its whole occupation. As a race not yet enervated by the effects of the luxury which follows conquest,

the character of the patrician was firm and resolute, the view sagacious, the act condensed and powerful. The Roman people during their virtuous days were under the impression of a strong religious sentiment. The patricians publicly professed it; and, in no far as we can judge, they professed it with more sincerity than the most of those who possess power in the present time. Aggrandizement and political preeminence were the objects of pursuit in the Roman republic. They were pursued with ardour; but the Roman, notwithstanding ambition and desire of power to excess, observed a scrupulous adherence to good faith. He never departed from the obligations of an oath; or, if he did, he did it with fear and trembling; and from causes so urgent that they were deemed irresistible necessities. The fact was strongly exemplified in the war with the Samnites. Faith and honour were there given up to political expediency; but they were given up with reluctance, and the act was so artfully covered by a veil of sophism that the dereliction of the principle was not perceived by the simpler people. The spirit of the Roman soldier could ill brook disgrace; but a Roman could not, at that period of the republic, have supported existence under the formal violation of a promise solemn as an oath. State necessity was urgent; and the Senate, which was honourable, but more ambitious than honourable, employed deception, with a view to render the services of the soldiers, who surrendered at the *furcæ caudinæ*, available to the state. The soldier, believing himself acquitted from his obligation in virtue of the decree of the senate, viz. that the surrender of the consul and chief functionaries fulfilled the condition, hastened to enroll himself under new standards, rushed to the combat with eagerness and avenged his honour with an unexampled fury in a subsequent combat. The soldier was religiously bound to his word, even to his detriment; the senate, though religious and honourable, acting under the impulse

of power, fortified by an opinion of expediency desired and adopted a measure of state policy, which even its own conscience did not approve.

The military preeminence of the Romans was what may be called artificial.—It arose from the operation of laws and morals, the direct result of military institution. The motive which acted on Romulus and his band of freebooters was, as already observed, aggrandizement by force of arms. This motive, in some measure innate in human nature, and ready to be moved into action at all times, was bridled, or reduced into order by the institutions of Numa. It was reanimated by subsequent kings; and the principle became general at a later period by the establishment of a republican form of government. The Romans do not appear to have possessed a physical constitution superior to the neighbouring people of Italy. They were of common stature, rather under than above the standard of the country where they lived. But, though not gigantic in size, the Romans were well made: muscular action was rapid and strong; and, as they were inured from infancy to field labour and military exercises in the open air, they were little sensible of changes of weather: frugal and temperate in manner of living, they were comparatively healthy; they were thus physically fit subjects for the practice of war.

The outline of character now given attaches to the Roman citizen—patrician or plebeian. It was the product of physical, political and moral causes, viz. the result of formal law, domestic habits, and physical constitution. The military preeminence was the fruit of military training and actual practice in war. The Roman, as already observed, was a man of ordinary stature; energetic in action, but not of extraordinary force considered as brute force. The military institution was laid on a scientific basis. The training was conducted by systematic rules calculated to ascertain and measure relative powers,

with a view to render them applicable to general purposes.—The leading points of Roman discipline are only touched in this sketch. Those who cultivate the military art, and occupy themselves with the investigation of the causes which contribute to form the man into the soldier, will study the subject at a higher source.

Recruits for the Roman armies were selected from country labourers in preference to the population of towns. Under the reign of kings, and in the first days of the republic, the soldiers were almost all field labourers; and as such they were simple in manner, and hardy in bodily frame. They were set apart for military life at the age of puberty or early youth,—that is, before the routine of domestic habits had so firmly impressed a character on the constitution of mind and body as to adhere to it through life.

On the subject of selection, some of the Roman tacticians were guided chiefly by appearance and height of stature; others, comparatively regardless of stature, gave preference to strength and energy in actual exertion. Moral character was considered as important to the recruit in all cases; but, it is almost unnecessary to say that moral character belonged to almost every Roman,—plebeian or patrician, in the infancy of the republic. A sentiment of honour, ambition of power and love of glory stimulated the Roman soldier to action: modesty, a sense of shame, or dread of disgrace supported him under difficulty, and rendered him in a manner insensible to danger. The nerves were firm constitutionally; and they were steeled artificially against alarm and panic by an impression of religion which, as sanctioning duty, is paramount to all impressions.

The Roman recruit was selected as a person fit for war in the view of constitutional qualities; he was drilled according to rule by the estimate which was formed of capacities; and, when completely drilled, he was placed in the ranks by tribe, according to the corres-

pondence of physical powers and mental sympathies—not according to the resemblances of exterior form. The just correspondence of the limbs in movement constitutes the basis of military tactic; and, on this head, the practice of the Romans was rigorous, methodical and exact. Twenty thousand paces, in five hours, constituted the ordinary rate of marching in the Roman army; twenty-four thousand paces, in five hours, constituted the march of alert or exertion. The rate which exceeds twenty-four thousand paces in five hours constitutes running. The measure of running cannot be defined: the practice of it was here executed in cadence, and executed with great precision. Besides exercise in marching on common roads and in champaign countries, the soldier was accustomed to march, and trained to run at different rates of velocity on irregular grounds, careful at the same time to preserve the order of the ranks unbroken. He was practised in leaping, for the purpose of improving the powers of exertion and giving knowledge of their extent, whether with a view to be applied to the surmounting of walls and leaping ditches, or of clearing impediments that interpose themselves to the military route. The soldier marched on ordinary occasions at the rate of twenty thousand paces in the space of five hours; and he marched at this rate under a load of sixty pounds weight of baggage. The load may appear at first sight to be oppressive:—it is so in a very inferior degree only in actual trial. If the weight be so placed as to bear equally on all parts of the body, the difference of fatigue in a steady march, loaded or unloaded is not material, as estimated at the end of the journey. This the writer knows by experience; and he may add that, if an enemy appear in the course of the march, the soldier, as disencumbered from his load, has a feeling of lightness and buoyancy as if he had risen from restraint, or acquired a new accession of strength by release from pressure. Besides the pains which were taken, in the course of training, to improve the powers

of the limbs, so as to sustain the fatigues of marching in order and cadence, the art of swimming was taught systematically, and practised assiduously, so as to be available for every contingency of service. The exercises, now mentioned, were parts of training, and the manner in which they were conducted, while subservient to the military purpose, increased bodily strength, improved health, and steeled the habit against vicissitudes of heat and cold, or the effects of rain and scorching suns.

The Roman manual consisted of various parts of exercise, which were more or less connected with each other, and which were generally interesting to the soldier, in as much as the utility, in application to practice in actual war, was distinctly figured to the learner's mind. The exercise at the stake was considered as the first exercise in the system of training. The recruit was furnished with an osier shield and a wooden club, each of them double the weight of the military shield and military sword. With this hurdle and club, he approached the stake as he would have approached an enemy, practising all modes of attack, and, in all his attacks, taking care to leave no parts of his own body unguarded. He submitted to the exercise at the stake twice a day, viz. in the morning and in the afternoon. It was an important exercise,—regarded in some measure as the rudiment of military training. The Roman recruit was principally instructed in the mode of giving point; for the Romans knew that wounds inflicted by the edge are comparatively less mortal than wounds which are given by the point, particularly where the more vulnerable parts of the body are protected by armour. It is further to be remarked in this place, that those who acquired knowledge in the use of arms with facility, and who attained dexterity in the practice of the customary manœuvres, were constituted temporary teachers and rewarded with a double ration; that those, who were slow in learning, were fed with barley instead of wheat, and

restricted to that species of food until their proficiency was acknowledged. After a certain degree of perfection was attained in the exercise at the stake, the recruit was instructed and practised in throwing the javelin,—a practice which was continued until a reasonable certainty in striking the object was attained. The art of shooting with arrows was taught scientifically; also the art of using the sling. In latter times, leaden bullets were substituted for stones, and actions of considerable extent appear, in the declining days of the empire, to have been decided by that form of missile force alone. Besides the exercises now mentioned, the recruit, and even the trained soldier was exercised carefully in mounting on horseback with arms, viz. sword drawn, or pike couched in an attitude for striking. He mounted on the right or left, in fact in any way that occasion presented. For this purpose, wooden horses were placed under cover in winter, and in the open field in summer. The recruit practised vaulting without arms; and when he was capable of doing this with facility, he commenced vaulting with arms, and finally in an attitude for action guarding himself at the same time as if he were in the ranks of the enemy.

The Roman soldier was armed in the earlier period of the republic, and protected by armour similar to that of the Greeks and neighbouring states of Italy. After he became stipendiary, and war began to be prosecuted systematically with a professed view to territorial conquest, the arms, armour and order of tactic submitted to occasional changes. Hints of improvement were borrowed, even from enemies. They were resolved to their principles, and incorporated into the existing system. No practice was adopted or servilely copied from another, without the manner being understood in which it acted through all its connexions:—the Roman tacticians amalgamated foreign excellencies: the base of the Roman system was still preserved.

The armour of the infantry soldier consisted, in the best days of the republic, of a shield, a helmet, a coat of mail and an iron boot or greve for the right leg: the arms consisted of a pike, a javelin, a sword and dagger. The body was thus well protected, and the weapons of offence seem, on a close consideration of reasons, to be particularly well contrived for execution. The Roman sword is a decisive weapon; strong and short, it is under the power of the arm in most situation, whether for offence or defence.

A Roman soldier, single or combined with others, might be considered as a model for the practice of war—in armour, arms and dexterity. The Roman army, as now modelled in the wars with the Latins, and improved in all its arrangements by the light of science, consisted of three orders or lines, viz. *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*. To each of these orders, a certain number of cavalry and skirmishers, viz. bowmen and slingers, were attached for the defence of the wings and the annoyance of the advancing enemy. The *hastati* were placed in front, that is, they formed the first line in the order of battle; the *principes* were drawn up directly in rear; the *triarii* were behind the *principes*. The first line was close, and compact with a view to sustain attack; the second was open, with a view to receive the first into its intervals when forced to retire, the third was still more open than the second, so as to be capable of receiving the whole, when the necessity of retiring occurred. The third line filled up and rendered compact by the accession of the *principes* and *hastati*, remained in position, either to sustain the attack of the enemy, or to advance upon him suddenly and furiously when he approached near his station. It seems to be implied in the fundamental arrangement of the plan of the Roman battle, that the *hastati*, when overpowered, should retire upon the *principes*; and that the whole, when they could no longer resist, should fall back upon the *triarii*. This seems to be the original

view ; but the Romans appear in practice, like the generals of modern times, to have oftener supported the first lines by bringing up the reserve, than to have retired upon it with a view to sustain an attack in position ; or to advance from position upon the advancing enemy as a tyger springing upon its prey from a lurking place.

The question of bringing up the reserve, or of a retiring upon it is a curious and important one. It deserves the attentive consideration of military men who have seen war, who have studied its principles, and who know the power of appearances on the sensibilities of human nature, in spite of all that can be done by art to counteract. A soldier, who obliges his enemy to leave his position, advances in pursuit of him with an accession of courage, in belief of his superiority ; and the soldier, who retires from an advancing enemy, retires with diminished courage under an impression of his weakness. This is fact ; but, while admitted as fact, it is also to be observed that, if the advancing soldier gain confidence, he often loses that closeness and compactness of order which gives strength in the shock of battle ; and it is also known that, as flushed with success and light in heart, if he meet with an enemy unexpectedly rushing to a charge as in recoil, he is liable to be struck with surprise, to retrograde in his turn,—and not unfrequently to fly. There are few people of military experience who may not have seen something of this kind ; and, if the case be viewed in all its bearings, the plan of the Roman order of battle must be admitted to be excellent, if the front ranks be good, and the *triarii* genuine veterans who are not appalled at appearances of danger. If this be not the case, the plan is hazardous, even so far hazardous as to commit ordinary troops to total route.—The historian Livy has described the Roman order of battle with precision, previously to the action with the Latins ; and he has given an example of the effect of this arrangement in that affair, which the military reader may peruse in the original, if he be so disposed.

The primary education of the Roman soldier was, as has been briefly stated, conducted in such a manner as to improve the capacity, and to ascertain the extent of the power of the individual, with a view to attain the knowledge of adapting him correctly to his place in the military instrument. The disposition of the instrument, and the application of its different parts in the field of battle appear to have been resolved to principles, and, adjusted to purposes with scientific knowledge. The system was in fact a whole, founded on knowledge of man's capacities, physical and moral. All the movements were under influence of something that was common to every Roman, things being so presented by the commander that every man, of common capacity, was qualified to form opinion of the purpose and utility of what was doing. This is scientific training. When the soldier was considered as perfect in the primary part of education, he was led to the practice of evolution and complex movement; viz. to open and close the ranks with facility and with safety; to preserve distances while moving at an equal and cadenced step; to double with rapidity and with order; to form the square with celerity; and, from the square to pass suddenly to the triangle or wedge. The practice of forming and moving in the *hollow circle* was also recommended—and to a certain extent practised; in a word, pains were taken by the drill that the young soldier should comprehend the principle on which he was directed to act, as well as the purpose for which he was required to submit to modes of acting which implied severity. The Roman soldiers, fully accoutred and armed at all points, were obliged three times in the month, with a view that they might be always fit for field service, to march ten thousand paces from the camp and to return the same distance, part of it at the ordinary military pace, and part of it at the accelerated pace;—and this they were accustomed to do, not only on the plain but on rugged and broken grounds.

The Roman legion was the basis of the Roman army ;—in fact an army in itself, well adjusted, by its composition, to meet the contingencies of war in all its presentations. The legion, so named from selection, consisted of Romans. An additional force of auxiliaries was attached to it,—at first allied and national, latterly mercenary and composed of the vagabonds of all nations. The legion was divided into cohorts. It was, as now said, an army in miniature, possessing every description of force that is employed in war, viz. skirmishers of all kinds, cavalry and solid lines of heavy armour. The numerical establishment of the Roman legion appears to have varied at different times ; and it would also appear that changes had taken place in the manner of bringing it into the field of battle. The subject is obscure ; and, as the writer does not presume to solve the difficulties that attach to it, or reconcile the disagreement which is found among historians in their incidental observations on the Roman armies, he simply transcribes the detail of the composition from Vegetius, a professed writer on the military art, who lived at a period of the Roman empire when the institutions were known and formally practised, but when the spirit which animated them in the early days of the republic was gone. According to Vegetius, the legion consisted of ten cohorts. The first cohort, to which the grenadier company of modern battalions bears some analogy, was stronger in number and higher in estimation than the others :—it was entrusted with the care of the eagle. The ranks of this cohort contained eleven hundred and five infantry, to which were added one hundred and thirty two horsemen in mail.—It was the head of the legion ; and, when the order of battle was formed, the other cohorts dressed their ranks by it. The second cohort contained five hundred and fifty-five foot, and sixty-six horse ; the third, the fourth and the fifth the same number. Those of the third, as the centre cohort, and those of the fifth, as

the left of the line, were selected on account of strength and valour.—These five cohorts constituted the first line. The sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth consisted, each of five hundred and fifty-five foot and sixty-six horse. The whole amount of the legion was thus six thousand and one hundred foot, seven hundred and twenty-six horse. It was raised to a higher number on some occasions, some of the other cohorts, besides the first, being filled up to a thousand or eleven hundred and five.

The legion had officers of different ranks; some to command in action; others to attend to economical concerns in the camp and field. The arrangements were systematic, apparently designed with foresight and knowledge of the subject in all its latitude. Among others, the causes, assigned by Vegetius for the selection of the centurion, are so distinctly noted and so important in themselves, that it is matter of surprize that they have not been adopted, as grounds of selection, by nations who are ambitious of that eminence in war which only can be attained by a good army.—It was required for instance that the centurion be of good stature, that he possess muscular power, so as to be capable of throwing the spear and other missiles with precision and to strike with effect, that he be skilled to use the sword dexterously and vigorously in offence, and to manage the shield adroitly in defence; in fact, that he be acquainted with every thing that belongs to arms, and moreover that he be sober, vigilant, active, more prompt to act than to speak, zealous to maintain his company in discipline, to enforce the regular practice of military exercises, and to take care that the whole be properly clothed and provided with good shoes.

Vegetius describes very minutely the field disposition of the legion as prepared to meet the enemy. The disposition may be considered as a description of the Roman order of battle; and on that account it is here

transcribed. The cavalry were placed on the wings; the line of battle was dressed on the first cohort which was stationed on the right; the second cohort was formed on the left of the first, the third occupied the centre; the fourth was on the left of the third; and the fifth on the left of whole, so as to constitute the left flank. The heavy armour consisted of helmet, coat of mail, boots, shield, sword, dagger, leaded javelins in the shield, and two other missile weapons,—one called *pilum* with a triangular head of iron nine inches in length and a shaft of five feet and a half, another called *verriculum* or *verrutum*, with a head of five inches, and a shaft of three feet and a half. The first rank, *hastati*; the second *principes*: behind these the whole host of light armed. The *triarii* fully armed, and couched as a tyger to spring upon its prey, were placed behind the whole. When the order of battle was formed, the first and second rank, or *principes* and *hastati* remained in position: the *triarii* rested upon the knee: the skirmishers provoked the enemy to battle; and, if their efforts caused him to retire, they followed and annoyed him in the retreat. If they were unequal to resist, they retired behind their own line. The heavy armed then took up the combat, and fought with sword and javelin. They remained in position as a wall of iron. If the enemy fled, they did not follow: the pursuit was committed to the light armed and cavalry.

The economical regulations of the Roman armies appear, from the testimony of Vegetius, to have been digested with a correct systematic knowledge of all the concerns of military life. Among others, the formation of a stock purse for every cohort, and a general purse for the whole legion, may be considered as one of the wisest military measures that has, perhaps, ever been practised by a military power to beget a mercenary attachment to the service. It made a family, and created a common property, maintained sympathy and union, common view and common purpose through all the parts of the corps.

Promotion moved in a circle through the different parts of the legion according to an established rule; for instance, the promotion was from the first cohort to the tenth; and, from the tenth, it rolled back to the first through all the cohorts in succession, with better pay and higher rank in the successive gradations as it advanced to the right. By this means, the captain of the first cohort was intimately and experimentally acquainted with the character and condition of every cohort in the legion:—the whole was in fact organized with knowledge of the qualities of individuals, and of the operation of the causes which beget mutual sympathies and mutual dependence.

The writer has endeavoured to bring together some points of information concerning the Roman army, which, he believes may assist the young reader, in forming opinion respecting the causes which acted upon the military character of that people, and which carried it to a point of eminence which the military character of other nations has rarely, if ever, attained. The impression, which characterized the Romans through all their history, was received from the original compact which obtained among freebooters. The act of their combination was direct rapine of goods, and direct subjection of the owners in literal sense and meaning. This was the simple and direct rule at the outset; it became complicated in the course of time. There is no state, within the annals of history, that appears to have been so well calculated by constitution for subduing nations, and for maintaining them permanently in subjection after they were subdued, as the Roman. The senate had a long life as an aristocratic corporation. Its object was acquisition of territory, and its sagacity, aided by the commanding tone of deceptious philanthropy which it often assumed, knew to consolidate what it acquired on a comparatively solid base. The love of liberty is inherent in mankind; and, though the Romans might gain a battle by superior generalship, superior valour, or

superior skill in the use of arms, the conquest of a country, and submission of the people could only be assured through fear or illusion. It was attempted to be assured in the present case by planting colonies with citizens and soldiers; and by granting, to the subdued, subordinate privileges which flattered vanity by admitting them to what was called fraternization.

The Roman military character retained, throughout its existence, the stamp of its original impression. It was rendered respectable, at an early period, through the operation of religious sentiment ingrafted upon it by the institutions of Numa. The physical constancy of the material was secured by frugal and modest habits which belonged to domestic life: its power was excited to exertion through emulation in glory, or through fear of powerful neighbours. The people of Italy, more particularly the Latins and Samnites, were not inferior to the Romans in physical force and courage. They were superior in general knowledge and liberal arts: they were inferior through defect of vigour in their constitutional government. The obligations of the religious sentiment were there comparatively weak; and the executive, among the Latins and Samnites, did not assume the prompt and condensed decision which it did among the Romans. The Roman command was absolute in the field: it was impartially and rigorously executed. The punishment, which the consul inflicted on his own son for acting without order, appears at first sight to be savage and inhuman. It was in fact an act of virtue of unparalleled value; for it is to rigour in the execution of laws that Rome owes her safety and her eminence.

The Roman military character was formed and perfected under the wars which were carried on with neighbouring states in Italy. While the Romans fought within the confines of Italy, against Latins, Samnites and Gauls, they might be considered as, in some measure,

fighting for independence ; and, though a system of conquest was even then in the view of the senate, the causes which provoke war were so disguised, and so artfully presented to the people, that they believed in the opinion that war was defensive, necessary and just. The Roman military character, in the early periods of the republic, was national ; the service voluntary or levied ; the expence personal. The expence was sustained with difficulty on many occasions ; and, in relief of the difficulty, it was decreed that the soldier should be supported by an allotted salary. The boon was received with acclamation,—and its first effect most probably gave an increase of energy to war. But, though tactic and mechanical execution may be reasonably supposed to have been rendered more perfect as a consequence of more entire devotion to military pursuits, and exemption from the care of providing subsistence ; yet, if we read the Roman history with attention, we can scarcely fail to observe the commencement of military degeneracy soon after the troops became stipendiary ; and particularly soon after war was undertaken solely for dominion over independent nations. In the second Punic war, the Roman army, though perfectly drilled in all ordinary manœuvres, appears to have lost much of its national value. Its frugality, its modesty, and its high sentiment of religion disappeared. These virtues did not in fact stand higher among the Roman soldiery than among the soldiery of the enemy, which was professedly mercenary. We have no evidence to justify us in saying that the moral virtues of the commanders for Rome were superior to those for Carthage ; and, if the moral virtues were not superior, the military virtues of no one, except perhaps Marcellus and Scipio, made any approach to those of Hannibal.

The Romans, whether pressed by difficulty, or urged by the desire of conquest, encroached on the vitals of the constitution in the

second Punic war. The purity of election was corrupted, and the people were rendered instruments of faction through deception. Scipio was personally amiable,—and he possessed military genius; but he was ambitious; and, as he was popular, he may be considered as the first who opened the road to systematic corruption at Rome. Through his great qualities and popular manners, he stepped over the boundary of the laws and usages of the republic; and, as such, he gave example that a leader might rule the nation by party or unfair means. The humiliation of Carthage at the termination of the second Punic war, and its final overthrow in the third, accelerated the decay of virtue among the Roman people. The object of the Roman government was now declared to be subjugation of all the nations of the earth; and, in the attempt to execute it all the institutions of the republic were overturned. The armies ceased to be national; and the state, after being deluged in blood by the rancorous ambition of contending factions, sunk into abject slavery under the most fortunate of the rival chiefs:—he was dignified with the name of emperor. —The military history of the Romans possesses little interest after the termination of the second Punic war. The ambitious spirit of the government was flagrant: the spirit of the soldiery was licentious, rapacious and mercenary. The picture was occasionally enlivened by the prominence of a great character, and sometimes relieved by the contemplation of a good one; but, upon the whole, the scene was corrupt, morals were disgusting, civil liberty extinguished, and the human character sunk latterly to the lowest point of degradation under the despotism of vicious tyrants. Rome was respectable; and she might be held to be invincible, as founded on a republican base, and supported by equal laws executed with unrelenting severity. She lost sight of her original, became aristocratic and factionary, finally monarchical, or despotic, and sunk into the dust in the midst of mortifi-

cations. Her fate, though striking, is a common fate, such as happens to every nation which violates the barrier of political justice, by encroaching on the rights of its neighbours.

CHAPTER V.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE MIDDLE AGE.

THE Roman empire arose from small beginnings, extended itself widely; and, as extended beyond just bounds, it was preserved with difficulty from falling to pieces. It was unweildy by its magnitude, and exposed to dangers by the character of the heterogenous materials which were latterly introduced into it. It split into two empires, viz. one in the west, of which Rome was the capital; and one in the east, the centre or capital of which was fixed at Byzantium, a locality beautiful beyond description. The empire in the west declined daily in vigour, and lost respect. Its extremities were pressed by barbarian hordes, and its centre had little power of recoil. The Roman soldiers were skilled in tactic and acquainted with all the forms of military evolution; but they were mercenary, and did not possess that love of country which is the bulwark,—and only bulwark of safety when states are in danger. In the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era, swarms of different races issued from the east in a warlike attitude, over ran the Roman provinces on the West and South, possessed themselves of Germany, France, Spain and part of Africa, established their power in Italy, sacked Rome, and dissolved the Roman government. These invaders, who

were warlike tribes in migratory progression from east to west, are described by their enemies as barbarian, almost as savage. It is not pretended to say that they did not commit barbarous acts; but the skill and address, with which they conducted military enterprizes, may satisfy the unprejudiced that they were not ignorant of the art of war, that is, ignorant of the art of slaughtering their fellow creatures according to a system of science. Besides skill in war acquired by experience, migratory tribes may be supposed to possess a common sentiment or feeling of equality, derived from participation in a common act. The Roman nation consisted in the late periods of its history of slave and master only. The barbarian invaders were on the contrary confederate warriors in compact with each other; consequently they might be supposed to have some idea of the liberty and independence of the human condition; and thus to have some feeling of what is due to man, merely as man. It is on this ground perhaps that they are deemed authors of representative government. They appear to have introduced it into Europe; for there is no evidence of its having existed, in this division of the globe, prior to the invasion of the barbarians.

The Roman empire was nominally Christian at the time its government was dissolved; and, barbarian, as the conqueror was, he did not interdict the exercise of the Christian worship to the conquered people. The worship went on under the superintendence of a religious chief. The chief, with the art which belongs to the sons of hypocrisy, found the means of converting the conqueror to an observance of the ceremonies of the Romish church,—not to the spirit and practice of the Christian religion. The pontif obtained an accession of power by the dominion which he gained over the powerful invader; and, as his ambition was insatiable, and the human race ignorant and credulous, he may be said, without a figure, to have usurped a throne in

heaven, and obliged all the new sovereigns of the west to bow before it. He styled himself Pope, or Father, and impiously assumed attributes of power which belong to no created being. Human indignation cannot rise higher than it rises against the Roman pontiffs. They were sacriligious impostors,—not simple impostors in common things. They assumed a viceroyskip of divine power, veiled the Creator from the view of his creatures by artifice; and, arrogating to themselves the power of binding or loosening upon earth, they may literally be said, by diverting worship to themselves, to have extinguished the religion of Jesus Christ; or in other words, to have expelled the true worship of the Deity from the earth.

Italy became nominally Christian at an early period: a great part of Europe continued pagan until the time of Charlemagne. Charlemagne may be considered as a man of extended views for the age in which he lived. He established an extensive empire, digested a code of law into systematic form, and displayed such pomp and magnificence in his exterior as might be supposed to have its origin from the east. Charlemagne's empire was what may be called vast. It was broken up at his death, part of it being portioned out in allotments to the principal officers of his household for particular services. So divided, it constituted a number of principalities, independent in internal jurisdiction, but bound in allegiance to the head of the empire by military service.

The military character of the nations who invaded and conquered Europe is not easily estimated. There is reason to believe that they brought with them, a certain feeling of liberty and independence of mind existing among themselves as associated adventurers. The spirit of individual liberty diminished when they became stationary; and it disappeared when they became nominal Christians, that is, vassals of the church of Rome. Independently of the practice of

local customs, which adhered to the people from time immemorial, and which indicated something of the relations of man with man on the base of equality, all human acts were now shackled by direct force, or by indirect instruments of fraud and delusion. The human mind was extinguished, or turned into the retrograde channel wherever the church obtained dominion:—the tyranny was insolent and intolerable. Quarrels and contentions were frequent among its vassals; for Christian princes were at this time its vassals. War, plunder and bloodshed were the prominent feature of the time; viz. war as principal, war as auxiliary, or war for the bribe of money and the spoils of the field;—in strict language, men were robbers or assassins almost universally; they were not Christians in reality. Where robbery and assassination were exercised to extent, power was obtained by the robber; and power, in common opinion constituted virtue and honour.—Such seemed to be the moral and military state of Christian Europe in what is called the middle age.

The Arabs or Saracens, who had emerged from obscurity in the seventh century, rose rapidly to eminence in the East. Their territorial acquisitions were considerable, and among others they possessed themselves of the holy land. They were tyrannical and often overbearing in manner, particularly to those who were not of the Mahomedan faith. They appear to have ill-treated some Christian pilgrims in their religious visits at Jerusalem; and, in consequence of this real or supposed ill treatment, the furious zeal of the hermit Peter was employed to rouse the indignation of the Christian world to avenge. Stimulated by the harangues of this enthusiast, the European princes undertook a joint expedition to Syria, with a view to conquer the land in question; and thereby to assure the free exercise of devotion at the holy shrine. The war was carried on for a length of time with varying success. Both Christians and Saracens were familiar with

blood, rioting, as may be said, in the slaughter of their fellow creatures. But, as the Saracens were at this time a comparatively refined and enlightened people, the Europeans, as being often in contact with them, could not well fail to make improvement through imitation. They actually did improve: the mind received a new impulse, and rose to a comparatively high point of value by the accession of ideas of honour and heroism as applicable to war. Instead of the insulated routine of slaughter, plunder and party feuds, which characterized the barbarous ages subsequent to the fall of the Roman empire, sentiments of gallantry and enterprizes of chivalry, implying a high refinement of mental idea as their motive, became a fashion, even a rage with a certain class of the warriors of Europe. The enterprizes were chivalrous, and the horrors of war were somewhat softened by the infusion of heroic sentiment; but it is not easy to say how far the science of war and the economical arrangements of armies were improved on the occasion. The organization of the warlike force of Europe still rested on a feudal base; and the shock in battle lay for the most part in trials of strength in close combat, viz. a hammering on coats of mail from morning to night. But, though the savage horror was softened by an intermixture of gallantry, the motive of aggression remained the same. The life of the commander, knight, or man of condition who fell into the hands of an enemy, was saved as a trophy of pride, or to be ransomed for a sum of money; the mass of the soldiery, if not enslaved for profit, was ordinarily slaughtered with as little remorse as if they had been mere cattle. The greatest part of Europe was Christian in name at this period; it was not, as already said, Christian in reality. War, plunder and the destruction of the species was the leading occupation of the race: justice, brotherly love and charity,—though the injunction of Jesus Christ, commanded no respect. The dominion of the church was

paramount ; and history supplies too many proofs to shew that the church had in view the extinction of knowledge and truth, that it might thereby perpetuate its power as arbiter of human destinies. There were local bursts of liberty, civil or religious, on some occasions ; but the mass of mankind remained in ignorance of themselves, enslaved to religious prejudice, or to the tyranny of feudal chiefs through fear or delusion.

The discovery of gunpowder, and the invention of fire-arms operated a change in the mode of carrying on war. The art was studied scientifically with a view to discover the best mode of applying the missile force with effect. Missile force, acting independently of physical strength, placed mankind in some degree on a level. Manœuvre and stratagem have place among the rudest of barbarian warriors ; systematic movements, and combinations in movement are only found among those who make a study of the scientific art of human slaughter. The tactic and movement of Greek and Roman armies were revived, and in some points improved after gunpowder was discovered. Ferocious barbarity in the application of brute force was diminished ; in fact, so materially diminished that the campaigns, of modern times, seem as royal pastime compared with those of the middle ages.

CHAPTER VI.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF ORIENTAL NATIONS, VIZ. ARAB, TURK,
AND TARTAR.

ARAB OR SARACEN.

THE exterior form and the physical powers of the human race are evidently moulded and modified by the influence of climate and locality; the internal character, or moral temperament is formed, at least modified by circumstances which present contingently in localities, or by the discipline of institutions which are formed on a basis of science. The rugged and barren parts of Arabia appear, by description, to be not unlike the rugged and mountainous highlands of Scotland,—with the exception of different latitude and different temperature. Similar objects make similar impressions on man according to a general law of animal nature; and, in correspondence with this law, the Arab and the highlander of Scotland resemble each other in many points of character. Besides the resemblances, which may be thought to be produced by influence of localities, the form of government,—patriarchal in both, appears to have brought these distant people more directly together in resemblance to each other than perhaps any other cause that was applied to act upon them. The pastoral and social form of life moved on one base in both; it was modified more or less distinctly by circumstances of contingency.

The government was patriarchal; the attachment to the chief was devotion—not mere obedience. Feuds between clans or tribes, resentment and desire of revenge for injuries sustained—real or supposed, characterized both. Both were proud of ancestry; and both preserved their history in memory rather than in written record;—and they preserved it correctly. Brilliant achievements were embodied in song, diffused among the people, and they, while a national record, were an incentive to deeds of glory. The impression, made by the scenery of a wild and mountainous country, appears to have produced the poetic mind both in the Arab and the Scotch highlander. The ideas were often sublime; the language forcible, whether descriptive of scenery, of manner and character, of conflicts in war, or of tender scenes in love. The Arab and Highlander were both brave,—even fierce in the conflict of battle. Patient, courageous and hardy, with a love of country the most ardent, and a devotion to the chief the most determined, the ancient Arab, as well as the Highlander of Scotland, may be supposed to have furnished materials of the first order for the formation of armies.

The Arabs, prior to the time of Mahomet, were idolaters. They appear to have drank to excess and gamed to desperation. They boasted of dissoluteness; and they gloried in shedding the blood of enemies. Their resentments were implacable: they may be said to have rioted in the slaughter of the field; the very women were fierce. The Arabs were regarded as robbers. They considered themselves to be at war with those who were not in their alliance, or under their protection; and, on this ground perhaps, they were not more robbers than the polished nations of modern times. The Arab was terrible to an enemy; he was generous and hospitable to a friend, or stranger who obtained his protection; and he was of inviolable faith, wherever faith was pledged. The difficulties of the country, the obstinate love

of liberty, with a contempt of what are esteemed luxuries of polished life, enabled the Arab to resist the arms and arts of the Romans, when the Romans were in the zenith of their power. They were thus, with the Highlanders of Scotland, almost the only people who preserved their independence against the preponderating force of Rome. Whether Arabia and Caledonia, defended as they were, were not to be conquered by Roman courage and Roman arts, or were not thought to be worth the expense to be incurred by a conquest through force, it is generally admitted that they were not conquered so as to submit to incorporation with the Roman state.

The Roman republic, stimulated by ambition to invade all accessible parts of the earth, and to civilize, as it arrogantly pretended, the barbarian or child of Nature, had subjugated almost all Europe, the Mediterranean coasts of Africa and a considerable portion of Asia, before the Arabs or Saracens were known beyond their mountains and their deserts. Ambition of conquest was the moving engine of the Roman republic; organization of the conquered people into a nominal colonial fraternity, as the bond through which the acquisition was to be maintained, was the object of the Roman policy. The Roman arms were successful; and the design of retaining what was acquired by arms was apparently wisely laid on the limited participation of citizenship. But the design, well laid as it apparently was, like all human designs which originate in a false view of things, and move on an unequal base, undermined itself and finally terminated in ruin. The Roman republic had thus run its course; and the population of its extensive domain was broken in spirit, and sunk in effeminacy prior to the appearance of Mahomet in Arabia. The moral and religious doctrine of Jesus Christ had a nominal existence within the circle of the Roman empire for some centuries prior to this epoch; but it was only, it is presumed, in the cottages of the poor

and humble that its true spirit was felt and known. It was not acknowledged, even in name by the rulers of the people, until it was corrupted; that is, until the means were discovered by which it might be rendered subservient to purposes as an engine of state. The doctrine of Jesus Christ inculcates love and charity to all men as common brothers; it of course virtually interdicts war which destroys human life. War is the child of ambition, the product of a passion to subjugate and domineer over equals; as such, it is unjust, viz. a violence subversive of the fundamental law and order of harmony, which is impressed on sublunary things by the hand of the Creator.

The Christian religion was the nominal religion of the shattered fabric of the Greek and Roman empires at the time that the Arabian prophet promulgated the doctrine of the Koran; but the religion was shattered and inconsistent as the fabric of the political empire. The population, conquerors and conquered, might then be said to be in a state of decrepitude. Without love of country, and without the strength of mind which characterizes the stage of society as it emerges from barbarism, they made no connected and scientific resistance to the inroads of the Saracen arms.

The new system of religion which Mahomet, after long labour and severe conflicts, established among his countrymen, electrified and, in a manner, new modelled the whole frame of the Arab mind. It is not easy at this distant period,—it even perhaps would not have been easy for those who lived at a contemporary period, to determine what was the real character of the person who effected this change; that is, to pronounce clearly, whether Mahomet was a deliberate impostor from the beginning, or, if he began to act under a peculiar hallucination of mind, and ended his act as an impostor—through circumstance only. He appears to have been acquainted with the histories of the Old and New Testaments. He venerated the patriarchs and the pro-

phets; and he never mentioned the name of Jesus Christ except with a respect which may be termed devotion. He stated distinctly that Jesus Christ was the interpreter of the will of God, and that his entrance into the world was not as that of common men. Mahomet, whether a deliberate political impostor, or an enthusiast under a peculiar form of mental hallucination that contingently degenerates into imposture, was a reformer of morals; and, if the sword had had less to do in the propagation of his doctrine than it had, his name might have been mentioned with respect, even by the followers of Jesus Christ. The Mahometan religion, abstracted from the impious assumption that it proceeded from the Deity communicated by the angel Gabriel to Mahomet direct, is a devoted form of religion, implying absorption of the sensibilities of the creature into the boundless goodness and mercy of the Creator. It appears by its effect to have electrified and sublimed the human character at the time, debased as it was by Pagan idolatry, selfish Judaism, corrupted Christianity, and the various vices which attach to hypocrisy and imposture. The law promulgated by Mahomet, as a law descending from the Deity, was propagated by the sword; it thus, contradicting itself, forfeited all claim to divinity and became, in the eye of reason, an engine of human imposture for a political purpose. It was in fact powerful as an engine for the extension of empire; so powerful indeed that the Saracen name was carried by means of it over Syria, Persia, Asia Minor, Egypt, the northern coasts of Africa, Spain, some of the islands in the Mediterranean, India, Tatar, &c. in an incredibly short time. It is not clear to the author, after reading the Koran again and again, that Mahomet himself was actually an impostor. It is perfectly clear that imposture belonged to Abubecker. Abubecker was a hypocrite in grain; a long headed man, acquainted with the weaknesses of human nature and the means of turning these weaknesses

to account. He was mainly instrumental in conducting the machinery of the Koran; and to him, more than to Mahomet, the establishment of the religion is due.—The early successors of Mahomet were of varied character. Some of them were men of genius, some of them were men of great force of mind, some of them were generous, just and real believers; more of them were political believers only, cruel, tyrannical, and literally insatiate of blood. Antipathy to other sects, and intolerance of other forms of worship grew with the success of the Saracen arms. The antipathies appear at last to have gone beyond the literal meaning of Mahomet.—The hatred is now rancorous, rendered so, it may be presumed, by the resistance which the propagation of the doctrine met with from Christian powers, particularly the Knights of Malta.

The early Saracens, as emerging from comparative barbarism, were a new people; and, like other new people, they evinced strong powers of mind. They had good sense; and, as proof of it they condescended to adopt many of the economical regulations, even some of the military views of the people with whom they fought, and whom they actually subdued; but they did not adopt them servilely, so as to surrender their judgment and national character to the dictate of foreign military masters.—The general principle acted on by Saracen armies appears to be a common principle, viz. annoyance by missile force at a distance, fury in the charge and perseverance in conflict at close quarters. The Arabs excelled in cavalry. The Saracen conquest was generally rapid, partly by the infusion of the principle that it was a duty to propagate religion by arms, and partly by the disorganized condition of the opponent. The conquest, so attained, was consolidated by the rigorous establishment of the laws of the Koran. Sultans and Khalifs were dethroned, Generals and

Vizirs beheaded; the dynasty was even changed; the religion remained the same. One class succeeded to another in rapid rotation; for power, however acquired, following its own rule acts blindly or capriciously; and thus runs into error, acts in error, and precipitates in ruin so as to leave the field open to some other master in fraud or violence.

The Saracens appear, from a superficial view of their history, to have been drawn into close action by planting a signal in front, attracting them to advance to a point of honour. They united at the point, and rushed forward to close with the enemy under the impressive sound of the word *Allah*. The word *Allah*, as a condensed and simple sound, impressing the most sublime and commanding sentiment that enters into the human mind, may be supposed, if skilfully applied, to produce the most firm and determined act that belongs to man. It does so in fact; for the charge of a well organised Mahomedan army is almost irresistible if it be made with skill.—The power of the Saracen military force seemed to lie in close combat. The individual looked on the naked point with a steady eye, and even smiled as he wreathed upon the spear. He was fierce in combat; and there was a period in his history when he was a soldier of the first quality. He seems still to retain his courage; but systematic organization and discipline have added nothing to his value.

The Arab had genius and good sense as a son of Nature.—Some of the Arabs were learned, and many were lovers of learning. Those who invaded Spain were scientific,—and magnificent in matter of taste beyond example. The Saracen power extended widely and flourished vigorously for a time; but, following the steps of other military creations, it lost vigour, declined at a certain point of expansion, and finally fell to pieces through the operation of the baser

passions of the human mind, viz. ambition, avarice, selfishness, insolence and bigotry. A generous hospitality characterized the Arab; kindness and humanity did not appear to be a part of his character:—shedding of human blood gave no remorse.

TURK.

THE Turk, another of the military nations which figured in the East, which still retains an extensive dominion in Asia, and even some share of power in Europe, possessed at one time a military organization of uncommon correctness. The Turk and Turcoman appear to have been originally pastoral and warlike migratory tribes. They came to the Saracen Khalifs as military servants, and finally became military masters. They placed and displaced according to their pleasure; and, after their power had attained a certain growth, they advanced to the West, dissolved the Greek empire and threatened the remains of the Roman. The external appearance of the individual Turk is majestic; and, whether acquired by the habit of command among conquered nations, or belonging to constitutional qualities of race, they have a loftiness and authority of air and manner more strikingly conspicuous than in any people in Europe. The very child looks like a master; in so much that the Turk strikes the eye as the born lord of the human creation. He is dignified and reserved, of a placid countenance, and a singular command over the expression of the purposes of his mind: he is decorous and well bred as a gentleman; respectful to old age, and profoundly reveren-

tial of progenitors ; but with all this, he is not amiable and interesting, or one to whom a stranger is disposed to give confidence. He is proud and self important; and, if kind, like others who conceive themselves sovereign, he is kind by condescension,—not through a feeling of sensibility to a brother. It is not easy to penetrate the Turkish mind, and it is not wise to be confident in the knowledge of it. The Turk acts by espionage or secret information; and he acts with secrecy, so that his purposes are rarely seen until they are executed. The disguise of countenance is perfect; in so much that a Turk is said to order the execution of a fellow creature, even to perform the act of execution without changing a feature of the face. In Turkey, as in other countries there is little trust in the promises of those who are in power; it is even said that a promise of safety is often held out to the offender at the time that the warrant is actually sealed for his execution. The Turk is cleanly in person, observant of propriety in all external relations, a perfect master in the arts of dissimulation,—but not a flatterer, at least of Christians. The spirit of the government is despotic; and the character of the people here, as in other places, takes its leading feature from the character of the government, the rule descending from the Seraglio to the lowest collector of the miri. The expanding power of the Turkish government is exhausted. Forward progression is impracticable, and the machine is only kept from falling to pieces by management, viz. a species of intrigue or espionage, conducted in all its steps under the influence of bribery with money. Every official person within the Turkish dominions is prone to exact:—many of them are rapacious; and, when they became rich through rapacity, they live in the lion's mouth—ready to be swallowed up whenever occasion offers. It is dangerous to be rich; and, as the property of the criminal is confiscated to the state, the crime is easily framed,—allegation being generally tantamount to

proof. A government which moves on this base cannot be a happy one; and, as Turkey is governed under this rule, while it presents a melancholy picture of the condition of the human race, implies a very uncertain chance of duration. The Mahomedan religion is a despotism in itself; and, as now practised, it is a tyranny persecuting to extremity. The government is tyrannic; but it is fortunately exempt from the insolence of the hereditary aristocracy which domineers in the majority of Christian European states.

The Turks are a people of great physical strength, and they may be supposed, from a preponderance of physical power, to be superior in the shock of battle to almost any of the European armies of the present day, if they were armed in the same manner and fairly joined in combat in the open field. But, though the power of the Turkish military strikes the eye, as a power irresistible in the charge of battle if properly applied to the point of attack, it is evidently less alert than many, and less fit for the service of the field than most. It is little instructed in tactic, and comparatively unapt in military movement: it is thus often,—almost always indeed defeated by European skill, not by European power or European courage.—The Turks lived formerly in the field and were accustomed to conquer. The habit of life is changed, and conquest has deserted their standards. They notwithstanding, degenerated as they are, still retain their courage; but undisciplined, little skilled, as little practised in the evolution and tactic of Modern Europe, they are liable to be taken by surprise, and thus to be sometimes struck with panic. The Turkish military is literally a militia, rather than a regular army according to the present idea of European tacticians; and, as it consists of various nations and different casts of Mahometans, it is capricious in temper, and not of dependence in action:—the different parts of it are sometimes at enmity with each other, even to strife in arms.

But, though the Turks cannot be said at present to be systematically organized as a military power, there was a time, when Europeans were only masses of armed men, or mercenary military bands, that the Turks had a scientific primary education, which has not perhaps been excelled by any of the innovations of recent times. According to authentic testimonies, the Turkish armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were formed of excellent materials, and put together with great skill. Children of the best promise, frequently children of Christian parents, were carried away by the Turkish conqueror, collected at depots, instructed in all the forms of education that might be required for their future destinations; viz. reading, writing, the doctrines of the Koran or law of Mahomet, exercise in the use of arms individually and collectively, and such forms of tactic, in complicated military evolution, as were useful for the prosecution of scientific war on an extensive scale. When thus prepared, the captives, as they might be called, rendered Mahomedan by rite, and moreover rendered important as incorporated with Turks, were entered into the corps of Janissaries with all the advantages that a primary systematic education could be supposed to give them. An army, formed after this model, could not be otherwise than formidable as a military instrument, in as much as every part was sound in its physical constitution, homogeneous in appearance, presumptively equal in courage, and as nearly balanced in physical power as possible. When the corps was put in motion, the act was consistent, the parts corresponding closely throughout in all their extent; hence a corps of Janissaries might actually be regarded as a military machine, calculated, on a scientific principle, to give out a precise and calculable effect.

War seems to be the great trade of sovereigns, and the formation of armies the great occupation of European princes; but, zealous to

excel each other as they are, they do not as yet seem to have attained the same base of science for the execution of their purposes, as the Turks of the times alluded to had attained. The materials of European armies are ordinarily fortuitously collected. They are put together by size or external appearance; and they are ordinarily forced to assume the military air and military gait by rigour of drilling. The internal temperament and the habits of the recruits, often discordant from each other, do not amalgamate; they are only kept in contact by constraint. The Turkish army, as formed of materials which had received one form of primary education, and which looked to conquest in war as an injunction of religion, might be supposed, with good reason, to be superior to the common armies of Europe, except in so far as they were inferior in arms, armour and the contingent advantages resulting from military skill. Most nations advance to the charge of the enemy with shouting, under the idea of giving an impulse to courage and union to the offensive act; but, of all the words employed to excite energies and cement union, no European nation has a word of charge of such concentrated and commanding force as the *Allah* of the Turks. The word *Allah* maintains union by the simple impression of sound; it infuses courage by assuming the protection of the most important sound that passes through human lips,—it is thus a pass-word of great import.

The constitution of the Turkish army appears, according to the report of Busbequius, who had the opportunity of seeing and of observing its movements when it was at the zenith of its glory, to have been the most perfect model of a military instrument that has ever perhaps been produced on a great theatre of war. It is now otherwise. The spirit of conquest, which was the soul of the Turkish nation, as a nation that lived as it were in the military camp, is now lost. The Janissaries still retain their name; but they are different

from the Janissaries of the great Turkish Sultans who conquered Greece and fought in Europe. The Turkish government is now decrepid, indeed far advanced in decrepitude. It is managed by intrigue; and it is in some manner in dread of itself. The Janissary corps, as of different sects and different interests, often quarrel and contend with each other, so as to keep the sovereign on the watch to find out the means by which he can best do away with what is obnoxious or dangerous. Jealousies and envies are common; and rapacity reigns throughout. The state is literally in the market; and it only continues perhaps to be a sovereign state through a feeling of Mahomedan pride, which supports it in its difficulties as the greatest and most respected power in the Mahomedan circle of the earth.

TATAR.

THE religion of Mahomet extended in every direction, and penetrated, among other distant countries, to Tatar at an early period. The history of the Tatar nation is little known prior to the time of the prophet Mahomet. The Tatars differed from Greeks and Romans and other civilized people of Europe; but it cannot be said, in strict propriety, that they were barbarous. They had their own customs and their own manners; and they had moreover a code of legislation of a character which proves that they had studied, and that they actually comprehended the fundamental principles of political organization. The mind was strong, as the mind of a pastoral nation acquainted with the face of Nature might be expected to be; the

warlike virtues, though not of the European fashion, were eminent. When the power of the successors of Mahomet began to decline, or rather when it actually had declined to a low ebb, the Tatar Timur arose as a meteor, dazzling the world by its brilliancy and intimidating all those who lay in its course by the dangers of its contact. Timur, though remotely related to the house of Gengiz Khan, may be said to have risen to power from comparatively small beginnings. It is not clear that he was more than a common Emir; some say he was less. He was thus a soldier of fortune; and, having collected and organized a band of followers for military enterprize, he applied it to action with skill and promptitude, and with nearly as much justice as others apply military force. His achievements were bold: his name made an impression, and his power spread with a rapidity that scarcely has a parallel in history. The history of his enterprizes, and the establishment of his power have been recorded by both friends and enemies, that is, by professed panegyrists and by professed calumniators, even by himself, in a work which is the most valuable memoir perhaps that has been put before the public by a sovereign prince. Timur may be supposed to have known the proper motives of his own acts, the causes which impeded their course, or which conducted them to their issue. As he was too proud to be uncandid, we may give him credit for truth; and we actually find him placed, by his own account, in a middle station between that which his blind panegyrist on the one part, and his professed calumniator on the other assign to him. The Persian, Ali Yezid, held to be one of the most elegant prose writers in the Persian language, has written a history of Timur in the highest extravagance of praise. In common with the writers of the East, Ali Yezid estimates the character of the warrior by the quantity of the blood which he sheds. Timur comes in for a large share of his esteem on this account,

for, according to the pompous descriptions of Ali, he waded to a throne through seas of blood, and of blood so wantonly shed that the European reader turns from his steps with horror and disgust. The Arab, Arabschah, a professed calumniator of the Tatar prince, employs a profusion of oratory, viz. all the tropes and figures of exaggeration, of which the Arabic language is susceptible, to blacken his character; and, though he may be supposed to have omitted no calumny that ever reached his ear, he has notwithstanding left Timur in possession of several of the qualities which constitute a great man, and even of some which belong to a good one. His own institutes, whether written by himself or under his direction, furnish convincing proof that he was a man of genius and original mind. He was not only a scientific tactician and a rigid disciplinarian; but he was a general of great foresight and of eminent skill in conducting combined movements. Besides this, Timur appears to have been deeply read in the knowledge of mankind, and of course deeply skilled in the politics of states. He does not appear, by the most authentic records of his history to have been cruel in his natural disposition; but he was, like the greater part or almost all the Sultans of the East, not more restrained by sympathy of fellow feeling from shedding human blood, than from shedding the blood of cattle. It is obvious in the history of Timur's campaigns and expeditions, that his military system was scientifically and systematically digested, and that his order of battle was judiciously and scientifically laid. He was cautious in deciding; but he was prompt in acting when he had decided; in fact, he was a military phenomenon of which there are few examples. The late Emperor of France may be thought to have made some aporoach to Timur in his views of war and conquest; but he was infinitely inferior to him in wisdom, even in genius of contrivance, and particularly in resource in circumstances of difficulty. Timur had a mind of

compass and reflection: he was a man within himself. Napoleon had ambition to excess and self opinion to disgust. His engines were force and imposture. The military machinery was magnificent; it astonished and it often acted with energy; but when it was disconcerted by accident, Napoleon discovered no genius in putting it right. He was in fact a little man, or rather no man under disaster; Timur was always a man.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE GERMAN NATION.

THE people, known under the collective name of German, has been long celebrated as a warrior nation, distinguished from early times for force and courage. The early Germans were numerous, powerful and brave; but little is known of their history and manners, except from chance notices in Cæsar's commentaries, or the short, but masterly memoir of the historian Tacitus. It is vain to conjecture where the Germans of Cæsar and Tacitus now are; for Germany Proper, like all the rest of Europe, was over-run subsequently to that period by strangers who, emigrating from their country in swarm, conquered, settled and assumed the sovereignty of the soil of the districts which they invaded. These appear to have brought with them language and customs; and, with what are called barbarian manners, a species of pomp and magnificence among the chiefs which

claims alliance with the manners of the East, viz. a lordly insolence belonging to men who consider the human race as the property of the powerful arm. It is impossible to say at this distance of time, in how far the aboriginal German was mixed with, destroyed, or expelled by the recent invader. The northern division of these warrior hordes,—Norwegian, Dane, Swede and Anglo-Saxon, passed beyond the limits of the German continent, embarked on expeditions of freebooting and piracy to distant places, sometimes with a view to settlement and permanent occupation, sometimes as a mere inroad for plunder. The southern division invaded Italy, France and Spain, passed the strait of Gibraltar and planted colonies in Africa.

The German nations, as independent of each other, were attacked, subdued, converted to nominal Christianity, and organized into certain forms of political association by the genius of the Emperor, Charlemagne. After the demise of that monarch, portions of this vast territory were formed into principalities, as rewards to the different servants of the imperial household, and considered as appendages of the empire. The princes of this appointment, whether electors, bishops or others, assumed the pageantry of a court, raised and maintained a military force, and exercised municipal jurisdiction; but, bound to the empire by service, they were not absolutely sovereign; and, as not sovereign, they could not be expected to rise to eminence in the great theatre of the world, either in war or otherwise. The political connexion between the empire and its vassals was more or less complicated and liable to jarrings. It was gradually weakened and finally almost dissolved. The Elector of Brandenburg, one of the electoral class was created King of Prussia at an early period of the last century; and Prussia, as a new kingdom, rose in a short time to the highest military reputation of any state in Europe. The Electors, several of whom have lately become Kings, had an extensive

territory and a strong military force; but, as Electors, they were not independent Sovereigns. Their troops were for the most part good in the ordinary sense of the word; that is, well appointed, and well practised in military training; but, as troops of a subordinate power, it was not to be expected that they should become troops of the first military character, particularly where they only appeared in the field of war as mercenary auxiliaries to foreign princes. The whole of the German territory seems to have been originally in military vassalage to the empire; and the mass of the inferior population, with the exception of the inhabitants of a few emancipated cities, was in military vassalage to kings, princes, electors, bishops, and barons. The people was thus a commodity of traffic for war at the disposal of their masters.—The vassal form of connexion between sovereign and subject is not without advantages; but it is liable to abuse, and the abuse has been at all times flagrant in Germany, particularly in the states of petty princes and feudal barons, who have trafficked and continue to traffic unblushingly in hiring their vassals for foreign war; which, as viewed with the eye of reason and truth may be considered as hiring for assassination. The practice is sanctioned by long precedent. It was apparently adopted, and it is maintained under the opinion, that the vassal is a commodity to be employed for his lord's advantage like other stock of the farm; and, as long practised, it is not thought to be crime against the general law of society to go on with it. Germany is thus the great mart of military recruits: and Great Britain is the great customer. Strong detachments of German subsidiary force fought for British pay, both in the American revolutionary war, and in the wars 1793 and 1803. Besides subsidiary German force, commanded by native officers of the subsidized state, numerous corps, both cavalry and infantry, were recruited in Germany by composition with the proprietors of particular districts in the late war with France.

They were disciplined as British, subjected to British military law, and considered as, in some degree, a part of the British army. Together with those entire corps, a number of stray Germans entered, and still enter as recruits into the ranks of British regiments, particularly into the 60th; and thus furnish an opportunity, to those who have served in foreign parts, to observe the conduct, and to form opinion of the military character of the native German, both in the field and in quarters.

The German subsidiary force, whether Hessian, Hanoverian or other, appeared to the writer to be orderly and exact in the performance of its allotted duty, regular and mechanical in the actual conflict, not impetuous in attack, and not obstinate in maintaining a position after the intention of abandoning it is made known: it is thus fair to conclude that the heart is rarely in the act of the hand. The infantry corps, which are recruited in Germany, and led partly by British officers, may be considered upon the whole as troops of a fair character:—they have no claim to excellence. The cavalry corps are conspicuous for good conduct, more perhaps for care than for adventurous courage. The German dragoon is almost always kind to his horse, and careful of him, so as to preserve him in good condition in circumstances where cavalry, under the care of British soldiers, are sickly and unserviceable. The German dragoon is trust worthy on duty. It is not said that he is superior, perhaps not equal to the British in the actual conflict of battle; but he is of more reliance for ordinary service, especially for covering positions and maintaining communications between different parts of an army. The corps of infantry are good to a certain extent. The individuals, who are mixed in the ranks of British regiments with subjects of Great Britain and Ireland, are generally of a steady character, sufficiently intelligent for common soldiers, and ordinarily trust-worthy in so far as vigilance and

attention go. They are soldiers by trade, and it could not be expected that they should be any thing beyond what belongs to their trade. The German soldier is, as has been said, as good as a mercenary soldier can be expected to be. He cannot be supposed to be of the first excellence as a fighting soldier, and he appears to occupy only a middle place as a moral one. He is comparatively indifferent to every thing except himself, and the duty that is formally imposed upon him, the non-execution of which subjects him to punishment. Spoil is an incentive to activity; and German sharp-shooters, as incited to enterprize by the hopes of obtaining the spoils of officers who are in advance, may in fact be considered as a kind of long-shot assassins.—The German soldier takes from an enemy's country, and not unfrequently from a neutral country, those things which suit his purpose; but, unlike the troops of some other nations, he rarely destroys wantonly, or carries away mischievously that for which he has no occasion. In short, the native German seems as if he were born to be a mechanical soldier, that is, to take care of himself and execute his prescribed duty by routine. He has little feeling of generosity or humanity; and, whether drilled to indifference, or constitutionally indifferent, he seems to be so punctilious in duty as to let a sick comrade almost perish with thirst, rather than encroach on the orderly's province by reaching to him a drink of water. This will be considered as perfection of discipline; it is however a perfection which one does not admire, and to which, it is presumed, no rigour would be sufficient to bring a native of France or England.

CHAPTER VIII.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE SPANISH NATION.

SPAIN, whether the climate and position, or the character of the people who have possessed, and who still possess it be brought under view, presents an object of more than common interest to the historian and military philosopher. The general aspect of the country is striking,—grand and beautiful in some places;—rugged and dreary in others; not upon the whole unfertile, but rarely well cultivated. The people, like most other people in Europe, are mixed in blood. Besides the aboriginal, whose local existence precedes the records of history, the blood of Carthaginians, Romans, Goths, Saracens, and other chance adventurers, united more or less together by the justlings and contentions of many ages, but not so perfectly united that the marks of distinctive character are altogether lost, may be supposed to exist in Spain.

The coasts of Spain were invaded by the Carthaginians at an early period of European history; and, as the Carthaginians were at that time all-powerful at sea, some of the maritime districts were seized and occupied by them. The Spaniard was oppressed, or thought himself oppressed; and as the Romans, who were humane when it suited their purposes to be so, were rivals of the Carthaginians, they

volunteered their aid in deliverance. The Carthaginians were obliged to retire, or to contract their limits: the Romans occupied their place. The Romans, ambitious of power, and wise in the ways of obtaining it, contrived to bring the whole of Spain under subjection; but they did not effect it without trouble; and they never perhaps could have effected it—without underhand management, that is, without the expedient of exciting and fomenting quarrels among the different independent tribes who held the country. No people in the records of history evinced more courage and determination in defending their townships against an enemy than the Spaniards of early times; and events in the late peninsular war prove sufficiently that the spirit is not yet extinguished. No people were superior, perhaps few were equal to the ancient Spaniards in faith and honour, or what may be called obstinacy in adhering to their purpose. They were brave in spirit and hardy in body; and it is fair to infer that the force of the Roman empire could not have prevailed against them, if the whole population of Spain had been united in one object, and conducted to the execution of it by a leader of ability. Some parts, or districts in the peninsula made great resistance, and for a long time baffled the power of Rome: it is even presumed that Spain would have triumphed over Rome herself, but for treachery or casual misfortune. Spain, thus overrun, was finally numbered among Roman conquests. It submitted to Roman civilization, that is, to Roman luxury and Roman effeminacy; and in that state of degeneracy, it was invaded, subdued and occupied by one of the migratory warlike nations which inundated Europe in the fourth and fifth centuries.

It is not known correctly in what manner the conquering Goths mixed with the subdued Spaniards; nor to what extent the new people operated a change upon the manners of the old. The Goths appear to have been a high minded race, pompous and somewhat

fantastic in manner. The original people, it is reasonable to suppose, were more or less changed by force, or assimilated by imitation to the character of the conqueror: they notwithstanding retained a considerable share of the original disposition; and they still seem to retain something that is distinctive of character.

The Christian religion had been carried to Spain by some of the early converts, and was nominally the religion of the state prior to the Gothic invasion. This is true literally; but it is proper to remark that, prior to that period, its purity had been stained by its professors, in so much that it was in reality an engine of state policy rather than a true worship of the Deity. The Goths were pagans and idolaters; but they were not perhaps very firmly rooted in their idolatry. They appear to have been easily converted to the Christian worship; for, as now said, they were Christian at the time that Spain was overrun, and partly subdued by the Saracens. The Saracens were at this time an enlightened people—comparatively with Europeans. They were eminent in arms, arts and sciences, and even perhaps more religious in the true sense of the word than Christians; that is, the worship of the Deity was direct, and presumptively devout. The Spaniards were compressed by the invaders: they were not subdued. They possessed a spirit of independence and a feeling of liberty, which, whether a quality of the native of Spain, or the attendant of migratory association, did not leave them in misfortune. It adhered to them, and seemed to preserve them from abject submission. They held fast to the mountains of Asturia, expanded from thence as from a centre; and, after much hard fighting and some good fortune, they finally drove the Moors from their country. The Moors were expelled in form; but there still remained among the people, particularly in the southern provinces, a large proportion of Moorish blood, more or less of

Moorish character, and strong traces of the fine symmetry of form which belongs to the Moorish race.

The Spanish nation expanded with force and rapidity after the expulsion of the Moors from the Spanish territory; and circumstances occurred, in a short time thereafter, which contributed to raise the Spanish name to an eminence of wealth and power which had no parallel in Europe at the time; for Europeans had not then fallen upon the expedient of creating wealth by the fiction of paper, or borrowing on state credit. The Western world, which abounds with mines of gold and silver, was discovered by Columbus towards the close of the fifteenth century; and, soon after its discovery, Spain was inundated by an influx of the precious metals, which gave her an influence in the affairs of the world until then unknown. The stimulus of gold and silver excited, and it still excites the Spaniard to activity. The whole nation became ravenous, so to speak, in the pursuit of gold; and this unhallowed desire, suffocating the sympathies and finer feelings of the heart, gave rise to crimes which stained the Spanish character in a manner that no atonement can expiate. The Spaniards not only destroyed the Indians for the sake of the gold which they possessed; but they condemned the living Indians to gather gold from the bowels of the earth for Spanish uses. Cupidity was here the cause of Spanish activity, and it operated with great effect. The cupidity still continues; but the power and energy of mind, necessary to its forward action are in a great measure lost or expended; and the Spaniard has, in consequence, sunk into a degraded condition, from which he cannot be expected to emerge, unless through such a revolution in thinking as brings out a new base for the organization of human society. The eyes of the Spaniards, at least some part of them, have been lately opened to their condition; and Spain has obtained through their exertions a certain form of political organization which, though

it does not appear to be laid on the base of a true constitution, has evidently done some good. The Spanish constitution prunes the product of error: it does not, or has not destroyed the root from which it springs; and, in this manner, the Cortes are kept in a constant state of vigilance and activity to repress reproduction, or to ward off accidents to which the movements of a fabric erected on a faulty base are exposed. The root, or material of counteraction still exists; and if it can be gradually seared and thus destroyed, the Spanish Cortes will have achieved the greatest act that ever was performed by man; viz. the restoration of effective political health without the subversion of the root of the disease by the violence of convulsion. It is doubtful whether there be promptitude and decision in the Spanish councils sufficient to effect the purpose in all its extent; that is, to counteract the complicated machinery that is planted against the new edifice by a treacherous and tyrannic priesthood, prejudiced nobles, bigotted and energetic women who detest the vulgarity of liberty and truth. But be the final result as it may, the Spanish nation, at least the Cortes, has shewn, by its conduct, that it is not inferior to any nation in Europe in good sense and discretion; and that it is superior to most of them in liberality and good temper.

The population of Spain exhibits considerable diversity in appearance, indicating more or less mixture of blood;—the whole has notwithstanding something Spanish which marks the distinctive of nations. The higher class claims, for the most part, a Gothic origin. Many are of a grand and stately deportment, a pompous, reserved and ostentatious manner; but, whether derived from Goths or Saracens, it may not be easy to determine. The higher classes, who live within the circle of the court are different from the people. They seem, like the higher classes of other countries, to have acquired the artificial character of courtiers; and, as the Kings of Spain have not,

for a long time past, been kings of the native blood; and, as the court has been a more despotic, at least a more bigotted and priest-ridden court than almost any other in Europe, the Spanish nobles, who are brought within its verge, assimilate to its manner, consequently retain no sentiment of the independence which belonged to the Spaniard of earlier times. The court noble is thus a mere creature of purposes; and, as not acting for himself, he does not rise to eminence.

The priesthood exercises an impious species of tyranny in Spain. Its labours have been incessant, and they appear to have been successful in converting the whole of the population of this extensive kingdom to the purposes of its will. Avarice may be said to be the general vice of priests. It is the crime of the priest in Spain; and, from that source, the character of the whole people has been contaminated with a baneful infection. Between the priest and the inquisitor, the liberty of the human mind, and, with that, the religion of Jesus Christ may be said to be extinguished; and while the mind is enslaved spiritually by the priest, the body is in some measure enslaved politically by the sovereign, who has ruled according to his will for a long time past and carried his rule into effect, through military force—foreign or native, the machinery so contrived as to establish a train of extortions from the throne to the lowest instrument of the throne's appointment. The revenues of the state are literally farmed; and, by that means, a portion of power is widely and arbitrarily diffused among the farmers. The people have no security from exaction; and the government, with the greatest income of gold and silver of any, or perhaps all the states in Europe, is actually in poverty, and almost always in arrear to its servants, except those who have the power to levy their own salaries.—It does not belong to this place to go into detail of abuses and causes of abuse. The fact

is only brought under notice, in as much as the practice pursued enfeebles the government, demoralizes the people, tarnishes the character of the soldier, and frequently defeats the execution of his duty. The higher classes seem to have lost much of the noble and chivalrous character that was ascribed to Spaniards in former times. The people still retain strong lines of the character of aboriginal Spaniards, more or less disguised by mixtures of blood and the crimes of corrupted Christianity.

The Spanish arms have had their epoch of glory; but little of it, since the expulsion of the Saracens, was native or genuine; and it was not of long duration. The Spanish armies have been so much mixed with foreigners for a long time past, that it is not easy to know what literally belongs to Spaniards. Foreign troops appear, for many years past, to have been the chief trust of the Spanish government for maintaining its rule over the nation. The native, as insulted and degraded by this preposterous policy, could scarcely be supposed to rise to excellence. The Spaniards have often acted with the French in recent times. It cannot be said that they have distinguished themselves, either at sea or on shore:—they were secondary, and they acted under disadvantages. They acted with the British in the late peninsular war; but they did not act cordially. They were considered as auxiliary where the cause was their own; and they were moreover frequently disgusted by the haughtiness of their Protector. The Spaniards are proud and important in themselves, too proud to act cordially in subordination to others; hence no just opinion can be formed of their real value as soldiers, from the manner in which they were associated on that occasion. The guerilla force was independent, and purely Spanish. It had a national motive, and it acted with an energy which manifested a Spanish resentment. Whether allured by the hopes of spoil, or instigated by a desire of revenge, it was a

formidable force. It annoyed and weakened the French; and in reality contributed more to discomfit them, at least to disgust them, than their ordinary defeats by the regular army. The Spaniards it is admitted, even by those who undervalue them, fight well and obstinately when in position. The people, even the female part of the people have perseverance, courage, and heroism under the pressure of misfortune, which belongs to no other European people in the same degree. The regular, or organized force of the Spanish nation is embarrassed, and of no dependence under movement in the open field: it does not even bear a high name for courage in the ordinary proceedings of common war. Whether its defects in the field be owing to want of training, want of confidence in commanders, or to peculiarity engrafted by inveterate habit on the physical constitution of the individual, it may be difficult to determine with precision. This however must be admitted that the Spanish people possess a firm and resolute courage where their honour is pledged, and that they retain the power of reacting consequent to an impulse of injury for a longer period of time than any other people in Europe.—They do not forget; and they never forgive where they can avenge.

The Spaniards were distinguished, among the troops of the sixteenth century, for superiority in the use of the match-lock. They occasionally undertook great and hazardous enterprizes; but they were generally such as marked persevering, firm and steady courage, rather than impetuous bursts of action through sudden impulses of passion, &c. Spain can scarcely be said to have been at war as principal, or to have acted with a genuine Spanish army since the introduction of the now prevailing system of military tactic. Native Spanish troops, as comparatively unpractised in war, are only in an imperfect state of discipline; and as such, it would be unfair to form

opinion of what they might be from what they now are. The people of the Spanish peninsula have a peculiar character, different from the character of most others in Europe, in as much as a Spaniard retains his own individual feeling, his sentiment of honour and resentment of injury offered to his country after he is absolved, according to the ideas of the time, from allegiance to the government under which he lived. The instances of this national reaction are numerous:—two pointed ones are connected with the British nation.

Soon after the capture of Gibraltar, in the year 1705, an attempt was made by five hundred gentlemen of Spain, in cooperation with other Spanish troops, to retake the place,—not so much perhaps that it was important as a station, but that it was an insult to Spain that it should remain in the possession of a foreigner. The five hundred, who devoted themselves to this enterprize, landed in a cove at the back of the rock, scaled a precipice that seems scarcely practicable, and lodged themselves in St. Michael's cave until the following night, which was the time agreed on for the combined attack. The attack, which was made by the five hundred, succeeded; the other failed. The five hundred were now in possession of the principal work on the south; but the whole force of the garrison being at liberty, by the failure of the attack on the north, to turn against them, they were assailed, overpowered, and, as might have been expected, put to the sword. The enterprize, which was conceived under a strong feeling of patriotism, was so heroically and even so wisely conducted, as to furnish a striking example of what Spaniards are capable of doing under the idea of avenging offended honour. The design was practicable but difficult; it failed by accident.

Buenos Ayres, in South America, fell into the hands of the British in recent times, almost without resistance. It was recovered by the inhabitants; who, as it would appear, felt themselves insulted by the

presence of a foreign, and particularly a heretic force. The place was taken by a British General and a British Commodore without the order, or sanction of the state. As it was taken without order, it was expected that it would have been given up without hesitation, and even with an apology for the unwarranted act. This was not done. Great Britain is commercial. Its government is moved, and maintained in movement by the power of money arising from the activity of manufacture and commerce; hence it is influenced in its acts, even beyond propriety, by the prospect of mercantile gains. It was supposed that the possession of Buenos Ayres would open an extensive mart for British manufactures, it was therefore determined, unjustly as the conquest had been made, to attempt to recover it from its present possessors and original owners at the expense of a great armament. The attempt failed; and the violation of the rules of international intercourse was here punished directly, as may be said by the hand of a special providence. The case of Buenos Ayres is important, as illustrative of the character of the Spanish nation. The retaking of it from the English furnishes an example of the existence of a spirit of recoil in Spaniards, which does not belong, in the same degree, to other people; and the defence of it, after it was retaken, furnishes a proof of the resolution and courage of the common Spaniard in maintaining positions which regular troops would scarcely think defensible, or persist in defending. It is evident that the General, who lost Buenos Ayres, was not what he ought to have been in caution and foresight; and it will not be maintained that the General, who was sent to retake it, was a General of a capacity calculated to succeed in any thing that was difficult or dangerous. But be that as it may, the fact, as it stands, is sufficient to shew that the Spaniard is not to be ranked among the common herd of mankind, who quietly suffer themselves to be transferred from master to master

like the stock of a farm.—The case alluded to is not creditable to Great Britain in its motive; and it proves among other things that the passion of commercial gain is blind, moves blindly and punishes itself by its own rapacity. A little knowledge of the history of the human mind, added to what almost every one knows of the powers of religious prejudices among Spaniards, might have been sufficient to satisfy those, who are acquainted with history, that it was folly to attempt to maintain a conquest, or to establish a colony in a Spanish province in South America; for it is an established fact, that the Roman Catholic religion must cease to exist, before the bigotted Catholic can be a faithful subject to a heretic king.

The higher class of Spaniards, with the exception of those who live within the immediate circle of a bigotted and arbitrary court, appear, though degenerated, still to retain something of the chivalrous spirit of past times. They are punctilious in honour according to its mode, firm in courage where the point which excites the courage is distinctly fixed, pompous in manner and boastful in words, disposed to assume the magnificent, even to exaggerate in details of matter of fact, hospitable to excess in expression, not deficient in act conformably with their own ideas of hospitality; jealous of preferences even in their parties of social intercourse. The majority of the gentlemen may be supposed to be the descendants of the Gothic invaders. If so, the Goths must have been a people of an elevated cast of mind; such a people in fact would have been an honour to human nature, had not the baneful doctrine of priests and the rigorous discipline of inquisitors perverted the mind to error, or intimidated it through fear of punishment from seeking after truth. The gentleman Spaniard, as thus prevented from looking at Nature, and from studying to know the God of Nature in simplicity and truth by the use of his own intellect, is driven, as it were by necessity, to unworthy pur-

suits; viz. gaming, intrigue and other vices which are not forbidden, or which obtain an easy pardon, however deeply they offend morality, from the fathers of the church.—The Spaniard thus becomes a votary of sensual appetite; and in this pursuit, he loses patriotism and courage.

Spain might be expected, from the various events of which it has been the theatre, to contain a great mixture of blood. The stock of the conqueror Goth may be presumed to predominate in the interior; the mixed on the sea coast towns; consequently the character is different. It is original, comparatively simple and elevated in one: it is artificial, complicated and mean in the other;—it has a trait of Spanish in all. As the Spanish peasant has, it may be presumed, courage like other men; and, as he is more attached to the honour of his country than most other men, it may be fairly supposed, if he be instructed in the use of arms, trained and practised in the movements which are necessary for military operations in the field, that he is equal to any one of his contemporaries in the actual practice of war, particularly in that species of warfare by which a country is best defended. The conclusion is fair: examples in proof are numerous; and, looking to the history of fact, the presumption is strong in the mind of the writer, that, had a man of genius and patriotism arisen among the Spaniards in recent times, the French, who obtained the country by treachery, would have been expelled from it by force without foreign assistance. There was no genius, and little patriotism among the higher classes of Spaniards at this period of degradation. The nobles were mostly pusillanimous, imbecile or mercenary; and the commercial class were ready, as might be expected, to embrace the most promising chance of increasing their gains wherever it was;—and it was apparently at one time on the side of the invader.—Spain was overrun; the government already disorganized by its vices, was dissolved, and a new

dynasty was established in its place, when Great Britain started up as the champion of an insulted and degraded people. The act was blazoned as an act of generosity: it has in reality no claim to the name; and it did no good to the Spanish nation. The enterprize was not undertaken to restore the country to the people; it was undertaken to prevent it from falling into their hands. The spirit of the people is dreaded by all governments that are built on the base of legitimacy; and it was presumed, not without reason, that if the people were permitted to go on by themselves, they would obtain a view of truth, and become sovereign. They were therefore directed by their lordly protector to fix the eye on Ferdinand the Seventh as their lawful monarch, and to do all things in his name and as it were under his authority. It may be presumed that a people of ancient blood, and high sentiment of national honour and independence, felt itself degraded by this injunction, as well as by the presence of a foreign military force pretending to liberate them from a foreign yoke, as if they were themselves coward and unworthy. The mass of the people were not gratified at the time; and events proved that they had no cause to be thankful. Liberation from Napoleon, for submission to Ferdinand, was not in fact a profitable change. The Spanish peasant of the interior is a man of character. He maintains his own way of thinking, and pursues his own purpose with exemplary perseverance. He is brave in his own way; temperate in manner of living; hardy in bodily frame; not impetuous in temper, but determined in pursuing his object where it has the sanction of his mind, or the resentment of his soul. His resentments sleep; they are not buried; and from that cause it is reasonable to suppose that the dominion of the French, as a dominion of foreigners, would not have been established in Spain for many ages to come. The dependents of the court, the creatures who are pleased with the pageantry of

royalty ; and the swarm of commercial adventurers, with whom money is country itself, might have been, and actually were in general gained to the usurper, the mass of the peasantry were averse ; and, though curbed, they were not subdued. The Spaniards are slow in their movements ; they are firm, as said repeatedly in their designs, where the design is national and connected with honour. Silent and reflecting, they are capable of conducting complicated enterprizes ; and from this cause, it may be concluded that had the French not been driven from Spain in the manner in which they were driven from it, they would have been exterminated, before the lapse of a century, by a people who neither forget nor forgive the insults that are offered to their honour.

The Spanish peasant, considered abstractedly in himself, is a man of strong natural sense, and of correct observation of the common affairs of life. He seems to think, to reflect and analyze ; and, as proof of his power of comparing and analyzing, he often speaks in proverb, or by analogy,—a mode of expression indicative of reflection and comprehension of the connexion of causes and effects with each other. This quality of reflection and analysis may be considered as proof of his fitness for the practice of war in the field,—not, it is admitted, as a part of a mechanical instrument that has no self-directing power, but as an instrument that is animated throughout by its own energies, and in which every part has a view of the general object which excites and supports its action. The reflecting character of the Spaniard is apparently generated, at least fed by the occupation which he pursues in his native plains and mountains. The peasant, whether sheep-herd, cow-herd, hog-herd or labourer in the field, has time for reflection. He is not a money driven hireling as man is in many parts of Europe ; and, having thus some power over himself and his actions, he observes what is before him with a certain feeling of

independence, and reflects on its causes and consequences with some exercise of judgment. Knowledge arises from reflection; hence the peasant, though altogether unlettered, is actually wise from the exercise of the faculties that are within himself on subjects that are before his eye.

The comforts of the domestic life of the Spanish peasant stand fair in comparison, with the comforts of the domestic life of the peasantry of most parts of Europe, if the estimate be made by the rule of nature, not by the rule of foreigners who consider the customs of their own country as the standard of perfection. The Spaniards are upon the whole temperate in eating and drinking: their fare is simple, but it is generally abundant and acceptable to the taste through habit. The houses, in which the peasants lodge, are ordinarily good as farm or peasant houses. The walls are substantial: they are generally clean, for they are often white washed, both within and without: the floor, whether earthen or paved, is seldom washed, not even carefully swept; but, in so far as the writer has seen, it rarely presents any thing that is disgusting, compared with the hovels of other peasants. There is no superfluity of furniture in the peasant's house, or even perhaps in houses of the higher classes; but there is usually what is sufficient for necessary purposes. The Spanish peasant is ordinarily of an olive or swarthy complexion; and as averse from ablution with water, he is not personally clean, and rarely free from vermin. He seldom undresses to sleep; and he has thus few of the pleasures which belong to a clean skin and change of apparel. The costume or dress is peculiar, the fashion gaudy and somewhat fantastic, indicative of the coxcombry of barbarous times. The cloak, which appears to be an indispensable appendage of the peasant's dress, is worn both in summer and winter: it is often thread bare and ragged, when the other parts of the dress are good, even gaudy. The linen is generally clean, and

comparatively fine for the peasant condition, a circumstance noticeable also in some parts of Ireland. The Spanish peasant is attached to the national costume, and faithfully adheres to it. The gentleman adopts the fashion of France or England, and is so punctilious in the adjustment of the different parts of his apparel as if the toilette were the study of his life. The female peasant, like the male, wears linen finer than might seem to be attainable by persons of her condition. She has moreover a millinery taste, however coarse her clothing may be. The lady has a grace peculiar to herself, an ease and elegance in the manner of attire, that the ladies of other countries scarcely attain, even at great expense.

The Spanish peasant, in so far as the writer observed, is not humble and obsequious in manner: neither is he blunt, rude and boisterous. He is ordinarily kind and charitable to those of his own cast and country, who require proofs of his kindness and charity; he is even civil to strangers who address him with civility, particularly with a catholic salutation. The Spanish manner is reserved, dignified and important,—such as indicates something of preeminence from an opinion of noble or ancient blood. The Spaniard is proud of descent, delights in titles and high sounding appellations; but he is rarely petulant, arrogant or overbearing to those of inferior condition, though he holds them at a distance in matrimonial alliance. The mass of the nation is pastoral or agricultural;—and it seems to be satisfied with its occupation. Such of the handicraft trades and arts, as are necessary for the common purposes of life, are cultivated to a certain extent; but the ingenious arts and grand manufactures, excited by the spirit and conducted by the genius of speculating monopoly, have hitherto made little progress in Spain:—the people are not in fact the playthings of changing fashion. The Spaniard is indolent, and idle in common opinion; but, with this idolence and idleness, he re-

tains something within himself which belongs to the sentiment of independence. Extensive commercial operations are little known in Spain; smugglers, traffickers and carriers are numerous every where.

But though the spirit of manufacture, arts and commerce, as the mover of the great operations of intercourse among nations, has made but little comparative progress in Spain, Spain has notwithstanding mechanics and artizans in sufficient number, and of sufficient proficiency for the purposes of a reasonable people. The Spaniards have an inherent spirit of pride, a desire to be thought principal; and it is from this cause perhaps that every person, who possesses a few dollars, becomes a trafficker on his own account, rather than a subordinate part in the machinery of others;—hence towns and villages abound with hucksters. Nothing is splendid, and little is superfluous in the shops of the country towns; but necessary things are in sufficient quantity. Contraband trade is carried on to great extent in all the districts near the sea. The prevalence of it may be thought to mark the existence of a spirit of liberty and independence, manifesting an unwillingness, abstractedly from the bait of gain, to be controlled by the arbitrary enactments of the Exchequer.—The peasantry of the interior may be regarded generally as peasantry of the national blood, possessing national sentiments, and manifesting the lines of national customs long inherent; the peasantry of the sea coasts and sea-port towns, as a mixture of many nations among whom the marks of the genuine Spanish character are more or less obscured, and in many points obliterated, contain a great proportion of people of prey, rapacious to excess, and unprincipled as any sea-port vultures in Europe.

National character may be thought to result from the reiterated impressions of a series of given causes acting on the organism of

different divisions of the inhabitants of the earth, whether presented casually by the combinations of Nature, or artificially by formal laws of institution. The first differs according to the contingencies of locality and the forms of social order which obtain contingently among the different divisions of the race; the second differs according to the spirit and force of the institution which constitutes the formal fabric of the law. The sense which man has attained of devotion to a Supreme Being, who is the cause of human existence, and of the existence and orderly movement of all things within the circle of the universe, is the principal bond which maintains human conduct in the right course. Where the sense of the connexion is duly felt, and justly estimated in all its relations, the acts of man move in harmony and give happiness as a result of the act. Where the connexion is not immediate, and where it is not duly felt, the Deity being veiled as it were from the view of the creature by accidental error, or deliberate imposture, the appetites and desires of animal nature spring up suddenly, assume superiority, stimulate to action, and bring error and confusion into all the proceedings of life.

The remark now made may perhaps be deemed out of place. The author only premises it, for the purpose of opening a view to the effect which a perverted form of the Christian religion has had, and still has on the moral and even on the military character of the Spanish nation. The character of the population of Spain has one grand base, viz. a feeling of pride or self consequence as Spaniard. This character has existed for long, and it still exists; but it has been masked and perverted by a number of contingencies from its plain expression. The Christian doctrine was carried to Spain and diffused to some extent at a comparatively early period of the Christian era; but, as said before, it was not received into Spain, or any other country in Europe as a national religion, until it was corrupted, so as

to be subservient to the secular purposes of the state. The very base of the doctrine was thus subverted. The law of the Deity was veiled, so to speak, from the view of the creature by the art of man. Fictions of machinery were substituted in the place of the universal Creator; or they were interposed, as necessary engines of introduction to the throne of heaven, by a scheme of presumption and wickedness so detestable in its nature that language cannot find a term sufficiently strong to reprobate it. It is scarcely possible to suppose human nature to be so completely wicked, as to form the deliberate systems of error and superstition that have been engrafted, and which still remain engrafted on the Christian doctrine by the machinations of the priests. Whether actually so or not, it is charitable to believe that the sacerdotal devices have arisen by accident, and grown to their present magnitude as deceptions on the imagination of the very deceivers themselves. Jesus Christ unveiled the operations of the Creator to the view of the discerning and reasoning part of the creation. The followers of Christ, who pretended to digest the Christian revelation into forms of observance, with a view to aid or facilitate human devotion, mistook the course. Instead of labouring to remove, they seem to have laboured to replace the veil, or to bring man back to idolatry; in other words, they endeavoured to imprison the Deity as it were, or to claim the Divine essence as a property of the priest by class. The enormity of the attempt cannot be characterized by common language; and if an apology, similar to that offered in this place, be not admitted in palliation of what was done by the Bishops of Rome and their dependents, the Catholic Fathers must appear to those, who think and reason, to be monsters of impiety and arrogance—of a degree of wickedness beyond the conceptions of a common mind. The sentence is a harsh one; and, as human nature, which is not bad in its real constitution, only becomes bad by accident, and only

continues in a bad course by mistake, that is, misconceptions of interest, it is reasonable, at least it is charitable to believe that the first step was a step of contingent error, and that the impulse to it, striking upon a spring in human organism which moved the passion of vanity and self importance, or some other passion of self approbation, urged on the course of error, and that the error thus laid was confirmed into habit by long practice, or by the appearance of advantages which arise from privilege. The priesthood may be supposed to have acquired power in Spain in the manner stated, that is, by appropriating the Deity to themselves; and, having obtained the initiative, whether by design or accident, they laboured to extend it; and, as it was extended according to the law of fungous growth, it established its dominion in such a manner that the nation became a sacerdotal creation in the literal sense of the word. It had no action except through the priest; and, as the priest acted by imposture in producing delusion, the people were precluded from a view of the source of moral truth and from knowledge of themselves. The priest, in approaching the Deity, adapted a machinery of etiquette, analogous to the machinery which adjusts the ceremony of admission at the courts of mortal princes. The spirit of the Christian religion was thus lost. The idea that saints and other dead persons have power to intercede with the Deity in behalf of living men, is absurd to common sense. It is revolting to the reasoning mind by its impiety, in as much as it encourages an opinion that the justice of heaven, like the justice of earthly courts, is capable of being perverted through the interest or intercession of individuals,—saints, priests or women. The saint, or the Virgin is the channel through which the Spaniard is permitted to approach the Deity. The saint, as a saint, is a fictitious being; and the supposition of intercession is a fiction which offends common sense. If there be no deliberate design of imposing on credulity in

the supposition of such intercession, there is manifest ignorance of the relations which subsist between man and his Creator,—such ignorance as could scarcely be supposed to obtain, and which could not in reality exist if the mind were left to its own simple operation. The Spanish priest rules all religious movements, veils the Deity by assumption, obscures the source of morals, even engrafts his own passions and propensities on the mass of the nation, and thus changes it to something analogous to himself. Avarice is the dominant vice of priests in most countries: it is more than a vice in Spain; and it may be said to be incorporated, through example, into the very constitution of the common man. Every Spaniard covets money, and many covet it beyond the common standard of covetousness. Gold strikes its infection by the medium of the eye, instigates to crime, viz. theft, robbery and murder in numerous instances by mere ocular impulse. The Spaniard has a propensity to game, with a view to gain money; he has a propensity to hoard, for the pleasure of hoarding and looking at the hoard. The propensities are different in appearance; they are one in reality, that is, different expressions of love of money beyond sufficiency. The Spaniard approaches the Deity only through the priest, devotes himself to the will of the priest, whom he regards as his protector in heaven and his shield against the justice of law on earth. The church is an inviolable asylum for murderers and assassins; the church is thus tyrant in Spain,—superior to the law of the land. Religion, or devotion to the will of the Deity is that alone which makes man happy; at least, which preserves him from the impression of causes which lead to unhappiness. Devotion to the priest, who is an engine of imposture, is the source of moral degeneracy. The vice which proceeds from high authority communicates its character to inferiors. It disfigures nations with errors which do not constitutionally belong to them, and Spain may be ranked in

the number thus led astray. The people are enticed to dissimulation, even to simulation by example: they are protected by sacerdotal authority, and absolved by it from crimes which, according to the laws of common justice, deserve the punishment of death.

Besides the predominant influence of the priesthood in forming and modifying the moral character of the inhabitants of Spain, the mode, in which the civil government was administered in past times, may be regarded as a cause which conduced materially to add to the moral deterioration of the people. The Spanish nation does not appear to have known liberty, not even the shadow of it since the accession of Charles the Fifth; and they had in fact no distinct conception of it at the invasion of Napoleon. Ambition of conquest was the passion of Charles, as well as of Napoleon. Cupidity of money, as the dominant passion of the human race, filled the ranks of the army with recruits. The armies of Charles were thus mercenary: the materials were collected from various nations and consisted of all kinds of vagabonds. They were well trained to arms comparatively;—good prize fighters—not patriotic soldiers. The successes of Charles seem to have arisen from combinations in design and force of means produced by money, rather than from superior military skill and heroic courage in the field. The ambition of the Spanish monarchy was then great. It waned after the time of Charles; or rather the genius, which is necessary to give ambition a forward course, was lost. As the spirit of ambition declined, the cupidity of money increased, with an increase of religious bigotry and political imbecility that eventually brought the nation to a state of extreme degradation. The Spanish possessions yielded gold and silver in abundance. The state collected with rigour: it was notwithstanding poor, for it did not know the base, upon which the system of proceeding which amalgamates riches with the state, is laid. The Spanish government is rapacious.

in its spirit. It placed its revenues at farm, and thereby delegated the spirit of rapacity to all its collectors. These, whether governor, general, or other magistrate, levied their salaries &c. from the contingencies which occurred within their jurisdictions. They levied with a severity amounting to extortion, or compounded with a dereliction of principle which offended honesty and corrupted morals. There was thus a train of exaction throughout Spain; and, as much latitude of discretion was given to the instruments of exaction, there was much opportunity for evasion, for oppression and for fraud. Every thing was transacted through the deteriorating operations of money; and, it is positively asserted that the very troops, who guard the shores against the entry of contraband goods, were, and even are, on some occasions, hired to unload a contraband cargo, and to pass it safely into the interior. Few of the lower officials refuse to open a prohibited barrier for a bribe in gold or silver; and, whatever moral error may be implied in the act, the dispensation of the priest relieves the conscience from the idea of offence. The fiscal tyranny of the state, independently of the chances of the gain of money, urges the individual to contraband trade, in revenge as may be supposed of an act of arbitrary oppression; and hence, while the sea coasts of Spain are more or less in revolt against the fiscal laws of the state, the basis of morality is undermined, truth and faith every where violated for the sake of a trifling illicit gain.

The population of the different divisions of continuous soils manifests more or less difference in ostensible character; and, whether the difference be constitutional and hereditary in a particular stock, or artificially formed by institution and confirmed into habit by long continuance in a given routine of practice, the general feature of difference is still noticeable. The Spaniards are perhaps the most conspicuous among the nations of Europe, in so far as respects the possession of

a distinctive peculiarity of character. National character, it may be observed, reposes, for the most part, on a general fundamental base. The national act ultimately moves upon it; and, in the present case, the act of the Spanish nation seems to move, as already said, on a base of national pride,—an opinion of self importance which is not easily separated from a Spanish mind,—a fact distinctly proved in history, both in ancient and modern times. It was this sentiment of national pride, stimulated to action by circumstances, which enabled the Spaniards to sustain the sieges of Saguntum in former times, and of Saragosa and Gerona in the present; in short, which roused and brought out the mountain population in bands against the formidable Napoleon, when the country was in a manner abandoned to itself. The Spaniards are not people who act suddenly and blindly from the impulse of passion. They are not hasty; but, when roused by insult, they are not easily appeased. They conceal their resentment of injury on many occasions; they do not forget their revenge on any. They appear to be subdued; they recoil and revenge when not expected. They are slow in their movements, military or other; but they are persevering in their purposes once they are formed. The recoil, in resentment of injury, is often long delayed by the Spaniard; when it comes, it is rarely incomplete; inasmuch as it is the execution of a design well matured by reflection—not a burst of passion. The Spaniard, even the peasant manifests a peculiarity of character. He is boastful, or speaks in the superlative degree as a soldier; but, though not open and prompt in action as a man of simple courage, he adheres to his purpose through difficulties and disguises; so that it is not easy to say when the mind of a Spaniard, either in war or otherwise, is completely laid open. He has good intellectual capacity where he is at liberty to exercise it, a peculiar wit and humour,—an apparent simplicity, and at the same time an acute and shrewd observa-

tion with a strong bias to his interests in all his manœuvres. He does not appear, as now said, to have that prompt and forward courage which darts boldly on the enemy: he requires an object in a forward position to solicit, or an instigation in the rear to urge him to advance.

The labouring peasant of Spain differs from the labouring peasant of most countries in Europe. He hires himself for a given time and for a given purpose; but he is not a mere drudge for daily, monthly, or yearly wages. He reserves a portion of his liberty for himself, and cannot be counted on for continuance at labour for other men's pleasures or profit. He is a man of some trust, where he accepts a charge: the house menial, if Spanish, is generally an outcast manifesting a strong disposition to pilfer. The Spanish male is sedate, slow and reserved; the female is cheerful in temper, prompt and energetic in manner, exhibiting everywhere, even in mountain villages, an elasticity of character and facility of address peculiar to Spain. The male, even the peasant male, has something of the air of a cavalier; the female has the grace and elegance of the inmate of a court. The rustic female, in the coup d' œil of a theatre at a bull-fight, has an appearance of polish and good breeding as if she were of the high blood of Europe. The female of Spain is captivating by exterior manner; but she is not interesting on near acquaintance. She is little instructed in knowledge beyond the knowledge of the courtesan; and she does not appear to possess, or to cultivate the finer sensibilities of female character which excite the permanent love and esteem of the other sex. Her mind is ordinarily filled with the prejudices of the priest; her life spent in amorous intrigue or religious devotedness;—in a word, she is amorous not amiable,—a syren in youth, a harpy in old age.

As Spain is a country of considerable extent, the people of its different districts shew considerable variety in aspect of countenance,

and more or less difference in manner and habit; they consequently may be supposed to have more or less fitness for the purposes of war according to difference of locality. In some provinces, they are comparatively low in stature, compact and well knit in their joints, hardy in frame and capable of enduring great fatigue. They are of good stature, erect figure, light body and long fork in others, consequently well calculated for services which require force as well as expedition. They are upon the whole good as mere military materials,—not inferior to any in Europe—superior to many. The Spaniards are temperate in eating and drinking, patient in toil and persevering in purposes. Familiar in their ordinary occupations with much of what occurs in war, they are in a manner at home in the field, and on that account less liable to suffer in their health, by the contingencies of severe campaigns, than the over fed peasantry of fertile countries, or the masses of refuse which fill the ranks of armies from manufacturing districts in time of war.

The Spanish army had its day of renown, even as a regular army. It has been in the shade for some time past, not from deterioration of the material, but from the operation of causes which counteract the national spirit, and do not supply its place by a correct system of mechanical training. The Spaniards have peculiar national properties. They are devoted to their country by a feeling of pride; they are deliberate in their councils, determined in their purposes once they are formed. Their natural habits are not remote from those of military life; and, in physical power, and physical endurance of toil they are equal, if not superior, to most of the peasantry of Europe. The military preeminence of the Spaniard appears principally in the defence of positions; and, as the defence of position, implying the defence of the native country, is the only legitimate ground of war, and that alone which the Spanish nation regards as warrantable and

suitable to the condition of Spain, it may be thought to be a primary object with the reformed Spaniards, while they pretend to adhere to the fundamental rule of right, to investigate the causes of things with rigour, so that they may attain to a knowledge of principles with accuracy, through which the end, which they appear to pursue with discretion, may be attained with certainty and effect through skill and courage. The chief renown of the Spaniards has arisen at all times from defence of position, or from maintaining a combat with fire-arms at a given distance, and under protection of something like a bulwark. The ordinary courage sinks at the presentation of a pistol ; and, it may be presumed, would not be proof at the near presentation of a firelock. It is firm against the naked point, at least the point of a sword or dagger ;—the writer cannot pretend to state the resolution and constancy with which it sustains the charge of the bayonet. The Spaniards do not appear to be people of the common herd, who may be moulded into any form the tactician chooses, and brought to that state of perfection in machine-like movement, which explodes a given number of rounds from the firelock, advances in regular order by word of command, and retires from the conflict with the same indifference as from a day of common field exercise. They may be made soldiers ; but it must be by the operation of a principle different from that of fear acting on brute matter.

It belongs to the tactician, who forms troops for military service, to study the character of the subject physically and morally, to train and put together according to powers and capacities ; and it particularly belongs to generals to apply the instrument, when thus formed, to the point of attack in the manner by which it may best act with advantage. It has not fallen to the lot of the Spanish nation to meet with this good fortune. The national spirit has been insulted for a long time past by the introduction of foreign troops, as the first guard and truest dependence of the throne ; and in the late war, the

nation was not thought equal to its own defence. The military force was in manner disorganized when Napoleon invaded Spain ; the work of war was consequently soon done. It was only, when the government was dissolved and the nation had no leader, that the character of the Spanish people developed itself. But, as the patriotism of the peasant is obnoxious to crowned heads and privileged classes, the patriotism of the Spaniards was not allowed to go its own issue; consequently the Spanish troops, as not principal in their own cause, were little esteemed during the whole of the Peninsula contest.—The Spaniards, notwithstanding the contempt in which they were held, gave proof of unsubdued spirit. The guerilla parties destroyed the invaders in multitudes:—they were in fact a main cause of their expulsion. The organized troops of Spain fought by themselves, or were present in the field with their allies. They appear to have been capricious in temper, even when they fought by themselves; their energy was rarely conspicuous, for the leaders were without genius, and incapable of animating the soldier. In the other case, they were the inferior instrument where they ought to have been the first: their pride was offended, and they were lukewarm where they ought to have been ardent as flame. They had not justice done them in training, for their character does not seem to have been studied and known. They had no advantage of being brought into the field under a national leader of prominent character; for Spain, unlike countries in revolution, did not produce a general, except perhaps some guerilla chiefs. These were not only zealous, but they were skilful as partizans, and revengeful as people personally offended.

The constitution of 1812 was formed in the name of Ferdinand; it was rejected by him when he returned to Spain; and it was imposed upon him in the year 1820, chiefly through the efforts of troops who were in preparation for foreign service. These, whether dis-

satisfied with the nature of the intended service, viz. the office of combatting the rising liberties of America, or animated with the patriotic desire of aiding in giving a free and rational constitution to their country, evinced much good sense, temper and humanity in the manner of conducting their enterprize. Their conduct impressed the writer, who was in Spain at the time, with sentiments of respect for the revolutionary chiefs, as it gave him reason to think that the people of Spain were not the play-things of ferocious and savage passions. Cadiz and the Isla de Leon were the scene of the insurrectionary explosion; the province of Andalusia was the field of what may be called the campaign. The royal general, who commanded at Algeiras, was ordered to assemble a force at, or near Chiclana. A detachment of the patriot insurgents under Colonel Riego, not quite two thousand in number, left the Isla, made its way through the country, and entered Algeiras in the absence of the commandant—O'Donnell. The people of Algeiras appeared to receive Colonel Riego favourably; but his situation was precarious, and he did not remain long among them. The royal General, O'Donnell, had a superior force in movement; and Riego, not considering it to be safe, or proper to remain long in one place, moved to San Roque, and, from San Roque, to Malaga. His rear guard was attacked on its way to Malaga—and he lost some men. Threatened by superior numbers he abandoned Malaga; but maintained himself in the strong grounds in the south parts of Andalusia, until the country declared itself for the constitution of the Cortes of 1812.

The appearance of Riego struck the writer with sympathy and respect. He was modest and unassuming, thoughtful and reserved; in fact, he looked like a man who had something within him. He was close in council. No one knew what he meant to do; but all were ready to follow him to death—in the then language of the day. Riego was aware at the time he passed through San Roque that his

situation was a dangerous one, almost a desperate one; for he had doubts, or rather little hopes of the cooperation of the other part of the army, and without that his destruction was certain. Refuge among the mountains was before him; but he, it is presumed, revolted from the idea of hiding himself in fastnesses, as a measure unbecoming the character of a man who had taken arms to give liberty to his country.

The royal and the revolted troops were part of the same army. They had been selected for a particular service; and they had the appearance of having been well selected. They were well equipped and well accoutred,—not so gilded, or so minutely punctilious in manual and manœuvre, as the high dressed battalions of the professed military sovereigns of Europe; but they were perfectly well adapted to the service of the field, and the economical arrangements, in so far as was seen, were substantial and good for a soldier. The royal troops did not appear to be discontented; but they testified no animation, and would have been pronounced at once by an indifferent spectator to be lukewarm. The patriot or insurgent, though their situation was not one of promise at the time alluded to, were cheerful and animated, inspired to enthusiasm according to appearance by the importance of the cause in which they were engaged. The patriot song, though not of the first class of merit as the expression of an electrified mind, made impression on the soldier as sung by himself: it was difficult to perceive its operation on the townsman or peasant. The peasant of the south part of Andalusia is of a stately and formal exterior. He is reserved, and it is not easy, on ordinary occasions, to read his countenance; it seemed to betray him on the present in spite of himself. He was not transported with joy; but his sombre countenance was enlivened so as to indicate feelings of inward satisfaction. The followers of Riego complained of the apathy of the people of Andalusia,

and the indifferent spectator might, perhaps, be disposed to join with them; but in considering the subject dispassionately, he would, it is presumed, be more inclined to applaud discretion than to censure want of feeling. Spain had not been permitted in recent times to look at the principles of national government, and Spaniards do not perhaps think much on the subject. The people of Andalusia, though not vociferous, were evidently enlivened by the hopes of something which they only knew by name; but they saw difficulties in the way of obtaining it, and they were slow to commit themselves in expressing joy. They were not politicians; but they had good sense, and were so far acquainted with human history as to know, that common revolution is rarely any other than the transfer of power from one tyrant to another.—The constitution of 1812 was not, it is admitted, a constitution for a people who had not attained to a true view of moral conduct; but, there were hopes that, if it were allowed to act, the condition of Spain and Spaniards might be ameliorated in time by the effect of its operations. The Cortes, it must be acknowledged, had an host of insidious enemies to combat in the Fathers of the Church, the Holy Alliance of the potentates of Europe, the king, and the nobles; and the constituent Cortes unfortunately had not gone to the true base of legislation. The attempt to do so would have been deemed revolution direct; and, as such a heresy in European politics. The partial legislative reform was therefore adopted. It pruned, but it did not eradicate evils; and if it eventually succeed in giving a good and stable government to the Spanish nation, the experiment may be justly held as the greatest of human achievements that history records. The roots of error were permitted to remain—in compliment to those to whom no compliment was due: they will bud and perhaps bear the fruit of confusion in spite of the counteraction of the Cortes.

The above remarks, on the military character of Spaniards, were written in Spain in the year 1820, some time after the constitution of 1812 had been accepted by Ferdinand. There was then a hope, though not a confident one, that the condition of Spain would be ameliorated by the labours of the constituent Cortes; and, though the constitution could not be said to be built on a sound base, it was not impossible but that it might have done good, had the king been honest. Spain, it may be remarked, had been long and deeply diseased as a political state; and, in this diseased state, it presented itself as an easy prey to the ambition of an insatiable and unprincipled conqueror. The country was invaded by Napoleon, Emperor of France: the government was dissolved; the king was carried away captive, and a new dynasty was placed upon the throne. The act of aggression, contrived by treachery and executed by force, directly insulted the people of Spain; and, as Spaniards are susceptible of affront, and strongly revengeful of injuries which offend their pride, the mass of the people rose up in resistance and made war upon the usurper. They hoped to rescue their country from foreign rule; and, that they might preserve it when rescued, they attempted to frame a system of law and government for its effective protection in future. Whether the persons, who assumed the office of framing the constitution, did not see the base on which a political constitution can only move with harmony and effect; or, whether they were not permitted to look at it and to act on it by commanding circumstances, the new constitution, instead of being laid on a true and simple base consistent with the law of nature, was laid on a base of artificial excrescences, viz. rank, property and privilege, the product of the fraud and violence of former times, and as such vitiated and unfit. It is not hereby meant to insinuate that the intention of the Cortes was otherwise than good; but it is to be regretted that its members were not

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sufficiently acquainted, with the laws of nature as they relate to man, to present themselves as legislators of a disturbed country ; or, that they were not sufficiently bold to act on their own knowledge in contradiction to other opinion. The constitution was framed in the name, and as it were under the authority of the captive king. It limited his royal power ; and it did not please him when presented to him at his return to Spain. It was called representative. As representative, it implied an exercise of mind and freedom of thinking, a privilege which had been long denied to the Spanish people. The influence of the king, priests and nobles was diminished by the laws of the constitution of 1812 ; but, improvidently it may be added, a sufficiency was left to them to be mischievous, if they were so disposed. The measure of curtailment was unwise. The Cortes ought to have known that taking away a little irritates as much as taking away the whole. It is obvious to demonstration, in the history of mankind, that power has no gratitude, and the fact is confirmed in recent events in Spain. The king, priests and nobles, whose powers were only very gently curbed, were irritated to excess, and they pursued the Cortes to vengeance through the power which was unwisely left to them by the laws of the constitution.

The constitution of 1812 was formally accepted by king Ferdinand in the month of March 1820. He then swore to observe the conditions of it ; he plotted, from the instant he had sworn, in what manner he might best overturn it. It is admitted that the constitution is weak, as an instrument of government to rule a people who can scarcely be said to have a moral principle, or a religion except the will of a domineering priest ; it was inefficient in its operations as counteracted by the king or chief executive. But though weak, the Spanish constitution cannot with any justice be said to be wicked. It insulted, or offended no other independent people ; and, it was so

specious, in its promises of security and happiness, that Naples and Portugal were induced to imitate it; but they imitated it, in so far as is commonly known, without any officious interference on the part of Spain. Its measures were moderate, intended to remove an inveterate disease without a strong remedy. It failed; but it is not improbable that it might have succeeded, to a certain extent at least, had Spain been left wholly to itself; for there was reason to expect that the eyes of the nation might be so opened, as to attain a liberal and general view of things in the course of time, and that the counteraction of kings, priests and nobles, as unavailing, would have eventually subsided. This event appears to have been dreaded by the club of sovereigns who impiously assume the title of Holy Alliance, and who are openly leagued to banish human liberty from the face of Europe. The French army acted as the vanguard of this sacrilegious combination, and restored Ferdinand to absolute power without much bloodshed, but with an eternal stain on their own character.

It is not pretended that the constitution of the Spanish Cortes was an efficient instrument of government for a corrupted state. Its ameliorating power was weak; and it did not, distinctly and clearly, open to public view the true source of morals. The priest, with his legends of fable and imposture, was still the instructor of the people; and it is unnecessary to say to what object his instructions ordinarily tended. The Cortes, constituent and administering, was evidently deficient in promptitude and energy of action. Spain, though fertile of good sense, discretion and liberality, was singularly barren of genius, or that bold and electric spirit which sees by intuition, and acts without balancing by grains of reasoning. The situation, in which the Cortes were placed, was one it must be admitted of great difficulty; and not aware perhaps that the middle course is the worst course in cases of extreme difficulty and danger, the members of it

compromised the nation and themselves to destruction, through too much reverence for the name of a perjured king. There was evidence before the Cortes, sufficient, it is presumed, for legal proof that Ferdinand was false, and that many of the nobles, and almost all the priests were acting treacherously against the state of which they were a part, and to which they had sworn fidelity. With this conviction, and it was not half conviction, the nation, or the Cortes, as the organ of the nation, were justifiable, and would have been justified in the most rigorous court of law, to suspend the royal function, to strip the nobles of their rank and privileges, to confine the priests to their monasteries, to proclaim the sovereignty of the people, and to diffuse the gospel of Jesus Christ over Spain as the true code of human liberty and human morals. The measure proposed implies revolution; but revolution was the only measure that could have saved Spain; and it was a measure, not only justified, but commanded by necessity when the country was invaded by a foreign force for the purpose avowed. Revolution was the anchor of hope in Spain; but it must be confessed that it could not have been easy to give it effect. The Spaniards, whether through inherent property of constitution, or through long subjection to a brutalizing priesthood, are deficient in that elasticity of mind which kindles into flame at the electric breath of liberty. They are proud as Spaniards; but they are not acutely sensible to encroachment on their rights as independent men. The pride of the independent man is obscured, or suffocated by the prejudices of the training priest; and, as such, it would not be easy to convince, through channels of reason and truth, that men are constitutionally equal to each other. The object to be accomplished it must be confessed was difficult; but if a proper view of it could have been given to the Spanish people; and had the idea been properly presented that the soil of Spain was their inheritance, it may

be presumed that they would have risen as one man to defend it—without bribe of money and without swerving, through unworthy motives, from the laudable act. And moreover, if they had felt the power of the pure doctrine of the Christian religion, they would have been men within themselves,—with courage on principle to maintain the sphere in which they had been placed by the universal Creator; but with no will, and no courage to encroach on the sphere of others. That implies violation of the law of justice, which a true Christian will not violate to attain the highest point of human elevation.

The French penetrated to the south of Spain, without meeting with any thing which deserves the name of resistance, except in Catalonia. They entered Spain under the shield of the Priest, and with their hands full of gold,—a protection and aid which availed them more than courage and skill in war. The opinion of the priest rules widely in Spain; and few Spaniards have courage to resist a bribe in money. These auxiliaries, with the treachery of the leaders of the Spanish army, made the French conquest an easy one. The Cortes was not decisive. It talked well, loudly and speciously; but it did not act boldly and promptly,—not it is presumed from want of patriotism, or even from want of courage, but from want of genius for action. The Guerilla parties did something; and Mina, the chief of Guerilla's did a great deal. It is scarcely to be expected that he alone can save Spain from degradation; but he has given, and it is to be hoped that he will yet give proof that all Spaniards are not worthless.—If what is said of him be true, he is entitled to rank with Wallace and Scander Beg as a patriot and enterprising man.

The conduct of the Spanish troops of the line has disappointed the expectations of many. There is cause to regret their uselessness; but, if things be considered in their reasons, there is not much cause to be surprized at what has happened. Spain, it must be borne in

mind, has not been a military power for a long series of years; and the natives of Spain have not moreover been the chief military trust of the kingdom, even in recent times. If this be so, it may be reasonably supposed that the military character was not held in esteem; and as such, had little chance to be eminent. Good sense is common; but military genius, or genius of prompt action is in a manner denied to the people of this country: under tyranny they dare not permit the mind to aspire. When the constitution of 1812 was accepted and proclaimed in 1820, it was fair to suppose that, as the nation was in some degree renovated, the military spirit would have declared itself strongly, and military organization would have been studied in its principles, so that a system of tactic and discipline, such as is best calculated for defence which was the avowed object of Spain, would have been laid on a true basis and conducted systematically to something like perfection. The writer cannot pretend to say what has been done on this head; but it is unfortunately proved that, whatever may have been attempted, nothing useful has been effected. The king was averse from the constitution; and it could not be expected, even if he had capacity to institute the organization of military force for the defence of the constitution which he had accepted, that he would encourage the prosecution of it while he was actually plotting to overturn it. These, viz. the want of truth in the king, and the want of military spirit and military genius among the people, were impediments to the formation of a new military system; but besides these, the Spaniards, if the author has read their character rightly, are not subjects to be moulded into common military form by ordinary tacticians. Frederick of Prussia himself it is presumed would have failed, if he had applied his principle to Spaniards. Spaniards have caprices and peculiarities which require to be studied in order to be known; and, when known, to be applied to purpose by science and impulse

of genius. Recruits were brought together, and arranged into regiments of the line on the present occasion. They were probably drilled carefully to common manœuvre; but it is fair to believe that they were not animated with the feelings of national soldiers. They saw the constitution only imperfectly; they were not amalgamated with it, and did not generally perhaps feel the true electric spirit of national liberty. Hence there may be cause to think that they were deteriorated rather than improved by their military training and military habits. The eye was taken from the country by the incorporation into a stipendiary class, and nothing was substituted in its place calculated to command attention. The Spanish soil had been long barren of military genius capable of animating the soldier to national enterprise, or of implanting in him a principle of honour which preserves from degradation. The troops not well drilled, or not perfect in tactic so as to act in the field as a military machine, were exposed, by contingent conditions, to the operation of various causes which are calculated to tarnish honour. They were ill paid; and, in want of bread, they were tempted to tamper with their duty for a bribe in money. They had not the honour of soldiers; and they might justly be considered as the most degraded portion of the Spanish nation; consequently the event which has recently taken place, in so far as it depended on the regular army, could not well be expected to be different from what it has been.

Ferdinand is restored to absolute power. The constitution of 1812 is annulled, and a new order of things has begun, or is about to begin. It is impossible to say precisely what may be the result of the new order; but it is plain that a cloud of horror, bloodshed and misery hangs over Spain, and threatens to desolate the country. The Spaniards have not perhaps had as yet a true view of human rights and liberties; but the word is amongst them, and will not, it is pre-

sumed, be lost. Ferdinand is faithless, vindictive and insolent; but, blinded by passions and prejudices, he is not wise. His counsellors, if opinion can be formed by the acts of the regency, are absolutely imbecile; and from this it may be concluded that, if a hostile collision again take place between the patriots and the king, the king will fall, for his late conduct must have undeceived the most stupid of his subjects, that he is no longer worthy of trust: he is both wicked and worthless.

The present is the most important era, in so far as regards the human race, that stands in the records of history. Man has been a prey to man from the beginning of the world to the present time. Individuals have overrun the earth, slaughtered the people without mercy, or reduced them to slavery; but these acts were generally the acts of individuals. The present age witnesses something more impudent, and more complicatedly wicked than the attempts of former times. A club of European kings have formed a conspiracy to bring the human race to the condition of cattle, to extinguish the human mind, and to make the human carcase the property of an individual for his pleasures and purposes. The act is now declared. It is a deliberate act and firm resolve of Christian princes; and, hypocritically as it may be clothed in language, it implies, in the writer's opinion, rebellion direct to the will of the Creator, if the Creator's will can be known by manifestation of the law which maintains the universe in order and harmony. If man be permitted to form opinion on things which fall under his observation, he has not room to doubt that the human race is one creation; and, if one creation, that one law is sufficient for its government. The law, as traced in its minutest operations, consists in action and reaction in reciprocity, that is, a law of justice equally balanced among all parts of the human creation; or, as intelligibly expressed in the Christian code, "the act of doing

unto others as we would that others do unto us." This law is the law of justice, and it applies equally to all conditions. Every one is functionary, and no one is more than functionary of a defined office. If this be granted, it is obvious that if the inhabitants of any given district of the earth choose to form an association among themselves for internal security and defence against foreign aggression, the law, by which they are to be connected and bound together, must be so laid as to bear equally on all and every part within the circle of the association; consequently it must be just in its conditions to all, and executed with inexorable severity on all—the functionary appointed for execution and for execution only. The law in this case is absolute. No functionary can stay its course, or supersede its decree. It is an insult to man's common sense to suppose that an individual of common clay with other men, should forge a patent from heaven to rule his fellows according to his will. It argues ignorance in the people if they believe it; and it reproaches them with worthlessness if they can be purchased with money to aid in carrying the practice of it into effect. The Holy Alliance has declared itself sovereign by its own will: the people will be beasts in reality if they do not resist, and declare themselves independent of the Holy Alliance. If man know himself, he will not encroach on the sphere of others, for the act is an offence against justice; and if he know himself, and reverence the law of the Creator, he will not yield his sphere, or a hair's breadth of his sphere through intimidations of human force.

CHAPTER IX.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE FRENCH.

THE population of Transalpine Gaul, consisting of various nations more or less connected with one another, was of a warlike character from the earliest records of its history. A people, bearing the name of Gaul, sacked Rome at an early period of the Roman republic, and was only prevented by accident from totally annihilating it. The inroads of the Gauls into Italy were frequent at subsequent periods; and they were sometimes so formidable as to threaten the safety of the Roman state. When the state expanded, so that the whole of Italy was at its command, Gaul was invaded by Julius Cæsar with a view to permanent conquest. It was in fact subdued and added to the list of Roman provinces; but it was not subdued easily, and it would not, it is presumed, have been subdued at all, had the Gauls been united so as to act cordially, and in concert with one another. Cæsar, who conquered Gaul, was the greatest captain of the age in which he lived, and as such may be supposed to be competent to form opinion on the military merits of his opponents. His testimony is favourable to them as soldiers; and their qualities then were not very different from what they now are in the inhabitants of modern France, viz. impetuosity in the onset, want of constancy and perseverance in

the conflict, elasticity, or ready recoil after discomfiture. The fact of the Gaulic character as recorded by Cæsar is of the best authority,—and it is important in the history of mankind. It goes to prove that military qualities, if not absolutely produced by circumstances of locality, are at least modified by them; or, it corroborates the opinion that those who invade, conquer and become lords of the soil, though they subvert the existing government and establish their own in its place, do not subvert or annul the radical character of the inhabitants of the country subdued.

The Gauls, when subdued by Roman arms and Roman arts, were organized into political society after the Roman manner; but they still retained the base of the Gaulic character. They received Roman laws, Roman civilization; and, they sunk in imitation into the vortex of Roman sensuality and Roman vice. As they had no part, or only a subordinate part in the government of themselves, they may be supposed to have been nearly indifferent to the interests of those who maintained dominion over them. The Roman central government was fluctuating, factious and corrupted; the provincial administration was weak and in a manner insulated. In that state of things a migratory tribe of warriors, from beyond the Rhine, entered the confines of Gaul and usurped dominion over the Roman province by force of arms. The human race was under a general warlike movement in the fourth and fifth centuries. The tide of migration rolled from the East and North-east to the South and West of Europe in wave after wave with irresistible force. The tribes came in clusters like dislodged bees; but they did not come in confusion:—they were organized though under migration. The migrating tribes were not scrupulous in conscience. The sword was their right to possession. In so far as is known, they were of a lofty and masculine character, stately and pompous in manner, chivalrous in spirit and not

ungenerous in sentiment. These qualities were conspicuous in the Franks, who, displacing the Roman power in Gaul, assumed the sovereignty of the soil, and gave a new name to the country which they had seized by force and claimed as a conquest. The feudal tenure of lands, constituting a military fief, seemed to be the bond of connexion, or symbol of society among these warlike tribes. It was introduced into France; and it continued to prevail in it with more or less modification until a recent date.

The Christian religion was established in Gaul at the time of the invasion of the Franks; and, as the Christian church adheres to the superior power in almost all cases, the Fathers of the church put themselves under the protection of the conqueror. It was their interest to assure it, and that they might attain it and trust in it, they laboured with zeal to convert him to their faith. The Christian religion, as often said, did not become the national religion of Gaul, or any other known country of Europe until it had ceased, in the proper sense of the word, to be the religion of Jesus Christ. It was corrupted in Gaul; and it was so loaded with superstitions, at the time of the invasion of the Franks, that it might be said to be a religion to priests, rather than a religion to the Creator. The conduct of the sacerdotal class, as judged by the simple fact of history, without making allowance for the inability of human nature to control its own acts by its simple reason, presents itself as a sacrilegious tyranny—the most nefarious that ever was practised upon man. It is charitable to believe, though it may not be perfectly true, that the enormities alluded to arose from a series of actions, the spring of which was little known to the ostensible actor. It was in fact the product of passions, or inordinate desires; which, once they obtain footing, work by their own rule, deaf to the voice of common reason, and averse from the remonstrances of truth and justice. Brotherly love and charity form the

base of the Christian character. It is an humble base—and it is a disinterested one. It removed the veil, which obscures the Deity from human view, without desiring worldly compensation for the labour; and it thus, in the true spirit of charity, led forlorn and helpless man to observe through the sensibilities of his own nature—to feel, worship and adore the Being who gave him life, and who protects him during its continuance. Such was the office of Jesus Christ and of many of his earlier followers; but the practice of it did not long continue in original purity. Those who devoted themselves to the service of the church obtained respect through the office which they had assumed. Respect brought power; power brought wealth in bribe for favour; and wealth, changing the ideas of the mind, so corrupted the feelings of the human heart as totally to disfigure the genuine man. Instead of the humility which characterized the author of the Christian doctrine, the Fathers of the church—not the earliest, assumed an air of important arrogance, so as to constitute themselves the channels of communication between man and his Creator. They laboured to veil the Deity from human view, in as much as they inculcated the necessity of the intercession of favourites for obtaining notice and protection from the throne of heaven,—an idea which, while it insults common sense, is impious, as applied to the universal Creator, whose essence is justice and truth, abhorrent from partialities in the strictest sense of the word.—The Franks were pagans at the time they invaded France. They became Christian; but Christianity was then so corrupted that they did not perhaps gain much by the exchange. True Christianity makes man an example of sincerity and truth; corrupted Christianity makes him a machine of hypocrisy and imposture.

The French, in as much as they were a tribe of migratory warriors, manifested at all times the character of a military people. They are

forward and adventurous as soldiers; and they were eminent in early times, as champions in the crusades to the Holy Land. Ambitious of power and dominion; and, drunk with the idea of military glory, they are a restless race, rarely long at peace with themselves or their neighbours. France, as a military country, has produced men of military talent on many occasions; but the reign of Francis the First was the most conspicuous for valorous captains. The late revolution was fertile of genius; for objects which excite genius were then laid open to the view of the multitude. The wars of Henry the Fourth were memorable for a peculiar species of generosity and high spirit. Henry himself, though not perhaps a consummate commander, was a heroic and noble minded man; his captains were numerous, and some of them were distinguished for talent. Turenne raised the military fame of France at a subsequent period to high eminence. Heroic and virtuous in himself, Turenne was the cause of heroism and virtue in others; and, during his time, the French army was respectable, even eminent. —The wars of 1792 and 1803 mark important epochs in the military annals of France. The revolution of 1789 alarmed the sovereigns of Europe. Under alarm, they approached the French frontier with armed force, in the hopes of repressing the commotion and of establishing royal authority in all its splendour. The collision took place; and the French obtained successes which, as the successes of an armed mob against troops in the highest order of discipline, frightened princes and confounded tacticians, who had been accustomed to calculate the issue of combats in war by rules which apply to regular military machines, put in motion by word of command and directed by the skill of privileged commanders.

The French revolutionary code of legislation, execrated as it has been, may be said to rest on the base of the Christian doctrine, “Do unto others as you would that others do unto you.” The operation

of the doctrine on society was seen, examined, and digested into system by the spirit of philanthropy. It was developed in the assembly of the nation by commanding powers of eloquence; and it seemed, when developed, to have produced that conviction on the people which derives from reason. The promise of happiness was fair at the outset; but its course was scarcely begun, when its harmony was disturbed by selfish passions, and counteracted by intrigues which excited the nation to violence. The throne was overturned, hereditary authorities were abolished and the base of the political government was laid on a primary condition of equality among the people as a body of brothers. The principle assumed is true in its foundations, if the Christian religion be true; but it is to be considered in the present case as in some degree an act of revenge, or retribution for fifteen hundred years or more of feudal bondage. The principle of the revolution opened the view to the primary condition of man's nature; and it may thus be supposed that the ancient Celtic stock, emancipated from feudal chains and electrified by the spirit of liberty which belongs to man, became literally new; and, with the energy which belongs to youth, carried the military glory of the country to a height unexampled in the history of nations. But, be the causes and the steps of the elevation of the French nation what they may, it is incontestible that it attained a distinguished eminence in war in an incredibly short time. French peasantry, presumptively the Celtic stock, were now the principal actors. The French peasantry possess a fair proportion of the physical and mental qualities which render men fit for the practice of war in the field. These qualities which seem to be innate in the race, are brought out and improved unintentionally in the primary schools of education. The French are upon the whole below the medium standard of the male population of most countries in Europe; and they are inferior in bulk and positive force

to many. But, though of a low stature comparatively and of inferior brute force generally, they are active and elastic, having the force which they possess at ready command. They are ordinarily well placed on their limbs, and well poised at the haunches; consequently they move with ease and freedom, and sustain long marches with facility. The French soldiers are alert; and they may be said with perfect truth to be inferior to no soldiers in Europe for the rapidity and order of their movements in all conditions of service. This quality, which is of great value in war, is principally to be ascribed to primary education and national mode of life. The exercise of dancing is the amusement and pleasure of the French; and it may thus be supposed that the discovering of those bearings and attitudes, which are most connected with easy movement in dancing, becomes an object of study: the exercise gives pleasure. Ease in movement is favourable to long endurance; hence dancing, while practised for pleasure and amusement, serves to improve the pliability of the limbs; and, as such, it may be considered as one of the means which conspire to increase the capacity of continuing exercise, military or other, with little comparative fatigue.—The idea now thrown out may be thought to be fanciful: it is notwithstanding founded in reason, and it is proved to be true in experience. The cadence, which is connected with or belongs to dancing, is a cause not altogether without weight, in facilitating the performance of forward movements in the field, even in facilitating retrograde movements under discomfiture, when the necessity of retiring occurs, —a duty which the French execute better, or in what is called a cleaner manner than the troops of any other European military power with which we are acquainted.—The French, when dispersed by accident, gather rapidly and group in order as if they acted in all their movements under a constitutional habit of cadenced step.

The French possess, as now said, much bodily activity according to the quantity of their power. They are moreover easily impressed by new objects, particularly by phantoms of military glory and desire of military fame; consequently they are easily led to every variety of combat which presents a novelty. They are vain individually, ambitious nationally,—ambitious in fact to such extent that national glory always stands prominent in the eye of the genuine Frenchman. If not so firm to resist as many, and not so powerful in the attack at close quarters as others, they are constitutionally impetuous, and susceptible of an enthusiasm which, striking by flashes, achieves great things where it is well directed. The French are not easily read, so as to be correctly classed; but they may be said upon the whole to belong to that class of human beings who act by impulses on sensation rather than by sentiment, the product of reflection. They are light and volatile in temper, apparently capricious and uncertain; but, as they possess much constitutional sensibility, and are capable of being excited even to enthusiasm by various causes, they become steady in their attachments by a judicious application of the means which excite the attachment.—They are in fact efficient instruments of war in the hands of a general, who has knowledge to discern the proper spring which moves the act of the different races of men who compose armies.

The French do not, as already observed, possess the same degree of muscular force as many of the nations of Europe. But, while inferior in this respect, they are superior to most in activity, and in that tact of mental sensibility which reads the countenance of things at first sight. Their power of perception is quick; and, while the power is quick, the impression is comparatively just; hence it is fair to conclude that the French, from quick perception, mental activity and celerity in movement, are excellently fitted by nature for the practice

of partizan war. Inferior in the power of the arm to many, inferior in constancy of courage to others, they are less calculated to resist than to attack; consequently they are most available as soldiers in services of forward movement, such as operate by appearance rather than by the impulse of actual force.—The French are light in figure and lively in manner. They were not conspicuous in the time of the monarchy as condensed and solid mechanical masses, either on parade or in the field; and they do not appear to have attained to distinction on that head, even in the time of the republic. Swiss and other foreigners were considered at one time as the bones of the French military machine: the native French were the garniture,—the parts conspicuous for enterprize and desultory activity. The military character of the nation was in a manner enchained in the time of the monarchy; for it was obscured by the preference which was given to foreigners. The war of the revolution brought it out in its own colours, and established it on a true and national base. The defenders of France were a mere mass of men, not organized as soldiers. They had little formal discipline; they were without experience, and were in fact regarded in the light of a mob by the soldiers of the regular school. It is not denied that the exterior appearance was mob-like: history proves that the interior was organized. The union, produced by the sentiment of liberty and love of country, then seen as it were for the first time and ardent as flame, was intimate and better cemented, in the shock of battle, than that of ordinary troops kept together by impressions of fear only. The French peasantry are intelligent and brave, active and enterprising in themselves. With these qualities, cemented and kept in action by devotion to a cause which touched the heart of every one, more was done for France by this ridiculed and ragged mob than could have been done for it, if all the population of the country, without the electrifying spirit of liberty, had been

drilled systematically to military manœuvre by Frederick of Prussia himself. It may be added perhaps that had rigorous measures been necessary for the formation of a soldier, they could not have been attempted at the time. The feeling of republican France was abhorrent from the brutal mode of military training, which prevailed in Europe at the commencement of the revolution; and the French tacticians, who appear to have been men of genius, shew their good sense and discernment in not offending it. The purpose was attained by other means, more effectually attained perhaps than in any other army then in the field.

The success of the French arms did not arise, in the first years of the republic, from causes which usually give success to the operations of regular mechanical armies. The French were apparently loosely organized. With the exception of the reserve, they were not formed into compact lines and columns, so as to have the exterior appearance of solid walls and impenetrable masses of men bristling with iron; even the reserve was not so selected and adjusted in the ranks, by size and exterior resemblance, as to present the appearance of a military instrument mechanically correct in the disposition of its parts. The order of the ranks was comparatively open; and the expression of individual activity was still observable in the most compact and perfect of the French battalions:—in fact a French soldier was not a simple part in a common machine;—the mind of the man was still at liberty. The battalions were loosely organized according to the ideas of modern tacticians. The generals had little or no experience in war, at least as commanders of armies; and, under these circumstances, the success, which was obtained, may appear to be a problem of difficult solution:—it is not however insoluble, if things be examined and resolved to principles. The French have quicker perceptions than any other military nation in Europe; and they act

more promptly than most others according to their perceptions. They became a new people from the lights which were evolved in the course of the revolution. They had lived long under the arbitrary rule of kingly or feudal power; and, as they were now emancipated by an act of force, they ran wild in liberty like persons escaped from the confinement of a gaol. France presented itself to the people as a country created by themselves. They were enamoured of their creation, enthusiastically attached to it, even devoted to death for its preservation from the fangs of the combined princes who darted upon it as upon a common prey. The flame of liberty ran through the whole of France with the rapidity of lightning, and with a character of infection so strong that those who had been sent in chains to serve in the ranks became ardent in the service, as if they had been originally volunteer. The French are more liable than most people to be transported by their passions; and, under the influence of passion, they often commit excesses, and sometimes crimes; but they are not intrinsically a cruel or a vicious people. The republican army rose daily in military reputation; and its moral conduct might be considered as exemplary. The fact of the good moral conduct of the soldiery of the republican army cannot be denied; and, if an explanation of it be sought for, some part of it at least may be found in the horrible atrocities which prevailed in the interior of France at a certain period of the revolutionary war,—horrors of such atrocity, as sent the best moralled part of the male population to the armies on the frontier as to an asylum. But whatever may have been the cause of the fact, the enemies of the republic are obliged to admit that the division of the army which forced the allies to retire from the Netherlands manifested a high sense of honour, and gave proof of humane and generous conduct, in their progress through the country, that scarcely has a parallel in history.

France has had a fair share of military talent at all periods of her history: she appears to have had more than a common share during the revolution. The mind of the French nation was then employed on the subject of legislation and government. Such form of employment naturally drew it to a consideration of the relation in which man stands with man as a member of a common class of beings. Exercise in the field of reasoning may be supposed to have been constant and severe; and it may be reasonably supposed to have opened a view to the principle through which the Creator maintains the order and harmony of the universe, viz. action and reaction in reciprocity. The fact of reciprocal action and reaction was seen and appreciated by the constituent assembly; and the universality of the fact apparently led the assembly to lay the base of national legislation on the stable foundation of the Christian tenet, viz. "Do unto others as you would others do unto you." The tenet is a demonstrative truth as a base of morals; and it is held by those, who assume the Christian name, to be of divine origin. It was assumed by the French, as now said, for a base of legislation. It is in fact the only base which admits of a consistent structure; but the assumption of it was considered, by the princes of Europe, as a heresy leading to the subversion of thrones and altars. The priests, the nobles and others, who were born in high stations and nursed in prejudice, withdrew from France. The Christian princes of all casts and denominations combined to invade the French territory, with a view to repress insurrection and chastise its authors for their insolent audacity. As the dangers which threatened religion, or rather the mockery of religion, were included among the pretexts for the combination of princes, the French nation considered itself as persecuted by a Christian faction; and, under the rule of an outrageous demagogue, interdicted the Christian worship in the territory of the republic. The act was violent. It was

done in resentment with a view to retaliation:—it was not the general sentiment of the inhabitants of France.

Few men of high birth or military reputation adhered to France during the revolution; men of talent started up among the people every where, particularly in the army. The French had a system of military training and discipline prior to the revolution, on a similar base and as perfectly executed perhaps as in most European countries. It did not suit with the present condition of things: it was therefore expedient, or necessary to form a new one more corresponding with the existing circumstances of the people. The scheme seems to have been adopted at an early period of the war; and, in so far as a non-professional man can be allowed to judge, it was laid on a more scientific base than any other of the systems of training that obtain among the great military powers of Europe. In these, appearance of uniformity is the object sought to be attained: force is the instrument employed to attain it. In the French, utility and effect prevail over uniformity of appearance: knowledge of animal structure and acquaintance with capacity of action in different structures are deemed necessary to adjust and measure the effect. The exercises of manual and manœuvre are performed in the French army with a celerity and precision that can not perhaps be exceeded: the explosions from the firelock astonish by close repetition. The effects of movements and evolutions in the face of an enemy, as studied in their reasons, are presented to the eye of the soldier while under training, in such manner that he may be supposed to comprehend the design, and execute the measure—not passively as a part of a machine, but actively and with energy as an intelligent being. Besides practice in manual and movement—which is the ostensible object in military training, pains are taken by the French tactician to lay the base of correct interior economy in the elements of the

army; consequently the recruit is here instructed in the best manner of taking care of himself, with a view to enable him to maintain his efficiency as a part in an instrument of force. He, among others is instructed, it may be said scientifically, in the best manner of dressing the raw material of the ration, so as to form a wholesome and savoury mess; and, from this knowledge and other knowledge that belongs to interior economy, he suffers less privation and fewer hardships in the field than the troops of other nations who are similarly circumstanced; particularly than the British, who, the most brave perhaps of any soldiers in Europe, are the least instructed in care of themselves. The French system of training appears to be very perfect according to its rule. The system of *stratagesy*, which was digested at an early period of the war and acted on with effect, is a striking outline of military science as drawn from a knowledge of human things. It is said to have been sketched by Count Carnot, a man of the first class of eminence as a speculative soldier, and of the first class of excellence as a citizen of spirit, honour and virtue.—The general principle, in so far as chance observation, or the testimony of creditable witnesses can be depended on, consists in forming a reserve of select men in a safe and commanding position connected with the scene of action. A swarm of sharp-shooters, sent out in every direction, masks the movement of the advancing force, and feels, as it is termed, the different points in the enemy's line. The sharp-shooters commence their fire at a great distance, and advance progressively until they ascertain the practicable points in the position, even sometimes maintain the combat, which they thus commence, so obstinately that the enemy becomes intimidated, and abandons his ground before any other than sharp-shooters make their appearance. When the position of the enemy is laid open, the lines and columns advance to the attack; sometimes they succeed,—sometimes they fail and retire:

they advance again; and, again repulsed and pressed, they rally under the protection of the reserve. In this manner, the conflict continues with fluctuating success until a point be gained in the enemy's line, when the position is abandoned; or, until the French themselves unable to make impression think proper to desist.— There are peculiarities in the manner in which the French carry on an action in the field different from the more usual practice of the time, and which, as laid on a basis that has been correctly reasoned, deserve the especial consideration of military men. The sharp shooters, and even the regular battalions commence their fire at a great distance, often at an elevation; and, as they are said to fire on many occasions, without ramming, they fire with great celerity, so as to give the idea that they calculate to make impression on the enemy by noise, rather than by the actual destruction of bullets. The French bring forward cannon in a bold manner, and use it freely in action. If the battle go against them, they abandon it, apparently without concern; deeming it unsafe to impede or confuse the retreat by attempting to carry it off. In this they act differently from others; but they seem to act wisely, for independently of the impediment which arises from the obstruction of the road, the act of withdrawing cannon marks discomfiture, and more than almost any other appearance communicates panic to young troops.

The mode of warfare, that was adopted by republican France, had much of the desultory and irregular warfare, which belongs to a new people acting by common sense and the reality of the thing, rather than by precedent and pomp of appearance. A battle, fought in this desultory style, consists of a repetition of attacks connected with each other, but not obviously and openly connected. The French, in executing their view on this subject, advance, attack, and retire, fire at a distance, and necessarily throw away much fire

without destructive effect, but in their own idea not without a purpose. The French are constitutionally quick and impetuous as a people; but the French soldier preserves the most perfect *sang froid* in the midst of fire: he may be killed; he scarcely can be driven from the field by the distant fire of musketry. He is not proof against a charge with the bayonet; nor is the writer competent to say to what extent he is proof against a close fire of musketry at twenty paces. Celerity of movement, with the correct order in which troops move in all forms of evolution, has great advantages in acting against heavy and compact masses of mechanical force. An action fought chiefly by irregular troops, who advance boldly, even rashly, retire but do not disperse, rally and again advance, is not easily calculated in its issue; and hence the mechanical armies of the great European sovereigns were often embarrassed, in the early part of the war, by the Proteus-like mutability and energy of the republican irregulars; who, if they were unable to effect their purpose by their own effort, fell back upon the reserve which consisted of tried men,—analagous in character to the *triarrii* of the Roman armies. The reserve was the trust, and, until it was touched and shaken, there was no alarm in the French army. The soldiers were lavish of life in the defence of their country; and the losses sustained by them, short of defeat, were regarded as accident—the play of a field day. The French troops are chiefly, as is commonly known, formidable in attack. They are impetuous; but they are not so united and so irresistible in the charge as the English. It has been often tried and proved that where a French battalion is pitted, as it were, in the open field against British, it yields to inferior numbers; on broken and irregular grounds, where part is seen and part concealed, it has advantages over the British and over most other soldiers of the present day, through superior activity and superior quickness of perception. The French readily read the

countenance of things, and they are prompt in striking the point on which the issue of the action turns.

The above are a few of the points, in the character of the French nation and military system of the French republic, which struck the writer forcibly in the few opportunities which he has had of observing, and of ascertaining the manner in which that people acted in the prosecution of their warlike views. A flame of patriotism, general and strong, animated the soldiers of the republic and cemented their union in difficulty; a quickness of perception and celerity of movement, almost unprecedented, gave rapidity and effect to execution; novelty in mode of attack astonished and perplexed, even produced effects which, not being foreseen, could not be expected to be averted. It was thought impossible that French militia should succeed against troops of the highest discipline of any in Europe; and it is perhaps as yet unintelligible to some how they did succeed. Constituted in mind as the French then were, and acting militarily as they then did, it is scarcely possible that they should have had less success than they had. The war of the republic was a combat of truth against prejudice; of knowledge against ignorance, that is, of nature against art. The discussions which took place prior to the revolution, and the facts which were developed in the revolution itself, brought the mass of the French nation in contact with nature and common sense. They saw without prejudice; and they adopted, in war, what was true and useful without regard to precedent. The love of country was yet the common object of Frenchmen; it gave a common impulse to all. The position of France itself, its compactness and sufficiency for almost every purpose of the inhabitant in peace or war, contributed much to the success of the defence. If there was compression at any point on the frontier, there was an elasticity at the centre which produced a recoil more than sufficient to remove the compression.

France, from an active, elastic and somewhat tumultuous republic, became a magnificent, a pompous and regularly organized empire—military and despotic. It became so through the management of a person who, from a comparatively obscure origin, rose to eminence as a general. During this person's continuance on the imperial throne, France was an object of terror to the rest of Europe. The army, which was the instrument of the emperor's power, and through which he appears to have contemplated the conquest of the world, was favoured, flattered and cajoled with titles and honours and gorgeous trappings. It was perhaps improved in military training and manœuvre during his reign ; but it was corrupted at the base, as it was converted from a national army to the army of a professed conqueror. The newly elected emperor became, like the kings and emperors of other countries, the prominent object in the eye of the military. The country, that is, the ideal independence of the country, through which much had been done and for which much had been suffered, sunk in the shade. Napoleon, who was a man of genius,—imposing and imperious,—not wise and not candid, appears to have had a systematic head. He was active, indefatigable in labour, and, working on principles of science which the early periods of the revolution had brought to light and confirmed, he organized the empire of France in all its departments on a systematic base, and organized it with a skill and precision which prove that, while a man of a wide scope in design, he was also of superior energy in execution. The reorganization and high finishing of the military instrument was one of the first works of the new emperor. The principle, on which the improvements were made, was discovered as already observed during the revolution,—a period in the history of nations where the prejudices, which arise in the long continued exercise of power, removed as it were by charm, allow the mind to look inwardly, and to snatch a view

of the real relation of things with one another. The reorganization of the various departments of the state, and among others that of the army, was commenced while France was yet republican: it was finished when it was imperial. The emperor, like other sovereigns, desired to have an army, or instrument of military power at his own disposal—ready and willing to act by his order against the nation or for it; and, with this view, he admitted foreigners into the military service of France, even formed corps, tantamount to armies, from the refuse population of the countries he had overrun. This act of the emperor was an insult to France in her purity and integrity as an independent country. The French army was corrupted, and the defensive force of the kingdom was actually diminished; while the irregularities and atrocities, committed by the foreigners in Napoleon's service, brought reproaches on the French soldiery which do not belong to the French nation. The French are neither thieves nor robbers as a people; and it was ungenerous in their emperor to contaminate them by mixing them with the outcast population of other countries. When France herself was a scene of horror from contending interests and conflicting passions, the army, which was on the frontier, evinced sentiments of honour, justice and humanity of which no nation in Europe has shewn a brighter example. The character of humanity adheres every where to the French people, unless where they are under particular circumstances of irritation, or misled by opinions respecting duty:—it was conspicuous among the troops in the most outrageous periods of the republic. The conduct of Robespierre, who was for some time political chief in France, was atrocious: it revolted human nature. That of Napoleon was not praiseworthy; for he considered men as instruments of purpose, and did not appear more than other great generals to regard the sacrifice of life in the field of battle, if he thereby gained an object, as a matter of much

regret :—he was not even scrupulous of individual sacrifice where it was favourable to his interest, or where it gratified his revenge to indulge it. Robespierre was a wretch and a monster. Napoleon was not a hero, or a pattern for imitation ; but neither the one nor the other can be allowed to stain the general character of the French nation.

The army of republican France, after it stepped over its own frontier, acted on the maxim of conquerors—viz. to make war support war. The exactions levied in the invaded countries for the accomplishment of this purpose were often heavy, but they were regularly levied. Private plunder was interdicted. It was rarely committed ; but, where committed and detected, it was severely punished. Napoleon continued the exaction : he was less careful to interdict the plunder, and less rigorous to punish the offender where there was cause to punish, for he was aware that license to violate and act loosely was a bait which filled his ranks with vagabonds. The French army was correctly organized in all its parts as a military instrument in the time of Napoleon ; the materials were good, as taken by conscription from the general mass of the people, not swept up as the refuse population of corrupted towns and cities. The primary education was scientific, and correct in all that relates to the care of the person or the good conduct of the man—a fact of importance which the author had the opportunity of ascertaining, in a manner that he thinks precludes deception. The French armies were organized as now said on a correct model, and they were brilliant in their attire in the latter period of Napoleon's reign ; but they were debased by foreign mixtures, and they were degraded from national soldiers to soldiers of an individual man. Napoleon's armies were strong in number and brilliant in appearance ; but they were less formidable in the field than the ragged armies of the republic. They seemed to have less elasticity, or power of recoil

from compression; they were still superior as soldiers, inferior to the British alone—and that only in close combat.

Nov. 1823. The above remarks were put together in the year 1816, not long after Louis XVIII. had been placed upon the throne of France; and, while he was yet supported on it by the arms of confederated kings. Louis was of the royal blood of France, absorbed in royal and priestly prejudices, infirm in health, of a hoggish exterior, and ill calculated for a king of a military and enterprising people. As he was introduced by force and supported by a numerous army, no one can believe that he was the choice of the French nation. A great proportion of the French, tired of war and oppressed by conscriptions, were desirous of peace; and the introduction of Louis, little desirable as he individually was, was favoured by many. Louis bears the character of being a religious man, or rather perhaps of being scrupulously exact in performing his duties at the altar. This does not necessarily imply the true worship of the Deity; but it passes current as such with many. The French had been republican, and had attained, during the reign of the republic, a view of what belongs to man as man, even a view of the relations of man with his Creator as the universal parent of mankind. From republican, they became imperial. They were absorbed in the military glory of their conquering emperor; but they were not enslaved except by the fascination of his character. They still retained the republican sentiment, hence a French soldier was still a national soldier. When Napoleon was dethroned, Louis was put in his place—to act under the conditions of a charter. He was bound to administer it; but he contrived with art, and before long so to set it aside that, at the present time, the charter is little more than a name. The prejudices of blood and priestcraft aided him powerfully, or rather worked powerfully under his name to extinguish the liberty and independence

of the people. The national representation is the next thing to a fiction; the legislative deliberations are factionary and prejudiced; the public voice is shackled; and the free exercise of mind, even in pursuits of philosophy and truth, is under restraint. Arts may flourish; science will decay; even the nation has little chance of ever being again great and generous.—The murder of Ney and the banishment of Carnot shew distinctly that genius, patriotism, honour and independent virtue are not plants for the soil of Bourbon France. Louis, conscious of treacherous designs and fearful of punishment, fills the country with spies, destroys the pleasures of social intercourse; and, by introducing mercenary troops as the first trust and dependence of the crown, insults the nation, arraigns its loyalty and degrades its military character. The French army is actually humbled and debased. It would not have been credited, eight years since, that a hundred thousand French soldiers could have been induced to act in Spain, as French soldiers have now acted, that is, to have destroyed the civil and religious liberties of a people who never offended them; who were in fact desirous of living in peace, and living in freedom as they had themselves desired. There was not a ray of false glory in the enterprize; there was iniquity in the design, and disgrace in the execution.

CHAPTER X.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE UNITED PROVINCES OF THE
NETHERLANDS.

A DISTRICT on the West coast of the German continent, known by the name of Netherlands, some part of it the richest and best cultivated country in Europe, revolted from the sovereign in the course of the sixteenth century. The history of the revolt is especially interesting, in as much as it supplies the means of tracing the progress of the emancipation of the human mind, through a variety of struggles and conflicts of a desperate kind. After long and severely contested wars, the richest part of the district succumbed. The poorer continued to resist; and, resisting successfully, it established its independence, became sovereign and lived nominally, if not really as a free state for some length of time. The energy of the district North of the Scheldt, consisting of seven provinces which united themselves into a certain form of federal republic, is striking in the history of nations. The firmness and perseverance of the people, chiefly fishermen and farmers, scarcely have a parallel in history in modern times.—A prince of the house of Orange offered himself as military chief at the commencement of the insurrectionary movement. He was an estimable man, patriotic, and, at the same time sagacious—

a politician as well as a soldier. The light of reason now began to dawn on the human race in Western Europe; consequently, the revolted, who claimed the freedom which belongs to man, had many well-wishers, and even some active and efficient friends among their neighbours. England gave her aid, partly through the sympathy and adventurous spirit of the people, which courts danger as connected with liberty or gain of money, and partly through the jealous and vindictive spirit of the Queen who disliked the King of Spain. The assistances which were given on this occasion were useful. They were cordially given, and they did good; but the great work was the work of the Dutch themselves. The industry of the maritime provinces north of the Scheldt was almost unparalleled. The enemy was opposed with arms. A country, gained from the inroads of the sea, was cultivated as a garden; and a constitution of law for the confederated states was moreover laid on a rational base of liberty. The Dutch fishermen were bold and fortunate in their sea enterprizes; and, while their boldness was conspicuous, good sense and discretion were apparent in all their resolves. They accumulated wealth in the midst of their wars; for, if they were adventurous as rovers, they were wise as storekeepers and merchants. They became strong in their own strength, claimed independence; and finally obtained it from the most arbitrary and bigotted monarch of the time.

The history of the Seven Provinces is singular in the history of mankind. It furnishes a striking example of the power of the stimulus of necessity in bringing out exertion. The Dutch were not irritable and passionate. They had intrinsically a strong fund of power, and they were not soon exhausted by action; but their movements were sluggish, torpid, mechanical and liable to stagnate unless they were excited by strong stimulation. When excited, if adequately excited, the act which was energetic, and endurance such as

was not expected. The Dutch became powerful; they were even heroic under the stimulation of necessity. Their success against the sovereign of the Netherlands, who was then king of Spain and the greatest monarch in Europe, may be considered as a problem not easily solved according to the common rules of calculation among politicians and soldiers. The Dutch were a simple people, chiefly fishermen and farmers. The soldiers of the king of Spain were numerous; and they were the most experienced and best disciplined soldiers in Europe at the time. The commanders, particularly the Duke of Alba and the Duke of Parma, were decidedly the most perfect captains of the age. The latter was a man of consummate military skill; the former was skilful as a soldier, severe, cruel and bigotted as a man:—terror attached to his name. Constancy in purpose baffled his arts; and necessity elicited acts of heroism from a people in whom heroism was not thought to reside.

The Seven Provinces became an independent republic under a Stadtholder; and, as industry in trade had supplied the means which conduced materially to the attainment of independence, trade was continued for the acquisition of wealth: the defence of the country, against foreign enemies, was trusted to the arms of soldiers hired for money. The tactic and economical arrangements of the mercenary Dutch troops were systematic and regular; but their value was small when dangers pressed. They made no proper defence of the country in the year 1792. It was indeed scarcely to be expected that they should; for they had little or no interest in doing it beyond a pay which might be earned any where; and which, as such, does not pledge to strong resistance in a doubtful case.—The history of the Dutch affords a striking example and useful lesson to statesmen. It proved distinctly that the defence of a country is only to be committed to the hand of the native inhabitant. The insurrectionary

Dutch, the native of swamps and bogs and barren lands, reared under churlish skies and inured to boisterous seas, pursued his course steadily through multiplied difficulties, and established the independence of his country against the efforts of the most powerful monarch of the time. The reformed and mercantile Dutch; who, by industry, had converted marshes into gardens, and hovels into elegant houses, lost independence—almost without an effort to maintain it. In the first case, there was pride of mind and attachment to the place of birth; in the second, there was attachment to gold, and comparative indifference to other things. The Dutch purchased men to defend their country with the same spirit as they purchased a bale of goods: the purchased men despised their purchasers as mean and pusillanimous shop keepers. The country was thus lost, by trusting its defence to means which experience and common sense evince can not be trusted.

CHAPTER XI.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE SWISS.

THE Swiss who inhabit the Alps, considered as the tower and citadel of Europe, long supported a character of moral and military eminence, corresponding in some degree with the elevation of the position which they occupied. Love of liberty and independence, national courage and heroism, purity of morals and fervor of religion, with amiable and interesting domestic manners, have distinguished

the Swiss among the other inhabitants of Europe for some centuries past. The Swiss, when in bondage, rescued their country from a formidable and harsh tyrant by promptitude and prowess; and they defended it with success against powerful enemies at subsequent times. The local advantages of Switzerland for defence are great; such as may be supposed to enable the united Swiss to resist in open war almost any amount of invading force that can be brought against them. This strikes the observer in travelling through the country; and, from this it may be presumed on fair grounds of reasoning, that the application of open force would not have given the French the possession of this strong hold, on a late occasion, had open force only been employed. The strength of the Swiss confederacy consisted in union. The basis of the union was here undermined by art; and the politics of the different cantons were put in counteraction to each other before the attempt of invasion was made. The foe, subtle and insidious as a foe, practised on the credulity of the unsuspecting, corrupted those who were corruptible, and succeeded in dividing the nation against itself. France acquired Switzerland through manœuvre. She even did more than gain possession of the ground; she effected something like political disorganization in the confederacy, so as to attain the means of cutting up the roots of that patriotic feeling, that devout, though superstitious, religion, and that estimable moral virtue which appeared to have its abode among the mountains of the Alps for many ages past.

The national character of the Swiss is military. It was hospitable, generous and sincere in the days of Switzerland's prosperity. The Swiss nation has been eminent at all times for military virtues; and Swiss soldiers have been esteemed on all occasions as men of trust. The Swiss enter into the service of foreign powers for pay; but they do not abandon the national character: they are always Swiss,—not

common mercenaries ready to cut the throat of any one for a sum of money. The Swiss are a professed military people: they possess a correct and rigid mechanical discipline, cemented and rendered strong by acting on national honour. Through the influence of this principle, the view is directed to a common object and the act concentrated to a common point. Though serving in foreign countries for pay, and, as such called mercenary, the Swiss uniformly preserve their character; viz. bravery, courage and fidelity. With these qualities, added to a most correct knowledge of tactic and evolution, the Swiss are justly regarded as the most perfect specimen of military force in Europe.

The military character of the Swiss was eminent: the moral character was amiable. It is probable that some part of this preeminence arose from the impression of localities; some part of it from institution, or moral training. The scenery, by which the native of Switzerland is daily surrounded, tends to elevate the mind, to exalt the courage and to confirm its constancy under trial. The intercourse among the inhabitants, who occupy vallies between lofty mountains, may be reasonably supposed to be intimate. The ideas, as restrained from wandering to distant and undefined objects by the circumstances of locality, are condensed and concentrated upon a point. The affections are mutually rivetted, so to speak, throughout the circumscribed circle; hence love and friendship fix their abode in these sequestered vales. The physical cause, as constantly applied to the object, contributes to form the moral act by its continual impression, even to confirm it in strength and constancy by exercise: it thus becomes in some degree an act of nature.—The limbs of the Swiss are active and elastic; the chest is ordinarily full and expanded; the wind is good, and respiration little disturbed by exertion in ascending a mountain. There is thus bodily force in the Swiss soldier, joined

with activity and intelligence of things similar to those which occur in war. The localities of Switzerland are calculated to engender and to confirm sentiments of independence; and sentiments of independence, however engendered, tend to excite and to maintain the individual in the practice of virtue. The Swiss are not what they have been. The simplicity of manner has changed; and, in the change, it has sustained deterioration. This is conspicuous within the last thirty years, particularly in the rich and popular cantons, where pleasures, generally regarded as vices, are pursued with as much eagerness as in any part of Europe: the poorer cantons seem still to be filled with a virtuous, devout and sincere people, superstitious to excess, but amiable in their superstitions.

CHAPTER XII.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE SWEDES.

THE Danes, Norwegians and Swedes, bold and adventurous in character like other Teutonic nations, sent out strong predatory expeditions in former times. They invaded defenceless countries, and established themselves in power on many of the coasts that were contiguous to them. The migratory warriors were literally robbers by force of arms; but robbery then, as war at present, was not a stain on the human character: it, on the contrary, enobled, or gave preeminence to individuals over their fellows. The Swedes appear

among the boldest of adventurers on the theatre of predatory war in early times; but they were then only robbers: they subsequently attained renown on the fairest field of human fame. The efforts of Gustavus Vasa were noble; and the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus raised the Swedish nation to eminence. The motive of Adolphus's undertaking, not perhaps unmingled with love of military glory and ambition of conquest, was ostensibly generous and noble:—the execution was creditable to the talent of a general, particularly of a tactician. The wars between contending powers on the continent were chiefly carried on at that time by cavaliers:—the battle was a crash of harnessed horses and mail covered horsemen. The limited pecuniary means of the Swedish king did not perhaps admit of a pompous display of cavalier force. He had notwithstanding a sufficiency of horse according to a just scale of utility; but he modelled the infantry, after a new form of tactic and discipline, not unlike that of the present time, and on them rested the main trust in combat. The Swedish infantry, prior to the time of Gustavus Adolphus, was strictly speaking militia. They were trained in the new tactic, and disciplined by German and English, or Scotch adventurers; who, as they had chosen war for their trade, may be supposed to have attained a mechanical dexterity in the use of arms beyond what is to be expected in common peasants. As the ostensible cause of Gustavus' war was the vindication of human liberty, that is, freedom of conscience in matter of religion, it was common to all the race. The hitherto degraded people, invited on this occasion to participation in war, were in a manner invited to participation in human rights; and, as such, they became proud and interested in the issue of the contest. Their powers were tried and proved in combat; their value was seen and appreciated;—they

became, from this time, the chief trust in battle; and, if they know themselves, they will ever remain so.

The feats of Generals, who commit slaughter on their fellow creatures without bounds, and without remorse, stand high in the records of history. Gustavus Adolphus was eminent; but he did not attain eminence from a cause so detestable. He protected those who were oppressed and suffered for conscience sake. He drew the sword in vindication of the independence of the human mind; and, as he was, in this instance, the protector, he may be regarded in all the acts of his life as the hero of the human race. The majority of those who flocked to his standard, whether foreign or native, were not ordinary soldiers serving for pay and the chance of spoil. They were animated by the common spirit of liberty, and felt themselves to be important in contending for a cause that is common to man. Courage was here of the highest kind. It was stimulated by a generous motive applied to a noble purpose, and it produced an exalted effect throughout. The Swedish nation, and their sovereign Gustavus Adolphus, rendered themselves dear to mankind by their generosity. Their valour in the field was a theme of wonder; their private virtues commanded the esteem of the good.

The Swede, frugal by habit and simple in manner of living, is capable of self denial in the midst of luxuries. Hardy in frame, and firm in courage, he endures fatigues without repining. He possesses a fair share of physical force, and an animated power of impression at the point of attack. He is brave as any man, devoted to his duty almost beyond example, mindful of his God in the full tide of success, even in the conflict of battle, and true to his country in the midst of disaster. The Swede was sometimes, indeed often rashly compromised by the ardour of the heroic Charles; but he was always a

Swede, and in so far as human power and human courage can be supposed to go, he was invincible. The military glory of Sweden was brilliant; but its duration was not long. It has now waned; but the Swedes themselves are still respectable. They furnish an example—rare in history, of a nation losing power and retaining moral character. The phenomenon is not common; and if it be allowable to form conjecture concerning the cause of it, it may be presumed that, as Sweden's power arose from a contingent superiority of military talent, the power has declined in the revolution of things without impairing the constitutional virtues of the subject; hence it is not precluded from chances of reappearance, in as much as the Swedish has not, like most nations, lost the physical fund of expansion in the exhausting operations of the luxury which usually accompanies the possession of riches.

The Swedish nation may be said to be constitutionally free. It possesses the privilege of deposing and electing a sovereign, or chief of the state; and, if it be not an irrelevant remark, it may be said to have been fortunate, on a recent occasion, in the use which it made of that privilege. The person elected Crown Prince had been a *man* before he became a prince; and there are grounds to believe that he will continue to be a *man* now that he is seated on a throne. He is not of the race of kings; but he appears to have a genuine legitimacy from nature, viz. a sound judgment and a benevolent heart,—more beneficial to mankind, therefore fitter to rule, than a fool or a tyrant who derives his origin from the blood of the imperial Cæsars.

CHAPTER XIII.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.

THE Austrian army is the most numerous; and, since the time of the Emperor Joseph, the best appointed of any of the armies which appear on the German continent. The materials of which it is composed, besides stray vagabonds of foreign countries, are drawn from Austria, Hungary and Bohemia; and, in so far as respects physical properties, they are good. The Austrians are generally of a higher stature and possess more muscular force than the French. They are less alert, and do not upon the whole perhaps possess military qualities for active war equal to the people of France.

As the Austrian soldier enlists only for a given term of years, he retains the power of disposing of himself at the expiration of the term; consequently he may be supposed to retain the feeling that he is still a man; or that there is a time before him when he may again assume the name of citizen. But, with the reserve of retiring from service at a given time and thus reassuming citizenship, he seems to forget that he is other than a living machine to be moulded into any form for the purposes of war that the tactician chooses. The Austrian manual, tactic and evolution are performed with a mechanical

correctness of the greatest precision. The system of interior economy is singularly exact according to external appearance; it is not always so well adjusted according to the intimate nature of things. The Austrian army appears to be constructed on the idea that the materials of it are of one brute animation. They are arranged in their places by external resemblance, or quantity of animal matter, and moved into action by external force. The action is regular and calculable, where the external force is strong and the powers of resistance weak; it stagnates, if the impelling power be little impressive; and it recoils, if the obstacles to forward progress be numerous and well placed. The forward act in war is here moved by a cause *a tergo* threatening punishment; or, it is solicited forward by hopes of plunder as a private advantage. These causes are stimulant; but they are adventitious and only relatively stimulant. They remit in force, or they are altogether withdrawn; but, even where they are present and exist in force, they do not act equally on all, for all are not equally susceptible; consequently the effect produced is not uniform and consistent. If the movement of an army be directed by the impulse of fluctuating causes, it cannot be expected to be other than capricious and uncertain; and hence it is that the Austrian army, though perfectly organized according to external appearance, fails not unfrequently in the day of battle in defect of that species of union which arises from the operation of an internal principle.

The natives of Austria are attached to the house of Hapsburg as strongly perhaps as most subjects are attached to princes. The attachment stimulates to good, even to heroic conduct. This was manifested in the late war, where the Arch-duke Charles of Austria commanded the Austrian army. It may be a question with some, whether or not the Arch-duke's military genius be of a superior cast. It is certain that no change was made by him in tactic which could

be supposed to lead to the success which he frequently obtained. He was a prince of Austria; and as a prince, his presence seemed to operate on the army by a kind of electric influence. As the materials were the same, there was no ostensible cause for the success of the Arch-duke and the discomfiture of others, unless from the spirit of animation communicated to the mind of the soldiery by the presence of a person, who was beloved, even idolized as a national hero. The army was animated and energetic when under the command of Charles; it was inert, as the Aulic Council, when under the command of others,—viz. a mere automaton mechanically correct in its proceedings, but without that elasticity and buoyancy in its movements which darts to its point from something within itself.

The Austrian army stands high in the estimation of military men. Estimated by exterior appearance, viz. physical form, correct mechanical arrangement in the ranks by size and figure, precision and order in movement, it has perhaps no superior in the present time: it notwithstanding appears to the writer to be an army only of the second order.—The Austrian organization and economy, the French intelligence and activity, the English courage and execution combined in a military body, might be regarded as an instrument of military excellence.

CHAPTER XIV.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.

FREDERICK the Second, King of Prussia, is generally regarded as the most skilful master in the art of war which the last century, or which according to some any age of the world has produced. He raised his nation to military eminence by his military achievements; and this he is supposed to have done by inventing, or improving a system of tactic which, while it astonished by apparent novelty, fortunately for him, excited the desire to imitate rather than the endeavour to counteract by other invention. The person who imitates becomes a scholar in the school of a master. He is thus inferior in his own estimation, in as much as he is a scholar; and he is only half prepared for defence as not thoroughly acquainted with the principle on which he commit himself to act

The King of Prussia did not possess better materials for the formation of an army than other generals of his time. He arranged them differently; and, in arranging them he appears to have taken, though not strictly speaking a new, at least a somewhat different view from his predecessors, with regard to the principle through which effect in war is produced. Frederick enrolled himself at an early age

in the ranks of philosophers. He was self-sufficient, and perhaps imperious as a royal philosopher; but he does not appear to have penetrated deep into the interior of the science. Philosophy, which is knowledge of man's self and of the intimate nature of things, brings proof to every reflecting mind that reciprocity of action and reaction, constituting order and harmony of movement throughout the whole extent of the universe, is God's ordination for the government of man in all his relations. The assumption of power by individuals is therefore to be considered as an usurpation, and, as such a proceeding in direct opposition to the law of the Deity. It subverts constitutional order; and it begets tyranny, which is a political act destructive of human happiness. Frederick ranks distinctly in the class of tyrants, that is, men who usurp the empire of the Deity by arrogating power to themselves. Whatever might be his pretensions to philosophy, his history proves practically that he was a man who did not know the true basis of human action. He acted on man only through his passions; and he in fact regarded the race as machines of organized animal matter to be moved into action, or restrained from acting by the force of material or visible things. As he thus appears to have considered man as an automaton, or mass of animated matter, he was led to despise him, and to mock the idea of his mental independence. He employed force as an engine of government—civil or military; and, in this manner, he laboured to extinguish all that gives value to man as a rational being.

The discomfiture of hostile force, whether by the impression of fear which urges to retrograde and flight, or by the destruction of life which removes resistance, is the purpose of a battle. A provision of force calculated to destroy, and an estimate of powers calculated to intimidate are consequently the chief objects of study with a commander. These are major engines, and they are both comprehended

in the Prussian system of war. The authority of the commander is supported by fear of punishment. Fear *a' tergo* gives impulse to the forward movement of the mass. But, as the impulse is external, and the machine on which it acts complicated in its nature, or not all of one temper, the movement is often uncertain, irregular and capricious. If the forward act be moved by the impulse of fear *a tergo*, as fear has no measure or self command, there can be no calculation of the issue of the act; and thus it is that, notwithstanding the machine-like correctness of the explosions of the Prussian firelock, the destroying effect upon the enemy, even in Frederick's time was sometimes almost nothing, in as much as it was made without other aim than order and correctness in time:—Frederick it may be presumed had a purpose in what he did; and on that purpose he appears to have instituted regular platoon firing, with a view to amuse or intimidate rather than to destroy;—destruction was ordinarily the result of actual charge made under protection of a close firing.

The Prussian system of tactic and evolution is one of great correctness, and generally held to be one of great value. It professes to teach the art of concentrating the power of fire, and of directing it with order and precision, when so concentrated, upon given points of the enemy's line. The direction of the force in the manner alluded to is a reality in the great art of war; and, as Frederick employed it skilfully, his success in the combat may be supposed to be in a great measure owing to the use which he made of it, that is, the superiority which he possessed in the conducting of marches and the development of force on vulnerable points. Promptitude in applying force, and skill in fixing the point of application mark the genius of a general. Frederick endeavoured to render generalship a science under the guidance of a systematic rule. In this he made some progress, and the progress which he made in science may be reckoned a main cause

of the issue of his battles. But, besides science, there were other causes, in the history of Frederick's wars which favoured the success of his arms. Some of them were factitious rather than real; and, as such, they disappear when they are known by experience and estimated by the lights of unprejudiced reason. The king of Prussia was impressed strongly with an idea of the servile nature of the human race; and as he knew from observation that armies are oftener intimidated by appearances to leave the field of battle, than actually driven from it by the touch of force, he profited by his knowledge, and brought forward an instrument of deception, viz. a line of soldiers of huge size and imposing aspect to aid his purpose. The appearance of the heavy mass operated on the ignorant; hence success resulted from appearance by imposing upon fears, not in reality by touch of force; for, had the question been tried and decided by the firelock, it is evident that the chances are against the bulky mass.

The imposition of fear by demonstrations of a bulky mass made a part in the Prussian system of war. The mode of tactic and evolution which was new modelled, or changed from what was practised at the time, presented itself as a novelty, and, as such, was deemed a product of genius, embarrassing to the opponent as not thoroughly understood. The manner of directing an accumulated weight of fire upon given points of the enemy's line, directly or obliquely, the exactness of arrangement, the correspondence of combined movements, the precision of effect, in so far as respects order and time, are all improvements which belong to the Prussian tactic. The authority of command, and the fear of punishment, from a dreaded authority, ensured the due performance of the mechanical act of drilling. The continuance of drilling for a length of time gave a facility and aptness in execution;—hence arose advantages in action over a less practised enemy. Besides the battalion soldier who fought the actual

battle, the officer was often a man of merit, at least for execution. The whole of the officers, to whom superior command was given, conceived the principle of the new system perfectly, and performed the assigned duties with fidelity and correctness. The success of the Prussian arms was great. It astonished those who were accustomed to calculate effect by mere quantity of matter; and, as may be inferred from what has been said, it arose from causes, some of which are real and will always have effect, some fictitious or accidental, and not to be deemed foundations on which to lay a calculation of events.

It is generally known that an impression of fear was the principle assumed by the King of Prussia in driving the Prussian recruit into military form: it predominated even in the advance to battle. The impression of fear on the human mind degrades the dignity of man's nature, and extinguishes all that is noble in his character; and, if there be faith in history, or even in the testimony of our senses, we cannot refuse to assent to the position that, though the impression of fear *a tergo* may prevent recoil from dangers in front, it cannot, in its nature, produce a forward act which deserves the name of courage. This is a fact of common observation, and it may be considered as a principle in the original constitution and frame of man; hence it is inferred that, if the conduct of the Prussian troops was good, (and it was such as may be called heroic in many instances) the explanation of the fact must be sought for in some other cause than the impression of fear on the organism of a reluctant animal. The ostensible cause of success is not in this case the real or sole cause. The King of Prussia had formed a system of tactic which was considered as new. It struck at first sight as a novelty; and, acting by the law of fashion, it excited the desire of imitation, rather than the desire of counteraction by means calculated to render its effect void. The

King understood the extent of the operation of the principle upon which his system was founded, as well as the amount of the effect which it was capable of producing. He was master of his own views in disposing of his engines; and, as he was sovereign, he was responsible to himself only for what he did. He knew the powers of his soldiers: he had tried them often and witnessed the extent of their value. The most of them had served long, and acquired such confidence in their skill as arises from long service. They were expert, at least familiar with the use of arms; and they had learned by experience to form a comparatively just estimate of themselves and of common things. The qualifications of the soldier were in some degree the product of the mechanical tactic and discipline of the Prussian school; they were strengthened and confirmed by experience in actual war in the midst of storms and battles. The qualifications were valuable in themselves; but they were not the sole or primary causes of success, and not the whole of the causes which gave success to Prussian arms in the seven years war.

The condition of Prussia was calculated, at the time of her greatest danger, to elicit from the mass of the people; and, among others, from the members of the army higher sentiments of patriotism, honour and energy than can be supposed to arise from a system of military training, the leading principle of action in which consists in fear of punishment in case of failure. Heroic actions do not originate from sensations of fear; yet the acts of the Prussian soldiers were often heroic, individually as well as collectively. The circumstances of the nation and the monarch, as surrounded and threatened to be overwhelmed by an host of enemies, were somewhat peculiar. They may be supposed to have acted on the common sympathies of man's nature, so as to excite sentiments of generosity in all, to unite all hearts in common defence, and to give such energy to action in war

as could not be given to it by means that are merely mechanical. The Prussian nation was then simple, as not enervated by the luxuries which follow the possession of wealth; and, as it was recently elevated from an electorate to a royalty, it began to feel the power of the expanding passion which is peculiar to man as he emerges from obscurity. The Prussian peasant may be supposed, in common with agricultural peasants, to have venerated the soil on which he was born and which covered the ashes of his fathers. He was irritated against those who attempted to violate it by force of arms, even ardent in its defence from feelings of resentment. The old soldier, who had fought and been victorious in battle, was proud of the renown which he had gained in long service; the recruit, whether levied by conscription, or trepanned by art, was for the most part carried away in the torrent of events; and, unknown to himself, or almost in spite of himself, he imbibed the sympathetic spirit of war as associated with warriors. He was prevented from leaving his standard on occasional chagrins by the surveillance of persons who were inured to war and staunch in loyalty; and, as thus prevented from desertion on common occasions, his ideas were turned into another channel, and he became important in himself by associating with those who had acquired military renown. He was warmed by example, and his exertions rose superior to the exertions of a man who acts merely by the impulse of fear. The whole of the army, forced or volunteer, foreign or native, was thus roused artificially to exertion through desire of fame; and this desire of fame, acting as an impulse to the machine, gave union and strength to its movements. The King was bold and enterprising, even rash as a general. His pleasure was in battle, his delight in the carnage of the field. He was indefatigable personally, and, as he travelled from combat to combat, generally from victory to victory by forced marches, he gave the soldier little time to turn his thoughts to

the difficulties and perils of his situation. The faculties were absorbed in the idea of military fame. The king had the address to keep the idea always before the eye, and to hold out specious expectations of another victory and a day of rest. The presence of a sovereign with an army in the field, especially of a sovereign who shares fatigues and dangers, rarely fails of assuring the attachment of the soldiery. Frederick was present in the hardest service, displayed no royal pomp, and shunned no danger; consequently he was a prominent object in the soldier's eye. He often conversed with the veteran; and, as he knew how to be familiar without compromising the respect which is due to a king and a commander, the royal *bon mot* circulated through the ranks as a talisman which served good purposes in difficult times. Frederick had studied the art of war scientifically and attained knowledge of its principle. He was unquestionably skilful; but there is reason to think that the opinion which the world held of his skill was higher than true history warrants. He went on with confidence, and was opposed in most cases with feebleness and fear. The enemy was in some manner paralysed in the seven years war by viewing him through a magnifier; he was seen in a clearer light at a subsequent period, viz. 1778, and he ceased to be an object of wonder.

The success of Frederick, King of Prussia, excited the admiration of Europe in the seven years war, as a success belonging only to a man of paramount military genius; and as it is important to know, so it will be right to investigate and ascertain so far as we can the hinge on which that success might be thought to turn. The author cannot pretend to do it in a satisfactory manner; but he thinks he is able to discover some of the causes with which the success was materially connected. A change in mode of tactic and manœuvre, by presenting an appearance of novelty, threw the enemy into embarrassment, as not prepared

to oppose, or as conscious of inferiority according to the mode in which he ought to oppose. The principle of attacking positions, instead of sustaining attacks in defensible ones, was conspicuous in Frederick's system. It was powerful, in as much as it gave extra courage to those who attacked, and at the same time diminishing the courage and powers of exertion of those who resisted. Celerity of movement and precision, in developing lines or columns on given points of the enemy's position, was a striking feature in Frederick's campaigns. These, with promptitude and decision in attack supported by the presence of the king, may be considered as the great cause of what happened. They are ostensible and valid causes which derived from the king himself. There are others, which arose without him, or rather in spite of him, as excited by the dangers which threatened Prussia as a country and Frederick as an oppressed sovereign. There is a germ of generosity in the human breast as uncorrupted by the intercourse of the world; and this generosity of the simple soldier appears, on this occasion, to have been the solid bulwark of the Prussian empire. Frederick's ostensible principle for the formation and management of armies consisted, as already observed, in fear *a tergo* urging to forward movement. It is not possible that fear should move an individual, or an army to an act of heroism; the heroic act was notwithstanding moved, and it is evident that it was here moved by the inherent spirit of the man, in contradiction to the dominant principle of the prince. Frederick undervalued mankind generally, and regarded his followers—officers or soldiers, as mere instruments, valuable only as they were useful to purposes. He did not, he said, reckon more than three or four generals in his army:—the others were machines, competent to execute, not to design. Frederick was a man without a heart,—it may be safely said without a moral principle. The base, mean and wicked expedients, by which

he attempted to fill the ranks of his army, excite a detestation of his character, which his military glory never can efface; and the indifference which he is said to have shewn for his troops, when their services became less necessary to his salvation, proves him to have been in reality a despicable man. He was not superior in any thing except in what relates to war; and, as success in war is relative to the circumstances and condition of the enemy, those circumstances and that condition must be known and estimated correctly before an opinion can be safely formed of the real merit of the conqueror. The principal opponent of Frederick was slow and cautious in his proceedings, and moreover a scholar in Frederick's military school. The enemy's general, as shackled by the orders of council, and not at liberty to follow the impulses of his own genius, was not animated by the spirit of enterprize as Frederick himself was. Frederick was responsible only to himself: he was rapid, and bold even to rashness; and to that rashness, which astonished and paralysed, he apparently owed much of his success.

Frederick effected a change, and presumptively an improvement in the common art of war. His general system of tactic, viz. movement and developement of movement was scientific. He improved the organization of hussar force, and it applied with skill in combat; he did not appear to understand the use and management of light troops. His success in the seven years war was great; the causes of it were adventitious—the product of contingent circumstances, rather than the evolution of principles that were altogether new. He was foiled in the year 1778 by the Emperor Joseph; and his embarrassments were so great as to prove to posterity that his genius was not paramount to that of all others, or his military instrument a *chef d'œuvre* of human genius. The fact of its insufficiency has been proved to demonstration in later times. The tactic, and all forms of

Frederick's discipline were adhered to and practised assiduously by Frederick's successor. The Prussian army was considered by many as irresistible in the field; yet, when the case was tried, William, the Prussian King, candidly acknowledged that his best battalions could not stand before the loosely organized soldiers of the French republic. The soldiers of republican France were irregular, comparatively with the soldiers of Prussia: they were intelligent, active and brave. They were as much before the Prussian battalions in celerity of movement and promptitude in action, as the Prussians had been before the Austrians in the seven years war, and this celerity more than compensated other defects. The Prussian army, after its repulse from the frontier of France, appeared to be crest fallen and humbled. In the course of the war 1803, the reigning King of Prussia, bribed at one time, bullied at another, threatened and insulted beyond enduring took the field against Napoleon—in despair. He was defeated, and the machine of the great Frederick was unhinged and broken to pieces by a single action. When the punishment of ambition and folly overtook Napoleon in Russia, a part of the Prussian troops, which acted with him as auxiliary, revolted from his standard. His power was broken; and the Prussian peasantry, rising enthusiastically in mass for the vindication of what was called the liberty of the country, rapidly assumed a military form of organization and entered courageously into the field of war. This new army had spirit, at least a desire of revenge for supposed or real ill treatment. A part of it, headed by the veteran and heroic Blucher, pressed eagerly to the frontier of France on Napoleon's return from Elba. It may be said to have been taken unawares on the frontier. It sustained a severe action at Ligny on the 16th of June. Defeated, but not dispersed, it rallied at Wavre, and advanced to Waterloo on the 18th to the aid of the Duke of Wellington. It can scarcely be said

to have fought on that field; but its appearance, at a lucky juncture, must be admitted by every one to have determined the enemy to give up the combat. The French retreated, and the retreat soon became route. The fugitives were pursued by the Prussians who, according to report, were insatiate of blood.—The Prussians are not merciful to a vanquished enemy at any time; here they were barbarous and cruel as judged by the rules of modern warfare.

Prussia was humbled and degraded by Napoleon. She is now restored to her place, or rather exalted to the place of one of the primary military powers in Europe, by the favour of Great Britain and Russia. She holds herself high; for her territory is extended by the partition of the country of defenceless neighbours. Her armies are, or may be doubled by the overflowings of her population; but it is not probable that she will ever again be a respectable and commanding nation. The despotic meanness of the King suppresses every expansion of mind. The promise of a free or representative government has been forfeited by him; and it may be presumed, on fair grounds of reasoning, that whatever happen to him, whether he rise high or fall low, his fate will not excite interest with honest and honourable men. He crouched to the power of Napoleon while fortune smiled on his steps: he deserted him on his first reverse; and he has not been grateful, not even just to the peasantry who raised him from the dust.

CHAPTER XV.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN NATION.

THE Russian nation, long barbarous and obscure, rose to eminence in the course of last century. The military character now stands high, higher perhaps than it deserves to stand if things be estimated by a true standard. The Russian peasant possesses physical properties suitable for the business of war; and Russian arms have been successful in the field from the physical property of the soldier, independently of his proficiency in military discipline. The Tatars, Cossacs, Persians and Turks who, from the time of Charles XII. until lately have been the principal opponents of Russian arms, do not furnish a field for an estimate of military merit according to the military ideas of modern Europe. The Turk is the enemy over whom Russian successes are most vaunted, at least best known to Europeans; and the Turk of recent times is miserably degenerated from what he has been. The spirit of conquest was the spirit of the Turk when he lived in camps. The spirit was lost in Constantinople; and with it was lost the celebrated discipline of the Janissaries, who are now armed men with little else than force, courage and insolence.

The materials of the Russian army are drawn from an immense tract of country,—from nations differing in language, manners and customs from each other. The mass consists of persons who are in the barbarous or semibarbarous stage of society. The materials, as drawn from an extensive field, are unlike to each other in external appearance and internal character ;—they are arranged or classed in the ranks according to size and figure, not according to national sympathies. The recruit undergoes severe trial in his moulding for war. He suffers, but he does not complain. Born in submission to a master who is absolute, he permits his person to be moulded, without murmur, into any form which his physical capacity is capable of sustaining ; or, succumbing to hardship when he can no longer sustain, he sinks to rest among a multitude of companions.

The Russian tactic is laid on a similar base with that of the King of Prussia. The principle which influences the movement is the same ; and the rule of execution is not less severe and rigorous. Every feeling which belongs to man, except the dread of military authority, is expelled from the mind of the recruit ; and, as obedience to arbitrary will is the object sought for in training, obedience is assured in the Russian army, in so far as it can be assured, through actual punishment, or the fear of its infliction. The establishment of a routine of artificial bodily action is the aim of the Russian military training ; consequently the individual, trained as a subordinate part in a mechanical instrument, is interdicted the exercise of his judgment in estimating what he does. Fear, as now said, is the paramount motive which urges to action ; and fear, as is commonly known, is an external stimulus from which human nature revolts :—it extinguishes every generous principle and manly sentiment in the human breast. There are incitements to action which arise from ideas of honour and desire of glory, and which inflame nations

with sentiments of valour to enthusiasm; but these can scarcely be supposed to have place in an army formed under the rule of the Russian military institution. The Russian training looks no higher than to form a machine possessing locomotive power, and performing offices according to mechanical rule, under the stimulation of fear of punishment for non performance. The movement advances, or is only prevented from its tendency to recoil from danger by an external cause of force urging it forward. Hence, as this cause moves, regulates or restrains, it is possible to understand the nature of the influence under which an army remains at its post, and works its musket mechanically as long as its physical capability remains entire. An army so constituted, and acting from such motive, can only be supposed to be capable of acting in a given tract, and of producing effect through a given channel. It is an automaton, at least the reason of the thing supposes it to be so; and, if perfect according to its rule, it is without motive of its own, consequently motionless except by the word of command. If it be less sensible of fear from the sabre or bayonet of the enemy than from the halbert of the sergeant, it remains at its post and suffers itself to be cut to pieces as an act of obedience to its proprietor; for, having no idea of independence, it makes no effort to extricate itself from danger by an act of its own natural sense. Such is, or may be supposed to be the character of an army formed according to the principle of the King of Prussia, and the practice of Russia. As it has no action of its own, and no motive to act except from impressions of fear urging it forward, it moves reluctantly, or it remains stationary as not stimulated by strong force to advance.

But, as the highest aim of the Russian discipline is directed to render man individually a mechanical instrument, and the army an aggregate of individuals trained to pour out a torrent of fire from this

instrument of destruction, it is evident that the value of the instrument consists in the correctness with which its act is directed by the general. The Russian army is put together mechanically by the appearance, rather than by the intrinsic qualities of the parts. It strikes the eye impressively as a machine of power; for, as the parts are correctly adjusted in their places, the ranks, while they have the semblance of firmness and solidity, have a shew of order and uniformity as if they had been dressed by the line and plummet. The whole thus composed, as united in movement by the cadenced step, seems to be irresistible in its course to whatever point it tends. The Russian soldier, expert and dextrous in the manual, rolls his fire from right to left, and from left to right with a rapidity not to be exceeded, and so exactly measured in time as if it proceeded from a machine worked by a mechanical spring. The exhibition is imposing on the parade, or at the review; but the appearance is deceptive; and the effect is often nugatory on the field of battle. The tactician, in training the Russian soldier to the exercise of the firelock, seems to regard rapidity of explosion and precision in time, as points of more importance than the direction of the bullet which strikes and disables the enemy. This is fairly inferred from observation; and, here it may be remarked that, if rapidity and closeness of firing be the object of training, while the direction of the bullet which destroys the enemy is little regarded, the object is mistaken. The fire is thrown away without purpose, except in so far as regular and close firing may be supposed, by acting on the the ear, to intimidate one part, and to give confidence to another part of the contending host.

The Russian discipline, though the most mechanical, the most rigid and the most systematic of any in Europe, has not yet attained that degree of perfection in execution, which produces uniform and well directed exertion on all occasions, or which assures subordination

in all the circumstances of actual war. The Russian soldier, who may be regarded as a part in a machine of fire, not unfrequently expends his ammunition without an adequate object for expenditure. He moves forward in ordinary circumstances under the impulse of propelling fear, stimulated, or stunned by his own tremendous explosions; but he does not always move in a steady progressive course. The impulse is obscured in many cases; and, in spite of the protecting fire of the machine itself, fear invades and the artificial fabric guarded by tactical care as it may be said, rushes headlong to disorganization and ruin. The illustrations are numerous. Instances are not even rare where Russian troops, after expending ammunition without object, have given themselves up to be slaughtered, or taken prisoner without resistance; or where, throwing off the restraints of discipline, they have run into the wildest insubordination, viz. drunkenness and plunder, even in the midst of battle.—It is thus that, in spite of the influence of causes which operate compulsively on man, the nature of man revolts occasionally from constraint, and reclaims the independence of its untamed condition.

The Russian army has attained a high name among military nations. It has been victorious in battle on many occasions; and it has been praised for its discipline. But, if causes be traced to their source, the whole of the victories, and the whole of the fame that has been given to it, do not prove themselves to be the fruit of formal training and discipline. The Russian soldier, though the slave of military authority, and reduced apparently to an automaton performing a routine of duty, still retains a quality of native barbarism, viz. covetousness of the spoils of the enemy. The Turkish empire has been the most conspicuous scene of the Russian glory; and, as the Turkish territory presents many things which the Russian soldier covets, the hopes of booty give animation to the forward act, and

thus exalt the Russian courage through a cause which does not belong to discipline. Besides the incentive of plunder, which is not a weak one, the Russian soldier, in spite of every rigour of training calculated to obscure or obliterate the thinking faculty, still retains something of the innate propensities which belong to the human character. His ideas are few and simple ; and, as constrained to move in a defined and narrow channel, they are strong and determined in their course ; hence, little distracted by the various presentations of pleasure which attach men to life for the sake of multiplied sensual gratification, the Russian soldier generally proceeds in the execution of his duty steadily and resolutely, whether to mount the breach by command, or to be cut to pieces at a post from which he has not been relieved by accredited authority. But, though this has been exemplified in numerous instances, the power of tactic, discipline and fear *a tergo* has, notwithstanding, been unequal in others to carry the soldier to the point of attack, until he was put under the banners of religion by the address of the Commander. In this manner, the soldier, daunted by the appearance of opposing force, has sometimes recoiled and only been induced to advance under the protection of a crucifix carried by a priest. The history of Suwarrow presents numerous instances of the effect of similar impulse when the means of common coercion had failed. Suwarrow, considered by many as a buffoon, was in reality a man of genius. His buffooneries were strange, but they were not unmeaning. When he put the different members of his own body to rest by the word of command, he seemed to know that he inculcated a lesson of implicit obedience to the soldiery. Implicit obedience was the great aim of Suwarrow's labour ; but common means were often insufficient for the effecting of his purpose. His original genius then discovered itself. He knew the Russian character ; and when the Russian army

was restive, so as not to be moved by the common sources of the tactician, he succeeded, not unfrequently, to animate it by infusing a certain degree of enthusiasm or fanaticism into it, through means which lie beyond the mere tactician's comprehension. The credulous were impressed with an opinion that Suwarrow had his days of inspiration; and in this belief, after being exhausted with toil and discomfited by the accidents of war, they started up in new strength and vigour to acts of daring at the electrifying sound of his wizard voice.

The Russian army presents itself to the eye of the observer as a military fabric almost perfect in the mechanical arrangements of its parts. The celerity with which the manual is performed, the exact correspondence in time, and the correctness of movement in the different parts of the evolution cannot perhaps be exceeded. A Russian battalion throws out a greater quantity of fire in a given time than any other European battalion of equal numbers; and, though it scatter it without aim or direction, it throws it out so correctly in time as if the triggers of the firelocks were drawn by one and the same finger. The lines and columns of the army, when arranged in order of battle, are compact and firm as walls of iron. The movements are rapid, considered as the movement of masses; and, while the nature of the ground, on which the action lies, admits of union and rapid movement, the Russian army may be thought to be irresistible—from its superior solidity and weight, and from the force of the external stimulus by which it is driven.—The machine moves rapidly; but, as it consists of many parts, the consistency of the movement depends upon a just combination of causes, consequently it is liable to be deranged by the contingencies of a military field. When deranged, it is not easily put right, for it has no rallying power within itself.—It may be supposed that a skilful enemy, who

studies things, moral and physical, in all their relations, refuses close action with a view to produce change in the mechanical disposition of the parts, as well as artfully to entice the blind machine to expend its ammunition without adequate object, and thereby to prepare its own discomfiture without being allowed the opportunity of directly applying its force. When the Russian army begins to fire, it seems to continue to fire without interval, and without aim until it sweep the field by showers of bullets, obtain possession of it by the intimidation of noise; or, until it expend its ammunition, exhaust its power, and become harmless. As the Russian soldier does not appear to be allowed the exercise of intellectual discretion, he has no merit except constancy and perseverance. He is supposed to act only by order; and if he have no order to advance to a given point, or to retire upon a given position, he stands still, according to the letter of his discipline, to be slaughtered on the spot.

The Russian army, the exterior tactic of which is as perfect perhaps as mechanical tactic can be made, is moreover eminent for the order of its ostensible economy. The clothing of the soldier is substantial and good of its kind, fashioned so as to be convenient and useful,—not cut fantastically to please the eye of a dress-making Commander. The soldier is at ease while he wears his uniform; he is not confined or fettered when he sleeps clothed and accoutred. The shoes, among other things, are excellent,—the soles thick, the quarter deep, the leather impenetrable to wet by impregnation with tallow. He is moreover furnished with a cloak of strong, thick cloth; which, while it serves for a covering at night, is also conveniently used as a defence against cold or wet, when on duty by night or day. The economical arrangements of the Russian army are laid on a good foundation; and, in order that they be not disturbed by common contingencies, every regiment has a certain number of workmen allotted to itself for the

execution of its own regimental business. Besides professed regimental workmen, every soldier in the ranks knows to mend his own clothes, to sew a plain seam, or to repair any accident that happens to his shoes. Hence the shoes and clothes, though often patched and mended, are never ragged and torn; and it is moreover true, though it may seem incredible to those who have only seen the British army in its helplessness, that the whole of the Russian army is so instructed, in what relates to its own concerns, as to be capable of clothing itself from head to foot in the space of three or four days.

The Russian army, which is so exact in tactic and economical arrangement, has also acquired fame on account of its exertions and its courage. This seems to be common opinion; but it does not appear, on close examination, that the physical qualities of the Russian stand high in the scale of comparison. The power of the native Russian, at least the relative balance of bulk, is ordinarily in the upper division of the body. The face of the peasant is broad, the features coarse; the trunk is heavy and long—relatively to height; the thighs and legs are short—without grace in the outline, round and fleshy—without the indent of muscular action. The Russian soldier moves in the military step at all times. The step is short, the repetition quick; but, as the action is scarcely ever brought to exertion, it is capable of being long continued with little comparative fatigue. The real Russian has, as now said, no pretension to grace and beauty of figure. The skin is coarse and harsh; and, though it be more frequently washed than the skin of any other soldier in Europe, it notwithstanding often appears to be dirty, dry and withered. The Russian soldier wears the hair long and plaited: his combs are bad, or rarely used, and he is not unfrequently overrun with vermin. He has, as already observed, a weighty carcase and considerable brute force; but he is not distinguished for activity and personal exertion;

and, unless in the exercise of the firelock, or other exercise of war to which he has been long and rigorously drilled, he is awkward and helpless compared with the most of his neighbours.

As the Russian soldier is not preeminent over the common soldiery of Europe in physical properties, neither does he seem to go beyond them in moral qualities. He is good natured, grateful for kindnesses rendered to him, obedient to superiors, either from direct fear, or from long habit of reverence to lords and masters. He is not simply good natured; he is cheerful in temper, and not dull in perception; but the limits of his ideas are circumscribed. He loves money in common with other men, perhaps as eagerly as most men; and it may be assumed with reason that love of money, or the hope of obtaining the spoils of the enemy is the main incentive which, exclusive of the command of the autocrat, sends him to the field of war. The desire of acquiring operates on the mass, and becomes in fact a paramount object of action; but the mind is simple; and, as uncorrupted by varied artifice, it seems to be more easily moved to acts of heroism and extraordinary sacrifice than the mind of the mere mercenary soldier.—Suwarrow, as already said, knew better than any other of the Russian Generals how to bring it out.

The Russian peasant lives on homely and coarse fare in his native land:—brown bread and cucumber are his chief support. When admitted into the ranks of the army, he obtains a ration of meat twice a week, sometimes three times a week. This is military allowance; and, though the soldier be thus more highly fed than the peasant, he is still coarsely fed as compared with the soldiers of most other countries. The Russian stomach is capable of receiving a large allowance of food at one time, and one meal is often sufficient for the purposes of one day. The bread is black, and so hard withal that good teeth only can make impression on it. The grutz, an essential

part of the ration, is not the most delicious of grains to an English palate; but it is savoury to the Russian, as well as the black bread; and, while these are in abundance, no complaint is made on the score of eating. Kuas, a sour liquor obtained by fermentation from grain, is the usual drink of the Russian. It is not unpleasant to the taste: it is cooling and refreshing,—not intoxicating, and not inferior in good qualities to vinegar and water, particularly as preventive of scurvy.

In estimating the military properties of the Russian people, there are grounds to believe that the farinaceous foods on which they live, and the Kuas or sour beverage which they principally drink, contribute, in no small degree, to keep the Russian habit at a low point of excitement under military exercise or exertion. The Russian is not of an irritable constitution physically, consequently his powers are not soon exhausted. He sustains labour for a comparative long time; but he is little capable of extraordinary effort; he even requires the impulse of strong causes to raise effort to what may be called energy. As native of a cold country, and, as such supposed to be familiar with cold, he might be reasonably expected to be little susceptible of its effects: that is not the case in fact. A Russian shrinks from a degree of cold that makes little impression on an Englishman; he is even not unfrequently frost bitten by exposure to cold where ordinary men scarcely suffer. The fact is not what would have been expected; but the writer believes it to be correct as a general fact. It was exemplified in the division of the Russian troops who served the campaign of 1799 in Holland, and who were afterwards cantoned in the islands of Jersey and Guernsey in part of the year 1800. The Russian, it must be admitted, was there a humbled man; but making allowance for diminished self importance, he did not appear to be radically hardy and elastic. The

manner of living and the quality of the diet, which is chiefly farinaceous, may in some measure account for the easy susceptibility of cold. The dwelling of the Russian peasant, and the barracks of the soldiery are uniformly kept at high temperature, not so often by heat of fire, as by exclusion of external air, and concentration of animal heat by individuals crowding together at unventilated corners. When obliged to go abroad in cold weather, the Russian does not brave the weather; he envelopes himself in fur, sheep skin, or cloak, so as to be little sensible of its impression through the quantity of extra external covering. The bath is resorted to by Russians of all descriptions once a week or oftener, wherever such accommodation can be procured; and thus from bathing, from warm clothing and warm apartments, the skin is sensible, the fibre relaxed, and animal action by no means energetic. The Russian, as may be collected from what is now said, is not of an elastic and hardy physical constitution; and, if he be less sensible to danger than many, whether from constitutional torpor, or from the tyrannic discipline which places the constant fear of the master above the chance fear of the enemy, he cannot fairly be admitted to have a balance of advantages over the other population of Europe for the purposes of war. If he be capable of perseverance in a given routine of duty for a comparatively long time, he is not intelligent of common things, in as much as he is prevented from the exercise of his own mind by the rigour of his military masters.

It appears evident, on a full consideration of the case, whether in Russian or other service, that military force arranged on a mere mechanical basis is only a feeble instrument in war. Unless its action be animated and pointed to its object by a quick sighted and imperious commander, or by a person who, practising illusion on credulity, engrosses the whole of the faculties so as to be capable of

turning them as he pleases, the movement of the mechanism is uncertain: it stands still at slight obstacles; it retrogrades at strong ones. The illusion of a name has often succeeded in bringing troops to the point of contact where common military skill and science had failed. The Russian General Suwarrow may be considered as an example of it in modern times. Suwarrow accomplished extraordinary things on various occasions; and much of what he did, as claiming the title of extraordinary, seems to have arisen from the opinion which the simple and credulous Russian entertained of his supernatural endowments as a General. Generals of equal courage, and perhaps of equal skill in tactic and the routine of warlike manœuvre, were discomfited with a command of troops not less perfectly organized than those with which Suwarrow fought and conquered. This was to a certain extent exemplified in Holland in the year 1799. A detachment of the Russian army was joined, in that year, with a British force for the re-establishment of the Stadtholder. The number of the detachment amounted to about seventeen thousand men apparently well selected for service,—indeed, in so far as the eye can judge, an army of elite. The sharp shooters seemed to have been well drilled to their duty. The Kalmuck and Cossac were not numerous, but they were choice troops of the kind. The infantry were healthy and physically strong; so imposing in aspect that, if an estimate were to be made by appearance, viz. closeness and compactness of force, they might have been thought to be capable of walking over the enemy, or over any troops in Europe, as over a stubble field. The Russians were sent into action soon after they landed. They moved on with a rapidity which astonished; and, as they advanced, they threw out a fire that was tremendous by its noise, but otherways harmless:—it was chiefly expended on the sand hills. Having met with little opposition, they penetrated to Bergen, entered the town, found

liquor and drank to excess:—they were soon intoxicated, ungovernable, mutinous, or dead drunk. The enemy, who had wisely given way to the torrent, halted and watched, returned in force, and, enveloping the town, made the Russians prisoners. Whether the Russians were led into the snare by design, or fell into it by accident, is not distinctly known; but this at least is known that it is a snare which is always before them, and always available for their destruction by an intelligent enemy. The Russian was so humbled by the disaster at Bergen that, in all the subsequent affairs in Holland, he seemed an unwilling actor. In advancing to action, the soldiers dropped off occasionally from the advancing lines; even officers assumed the retrograde. One General literally ran away; another, wounded, as it were by the first fire, retired. It is common and allowable that wounded persons retire from action; but the person in question was wounded in such a manner that it was scarcely possible to suppose he had been wounded by the ball of an enemy's musket. The General who ran away was cashiered by the Emperor Paul in a passion; but the manner, in which he was treated by his brother officers after his disgrace, affords a striking example of the trivial light in which military cowardice is regarded in Russia. Instead of being shunned and despised, the person alluded to walked at large as if nothing had happened to him; he was even regaled by his brother officers, prior to his departure for Russia, with a fete of honour as if he had returned from a victory.—It is not meant to insinuate, in stating this fact, that the Russian officers are generally deficient in courage; it is clear that they have not the same feeling respecting it that officers have in the west of Europe.

The Emperor Paul was drawn off from his alliance with great Britain by the address and management of the French consulate; and Russia continued at peace, and apparently in friendly intercourse

with France for some time after Paul's dethronement. The first consul, Buonaparte, became the Emperor Napoleon; and, being an Emperor, he appears to have thought that he had a right to make war in the manner of an Emperor. He contemplated the conquest of Europe, and perhaps of more than Europe. He overthrew the minor powers, even Austria and Prussia submitted to his law. He finally came in contact with Russia; and by intrigue and address in politics, he gained the ascendancy over the Emperor Alexander. The Emperor made a disadvantageous peace; but the Russian troops appear to have fought with courage and perseverance in the greater part of the war that preceded the peace of Tilsit. Their military firmness was such that Napoleon was not able, with all his arts of deception, to announce a victory in every bulletin which was issued from the field of battle. From the time that peace was made at Tilsit, Alexander seems to have been in some degree subservient to the views of Napoleon. Nothing short of absolute subjection was sufficient to satisfy Napoleon's ambition and arrogance; and, though Alexander be not perhaps one of the most courageous of warrior kings, he himself and his nation were so insulted that it was at last determined to resist. Napoleon had attained a height from which he had no distinct vision of what was below; and in this state of elevation, which obscures the sight and clouds the mind, he invaded Russia with a numerous and well appointed army,—in hopes of compelling her sovereign to unconditional submission. It cannot, in the just estimate of things, be considered as sound policy to put the safety of an invaded country on the chance of a single battle; and the Russians, who it would appear were aware of this truth, do not seem to have fought to desperation. They opposed the invaders at several points; but they gave way when severely pressed. Napoleon's ambition had deprived him of common sense, as well as military judge-

ment. He advanced precipitately and improvidently; and lost, by causes which he himself did not foresee, but which were foreseen by men of common understanding, the largest, and perhaps the finest army that ever was brought together in Europe. The army was destroyed; the Emperor escaped as a fugitive. Russia was cleared; but the character of the Russian army was not exalted by the doing of it. The peasantry, like other barbarians, were patriot. Resentment against the invaders of their country was strong; and to the resentment of the peasantry, cold and hunger from climate and other causes, the destruction of the French army is justly ascribed—not to the organized military force and the skill of the Emperor Alexander.

CHAPTER XVI.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

THE British army had not attained that perfection in tactic in the year 1804, when this work was given to the public, to which it has since attained. But, though not correct in internal organization, it was even then superior in show and brilliancy of appearance to any army in Europe. The dazzling colour of the uniform, the variety of the facings, the contrasts of the different parts of the dress, the profusion of ornament, viz. feathers, frizures, powdered locks, ponderous queues and

polished accoutrements were singularly contrived to strike the admiring multitude. A military review was at this time a brilliant exhibition—a gorgeous display of milinery taste and military error. The size, figure and complexion of the men, as arranged in battalion, presented a dazzling coup d'œil to the common observer,—not a satisfactory one to the eye of the real soldier, for it gave no idea of utility.

The idea of beauty is relative to purpose. Brilliant dress and rosy complexion have no value in war, are not in fact compatible with war; they therefore detract from, rather than add to value as estimated by the reason of the thing. A sun burnt complexion, a hardy and weather beaten countenance, an eye of fire—stern and rivetted as it were to a forward point, constitute the beauty of a soldier. To a few only of the British regiments of the line does this character apply. The British soldiery, levied in haste for urgent service, and sent to remote countries on detached duties, does not receive that form of training, prior to leaving home, which gives to the mass a uniform military deportment. Differences in air, manner and economy are observable in almost every corps of the line. These differences arise apparently from the differing views of regimental chiefs, who, as employed on detached services, take the liberty, not unfrequently, to change the dress, and modify the tactic and economy to their own particular fancies; hence the impression of consolidated effect, as arising from education in one school, where every military object is viewed through one medium, does not strike strongly in a general survey of the British army.

It is an object of importance in its own nature; and it is of urgent necessity in the circumstances of the times, to analyze the materials of the army, that is, to investigate the qualities of individuals, and to suggest the means of adjusting their arrangement in a given order, so that the fabric, formed from the combination, be solid at its

foundations, and united in its movements by physical, and, in so far as is possible, by intellectual correspondences. If the British empire is to be defended by a regular army, it is evident that the defence will not be of reliance unless the troops be of the best quality. The narrow limits of Great Britain does not allow the British government to calculate on a balance of numbers; and, even if numbers were at command, quality is indispensable to security; consequently the means of attaining preeminence in quality, not the simple means of filling the muster-roll are, or ought to be considered as the principal object of the statesman's study. Preeminence cannot be attained without an intimate knowledge of the qualities of the elementary materials, that is, without knowledge of the physical powers of action and reaction in one and all, and without knowledge of the internal principle which moves and maintains general movement in efficiency under every variety of condition that occurs in service.—The subject requires a minute and scientific consideration. The author regrets that he is not able to give to it that illucidation which its importance requires; but he hopes he may be able to do something in aiding others to pursue it, and to apprehend the principle of it more correctly than they now do.

The British army is composed of three different people, or nations, viz. English, Scotch and Irish. They all possess courage, which stands first in the list of military qualities, but there are shades of difference in the manner of displaying it, either, as arising from difference of blood, difference of climate and locality, difference in national institution, or difference in those contingent habits of life which act on the national character, which require notice in this place.

ENGLISH.

THE English, who stand the first in the British army, may be divided into two classes, viz. labourers or peasants, townsmen or artizans. The pastoral occupation scarcely has existence in England at the present time, consequently pastoral life so rarely furnishes materials for the army, that the pastoral condition need not be taken into account in considering the character of the military recruits. Distinctions of the people of a country into classes by original blood are not easily made any where ; they are particularly difficult in England, for England has been often invaded, often overrun and conquered ; and, as it is now the gathering place of adventurers, and the asylum of the oppressed, the people, who dwell in it, may be regarded as a mixture of all the nations of Europe. This has been going on for the last two thousand years. It is still going on, and it may be supposed, by its constant operation, to have modified the national character to something different from that of other people. The English peasant is a bold and confident peasant. He is open and blunt, apparently sincere, sometimes generous, often rude, boisterous, and overbearing,—rarely gracious or courteous to strangers. He generally assumes an air of independence, is indifferent to equals, even to superiors, except where he expects favour or bounty ; he is then as obsequious as his neighbours of the north. He sells his service, and deems his labour equal to his reward. He is little disposed to form personal attachment from pure love, even to military officers. He is often arrogant when he possesses money ; abject when he is without it, for he seems to consider money as the sovereign of men and things. He

is proud of his nation and contemptuous of others; rude, but not cruel or vindictive, he rarely insults, or ill treats an enemy after the chance of war, or any other chance has brought him within his power.

The English, compared with the Scotch and Irish, presents himself, at the time of enlistment, with a balance of advantages. He is well made and has a powerful arm, a full habit—round and plump, as if he had been well fed and not overworked. The chest is prominent and expanded; the muscles of the shoulders and arms are thick and brawney; the trunk of the body is proportionally ponderous, the balance of power conspicuously in the upper extremities. The Englishman is strong; but, as a labourer, he is an economist of his strength. He does not endure toil, or bear hardship and privation with the same temper and cheerfulness as the peasants of many other countries; and, as he is little accustomed to travel on foot, and little practised in walking, he is scarcely equal to the other parts of the army in marching, particularly in marching over broken and irregular grounds. He is not, as now said, patient of toil and hardy in constitution, consequently not capable of resisting the impressions of the numerous causes of disease to which soldiers are exposed in the service of the field; he thus suffers from sickness in his first campaigns oftener than others. When well clothed, well fed and well lodged, no one performs his duty more steadily and more efficiently than the Englishman; but, as every thing is new in war to persons who are born and bred in a country abounding with plenty, or in a manufacturing town, the hot-bed of luxury and dissipation, he is not always contented, not even subordinate to authority when severely pressed by privations and hardships.

The English peasant and the English artizan are the same people radically, but different occupations bring out their powers and capa-

cities in different degrees of perfection. The artizan is of less physical force than the labourer, usually of inferior size, of a less florid complexion, a less comely and pleasing aspect, more alert in movement, more dexterous in manual operation, and as such, more easily trained to military evolution. He is rarely in the full vigour of health at the time he enters the army; for, as the most part of artizan occupations are sedentary, health and vigour are more or less deficient in that class. Changes in situation and changes in circumstances act favourably, for the most part, on the health of persons of a languid and feeble frame of body; hence the health of the artizan ordinarily experiences improvement by the adoption of a military life. The labouring peasant is vigorous and healthy at the outset, and has a superiority over the artizan in acts of exertion. The artizan is apt as a scholar; and has, in his turn, an advantage over the peasant in the facility of acquiring those forms of cadenced movement which are connected with the mechanism of tactic. But, whatever be the shades of difference among the different classes of English recruits, steady courage, actual force, and promptitude in applying force to the proper point of attack belong to all. These properties are military properties; and it cannot be denied that the part of the army, which is recruited in England, stands on fair ground in this respect with its other parts, on advantageous ground with the military materials of most other nations.

Whether it be that the British nation has an innate propensity for war, or that the extent and complication of its political concerns draws it into war involuntarily, the fact is notorious that it scarcely ever is without war in one part of the world or other, or, in the language of Rome, scarcely ever shuts the temple of Janus. But, notwithstanding the national propensity to war, or the casual necessities which command it, the English cannot be said to possess the

character which is genuinely denominated military. National pursuits are artificial and subject to changes. The English are nationally speculative, and adventurous at all games of chance. Two passions do not reign with equal force in the same subject at the same time; consequently the spirit of the war of honour, as it is called, does not run high among people who are adventurers for gain of money through speculations in trade and commerce. The name of military service does not bring distinction in England as it does in many parts of Europe; and, as the profession of arms is not here held in the first estimation, the better class of the peasantry do not leave the plough or the shuttle for the sword; consequently the recruits of infantry regiments are rarely on a level with the mass of the nation. They are often drawn from the refuse of manufacturing towns, the destitute workmen, when the manufactory stops or stagnates, enrolling themselves in the army through necessity or want of bread, not in love of arms. Manufacturers are often dissipated and effeminate, inferior in good qualities to the common standard of the country; the military character of the British nation is not therefore fairly judged, as estimated by the qualities of the recruits who fill its military ranks. The British army has only an annual existence; and it has usually been the policy to reduce it to a low standard in point of numbers at the close of war. When so reduced, the ranks, when occasions demand augmentation, can only be expected to be filled by the bribery of high bounties; for the dominant principle of acting for and by money adheres to the nation in all its operations, that is, the nation is manufacturing and commercial by constitutional habit, military contingently for profit—not for glory. A proportion of the people, influenced by the desire of gain, enticed by the tinsel of dress, or driven by the necessity of want, arrange themselves, at the commencement of the war, under military

standards. The ranks are thus filled with men ; they are not filled with soldiers, for we do not admit those to be soldiers, who have no higher motive to induce them to assume the soldier's garb than a pecuniary bribe, an instigation of vanity, or a necessity arising from want of bread ; and as the mass of English recruits consists of such, its military character is not what it might be, that is, not a level with the bulk of the nation.—What is here said was correct within the memory of the writer ; it is now somewhat different. The ranks of the militia are filled by conscription from the whole of the people ; and drafts have been latterly made from the militia under the name of volunteer—in reality under the bribe of a high bounty ; consequently the expedient of volunteering from the militia, which is an indirect conscription, has filled the ranks of the line with good subjects comparatively, both physically and morally, and thus put the army nearly on a level, in point of worth, with the common inhabitants of the country.

The English peasant has no predilection for military life ; nor does the profession of arms appear, until lately, to have been much sought after by those of the higher class. But, though neither gentleman nor peasant manifest that military ardour which marks a military passion, it must still be allowed that the English officer and the English soldier uniformly maintain a national character in the conflict of war. They display a cool and deliberate courage in battle, decision in difficulty, and exertion in danger equalled by few and surpassed by none. This is true in itself ; but it may be added at the same time that the spirit of enthusiasm, which stimulates to the enterprize of hazardous acts, is not, as things now stand, a prominent feature of the English army. A spirit of enterprize, and a desire of adventure are conspicuous in the navy ; consequently it may be concluded that the fund of enterprize exists in the physical constitution of both,—dor-

mant in one from want of culture, or want of reward. The sailor has direct spoil in his eye in all his enterprizes; and he acts as if no impediment should stand in the way of attaining it. The soldier has nothing to expect in a battle except a broken leg; and, though not coward, he ordinarily keeps within the line of his prescribed duty. He is not impetuous to the same extent as the soldiers of some countries; but he is courageous and determined as any, and he has this farther advantage that he ordinarily retains command of himself, even in battle, so that, if he do not succeed in his purpose, he retires from the contest—defeated not routed. He performs his duties in ordinary circumstances with correctness; but he performs them as duties which are not to exceed a certain limit; there is in fact something like discretion—a bargain with himself in all his acts. He is capable of attachment, not susceptible of enthusiastic devotion abstracted from solid reasons. He looks to a general cause, and expects to find a reason for his attachment connected with something that applies to himself. He thus, even as a soldier, retains the base of the national character, viz. a spirit of independence, that is, a power to dispose of himself according to his own way of thinking,—and necessarily connected with his real or supposed advantage.

Military enthusiasm does not, as already observed, rise high in the English army. The expression of ardour beyond literal duty is ridiculed rather than encouraged by superiors; and, if not encouraged by approbation, or stimulated by reward, it is not likely to exist, for few objects come under the eye of the peasant in early life, which have a tendency to inspire romantic sentiments of chivalry. The labourer performs his labour on a given condition, and after a regular routine. He works for hire, and has little interest in the work which he performs, abstractedly from the amount of the hire which it brings. The mode of agriculture, at the present time, furnishes few

opportunities for groups of young persons meeting together in field occupations. Where that occurred (and it often occurred in times past), games and pastimes calculated to bring forth bodily exertion were practised with ardour—with a view to attain superiority; and, thus practised, they tended to excite the general desire of distinction, even to lead the mind, unintentionally as it were, to look to achievements in war as the final goal of a course of rivalry in feats of strength and activity. As this has now no place, the phantom of military glory has no artificial food; and, if the love of gain, or casual necessity did not operate on the peasant class, it is reasonable to believe that English volunteers for military service would actually be few in number. The military character did not until lately stand high in estimation with the peasantry. The return of a soldier to his native home, though covered with what are called honourable wounds gained in glorious battles, made no favourable impression on vulgar opinion, so as to prove an incentive to the youth of the neighbourhood to volunteer military service. It was thus little to be expected that the English peasant should be of a direct military cast; it is notwithstanding true that he possesses qualities, which give him advantages in war, and which contribute materially to beget coolness, self-command and resolution in action, which the peasant of few nations possesses in an equal degree. An Englishman is accustomed from early youth to enter the lists of combat without what may be called personal enmity. He contends until he is overpowered: he gives in when he discovers his inferiority,—and he does so, without that sensation of shame and confusion which is manifested by his northern neighbour under similar discomfiture. This practice in trial of strength, without passion or enmity, is almost peculiar to the people of England; and to this, perhaps, may be ascribed that good sense and self command, which gives up a contest in the more

serious conflicts of war without feeling, or manifesting such vexation and despair as create confusion and lead to total route. The English soldier has thus a cool and determined courage, either naturally or artificially acquired by habit; and, possessing this quality, he possesses a valuable property for the practice of common warfare. In point of intelligence, he is inferior to many; and, though powerful in actual force, he is not, as already said, hardy in bodily constitution. He is accustomed to full living at his home; and, as he expects a certain condition of things to be present in war as well as in peace, he does not submit to privation without murmur; nor does he endure toil, even when inevitable as a part of his duty, with cheerfulness. These are defects; but with these defects, he is a valuable soldier: he is honest and manly in sentiment, cool in action and firm in courage. On these qualities, dependence may be placed; and, though they are not all the qualities which a soldier ought to possess, they are qualities of great value to generals who conduct extensive military operations.

SCOTCH.

THE Lowland Scot, as viewed superficially, is inferior to the English; at least he is less attractive by the comeliness and apparent power of his person. He is ordinarily of a lower stature, less full of flesh, and of a less brawny or muscular arm. The trunk of the body is less ponderous; the legs and thighs are more sinewy and elastic;—the balance of power is in the inferior extremities. The Scotch-

man's address and manner are uncouth; the countenance serious and often harsh, the tints of colour little delicate. The *ensemble* of the figure is not prepossessing by its grace; but it is military as expressive of activity and elasticity in muscular action. The shades of difference here noticed, arising in a great measure from manner of living and manner of occupation, wear out fast in the South of Scotland,—the traces of it are however still to be seen. The English peasant has, as already observed, a proportionally great weight of body, an expanded chest, and apparently great power of arm: the Scot has sinewy limbs, and a frame of comparative great resistance; he is thus presumptively better calculated to endure toil, and to submit to the privations that are incident to war than his southern neighbour. As the exterior appearances of the people who dwell on the opposite sides of the Tweed are not precisely the same, so neither is the mental character. The Englishman is open and blunt in manner, and somewhat boastful; the Scotsman is close, shrewd and intelligent. The Englishman meets his enemy coolly and deliberately, and preserves an unruffled temper even in the combat. He now is, and has been at all times capable of mechanical discipline; and, as proof of a calm temper, he has at all times excelled in the use of missile force. But, while capable of discipline and cool in temper, he is little enterprising comparatively, and has little of the daring and irregular impetuosity in actual conflict which characterizes the Scot, and occasionally confounds the antagonist. The impetuosity of the Scot is proverbial. It leads him far, and it leads him into difficulty and danger on some occasions; but it also leads him now and then to the achievement of things beyond calculation:—it is almost irresistible when well directed.

The people of England and of the South of Scotland may be regarded as people of a common origin. The level parts of Great

Britain were overrun and occupied, by different conquerors, at different times. The whole of the sea coast admitted into its bosom hordes of freebooters, who, landing as military adventurers under one pretext or other, usurped the sovereignty of the soil, extirpated, expelled or converted the actual possessors to bondsmen or vassal dependents. The invaders were freebooters and men of the sword only; but those of them, who fixed their abode in England, appear to have assumed habits of industry at an earlier period than those who settled in Scotland, probably led to do so by the comparatively higher culture of the south part of the island, as more under the dominion and domestic management of the Romans at former times. The lands in Scotland seem to have been held by feudal tenure until lately; and, it may be remarked that where feudalism prevails, agricultural improvements do not obtain a scientific and systematic attention. The lands north of the Tweed, within the memory of persons still living, were not cultivated generally with any other view than that of producing subsistence in bread for the season; and, as there was little produce from the lands beyond what was necessary for annual consumption, there was little foreign trade:—the domestic manufactures were chiefly such as were wanted for purposes of necessity. A field, badly manured and clumsily worked, produced an inferior grain which was made into coarse bread; the cattle and sheep, which covered the hills and vallies, furnished milk for food and wool for clothing. Society was in the pastoral stage,—a stage, considered as barbarous by those, who regard the art of stimulating animal appetite to be the refinement of human life, but in reality a stage of wisdom.

The exercise of the mental faculty, on subjects of military enterprise, occupies a period in the history of almost every people in their emergence from barbarism. Such exercise arose among the Scotch as

among others ; and various causes concurred to expand its sphere, prolong its duration and give to it an extraordinary degree of interest. The Scotch—south of the Forth, even when there was truce between the Kings of England and Scotland, were rarely at peace with their neighbours. If open war was suspended, the war of depredation went on. Until the accession of James the VI. even until the union of the two kingdoms, and later than the union, the recollection that Scotland had been invaded by the English, with a view to subjugation, kept a feeling of resentment in the breast of the Scotch peasantry, which cherished and supported a martial spirit throughout the whole extent of the southern district. The resentment against England and Englishmen was strong—in a manner innate: it was fostered by popular ballads and the histories of Sir William Wallace and Robert the Bruce. The history of Sir William Wallace was, until these last forty or fifty years, the military catechism of the Scottish youth,—the torch of Scottish courage, of love of country, and desire of war; in fact, the manual of honour and independence. The tale is uncouthly told, and told moreover without a ray of genius; it notwithstanding makes deep impression by the nature of the matter. The Scottish youth, in times that are but recently passed, devoured the details of the combats of Wallace with what may be called ravenous appetite. He rose lofty within himself at the recital of Wallace's prowess, almost believed himself to be his companion, or shed tears of regret that he was not,—that he had not lived to fight by his side, even to die with him or for him. The impression of liberty and independence, which arose from this source of recollection, served to foster a martial spirit among the people, and to give to the peasant character an air of heroism scarcely to be met with except on the theatre of Wallace's achievements,—The time is now past; the face of the country is changed, and, with it, the manners of the people

are changed. Wallace's name is occasionally mentioned ;—his spirit has fled from the theatre of his exploits.

The warlike spirit, which was cherished in Scotland by the recital of the warlike achievements of Wallace and the history of the border freebooters, was supported by the social condition which obtained throughout the country. A certain form of the feudal tenure of lands obtained in Scotland from time immemorial to a late period. Whatever may be the evils and inconveniences of feudalism, the operation on society is decidedly warlike. If the tenure be liberal in its conditions, and well conducted in its application to practice, it serves to produce and cherish a general love of country, in as much as it gives a limited inheritance of the soil to those who are capable of military service. Man naturally respects that which he receives from his fathers, and cherishes that which he hopes to transmit to his children. The degree of attachment to paternal inheritance is not measured by absolute value. The attachment is usually strong where the quantum is small ; it is weak where the quantity is great and widely extended. The peasant, as sheltered from the piercing blast, is grateful for the protection of his hut ; the meagre grain of his unfertile field is received as a bounty from the God of Nature : the heart is warmed with gratitude ; and, thus warmed, the individual becomes patriot, even to devotion. On the contrary, the lordly master of the superb mansion and wide domain, who believes that all his possessions are the work of his own hands, has no patriotism beyond the value of his own property. As he raised a mansion by his own power, so he conceives that he adorns it by the dignity of his own presence. He has self gratification ; but he acknowledges no gratitude. He may draw his sword in defence of his country as well as the peasant ; but he draws it from a different motive and with a different feeling. With the lord, it is the defence of property, valued and estimated as pro-

perty; with the peasant, it is the defence of an abode dear by its familiarity, and venerated as an asylum from the storms and tempests of the sky. The one is ready to compromise the independence of his nation for the secure possession of his acres and his mansions; the other is ready to shed his blood in defence of the soil which gives him bread, and which gives cover to the bones of his fathers; in a word, the peasant has pride of feeling as a member of the nation; the lord has pride or arrogance as a feeling for individual self.

There are causes and conditions contingent to the life of man, which operate so efficiently on the animal fabric as materially to modify its constitutional forms of action; and among others, the causes here alluded to, acting in some manner mechanically on organism, appear to have had a share in rendering the Scottish peasant a patriot on principle. The possession of land appears at one time to have been a species of permanent inheritance to the peasant. The rents which were chiefly paid in kind, or by service, were a tax on the mere product of labour, and as such, they exempted the tenant from ravenous pursuits of money to satisfy the desires of craving landlords. The trade of farming, where lands are taken in large lots with a view to monopolize products and accumulate money, was not known to any extent until very recent times:—the provision of subsistence in bread was the main object of the husbandman's care. The science of agriculture was little understood at the time alluded to; and, as agricultural labours were only necessary in this state of rudeness at particular periods of the year, the mass of the people were frequently without employment; hence, as the hand had no occupation, the mind, which is seldom totally inactive, assumed the first expanding act of the human faculties, and struck into the field of warlike adventure, rather than into the field of mechanical labour connected with arts of peace. It is thus perhaps that, as the accidental condition of the

tenure of lands contributed to foster a love of country, the state of society and the accidental circumstances of locality, independently of formal institution served to encourage the martial propensity which was once so conspicuous among the peasantry of the South of Scotland.

In early times, when man was simple and what is called barbarous, the heart was sensible to friendship and grateful for kindness. The affections of the peasant were strong to all that was connected with the place of his birth. They expanded from the centre in circles, extended wider and wider though with diminishing ardour, and ultimately embraced the whole circle of the empire of which he was a member. Community of labour, which appears to have prevailed among the peasantry in Scotland in times not long past, spread good will and kindness among the various members of the circumscribed circle. The people then clustered together in small townships; and their union with one another was intimate as the union of those who are allied by blood. The right of pasturage for sheep and cattle was in many cases a common right. Much of the business connected with common pasturage was transacted in common, the execution of it occasioning intercourse, even intimacy among the different members of the sequestered habitations. But, besides the circumscribed intercourse alluded to, there were particular seasons of the year, where mutual aids in labour were general and extensive. Among these, the provision of fuel was one of the most important. Peat or turf,—a material which requires to be dug from the earth and carefully spread out to dry in the sun, is the ordinary fuel of large tracts of country in Scotland. The operation of digging &c. is laborious; but, instead of being considered as a labour to be shunned, it was generally anticipated as a pleasure to be enjoyed, in as much as it was a day of good cheer and regalement to all. The heart was light and

satisfied, as making provision against the cold of winter. It was sensible to the Deity, as expectant of benefit. Besides community of labour in the preparation of peat; hay and corn harvest brought the people frequently and intimately together in their fields, and certain days of *corvée* labour to the land proprietor, instead of being regarded as irksome toil, were often regarded as days of festivity. The Scotch parent was at this time sober—and chaste, intelligent, religious, and watchful over the conduct of the young. The young were modest; but they were enterprising. They ordinarily contended in manly exercises, viz. in running, leaping, wrestling and other similar sports, where superiority gives distinction in the peasant circle, and where distinction entices the individual to farther adventure,—often to try his fortune in war. Such customs were once common in the South of Scotland; and such practices may be supposed to have excited and supported a military spirit among the people. Challenges for curling on the ice, ball playing, &c. took place on many occasions between contiguous parishes. They were contentions of emulation, similar, in a humble sphere, to the tournaments of knights and nobles, and they produced somewhat similar effects on the subject.

A propensity for war and military achievement was engendered and fostered by the intercourse, which took place among the people in consequence of the tenure under which they held their lands. It was moreover supported by a custom, which then very generally prevailed, of assembling in the winter evenings in one of the larger houses in the village for the purpose of hearing tales of other times. The Scottish peasant is inquisitive, even greedy of information on the general affairs of mankind. This he often is, though he may not be acquainted with letters, or ever have moved from his humble village. There was ordinarily one or more chroniclers in a township, acquainted by oral tradition with all the encounters and petty feuds

of the freebooters and lawless barons of the border; and to these chroniclers of border war, old soldiers travelling through the country, begging bread, or flying the ennui of a fixed abode, often added the more recent achievements of systematic warriors in foreign climes; thus giving a picture of things, long or recently past, so impressively drawn, as to inflame the military mind of the listening youth to enthusiasm. A beggar is necessarily a degraded person; an old soldier, within the last half century, was an exception in Scotland. He was generally received with kindness at one of the best farm houses in the place. Young men and children gathered round him, solicited him to talk; and, as he talked, they listened earnestly to his tale of battles and his adventures in foreign parts. The Scotch were at this time kind and charitable. They were poor; and, in common with the inhabitants of poor, at least of pastoral countries, they were hospitable. It is now otherwise. The Scotch have assumed the commercial character. They are manufacturers of goods, or speculators in farming; and, like the inhabitants of countries where arts prevail, and where the desire of gain engrosses all the faculties of the soul, hospitality, or that grace of charity which gives to the indigent without offering insult, or testifying contempt, is rarely to be found.

But, as an attachment to the soil appears to have arisen from the tenure of the lands and the simplicity of peasant society, the Scotch were patriot, and they were moreover military. They had a propensity to war from the operation of a variety of natural causes which act on the human mind; and, while they had this propensity through nature, the moral training and the impressions of religion, engrafted on the habit at an early period of life by discipline, ensured a correct and principled execution of duty on all important occasions of trial. The Scotch are Calvinists in religious belief; and Calvinists believe that every thing which happens in life is preordained by providence

to happen, consequently that individual life is as secure in the rage of battle as in the shades of peace. Such opinion influenced the conduct of the Lowland Scot, fortified his mind in the dangers of war; and hence the Scotch, who are enterprising and ardent as a quality of national character, were at this time courageous from education, and steady in their purpose through the impression of their religious creed. The Scotch, before the introduction of that system of scientific agriculture which now prevails in Great Britain, were pastoral, and they were comparatively idle. They were not skilled in agricultural science, in manufacture and speculations in trade, but they were not without talent. The mind was strong within itself; and the moral sentiment was chaste and pure, from the time of Knox's reformation that they were permitted to read the Bible. This energy of mind and chastity of moral sentiment, for which the Scottish peasant is eminently conspicuous among the peasantry of other countries, were principally to be ascribed to the exertions of the parish ministers,—a body of men, than whom no religious teachers since the days of the apostles have manifested more of the christian disposition, or laboured more faithfully to preserve purity in morals and good conduct among men. The Scotch clergy, not only preached the doctrine of Jesus Christ, which is a doctrine of truth and piety; but they practised it in purity, and took pains to explain its truth and beauty to their flocks,—not only from the pulpit, but more directly at the peasant's home in his domestic circle.

The Scotch, as now said, are Calvinist in religion; and, as the religion of Calvin inculcates the belief that any means which man may employ to obviate the dangers of battle are of no avail, the soldier, as believing in the certainty of predestination, may be supposed to be in some degree exempted from the impressions of fear. The idea of exemption is something; but it is not all that confirms the courage

of a Scotchman. A sentiment of duty, engrafted in the constitution of the mind by public and domestic education, existed in Scotland at a period not long past. It acted; and it may be said to have bound the Scotch soldier to his post by something like a principle of honour. The system of education, which produced this effect was a national education, conducted under the eye of the clergy as national guardians of religion and morals. The basis of it was laid on the fundamental doctrine of the New Testament; which, with the exception of a Calvinistical catechism, was the only book of instruction known in the schools at the period alluded to. The education was, as already said, conducted under the eye of the parish minister,—and it was not permitted to divert from its object, which is an object of piety and good moral conduct. The period allotted to instruction was short; but as the precept “Do unto others as you would that others do unto you,” was constantly in the pupils eye, the impression, as made at an early age and supported systematically in the subsequent proceedings of life by almost every cause that met the eye, was well fixed. When the pupil was removed from school, his conduct was submitted to the surveillance of a small and jealous community in a sequestered valley—in a circle where a bad or disgraceful act could not be concealed, and where there were fortunately few causes to lead to its commission. A person educated on the base of the Christian doctrine is supposed to be just to others, and to respect himself. He neither encroaches on the weak and timid, nor yields to the arrogant and overbearing. The Scotch peasant had some thing of this character from the time he became a presbyterian; but it was not perfect. The prejudices of feudal times still existed. Their force was diminished by the doctrines of Calvin; but the lord or laird was still a great man, who claimed homage from the peasant beyond the reason of the thing.

The cottage of the Scotch peasant was humble,—a hut comparatively with the peasant dwelling in the present time. But, though humble, it was interesting, for the inmates were without guile. Simple as children of nature, the affections were genuine and warm—not easily obliterated through intercourse with the world. If any one served as a soldier in a foreign climate, (and there was strong predeliction among the Scotch for military service,) he still retained a recollection of home, and exulted when he returned home to receive the welcome of his friends,—ashamed to return, or to receive welcome if there was a spot upon his honour. Virtue was esteemed on its own account; and virtue was esteemed more than riches. The introduction of farming as a trade, of manufacture and commerce as a gaming adventure, has turned all the energies of the mind to the means of acquiring money, and the acquisition of money has here, as in other places, produced luxury; which, absorbing the mental faculties in pursuits of pleasure and gratifications of animal sense, has extinguished force of mind, and brought man, through a long detour of wandering, to a state of imbecility, even to ignorance of himself and his own condition.

The face of sublunary things is constantly under change; and the change which has taken place in Scotland, within these last sixty or seventy years, is such as has rarely been any where witnessed in so short a space of time. The fields, which were then bare, bleak and barren, are now rich, gay and smiling as gardens. The peasantry, who were homely, and uncouth in appearance as clothed in coarse home manufacture, are now gaily and gaudily dressed, well instructed in book learning, and polished in manner above the peasantry of most countries: the exterior is gilded, the interior is going to decay. The Scotch peasant is not now ashamed to contract debts which he can scarcely ever expect to pay. Bankruptcy was an indelible disgrace.

at one time ; it is now regarded as no more than the bad fortune of a gamester. The moral character is changed. It was sincere and true in past times—and perhaps rude ; it is now refined and polished ; but with refinement, it has assumed the garb of duplicity, and sacrificed the principle of peasant honour to commercial splendour. The progress of the deteriorating operation is visible in the mass of the Scottish peasantry. They still possess valuable qualities in civil and military life ; but they have not the same ardent mind and hardy body as they had at the early periods of the last century, nor even the same purity of character in their social intercourse, as marked the days of emergence from the bondage of the Romish church. The love of riches has absorbed the faculties of the soul ; the love of military service, except as a mercenary pursuit, is faint. Luxury of living, by pampering the body, has weakened the elastic powers of life, and thus augmented the constitutional susceptibility to disease. With this change in dress and manner, the form of national intercourse is also changed. Townships are broken up ; community of labour is gone into disuse ; and ballads, recording the feats of the border thieves, who were often chivalrous men, no longer live in the memory of the people. Love and martial achievements were the subject of the border song ; and, as the song often recorded a romantic and chaste love, though the love of a robber, a similar sentiment was infused into the breast of the peasant by a species of contagion. The recitation of popular songs filled up the idle hours of the pastoral Scotch, and attachment between the sexes not unfrequently followed as a consequence of the recitation. This was common, and the cause of it is not of difficult comprehension. It is in sequestered vallies, and in country villages that the passion of romantic love fixes its abode. Where the passion is strong, and where it is opposed by difficulties, it often hurries its votary to the field of war, and urges

him, under an impression of his mistress's perfections, to undertake bold and adventurous enterprises with a view to obtain her favour. The history alluded to belongs to what may be called pastoral life. It is past in Scotland; but it is not long past.—It marked, when it did not exist, the age of chivalry among the plebeian class. The passion of love, while pure and genuine, stimulates to military enterprise; the ideal presence of the beloved object gives energy to the lover's acts, and thus places his name with the heroes of past ages.

The Scotch, while in the pastoral or semibarbarous stage of society, that is, before they became skilful farmers, ingenious manufacturers, and speculating merchants, were regarded and justly regarded as persons possessing a character well suited to the business of war. The impression of the warlike sentiment was then strong; and military service was considered as conferring an honorary distinction. The circle of society was narrow: friendships were intimate, and union in combat was cemented by individual intimacy, as well as by a general principle of duty. The sentiment of honour, which was planted at an early age by institution or casual circumstance, grew with years, and often attained the force of passion. If to these was added an impression of religion sanctifying the act of duty, death in its most formidable form lost its terrors. The Scotch were in this manner warlike in character; but their warlike character, though eminent, was not without alloy. They were eager in enterprise for the sake of glory; they were impetuous in action—impassioned and apt to commit themselves by too great ardour. Transported into rage by passion they were forward to join in close combat; and, as they advanced with a desire of vengeance, a change of circumstances changing, or disguising the object of their resentment, occasioned pause and disappointment: disappointment occasioned hesitation, some-

times panic, and probably route. This character of impetuosity is national; and it seems not unfrequently to have committed the Scotch to the chastisement of their southern neighbours. The Scotch were generally superior in recounters where every part was brought at once into direct contact; they were inferior in great affairs, where foresight and temper were indispensable to the execution of complicated purposes. This character still adheres to the Scotch soldier; for, as he did not in former times, so he does not now, with all the advantages of Prussian discipline, retire from battle with a confession of inferiority. He commits errors, or forgets himself on some occasions; but if so, he often, at a word which touches a secret spring of action, nobly repairs it—and he sometimes does so with an energy which does not come within common military calculation.

The Scotch, from a variety of concurring causes, appear to possess a greater predilection for war than their neighbours of the south; and though not superior in bodily strength, they bear the hardships of military life with more temper and cheerfulness. Military adventure is more congenial with their dispositions; fatigues and self denials are less foreign from their habits. When Scotland was more of a pastoral than agricultural country, the peasant was familiarized with wind and rain in his daily occupation. If wet with rain, he suffered little injury in his health, the circumstance, as not novel to him, having little effect upon him. He considered it to be no hardship to sleep in the open air—in a furrow or ravine, without any other covering than that of a sheep-herd's plaid. He was thus accustomed, from early youth, to things that are similar to those of war in the field. His fare, at his native home, was not so delicate, rarely so abundant as that of a soldier in the service of a campaign. He felt no hardship, and he complained not of any. He did not suffer sickness from the effects of cold and hunger, in the same proportion

as those who had been delicately fed and carefully nursed in their infant years. He was upon the whole a valuable subject for a soldier; he is so still, and, and if well understood, he is one of the first quality.

The English and the lowland Scotch are radically the same people. They had at one time a different modification of law and government, and, as might be expected, they manifested a modified difference of character. They are now under one general government; and as they assimilate in domestic manners, in consequence of frequent intercourse, they also approximate in military qualities, as a result of similar training and one form of military service. The HIGHLANDERS are distinct. They cherish the pride of not having submitted to the Roman arms which subjugated Great Britain; and, amid the invasions and revolutions which have repeatedly mixed the inhabitants, and new modelled the government of the low country, the mountaineers pretend (not perhaps with perfect correctness) to aboriginal independence. They have preserved what they consider to be their ancient tongue, their ancient customs and manners. It is difficult to speak positively on this head, or to pronounce with certainty, whether the present Highlanders of Scotland be a pure Celtic race, or a mixed race of Celts and Scandinavian, or other Goths; but it is more than probable, from marks of the existence of two castes of people observable in each clan, that the present Highlands are actually a mixed people, the Celtic stock predominating in number, the Scandinavian or Gothic in power. The Gothic invader, having gained the sovereignty of the soil by arms, continued to maintain it by management; and he appears to have made the incorporation of the aboriginal Celt with the invading Goth under one common name the engine of his operation. It is not clear, whether or not the invader established his own language in the Highlands, or adopted that

of the conquered, for the present Gaelic has only a remote connexion with the Welch which may be supposed to be Celtic. It is pretty clear that he brought with him, and planted in the Highlands, the lofty tone of the migratory warlike tribes, their freebooting spirit, their chivalrous character, and the custom of land tenure common to Eastern adventurers.

In early times, even until lately, the tenure of lands in the Highlands of Scotland was feudal; the life of the people was pastoral and the character warlike. The people of the Highlands, dispersed in glens or sequestered vallies, classed in districts by tribes or clans pretending to the same origin and warmed by the same blood, maintained a correspondence and intimate connexion with one another through all the ramifications of the clan. The bond, or supposed bond of union by blood operated strongly at one time; and, as every separate clan considered itself independent, subject to a chief or sovereign of its own, but to no other sovereign, collisions took place occasionally among them, and strife arose between neighbouring clans or neighbouring chiefs, in a similar manner as wars arise between great kingdoms and powerful kings. The Scotch Highlanders were thus often engaged in wars and contentions with each other; for, as an insult offered, or an injury sustained by any individual of the clan, was felt and resented as an insult offered, or an injury sustained by the whole of the cognominated clan, the occasions of dispute were numerous—and the affrays were often bloody.

The remains of Celtic or rather Gaelic song, which may be considered as a record of Gaelic history, serve to shew that as manners were not refined beyond the pastoral, or semibarbarous stage of society, the chief occupation was hunting the deer, &c. the chief glory of the nation a successful military expedition. To obtain a name in war was the first object of the Gael,—an object, if credit be due to the

song, sought in the defence of friends rather than in the aggression of foes. There was a spirit of heroism in the times; and the warlike fame of the Highlander, whether aboriginal Celt or usurping Goth, was high in this age of chivalry. Fingal was renowned; and whoever Fingal may have been, or in whatever age he may have lived, it would be bold to attempt to maintain that he had not a real existence. Ossian was a poet with a warrior's mind, even with a hero's spirit. He was original as a poet; his pictures were drawn from life. The pieces ascribed to him bear internal evidence of antiquity, and undeniable evidence of a poetical genius of the first order. The date of Ossian's song cannot be fixed; but, from the whole of the circumstances connected with it, it seems to be more reasonably referred to the inroads of the migratory warlike tribes, who inundated Europe at an early period of the Christian era, than to the invasion of Roman armies. As the date is unknown, and the objects not so precisely defined that they can be distinctly traced, the songs of Ossian have been considered by some as a fabrication of recent times; consequently there is controversy on the subject—a controversy which unfortunately has not been liberally conducted. The opinion of genuineness has been maintained on one part with marks of prejudiced zeal, not investigated with the humility of candour. It has been impugned on the other by ignorance, chiefly by the authority of a learned man who had no knowledge of the subject. It is no proof, not even presumptive proof that the poems, ascribed to Ossian, are the work of Mr. Macpherson, because they did not, or do not exist in writing. The history of Arab literature, and what is known of Arab manners is sufficiently illustrative of the possibility of what the advocates of the genuineness of the poems assume. The fact, that the published poems might have been better translated in some points than they actually are translated, is an argument of weight in favour of the opinion here maintained;

while the fact, that the translator has not always hit the precise meaning of the original, may be deemed conclusive in proof of it, for it can scarcely be supposed that the translator would mistake himself. The proof, or disproof of the genuineness of these poems does not belong to this place; but the question is interesting generally, and, as it bears directly on the military character of the Highlanders, it is here adverted to. The picture of life drawn in these poems is primitive; the characters of the actors are simple and warlike; the sentiments are generous and noble,—and they are not merely ideal. Characters, not unlike those which embellish the poems alluded to, occurred occasionally in the last century among native Highlanders. They were considered, and will continue to be considered, by the sons of civilization, as characters of romance; they are notwithstanding real,—and resemblances are not altogether unknown to the writer.

The clans, who possessed the north and western parts of the Highlands of Scotland, do not appear to have owed unconditional submission to the Scottish crown. The different chiefs possessed a species of independence in their several districts; and, until lately, they had jurisdiction in life and death over their vassals. The interests of neighbouring clans frequently clashed with one another; and, as the chiefs had pride and jealousy to excess, they went to war with other chiefs, as lord or sovereign, without permission of the king of the low country. As they possessed a species of sovereignty in their domain, they maintained an appearance of state and dignity, such as is assumed by sovereigns in other parts of the world. They seem to have resembled Arab chiefs in history and character; but they were less simple. The exterior of the people was rude; the mind had a tone of high elevation. The chief displayed, in his castle, more or less of sovereign pomp, and frequently not less of despotism

than the Czar of Muscovy. The Highlander of all classes is noted for hospitality, generosity,—and friendship where he is a friend. The submission of the common Highlander to the chief, and chieftains of the clan, was perfect in past times; but it was not the servility of a slave in fear of the whip; it was the attachment of a son to a father, accompanied with reverence for authority from preeminence of station. The clan was supposed to be of one blood; and, as such it was held together by one connexion. All the members of the clan owed submission to the chief, but to no power, in their own idea, superior to the chief. The meanest subject of the clan considered the cause of the chief as the cause of himself, and his own cause as the cause of the chief;—they were thus one. The idea of this reciprocal action and reaction was fostered with pride; and, under this idea, the warlike onset of Highlanders, as stimulated by resentment and cemented by sympathy from blood, was impetuous as a torrent from the mountain,—not to be resisted by common means of defence. Besides the cause now alluded to, the tones of the bag-pipe,—a musical instrument peculiar to the Highlanders of Scotland, were singularly powerful in rousing and in supporting courage in the conflict of battle. There are tones in the bag-pipe which penetrate to the inmost fibres of the frame, and rivet, so to speak, the whole action of the soul to one point: it is thus that a charge to battle, sounded *in pibroch*, absorbs all the distracting cares and selfish sensibilities denominated fears, inflames the courage to enthusiasm, and renders a common man a hero. The sound of the instrument transports the Highlander with joy in common circumstances; it renders him insensible to danger in the conflicts of war.

The Highlanders of Scotland, who are differently dressed, differently armed, and speak a different language from the inhabitants of the low country, have some striking peculiarities in their character.

Their origin is obscure ; and their history, until recent times, is only known in their own traditionary songs. The form of dress, and the distinction of colours in the dress of the different clans indicate something beyond savage life, something of arrangement which marks the reflecting and analyzing mind. The arms, armour and mode of warlike attack are peculiar. The arms and armour are well contrived for execution or defence, the mode of applying them impressive—almost irresistible. The language of the Highlanders and of the Irish has the same base ; the Welch is only remotely allied with it. The proper elucidation of the subject is beyond the author's power of explanation ; but he thinks it not improbable, from dissimilarity, or only contingent resemblance with the Welch, that the Gaelic or Erse, as now spoken, is a language of invaders, not the Celtic or language of the aboriginal inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland. The supposition is arbitrary ; but it is supported by arguments which are not without weight. The inequality in size, the difference in form and configuration among the different members of the same nominal clan, render it more than probable that the west Highlands of Scotland received, at a remote but unascertained period, a body of foreigners who, rendering themselves lords of the soil by force of arms, absorbed the aboriginal inhabitants into their mass, and, in the course of time honoured them with their own name, and perhaps their own language. The clan is different in itself. One part is military *par excellence*—with the true mien of a soldier ; the other is shrewd, intelligent of things which fall under its eye, penetrating, by a second sight as it were, into the interior of men and things ; and thus adroit in espionage or deception, particularly such as is practised in partizan war. Some of the Highlanders are tall and erect, of great muscular power, of a dignified and majestic air,—the elite as it were, of the Gothic race ; the greater number are of comparatively low sta-

ture, compact and firmly knit in their joints, hardy in bodily frame, without grace or elegance in manner and movement, but of great endurance of fatigue and hard living. The countenance of the higher class of Highlanders is, for the most part, strongly marked as a war-like countenance; the face is broad, the cheek bones high, the visage manly—stern rather than comely. The features are often harsh, and the skin is coarse, as much exposed to weather. But though the Highlander, gentleman or gilly, be not so smooth, plump and polished as his southern neighbour, the ensemble of the figure commands attention and indicates character. The limbs of the Highlander are strong and sinewy, the frame hardy, and of great physical power in proportion to size. He endures cold, hunger and fatigue with patience; in other words, he has an elasticity or pride of mind which does not feel, or which refuses to complain of hardship. The air of the gentleman is ordinarily majestic; the air and gait of the gilly is not graceful. He walks with a bended knee, and does not walk with grace, but his movement has energy; and between walking and trotting, and by an interchange of pace he performs long journeys with facility, particularly on broken and irregular ground, such as he has been accustomed to traverse in his native country.

The Highlander possesses courage in a preeminent degree; and with courage he possesses other qualities which are valuable in war. The qualities alluded to may be supposed to be the product of circumstances, viz. local situation, stage of society, and national institutions which ingraft peculiarities on the habit by long custom. The Highlanders, divided into clans, collected into glens or vallies, and clustered on the banks of streams and rivulets in huts or cottages, are intimately united with one another by circumstances of locality, as well as community of blood. The friendships are warm, even ardent; the enmities and resentments are strong. Objects are

little varied in the circumscribed scene where they dwell, and those which do present make deep impression by frequent repetition. As often repeated, they ingraft a habit on the constitution, which has to a certain extent the power of a law of Nature; and hence the Highlanders of Scotland, born and reared under the circumstances stated, marshalled for action by clans according to ancient usage, led into action by chiefs who possess confidence from an opinion of knowledge; and love from the influence of blood, may be calculated upon as returning victorious, or dying in the grasp of the enemy. Scotch Highlanders have a courage devoted to honour; but they have an impetuosity which, if not well understood and skilfully directed, is liable to commit them to error. The Scotch fight individually as if the cause were their own—not as if it were the cause of a commander only,—and they fight impassioned. Whether training and discipline may bring them in time to the apathy of German soldiers, further experience will determine; but the Highlanders are even now impetuous; and, if they fail to accomplish their object, they cannot be withdrawn from it like those who fight a battle by the job. The object stands in their own view; the eye is fixed upon it; they rush towards it, seize it and proclaim victory with exultation. They are not, as now said, the instruments of a commander. The cause of action, which is prominent in their own minds, determines the course and whets the courage. If the course be hidden from the view by contingency, or guarded from the grasp by unsurmountable obstacle, the movement stagnates; and, as it does not advance, it is disposed to recoil, and does not often recoil by the rule of tactic. The mind becomes blank; the powers are paralysed; the steps retrograde, and sometimes assume the retrograde of flight. This character of ardor belongs to Highland troops. It is a quality in the Highlanders nature; and this being so, it is the duty of the officer who commands an

army or division of Highlanders to study, so as to know and estimate effect, and not, through ignorance, misapply means, or misplace instruments, and thereby concert his own misfortune and the ruin of others. If ardour to close with the enemy be the characteristic of Highlanders, it is evident that Highlanders, as acting with armies, are not troops to be employed in masked manœuvres, demonstrations and encounters with a view to diversion. The suggestion is a rule of common sense; and it is moreover a rule, well founded in the writer's opinion, never to bring Highlanders under fire in the field, where they are precluded by circumstances from extinguishing it by the bayonet. The Highlander does not sustain a distant fire with coolness, or retire with temper from an enterprize to which his front has been turned. He may be trusted to cover a retreat—the most difficult and dangerous, if such duty be assigned to him as a duty of honour and distinction; a retreat, in failure of an enterprize of his own, is likely, under his own management, to degenerate into a route. But though this be true, and sometimes exemplified in history, it may still be observed that, even under failure, a note of the *pibroch*, or a single word that strikes a spring of national feeling, not unfrequently arrests the retrograde, stimulates to forward movement, and infuses an energy into the arm which washes out, in the blood of the enemy, the stain of momentary forgetfulness. The Highlander upon the whole is a soldier of the first quality; but, as already said, he requires to see his object fully, and to come into contact with it in all its extent. He then feels the impression of his duty through a channel which he understands, and he acts consistently in consequence of the impression, that is, in consequence of the impulse of his own internal sentiment, rather than the external impulse of the command of another; for it is often verified in experience that, where the enemy is before the Highlander and nearly in contact with him,

the authority of the officer is in a manner null ; the duty is notwithstanding done, and well done by the impulses of natural instinct.

Different nations have different excellencies, or different defects in their warlike character. Some excel in the use of missile weapons ;—the excellence of the Highlander lies in close combat with the naked point. Close charge was his ancient mode of attack ; and he still charges with more impetuosity, or sustains the charge with more firmness, that is, disputes the ground with more obstinacy than almost any other man in Europe,—presumptively from impressions engrafted on organism by national custom. Some nations, who sustain the distant combat with courage, turn with fear from the countenance of an enraged enemy. The Highlander advances towards his antagonist with ardour ; and, if circumstances permit him to grasp him, as man grasps with man, his courage is assured ; it is less to be depended on in distant annoyance, and it is not altogether proof, at least until recent times, against the threatenings of cavalry and cannon.

The Highlanders are social in private life—convivial even to excess. The enterprizes of war are the more common themes of conversation ; and, as the annals of the clans are full of martial achievement, the conversation rarely languishes. Highlanders are remarkable for a spirit of inquisitiveness ; and they have strong memories of historical events. The language of the peasant Highlander is animated, and impressive as the language of those who possess the poetic mind ;—conversation is in fact a living picture, events long past being often painted in such striking colours as if the painter had himself been present in the scene. Where animal sense is not distracted by the presentation of various and fleeting objects soliciting sensual enjoyment, common impressions make a deep indent, and ideas grow up and acquire strength in correspondence with the cha-

racter of the indent. The Highlanders, who look upon war and the enterprizes of war with interest, seem to acquire instinctive ideas of the military art. The germ of education is scattered every where; and, as the Highlanders have strong minds, and a great desire to learn, they take lessons from what they accidentally hear and see; and they actually attain, in the course of their lives, to a higher scale in military sagacity than any other people in the kingdom, or perhaps than any other peasant people in Europe.

Besides the social habit and military bias conspicuous among the inhabitants of the Highlands of Scotland, the close union of society, which exists in the glens and vallies, encourages a close and intimate love between the sexes. Love was a comparatively pure sentiment in the early or pastoral age; it was ardent and romantic, not gross and licentious as the love of mercenary manufacturers or the roving sons of commerce. The name of warlike glory was the leading passion of the Highland youth; hunting the deer, martial music, love and song, and the pleasures of the *shell* were the principal occupations of life. The scene of Highland festivity was simple; the enjoyment often went to riot or excess; the manner was rude in exterior appearance, the sentiment of the mind was elevated and often refined. The different branches of the clan, as united by blood, paid a submissive devotion to the chief. The chief, as a patriarch, regarded the remoter branches of the clan as parts of himself; and on this ground, he held the whole together by the bond of affection, not less than by the constraint of authority. The population of the Highlands of Scotland consisted at one time of independent tribes. The ideal interest of the tribes often clashed. Feuds arose; war was the consequence of feud, and the Highlands were thus a scene of blood on too many occasions. The Scotch Highlanders are brave individually, and the clan is intimately united with itself; but, as different clans are

jealous of each other, it is not easy to assure a joint and cordial cooperation in enterprizes that are of complicated execution. The rebellion of the year 1745, which was the greatest affair the Highlanders ever undertook, and the most important that a people could be supposed to undertake, appears to have been defeated by the jealousies and insulated views of the chiefs of different tribes. The enterprize was hazardous in itself. It was exposed to numerous causes of counteraction; and it was not shielded by that prominent force of character in the leader which sinks individual interests in a general object. The prince had many amiable traits of character as a gentleman; but he was neither a general nor a hero in the field, and he was particularly deficient in that impenetrability of mind which is indispensable to the chief of a desperate undertaking.

The Highlanders were considered, in relation to their southern neighbours, as freebooters given to spoil and plunder; and the charge had some appearance of truth at one period of their history. The Lowlanders were held by them in the light of hostile people; and it was not comprehended in the creed of the Highlanders, more than it was comprehended in the creed of other people in Europe at the time, to abstain from the property of those whom they regard as their enemies, or only as equivocal friends. They levied contributions on the Lowlands on some occasions, and they committed outrages on others; but, though they did this in cases that were not always justifiable, even according to the constitution of civil society at the time, their conduct in the year 1745 proves very distinctly that they are neither a ferocious nor a cruel people. No troops ever, perhaps, traversed a country which might be deemed hostile, leaving so few traces of outrage behind them as were left by the Highlanders in the year 1745. They are better known at the present time than they were then, and they are known to be eminent for honesty and fidelity

where confidence is given to them. They possess exalted notions of honour, warm friendships and much national pride. Their ideas are comparatively few, but their conceptions are correct; and certain classes of them have a sagacity and penetration in things connected with war, which exceeds the common measure of sagacity among most other nations. The sentiment of the Highlander is strong;—it is a principle as it were in the constitution of his nature. He may be said to have a patriarchal education, and he is attached to kingly power with a blind devotion. He is repugnant from republicanism; in short, he is a soldier who looks to a chief, not a philosopher who considers the sons of man as equal in condition to one another.

IRISH.

A CONSIDERABLE part of the materials of the British army is drawn from Ireland; and, as the Catholic subjects of Ireland are not yet admitted to the privileges of what may be called citizenship, the Catholic soldier is not unjustly considered as a foreigner in the British service. As a foreigner, or rather as a degraded subject, he cannot be supposed to possess a national incentive to acts of enterprise, such as may be thought to stimulate others to a course of heroic conduct. The Irish soldier, while he has not the same incentive as the English and Scotch, has not the same chance of obtaining praise for the feats which he may perform;—his glory is absorbed and sunk, as may be said, in the mass of the British army of which he forms a part. He thus enters the service under less advantageous

circumstances than other recruits ; and, as he has more eccentricity, and more caprice of character than the natives of Great Britain, more knowledge of human nature is required to penetrate into the motive which moves his mind, commands his affections and brings his power into action with effect. Such good fortune rarely falls to his lot ; and hence his services are rarely turned to the best account. It may be said with safety that the Irish soldier does not, as things now are, rise to his proper station in the British service. He is secondary as it were in the military instrument,—his constitutional qualities, it is presumed, entitle him to a better introduction.—The Irish brigade obtained a high character in the service of France in the time of the French monarchy ; and, even in the present time, there is perhaps no regiment which has a higher reputation than the 27th (Inniskilling), which is one of the purest Irish regiments in the British line. Other Irish regiments have obtained reputation for brilliant acts in the field, the 27th has uniformly maintained a high military name in all its history, varied as its service has been.

The nations, who at present inhabit the continent and islands in the European seas, seem to consist of different castes of original people variously mixed and amalgamated with one another in the course of many ages. The difference of original blood is distinctly marked in Ireland. Notwithstanding the intermixture which has arisen from invasion, conquest and colonization, two classes of Irish are still distinguishable from each other by the form of the body, and, more or less, by the features of the mind. The aboriginal stock abounds in the south and west. The physical form, the mental character and the ordinary costume of dress very much resemble the figure, character and dress of what seems to constitute the base of the population of Spain. This portion of the Irish is rather under than above the middle standard of height of European peasantry, except the peasantry

of France, Portugal and Wales. The head is small in proportion to the rest of the body, but it is well and gracefully formed,—such as might be supposed by craniologists to indicate intelligence. The eye is small, sometimes blue, often grey—quick in its motions, unsteady and difficultly fixed to its object. The hair is usually black; the features are small, and somewhat sharp; the complexion is swarthy; the skin coarse; the neck thick; the chest full and expanded; the shoulders broad comparatively, the trunk compact, the thighs thick and fleshy, the legs clumsy, the ankle foul, &c.—The expression of countenance is peculiar. It is not open and blunt as the countenance of an Englishman, nor steady and sedate as that of a Scotchman:—it is the countenance of an humourist. Often overcast and not easily read, it indicates archness, or something like ridicule at human life. It is often difficult to trace this aboriginal peasant in his course; but, though difficult to be traced as under a disguise of eccentric acts, he notwithstanding has a course—a purpose and often a deep one. The class alluded to constitutes the depressed and most numerous of the Irish peasantry. There is another part of the population different in external form, and perhaps somewhat different in internal character, which appears to have been sovereign at the invasion and conquest of the English, and which we may suppose to have been itself invader, that requires to be noticed in this place. The origin and history of it cannot be ascertained with certainty. It has evidently corporeal resemblance and common language with the tribes who invaded, and established themselves in the sovereignty of the isles and west Highlands of Scotland at a period, not very remote perhaps, but not distinctly known. The individuals of it are generally tall and strong, fleshy and rather clumsy, powerful in desultory action,—not remarkable for endurance of toil. The thighs are fleshy, the legs thick at the ankle.—The figure is cast in a large mould, but it is

not of the finest proportions.—The descendants of English conquerors and Scotch manufacturers are numerous in Ireland. They retain the properties of their original ; and, in so far as respects capacity, they do not seem to have degenerated by transportation to the new soil.

The whole of the Irish, whether aboriginal, early or recent conquerors or colonists, have something in physical constitution and mental disposition which savours of Ireland. They are upon the whole good materials for the composition of armies ;—and if they be well understood and skilfully put together, they are among the best in Europe. They are not inferior in exertion, at least in desultory exertion to either English or Scotch ;—and they rarely fail in courage ;—but they are apparently capricious and not easily managed. In running, wrestling and leaping ; in short, in the whole round of athletic exercises, they claim superiority over their fellow subjects, for, as they are little given to the pursuits of trade and manufacture, they pass their idle hours in ball playing, contests of speed and agility, and such other sports of pas-time as excite the activity of the limbs, and augment their power. Such exercises are preparatory of the condition which fits men for war ; and, as the Irish spend much time in exercises of this kind, they may be fairly supposed to attain a balance of advantages over either English or Scotch,—decidedly over manufacturers and artizans in either nation.

The Irish peasant lives on the coarsest fare at his native home, and, thus being fed plainly and poorly in early youth, he rarely complains of hardships where there is little choice of viands. He is ordinarily loosely and badly clothed, and otherwise much exposed to weather in his native bogs ; it may therefore be presumed that he will suffer little comparatively from similar exposure in the service of the campaign—and it is so in fact. Ireland is a damp and drizzling climate ;

and, as might be expected, the Irish peasant lives with impunity in an atmosphere that would not be safe to the native of a dry soil. In a word, the Irish soldier, as accustomed to homely fare and rude accommodation from his infancy, rarely complains of the hardships which disgust the luxurious; and he rarely suffers from causes which grievously afflict the health of those who have been delicately fed and tenderly nursed in the early part of life:—on this account, the Irishman possesses a large share of constitutional advantages for the practice of war.

The bodily powers of the Irish soldier stand high on a scale of comparison with others. But, though high, they are less available and less calculable than those of the well trained English; less firm and less durable than those of the ordinary Scot, particularly the Highlander. The act of the Irish is often energetic, but it is not steady; and, as an act of impulse, it is not possible to calculate it with precision. The inhabitants of Ireland, as observed above, appear to be of two original castes, exclusive of the descendants of the comparatively recent English conquerors and Scotch colonists. The Irish speak a peculiar language, whether the language of the aboriginal, or the language imported by tribes of freebooters who invaded Ireland, conquered and usurped the sovereignty of the soil at a comparatively recent date, is not easily ascertained. But, though the origin be doubtful, the language exists; and, being from the same root, indeed the same language as that of the West Highlands of Scotland, the presumption is strong that those, who held the sovereignty of Ireland prior to the English invasion, were of the same race of people as those who at that time held the sovereignty of the West Highlands. Whether the warlike and domestic character was then the same in both, is matter of conjecture only; it is now visibly different. The native Irish, particularly those who are properly considered as

aboriginal, are, in appearance, the playthings of impulse on sense. They are moved to enterprize by sudden impression; and they appear to abandon it, or move to another enterprize by the collision of another impulse. The perception of the Irish is acute; but, where there is not a strong and an ostensible object to which the act tends and by which it is regulated, the conduct is uncertain and apparently capricious. To this, the Highlander of Scotland, who is firm and determined in all his undertakings, presents a contrast. The fact is undeniable, and the cause of it may probably be thus explained. Clanship existed, and operated strongly on morals and manners in the Highlands of Scotland prior to the year 1745; and, as the name, or reputation of a clan was the polar star by which the conduct of the meanest member of the clan was directed, prior to that time, the acts of the Highlander were uniform and consistent as compared with the acts of most other people. The sovereignty of Irish chiefs was annihilated by the English conquest; and, if ever the Irish had the same attachment to family name and family character as the Highlanders of Scotland, it was lost when they became the vassals of the King of England:—they then ceased to be a nation. The aboriginals of Ireland possess a ticklish organism, which acts well and consistently as touched by a commanding cause; but the act is of little dependence, unless where it moves under the touch of a strong impression:—it flies off at a tangent to new solicitation, wherever the impression is weakened or withdrawn. The native of Ireland, particularly the primitive class, has an acute sense and ready susceptibility of impression; and hence it is that the Irish recruit learns military exercises and military manœuvres more aptly than either English or Scotch. He learns sooner, but he also sooner forgets, or rather requires to be always at the school.

The apparent inconsistency of the native Irish embarrasses those who attempt to analyze conduct, and to account for human action on a basis of reasoning. The Irishman possesses, as already said, an acute sense of feeling, and he appears for the most part to act unreflectingly in obedience to that feeling. The nature of the cause, which impels to action, changes through a multitude of contingencies, and the aspect of the act changes in correspondence with change in the nature of the impulse. This is apparently the case with the mass of the Irish. They appear to be capricious; they notwithstanding, under a mask of levity and thoughtlessness, conceal on some occasions a purpose of deep design, a fact which has tended to affix upon them an imputation of disguise, cunning and systematic deception. The imputation is not perhaps altogether unfounded; but, if founded, it is not altogether difficult to see in what manner it has been produced. The Irish nation does not at present possess the disposal of itself in its political relations; it cannot therefore, as not master of itself, possess that pride of mind which belongs to freedom, and which is alone capable of giving consistency and dignity to human conduct in the various contingencies of life. The Irish Catholic, dispossessed of paternal inheritance by violence, ruled by conquerors who reside in a foreign land, not even admitted to participation of civil and religious rights on an equal condition with other subjects of the realm, of which they are said to be a part, are degraded, in a manner enslaved, and cannot, perhaps, refrain from thinking that they are treated unjustly. Impressed in this manner by a sense of wrong, and not capable, in want of union, to obtain redress by the open exertion of force, life becomes a brute life, or its activity, in order to effect a purpose, strikes into channels of snare and circumvention. It is a law of Nature that, if the straight course be obstructed, a devious course arises as a consequence of the

obstruction. This secondary necessity, as it may be called, models the form of the Irish character. The Irish peasants flock to the army in time of war. They are comparatively idle at their native homes. The mind may be said to be always afloat, and to have a natural propensity to a fray, whether it be with clubs or cannon. Attracted by the sound of the recruiting drum, and allured by bounties or high bribes of money, they enroll themselves for military service—apparently with little thought or reflection. They are not niggardly of money when they have it; they are as eager to get it as any people in Europe. They enlist in thoughtlessness, in want of bread, or as tempted by a high bounty. They are naturally acute observers; and they observe, in their experience, that certain bodily inabilities assure rejection from the military ranks. They tire of the service; and, not taught by their moral instructors that there is crime in fabricating a cause, where a purpose is to be obtained by the fabrication, they endeavour, through much complication of art, to inflict such bodily disabilities upon themselves as, by imposing on ignorance and credulity, assure their rejection from the lists of the army. They are rejected, regain health, or conceal defects which bar admission into the army, present themselves to a recruiting officer in a distant part of the country, receive another bounty, practise another experiment to compass another rejection, or declare the existence of a concealed bodily infirmity which positively renders them unfit for military life. This round of deception was practised to great extent in the war 1793; and experiments of this kind were so often repeated by the same person that many, had they been as economical of the money which they obtained, as they were adroit in the manner of obtaining it, might have realized a competence by the repeated sale of the carcase.

It is somewhat curious, and may perhaps be deemed a problem in

the history of the human mind, that the Irish peasant, apparently unthinking, and acting in ordinary circumstances by immediate impulse upon sense, should, notwithstanding his apparent instability, pursue plans of deep design through a long series of adventures; or that a people, so lightly affected, and acting so capriciously in the common affairs of life as the Irish are known to do, should persevere in pursuing the phantom of emancipation, through a series of years, and against a barrier of obstacles contrived by a people instructed in all the arts of politicians, and supported in the enforcement of them by an army of soldiers. The scheme of desertion and reenlistment, so much practised by the Irish, arises from an unjust desire of gain. Recruiting for the army is considered as a Government job; and the Irish, as well as other good subjects of the realm, employ their wits to take advantage of the oversights and ignorances of the Government. The Irish peasant does not view Great Britain in the light of a parent, and does not enlist in its service from a feeling of pure patriotism. He believes it to be no crime, at least a venial crime, to dispose of himself as often and to as good advantage as he can; while the recruiting officer, eager to add to the numbers of his list, is not always sufficiently cautious in examining the conditions and character of the subjects whom he ventures to engage. The wits are at work on both sides; and the acuteness of the rude unlettered peasant not unfrequently overmatches the caution of the accomplished English gentleman. An unsound recruit is admitted on the list: he receives bounty, discovers his blemish and obtains his discharge. In other cases, a professed trafficker in deception, presents himself to a young officer, makes a bargain, receives a bounty, clothing, &c. proceeds to the head quarters of the corps, passes muster and takes an early opportunity to walk off with his spoil, in the design of making a similar experiment at a distant place. This practice was carried to

great extent at one time. But besides this, which marks an unprincipled and hazardous species of gaming at a great risk of life and with a certain loss of honour, the Irish soldier has at all times a propensity to leave his colours on slight pretexts, and often without pretext of any kind. He seems to do it in vacuity of mind, or in want of a cause of force to fix his attention to his duty. He rarely does it on the eve of battle, or where there is a direct object before him. This was strongly exemplified at Camden in South Carolina in the American revolutionary war, in an Irish corps composed of deserters, and so notorious for desertion that its ranks were scarcely ever the same at the morning and evening parade. The commander of the post, who was the colonel of the corps, aware of the causes which act on the mind of his countrymen, made it known to them that it was his intention to attack the enemy next day at noon. Not a man moved from the garrison in the night. They were drawn out and carried to the attack next day according to promise: they assailed the enemy with vigour and drove him from his post. This fact proves, among many others, that the Irish soldier has a mind and a strong one, when the commander takes the trouble to touch the spring which moves it and keeps it in motion. The Catholic Irish soldier has prejudices in religion. He seems often to disregard the obligation of an oath; but in such case, the oath, it is believed, has been made upon the bible, not upon the cross: the one is a sacred symbol which he reverences; the other is a book which he cannot read, and of which he knows little.

The Irish peasant is, or believes himself to be oppressed by the hand of power. He sighs after emancipation, and never perhaps discards it from his mind. He has some resemblance to the Spaniard in concealing his resentment. He does not blot it out; and, in this concealment, he discovers much address, and in his acts much of

boyish mischief. The causes of irritation are numerous. The mansions which belonged to his fathers are still before his eye. Disinherited by violence, he lives in a hovel at the gates of his paternal castle. He feels what he is; the scene before him reminds him of what he might have been, viz. a lord and master, instead of a starving and almost houseless vassal. He conceives himself to be injured, and, possessing a susceptible organism, he is now and then moved to rebel. This spirit of resentment and tendency to revolt is sometimes higher, sometimes lower: it has been lulled for a time; it has never been at rest, and it cannot be expected to be at rest, or entirely eradicated until a revolution be effected in the manners of the people by the introduction of new habits, the accomplishment of which will be a difficult task, implying a deeper view of human nature than falls within the sphere of common statesmen. The art of working moral reformation is not easy in itself; and, when attempted, it is too often counteracted by the very engines which are employed to carry it into execution. It is the example, not the injunctive precept of those who are in high official stations, that operates on the moral character of nations; and, as man is an animal of imitation, and endeavours to imitate what is higher than himself, it would be extravagant to expect that he should be frugal, chaste and just in principle, while his master is prodigal, profligate and usurping. Conquest, or usurpation over the persons and property of independent people, is an aggression on the fundamental principles of moral law. Wherever it is introduced, the spirit of it expands, and the act tyrannizes to extremity. The trade of conquest for the love of mankind, though imposed on the ears of the people by venal orators as a merit, is a mockery of common sense. The consequence of conquest, for whatever cause it may have been undertaken, is exaction upon exaction by every petty

member of the band, and degradation of the conquered to the lowest condition of human degradation. It is customary with those in power, and with those who are ranked in what are called the higher classes of society, to declaim at the vices and bad habits of the vulgar people without being aware perhaps, that in doing so they censure themselves. The conduct of the Government is a moral mirror to the nation; and, if the history of mankind be examined without prejudice, the mass of the people will be found to be imitators of its acts, whether in virtue or in vice. The vices may be disguised; but the radical principle obtains throughout, and influences the general act. The Irish are a conquered people; and it would be vain to expect a higher share of virtue among them than belongs to a conquered people. As soldiers they are brave; but they are uncertain. When intoxicated with liquor,—and it is not a rare occurrence, they are riotous, insubordinate and often in a manner mutinous. They are said to be insidious; but, when this is brought against them, it ought to be recollected that snare is the common resource of those who are oppressed by power. The Irish do not, it is admitted, possess the sentiment which issues from an independent mind, and which gives a consistent character to every one of their acts; but, with all the disadvantages and drawbacks which attach to their condition, they possess a sense of honour and a frank generosity which occasionally produces brilliant acts, and sometimes noble ones.

RECAPITULATION.

THE British army is composed of three nations, viz. English, Scotch and Irish. The leading features in the character of each have been cursorily stated in the preceeding pages, if not in an impressive and

discriminating manner, at least in an impartial one—in so far as the writer's knowledge goes. Of the different parts of the British military force, the English is the most attractive as estimated by beauty of appearance, not the most striking as estimated by utility in the eye of a soldier. It is equal, if not superior in power to either of the others; it is inferior in that species of hardiness which endures the fatigues that are incident to war. As the English peasant is more fully fed, more carefully nursed, and more cautiously guarded against the influences of the weather, in the early part of his life, than the Scotch and Irish, so he is more susceptible of the impression of the causes of disease which arise from the contingences of military service, consequently more sickly on a hard campaign. The English is generally open and manly in character, and, for the most part, sincere and true in his professions. He performs military duty as something bargained for, and he performs it faithfully; but he does not perform it with enthusiasm. He continues, even as a soldier to act under the impression of independence which characterizes the nation; that is, he gives service to a certain extent under a specified condition, but not beyond that extent; nor does he give it without something like earnest of reward. He is not suspicious of fraud being practised on him in regard to his pay and allowances; but he does not, in case of privations, consider causes and reasons with discrimination, so as to be satisfied when the accidents which occur in the field, or elsewhere, preclude a regular supply of provisions and other minor conveniences, which are considered as conditions of the service. He is then almost mutinous, and too ready to leave his colours under this, or similar pretext.—These are defects in the military character of the Englishman; but, with these defects, he may be considered as a good material for the construction of an army, the best perhaps in Europe, certainly the best in the British dominion, in so far as regards the

the operations of systematic war. He is capable of correct mechanical discipline, steady in action, cool in temper, and generous to the conquered;—he rarely sheds the blood of those who throw down their arms.

The *Scot* is shrewd and intelligent, tenacious of his rights, and suspicious that he may not be fairly dealt with in his pecuniary concerns; he is seldom troublesome with complaints relative to the hardships of a hard campaign. He is hardy in physical constitution, eager of enterprize, impetuous in action, more distinguished for close charge with the bayonet than for regular and distant combat with fire arms; and, as he fights under an excitement nearly allied with passion, he is not altogether so merciful to an enemy in the act of route as the soldiers of the English nation. He is true to his oath, rarely deserts his colours; and, at the point of attack, may be considered as the first soldier in Europe. The Scot advances to the enemy with a firm step and a determined eye. When his position is forced by superior power, and the ranks broken by accident, he maintains the combat and fights with firmness and courage, as if he were in close battalion. He bears fire with patience in the siege: he does not bear it with patience in the open field. He is restrained with difficulty from advancing; he is thus liable to commit himself to discomfiture by too great ardour. He is a man of trust for enterprizes in the night, if he have proper information of the design: he is throughout a man of trust, with this reserve that he is eager, some may think too eager to close with the enemy.

The *Irish* nation furnishes the other part of the British army, and, at present perhaps the largest; its conduct in war is a riddle. The Irish soldier has the appearance of being indifferent to danger, careless and without thought of himself. Confusion, like the confusion of a row, seems to be his delight; he often in fact seems a playful

humourist in the face of an enemy, anticipating, as it were, with pleasure the effect of the snares of the military decoy that he conceives to be in preparation for him. He is brave; but his bravery cannot be calculated with certainty. It seems to depend on impulse of circumstances, rather than on a fixed and determined sentiment of the mind; consequently examples of heroism and panic are strangely mixed. The Irish soldier requires that the point of attack be distinctly in his eye; and, in order that his good conduct be calculable, it is required that he be directly under the eye of a rigorous commanding officer; consequently he is not of dependence in night expeditions and night attacks, nor is he of that description of force to which the act of covering a retreat would be safely committed. The case is here stated as it ordinarily is; but it must be observed at the same time that the Irish are capable of discipline, susceptible of the impulse of honour, and as such of dependence as the other parts of the army.

The materials of the British army, collected from three different nations, are classed in corps as chance or circumstances of necessity direct, rather than by nation, or by a rule of systematic arrangement according to constitutional qualities in the parts. Whether such a form of composition be calculated to produce the highest possible military excellence of which man is capable, better judges than the writer must decide;—there are grounds to believe that it might. The probability of the supposition derives proof and illustration from the example of corps, that are purely national, being generally more distinguished for good conduct than corps that are filled promiscuously with materials that are of a character nationally repulsive to each other. The question is of some importance to be studied and known; but it cannot be properly

discussed in this place. The army that is purely national retains a love for its nation, and continues to regard that love as the paramount object of assuming arms. It has the nation in its eye rather than the temporary commander; and, on that account, it is obnoxious to sovereigns in as much as it is a check upon the course to despotism. There are recent proofs in Europe that a national army is patriot; and proofs also that despots dread it.—It remains to be remarked of the British army as now formed that, though it may be reckoned superior to most, if not to every one of the European armies of the present time in the actual conflict of battle, it is inferior in discipline and steady conduct to most of them under discomfiture, or in reverse of fortune. The instances in proof are numerous: two very remarkable ones occurred in Spain during the late peninsular war, viz. the retreat upon Corunna, and the retreat from Burgos. The army was in a manner disorganized in both of them; and the hardships to which it was exposed do not appear to have been such as ought to have disorganized an army, the base of whose discipline was well laid. The fact is recent and precise; and it shews that something is yet wanting in the British military system to form an army of dependence; where circumstances compel it to assume the retrograde, or turn its face from the enemy.

CHAPTER XVII.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTH
AMERICA.

IN estimating the military character of the different nations who have attained a name in the records of history, the people of North America, who, in apparent weakness, revolted against a powerful parent state and finally established independence, claim especial notice in this place. The North Americans, who were colonial—and dependent on Great Britain in the year 1775, are now free and sovereign; and, not only free and sovereign, but rich and powerful. As they have attained to an independent station among nations, they will probably be held by posterity to have achieved that independence by their own military prowess.—Of this there are grounds to doubt. The American success, in looking into it closely, will, it is presumed, be found to have been more owing to bad management on the part of the mother country, than to great exertion on the part of the colony. The opinion is contrary to common opinion; it will therefore be necessary to state the grounds on which it is thought to stand.

The means, employed by the parent state to check the revolt of the American provinces, appear to have been sufficient in quantity, even more than sufficient to have effected the purpose, had they been

applied under the direction of a principle of military science, and rigorously enforced in execution. The means were commanding; but it is not maintained that they were sufficient to have ensured the submission of a people who had resolution to forego connexion with Europe, and to live in freedom beyond the mountains rather than to submit to foreign domination. Great Britain might have made a desert of the inhabited country by the force which she commanded; but it would not, it is presumed, have been necessary to do so. It is not probable that there were many among the Americans who would have left their homes for houseless liberty in the woods. They were not brought to the alternative, for the measures adopted for bringing them to obedience were only half measures, neither possessing consistent rigour nor consistent kindness. Some part of the American people, chiefly those of the Northern provinces, had a spirit of independence, and something like attachment to the soil that had given bread to their persecuted fathers; the majority, particularly those whose ancestors, if not banished from Great Britain for evil deeds, had been adventurers in pursuit of fortune, had little attachment to the country unconnected with its productiveness; and, it was more perhaps in irritation from violence committed on their property by arbitrary taxation, from a prospect of getting rid of British debts, from a spirit of faction among themselves, than from a real desire of independent liberty that the revolt became general and remained united. The Americans talk boastingly at a distance from danger; they are not in general a bold and resolute people when the hand of power grasps them closely. As such, it is not improbable that they would have yielded to fear, had the impression of fear been applied systematically, skilfully and with rigour. That was not done. The threatenings were numerous, but they were vain words; the severities inflicted were few and partial; they irritated; they did not intimidate or disable. The offers of kindness were pro-

fuse; but they were not applied judiciously. They savoured of the coaxing which acts on the simple and childish, rather than of the kindness which gains the heart of the generous and discerning:—they were in fact bribes to gain a purpose. The purpose was seen, and the coaxing did no good; it, on the contrary, appeared to have done harm. Protection was offered, submission followed the offer of protection. The views of the protectors changed; or, protection having been offered without a previous calculation of means to maintain it, the protectors left their positions and left the protected to the mercy of the enemy. This was particularly the case in the Southern provinces, where, by a series of treatment indicating weakness or want of consideration, the desire, which many of the Americans had to be again connected with Great Britain, was finally extinguished.

North America had not, as a colony depending on Great Britain, a regular army at the time of the revolt. It is true that the different provinces had provincial militia, more or less numerous; and it is moreover true that the most of the individuals in the provinces were well acquainted with the use of the firelock. Many of them were expert beyond example with the rifle; but few, if any of them, understood tactic and manœuvre; nor could they be expected to learn it, for American ideas were abhorrent, at that time, from the restraints of military discipline. But, though the people of America were not disciplined, and could not be subjected to that form of mechanical discipline which gives success in systematic war as practised by Europeans, they were almost universally excellent marksmen; and, with this acquirement, they were prepared for that desultory and irregular mode of warfare which was best suited to the defence of such a country as America then was. There were no restrictions in America against killing game; and, as the pursuit of game is pass-

time, or amusement in most countries, the American peasantry spent their idle hours in shooting birds, or hunting deer, &c. They became acquainted, through these means, with the nature of ground; and they were thus initiated, to a certain extent, in partizan war. The Americans were novices in mechanical tactic and field evolutions when they first took to arms; and, as unpractised in the field, and not constitutionally of the most daring courage, they had little confidence in themselves, unless when they were placed under cover in a secure position,—they were then the most expert of marksmen. They did not, with all the pains they bestowed upon the subject, acquire equal celerity in firing, and equal precision in firing in time as the trained battalions of Europe; but they fired with better direction than any of them, and were of course their superiors in the work of destruction. Though not daring, they were not without courage; but it was a courage of circumstance. They supported the direct combat, front to front, with as much resolution as most; they moved off precipitately when the flanks were turned, when the design of turning them was discovered, or when close attack by the bayonet was threatened in front.—This seemed to the writer to be the leading feature of the American military character during the revolutionary war; and, as it is in some measure a feature of circumstance, it is reasonable to believe that it resulted from habits engendered by mode of life. The value of the American people as soldiers consists in skill in the use of fire-arms, and that skill arises presumptively from the practice of firing at birds and wild beasts in the numerous rivers, ponds and woods of an extensive continent. Accustomed to circumvent and to shoot from behind cover, the Americans were themselves afraid of being circumvented; and, impressed perhaps with the idea of circumvention, they moved off precipitately at the appearance of suspicious manœuvres being practised against them:—they had not

as a soldier ought to have, a face for flank and rear. The prey, which the Americans were accustomed to pursue being a timid prey,—to be entrapped rather than combatted by force; courage to face the enemy boldly was not acquired by the exercise of hunting; it was rather perhaps diminished by the habit of caution, resulting from the practice of circumvention.

If the military merit of the American people, as it appeared during the revolutionary war, be estimated fairly, it does not stand high, even in partizan war. The Americans were soldiers from necessity—not from genius or inclination. They did not proceed to the combat with a mind inflamed with ideas of national glory. They had little of military enterprize in the constitution originally; and they made little scientific progress in the military art during the continuance of the contest. They advanced boldly to action in several instances; they maintained no combat obstinately. The cover of a bank, a tree or a fence was necessary to give them confidence to look at their antagonist. They exercised the firelock with effect while they were under cover; they retired when the enemy approached near, that is, they split and squandered, according to the cant phrase, to rally at an assigned point in the rear.

The Americans, who were colonists under the protection of Great Britain, revolted and declared war without a regular organized military force to support their pretensions, with few persons capable of putting troops into common military form, and with no one, within the union, who had experience in conducting an army in the field. Some persons on British half-pay, who had settled in America at the termination of the war 1756, joined the standard of revolt, and obtained rank and command in the new army. Of these Gates, Lee and Montgomery were the most distinguished. Montgomery was considered as a brave and gallant man, with something of the hero in his character. He

fell at an early period of the war in the attack on Quebec. Lee was a man of some learning, wit and humour; and, in so far as opinion can be formed from reports of his conduct in the year 1756, he was not without military talent. He was ambitious of power, capricious in temper, and disposed to despise the people in whose cause he had engaged to fight.—Gates was an amiable man; but he was a man of common abilities only. He commanded the troops to which General Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga. He obtained reputation in consequence; but subsequently defeated at Camden by Lord Cornwallis,—he lost it and remained afterwards in retirement.

General Washington was a native American, born in the province of Virginia, of which he was at one time the Surveyor-General. He was commander of a corps of militia, and was employed occasionally in the service that was allotted to militia in the war 1756. He was present with General Braddock in his unfortunate expedition, and evinced some military talent on that occasion; at least he gave proofs of good sense and discernment, to which his General did not, to his own misfortune and the misfortune of others, sufficiently attend. His reputation stood high with his countrymen on that account; and, in consequence of his general respectability, and the opinion which was entertained of his military knowledge, he was appointed to the chief command of the army of the revolted provinces. He appears to have been a prudent and sagacious man, patient in labour and patriotic in spirit. The wisdom, which he displayed in keeping the Americans together under the difficulties by which they were frequently pressed, was more conspicuous than the force of his military genius in the field. He did much, as much perhaps with the means that were in his hands, as any man could have done; more it is believed than many would have done. He was more than a common man; and, without being biassed in favour of Americans,

we are warranted to say that General Washington, with the exception of a transatlantic blemish, viz. that man is not bound to his word, &c. beyond what is useful, or expedient in a worldly point of view, would have passed into the page of history for a most respectable, even for a great man. The capitulation which he signed at Great Meadows in the year 1755, in which there was a charge of assassination laid against him, appears to the writer to tarnish his character as a man and a soldier; and the attempt to violate the capitulation of York-town, by threatening to hang Captain Asgil, a person under the guarantee of that capitulation and who had committed no crime, diminishes the respect with which an unbiassed individual is otherwise disposed to regard him. If it be argued that he threatened, only with a view to enforce redress from the British commander-in-chief for an irregularity which had been committed at New York, he was most unfortunate in fixing on the subject of a capitulation, for whose safety his own honour and the honour of his nation was pledged.

Green, another of the American generals who became conspicuous in the southern provinces towards the close of the war, was also a native of the country. He was a man of good character in private life,—and he was peculiar in his military history. General Green cannot be said to have ever decidedly gained a field of battle; the event of every action which he fought was notwithstanding a victory to him. He advanced confidently to the field in most cases; he did not act confidently in the conflict in any, whether owing to his own timidity under fire, or to the timidity of the troops which he commanded, the writer does not venture to pronounce. He retired in some instances where victory was actually in his hands; but, though he retired thus inconsiderately, or as it were in ignorance of the real state of things, he rallied rapidly in most, and again advanced with a good countenance. He was repulsed, or rather left the field abruptly at

Guildford Court-house, at Camden, at Ninety-six, and at the Eutaws. He could not claim a victory at any of them: he reaped the fruits of victory from all of them.

General Arnold, another of the American Generals was, a native of America, and a man of genius in the true sense of the word. He had more military talent than perhaps any one who appeared on the military theatre in the revolutionary war, on either side. He went over to the British for a sum of money; and his treachery tarnished his character in such a manner that his value was obscured, or lost. He was sent to Virginia by the British General with a small force. He did something; and the preparations, which he had made for doing more, shewed clearly what he was capable of doing, if his genius had been left to its own scope. He was a man at all points; his power was within himself.—By his coolness and decision, he rendered the British good service in the war 1793 in their disaster at Guadaloupe, where he happened to be by accident on a trading speculation; for General Arnold was every thing, and capable of almost every thing—as Huckster, Horse-dealer, or General he was original.

The people of North America revolted from the mother country, and established their independence after a contest of about seven years duration. As free and independent, they assumed the character of a new people; and as a new people, looking at the human race with the eye of philosophy, they discovered that it has one common origin, and is destined to move on one common base. They considered men as fellows, without other eminence than what is derived from talent, and without other authority than what is given for executing the duties of official stations. The Americans, when emancipated from the chains of the mother country, considered it to be the first step in their proceeding to digest a system of law for their government as a free and independent people. The author does not pretend

to maintain that the law, or constitution which they formed is perfect in all things ; but he thinks he may say it adheres more closely to the constitution of man's nature than any other constitution now in operation in Europe ; it must therefore be supposed to be deserving of every man's attention. The American constitution has a somewhat similar basis with what is called the British constitution, in so far as respects the liberty of the subject and the general forms of legislation. The principle is professed republicanism ; but not universal republicanism, for the possession of property is the condition which admits the individual to be a part in the state. This is not a true condition ; for the good man may be without property, and the rich man without virtue ; but, as the mass of the American people have property, the corruptive tendency of the principle has not as yet been injurious to any extent:—the chief of the executive is temporary, and has no absurd privileges during his presidency.

The Americans are active and enterprising as speculators, rather than patient and industrious as labourers. Some of the agriculturists are moderate, frugal, and contented with the product of the labour of their own hands ; the majority are speculative, enterprising, eager in the pursuit of gain ; and though professing to be free, not scrupulous in making gain by the labour of slaves. Slavery existed in colonial America. It was not done away generally when America became independent ; consequently American liberty, like liberty in other parts of the civilized world, is only a combination, among those who have property, power and enterprize, to apply to their purposes the persons of those who are destitute, weak and indolent. The agricultural, fishing and hunting occupation of the Americans was primary ; the commercial, as it necessarily must be, was secondary. The American hunters, fishers, and explorers of new regions, with a view to traffic, were numerous and adventurous. If not scientific navigators, they are

bold and skilful seamen. Possessed of good natural sense,—they are diligent observers of what comes under the eye, and, as unprejudiced, they make just observations on what they see. The peasant is inquisitive; and, as not fettered by the prejudices of education, he looks at things as a man of common sense, and makes his conclusions, as it may be said, with his own judgment. The American was dependent as a colonist, consequently inferior; he became sovereign by a contest in arms; and, as such, he assumed a place among sovereign nations. He formed a constitutional system of law according to his own view of right or expediency; and under that system, faulty as the execution is in many points, particularly in the looseness or chicanery of common law, he made more progress towards improvement in a shorter time than perhaps any other nation in the records of history. The writer had the opportunity of seeing the Americans in the revolutionary war, secondly, in the year 1798, and lastly in the year 1815; and, in so far as he could judge from what he saw, the Americans had improved greatly during that time, both in manners and morals. The American peasantry, contiguous to the sea coast from Charlestown to New York, are the best informed peasantry that any inhabited part of the globe, which he has seen, contains. The Americans do not often exhibit examples of the first rate genius and fine taste. They have little of the courtier manner; but they are not rude in the true sense of the word. They pursue science, collect information, and are well informed generally of what is useful in common life. They have a disposition to oratory or declamation, rather than to rigorous reasoning; they are thus more specious than deep. This may be said with truth; they have their merits notwithstanding. They have applied the discoveries of science to the useful arts on a grand scale, and with more success than any other known people. They are, as new people, near to the root of common sense, and have thus

a good chance of acting wisely. The construction of steam vessels, and the construction of ships of war place the Americans on an envious eminence. The ships of war are without parallel in perfection: they are products of common sense, rather than imitations of European naval architecture. The person who built the Franklin (74) had never seen a war ship of higher rate than frigate, and there is nothing in the British navy to be compared with the Franklin, whether we regard the formidableness of the battery, or the connexion and harmony of the parts combined in the structure.

The people of North America were adventurous speculators as colonist, they are restless and bold speculators as sovereign and independent. They open new grounds for agricultural pursuits often at a venture; and they extend their trade by sea in all directions. They were industrious in their early days, and they became rich; and, as a consequence of riches, they became arrogant. The population of America multiplied at an astonishing rate after the establishment of independence, and the population thus increased became self-important and overbearing. Confident in their power from number, they went to war with Great Britain in the year 1803 on very slight provocation. They made their attack on the province of Canada, and the lakes were the scene of serious conflicts. The superiority on the lakes and also on the ocean was claimed by the Americans; and it was established to an extent that was not foreseen or expected. It arose evidently from the mode in which the ships were constructed, viz. from the greater concentration of fire, the superior weight of metal and perhaps from superior skill in gunnery—not from superior courage or seamanship of the sailor. The combats were only encounters of single ships; and, though the Americans did not appear to be equal in courage to the British at close quarters, they obtained upon the whole the balance of advantages. This must be admitted; but it is not probable that

there would have been cause to admit it, had the combat been between large fleets at open sea, or had the engagements been yard-arm and yard-arm between individual ships. The American navy is the most perfect navy, in so far as it goes, that has yet been produced by human skill. It may in fact be considered as a model of perfection produced by common sense, rather than artificial science. The army is not entitled to the same praise. It does not seem to have made much, if any progress since the termination of the revolutionary war; nor does it seem probable that it ever will make much. The people of North America are deficient in two qualities that are essential to the formation of military force, viz. the subordination which submits patiently to such forms of moulding and discipline as renders the human race a machine, obedient to the will of a general to whatever point it may be directed, or to whatever purpose it may be applied; or, secondly, the ardent love of country, which, rising to enthusiasm, produces acts of individual heroism beyond the calculations of tacticians, and superior to the acts of mere mechanism. The Americans claim liberty and independence as the abstract right of man,—and do not submit to the first; they have no attachment to the country, analogous to the attachment of aboriginal people,—and are little susceptible of the second.

The Americans made an attack upon the province of Canada in the year 1813; and, from the preponderating force which they might have been supposed to be capable of bringing to bear upon it, they might have been expected to carry it without difficulty. They failed—from want of skill, want of courage, or want of union and cordiality. The first expeditions were badly conducted,—committed to destruction by mismanagement, or something worse. The sick list of a force of 2500 men amounted to 1800. The form of the sickness was gangrenous; such as, in the opinion of the chief medical officer, was

occasioned by damaged grain and other damaged provisions. The expedition, paralysed by this extraordinary sickness, came to nothing; and this extraordinary sickness, according to report, was occasioned by the villainy of commissaries or contractors, who sold the sound provisions to the enemy, and fed the troops with damaged grain and putrid beef. This was said to be the cause of the failure; but independently of this, the General was not a proper man. A General of more ability was appointed to his place; and under the impulse which the new General gave to the American spirit, the Canadian army fought with a determination and vigour, at Chippawa and Fort Erie, that would have done credit to the best troops in Europe. The exertion was a forced one, produced by a General of spirit and resolution; but it was relatively a successful one. The defence of the capital, when attacked by a detachment of the British army in the year 1814, was feeble and ill concerted. The design does no credit to the British government; but the attack shews, among other things, that the Americans are not in themselves a patriotic and a military people. A motive of strong force, applied with skill, is necessary to induce them to do their duty like men:—this was seen at New Orleans. The British fleet and army made its appearance in the Mississippi; and, as the armament was formidable and apparently well conducted, the inhabitants, according to report, were ready to compound for the safety of their property. The General, who commanded at New Orleans was a man of promptitude and decision,—not inferior in energy of execution to any General of his time. He was imperious and peremptory; and he gave the people to understand that, though he had not force adequate to the defence of the post without their assistance, he had force to burn it in spite of them,—and that he would do it. They knew him to be a man who did not threaten vainly; and, as they found that they could not save their

cotton bags without fighting, they made a virtue of necessity, formed them into bulwarks, and under cover of their merchandize repulsed the British with the greatest slaughter, in the shortest time, that stands on record in any scene that occurred in the late war. The determination to resist, with a comparatively weak force, was an act of resolution belonging to the General. The troops, at least the militia had no part of the merit of it; and no merit in the action, except that under cover of the cotton bags and under the eye of a severe and intrepid commander, they used their fire-arms with unparalleled effect. They abandoned an island in the river without adequate resistance;—a proof that they do not fight to desperation where they have option to fly. The threatening eye of the General superintended their conduct at the lines, not at the island,—and the result was different.

CONCLUSION.

THE preceding sketch of the military character of nations, imperfect as it is, offers some important truths on the subject of war and warlike arrangement. The human race, as is obvious to every observer, has one general constitution. It is differently modified in bodily form, and manifests more or less difference in the character and degree of mental capacity; but it is still one in its foundations—from the savage in the woods to the monarch on the throne. Its natural propensities are similar. Its passions, which are propensities in excess, are so modified on many occasions as to give a new face, by coverings of art, to masses of the human creation: this is par-

ticularly conspicuous in those who dedicate themselves to military life.

Action and reaction in reciprocity is the visible cause which indicates the life and maintains the health of the sublunary system. The balance of action, among the individuals of the human race, which is called justice, or, more explicitly, the act of doing unto others as you would that others do unto you, is the base of human morals. Man, it is to be borne in mind, is introduced into the world, the greatest as well as the meanest, in a state of absolute helplessness. He has appetites and desires; he covets and acquires, that is, appropriates. He cannot acquire and appropriate, at least he rarely does acquire and appropriate without encroaching on the sphere of his fellow man; and he does not encroach on his fellow without violating a fundamental law of the Creator of the universe. Man, as repeatedly observed, has an innate desire to extend his sphere and aggrandize his condition. He has, at the same time, an injunction, in the structure of his frame not to overstep a limited boundary. But, while this is so constitutionally, it is also to be observed that the desire, which solicits to exceed, is often stronger than the injunction given to restrain. Where the desire prevails, the barrier of right is broken, and the subsequent course is precipitous and irregular, the termination any thing but happy. If power be acquired through usurpation on the rights of others, an artificial centre of action is planted in the power usurped. The usurpation, as extraneous to the constitution, is deaf to reason and blind to truth. It worships its own greatness, becomes tyrant over the law of the constitution, and endeavours to maintain power, and to exercise tyranny by every means of fraud and force that occurs to vitiated faculties. It is thus that, where the usurper attains a given degree of elevation through art or accident, he rarely fails to prepare an artificial instrument, by means of which he multiplies aggressions,

and maintains the stations he has injuriously assumed. He thus, becomes a robber, under the protection of organized military force.

The Romans, who made extensive conquests, and who maintained their conquests longer than any other people in the records of European history, understood the art of military organization, as well as the application of the force by which conquest is made and assured, better than any others with whom we are acquainted. The form of military training and discipline instituted by this people, and to which the effect alluded to may be considered as due, was such as communicated an interest to the individual who practised it; in as much as the utility of every part of the discipline was obviously and directly within his comprehension; at the same time that it was impressive on his senses as an exercise conducing to his safety. The exercises of the present time have not a similar electrizing effect. The manual, or firelock exercise is executed with mechanical precision and correct correspondence as to the time of the explosions; but, as the utility of precision and correspondence in time is not perceived by the individual himself, there is necessarily little interest in the execution. The execution is a compulsion,—and it is performed mechanically. The soldier is no more than a hinge in a compound instrument; and, as he is not well informed of the principle on which the instrument acts, he can scarcely be supposed to exercise his judgment in modifying the act which he is ordered to perform. If the attainment of superiority in the actual conflict of battle be the object of military training, the temper and energy of the individuals ought, in the just reason of things, to be estimated, so as to be known correctly to the full extent of their value. The exact order of external uniformity, according to which separate parts are arranged in the military fabric in the present time, is in fact only a secondary object in the true meaning of things. Correspondence in power—not uniformity in the *coup d'œil*, is the

base of true military organization: and hence, the tactician is understood to arrange or put together according to radical properties;—not external appearances; and, when that is done, to inure, by discipline, to move correctly, so as to be capable of executing official functions with effect. As it is in the temper of the parts, not in the uniformity of the *coup d'œil*, that the value of the military instrument consists, it is, or ought to be the main object of the scientific tactician, as frequently said, to arrange the parts in the ranks according to power and temper, rather than according to size and external resemblance. But it happens here, as it happens in many other things, that the ingenuity, or rather the presumption of man counteracts his own design. Ignorant, or regardless of the real nature of things, he acts on the information of the eye, and thus gives a garb of order and dressing to the materials of the fabric which detracts from union, vigour and consistency in the execution of function. Hence it is that military education becomes vain, the effect comparatively void, or the reverse of good. Unless order be engrafted on the properties of the material with such care and discernment, that no part of the constitutional power and native spirit be marred or shackled by the artificial arrangement, the instinctive sagacity of the barbarian prevails over the science of the refined tactician. The fact is illustrated by the military history of semibarbarous nations; who, though inferior in military arrangement, in the exterior forms of discipline, and greatly inferior in arms and military apparatus, not unfrequently defeat the armies of scientific, polished and refined masters in the art of war. The examples are numerous in the history of mankind; and even in recent times, the untaught peasantry of the poorer cantons of Switzerland, and of some part of Tyrol gave more trouble to the troops of France than the regular armies of the great monarchs, which were exact in

their movements as a machine of mechanical construction. Great Britain herself can speak to the fact. She sustained greater injury to her military reputation, by the people of the town and district of Buenos Ayres and New Orleans, than from all the regular armies she encountered in the field during the late war.

The energy of spirit which leads to military enterprize is a quality of the early stage of society. It vanishes from nations in proportion as they become polished and refined ; at least, it is not supported in a progressive course, unless by scientific study and a judicious application of such causes as, acting on human organism, maintain the machine in a state of activity to a forward point, prominent in the view of all. The exercises with the firelock, or common drillings of the European infantry, are not of a nature to interest the simple soldier. The purpose of them, as connected with utility, is not fully comprehended by him. He goes to the field as an automaton—to act and to be acted upon by mechanical powers, ignorant of the principle on which he acts, and the purpose for which he is constrained to act. The mind is not interested by routine forms of duty ; and, as it is important to success that the mind should be interested, it is useful, or may be supposed to be useful to endeavour to give a new cast, consequently a new force of impression to military exercises and military forms of evolution, without changing the principles of such practices as are laid on a basis of truth. New modes of military exercise interest the individual by their novelty ; they even not unfrequently communicate an animating energy to the arm of the actor which goes beyond the limits of ordinary calculation : they seldom fail to intimidate the enemy as striking him by surprize. If this be so, it belongs to military genius to change the appearances of things, with a view to animate one part and to intimidate another. But, while this is done, especial care is to be taken that the fundamental principles of

military tactic be not rashly violated. The *Shrapnel* shell, as a means of extending the range of missile force, is an invention of science; and it may be considered as an important one in modifying the character of a military action. The *Congreve* rocket may amuse and may surprize the inexperienced: it is a child's play-thing in the field, rather than an instrument in war:—it may be employed with advantage in sieges. The Polish lance, with which hussars have lately been armed, has had advantage on some occasions as an arm of offence; but it is chiefly to novelty that the unexpected effect is to be ascribed. The broad-sword and target of the Scotch Highlander is perhaps inferior, in a correct estimate of the power of weapons, to the firelock and bayonet; it was notwithstanding formidable, and made a striking impression on British troops in the year 1745. The British soldier was armed in the year 1745 with the firelock and bayonet. He was a trained soldier, and moreover a soldier not unacquainted with the practice of war. The Highlander was rude—and unskilled in military tactic. If he carried a carbine into the field; he did not much rely on it. His chief trust was in the broadsword. It was his national arm, and it was to him a talisman which gave confidence, even an idea of invincibility. With this arm and armour, he discomfited the experienced troops of Great Britain, presumptively through surprize at the unknown mode of attack. The Highlanders, who fought on the continent of Europe and in America in the war 1756, seemed to have acted on the French by a similar form of impression, as they had acted on the British at Preston-pans and Falkirk. Even, so late as the American revolutionary war, the Highlanders, probably from the impression which the peculiarity of dress &c. made upon the peasant militia, were more dreaded than other British soldiers. It is sufficiently proved in history that rude and semibarbarous nations, ill armed and with little of what is called discipline, often discomfit the systematic

armies of scientific tacticians and accomplished Generals. If they do so, they must be supposed to do it by the instinctive impulses of simple nature. The fact is incontestibly proved in history; and, as true, we may adduce in explanation of it that, wherever art usurps dominion, so as to control and constrain the physical powers of nature to move in artificial channels, the fabric produced by such system of force, is weak in itself and easily overturned, whatever may be the speciousness of its outside. The refinements of polished life, which are different modes of desire and appetite assuming superiority, undermine the stability of society. The path of Nature is narrow, simple and direct; the paths of what is called civilization are specious, numerous and devious; but, as deviations from the direct course of Nature, they are errors which lead ultimately to destruction. In all improvements therefore in the processes of human life, military as well as others, the fundamental law of the constitution of things is to be cautiously guarded from violation; for, if the principle of the improvement do not rest on Nature and truth, the superstructure, with all its ornaments of art and beauty, will go to decay as a building the timbers of which are consumed by dry rot.

PART III.

OUTLINE OF TACTIC, OR RUDIMENT OF MILITARY TRAINING.

THE history of mankind presents little to the eye of the philosopher. except a picture of ambitious and inordinate passions, leading to acts of robbery and massacre vulgarly dignified with the name of war. An innate propensity to transgress the bounds of justice, that is, a desire to extend power and usurp dominion over equals, characterises man from other animals. The desire of obtaining something necessary, or supposed to be necessary for human enjoyment, constitutes the ostensible motive of human activity. Without desire life would stagnate, without the influence of a spirit of justice to control its movements, activity would become injurious to others and ultimately destructive to itself. Encroachment on the sphere of others is unjust, in as much as it is the transgression of the law of the Deity, which assigns a limit to the acts of every created thing. The transgression of the limit, as it relates to man with man, is effected by superior force,—simple brute force in one case, force combined with fraud, and organized by intelligence in another. The first is the rude violence of the savage; the latter is the work of civilization.

The art of war, considered as the means of acquiring power, or of preserving power already acquired, stands at the head of human sciences. It is the science of sovereigns; and, where the object of it is legitimate, that is, national protection and defence against unjust aggression, it is a generous and a noble one. It is in all cases a deep one, for it comprehends, within its circle, the supposition of an intimate knowledge of the physical and moral powers of man. As the act is an act of high privilege,—the practice of it reserved for sovereigns and their satellites, a discussion on the principles of the science would here be deemed presumption, the author therefore abstains from touching it, unless in cases where common sense is permitted to speak.

The proper organization of a military instrument, for the purposes of war, requires a correct knowledge of the constituent material both in its physical and moral relations; and, as this knowledge is important and not easily attained, it implies a necessity of studying the subject scientifically and with care. The leader of an army conducts a series of active and skilfully combined operations for the purpose of attaining a military object. As the operation implies a contest between opposing powers; and, as the contest exhibits a trial of skill, the effect indicates the preeminence of one over the other, so as to fix a distinction of relative value. The act of the General, considered as Commander, is supposed to be prompt, but not at random. He does not balance on the field of battle; but he seizes, as it were intuitively, the fit time and place for acting with the promptitude which belongs to genius. Promptitude in the field is what may be called military knowledge. It cannot be learned from books; but it may be matured and systematized by observation and reflection; while the preparation of the instrument through which the purpose is effected is evidently the work of the philosopher, who studies and knows human nature in its

principles. It is from the perfection of the military instrument in its tactical movement that results in war are calculated. Hence an army, correctly organized and animated by social sympathies, often conquers with little aid from the general; a general of genius and ability, sometimes fails in spite of his military skill,—by the mere defect of his instrument. If this be so, it is evident that the organization of military materials on a basis of science, cannot be otherwise than an object of great and essential importance to those who pursue war as a trade, or who cultivate it as science for the protection of themselves and their country against external violence.

An army, which is a military instrument formed with a view to execute a design of general purpose, is, or may be constituted according to two different views; viz. according to the quantity and external form of the animal mass; or, according to the power and temper of the individual parts, as tried and proved by experiment to be suitable. The first is the common mode. Symmetry, or uniformity of *coup d'œil* is the chief object in the tactician's eye. The appearance imposes; but, imposing as it may be, it is not of dependence. The second, (and it is that which is here recommended) does not disregard external symmetry and superficial appearance, but it does not build exclusively upon them. The parts may either correspond, or differ in size and figure from each other, but it is important and indispensable that they correspond in effective power, and that they be similar in temper and internal character. If the parts of which the military instrument consists be adjusted in the manner proposed, it is evident that the act will be one throughout, and that the parts will move in unison when they are brought to action, even when they are incited to the utmost extent of exertion. Hence if the united act, arising from a corresponding and joint action of parts, be the object which is sought for in war, the mode of arrangement suggested in this

place is the useful one: the other is delusive,—made up for the pleasure of the eye of the proprietor, or for imposing on an enemy who is timid as without true knowledge of things.

Animal power is not calculable according to the visible form of the animal mass. It neither resides exclusively in the volume of the muscle, nor in the height of stature. This is an ascertained fact; and it is fair to infer from it that if the materials of armies be classed by appearances, without regard to the measure of powers as proved in trial, they cannot do otherways than act differently under forced exertions. The act is necessarily unequal,—excessive in some parts, defective in others; or made in succession where it ought to be of one impulse: hence the effort is feeble, and the end is imperfect or void. It is evident that where the power of the parts, of which the military instrument is made up, is unequal in constitutional properties, the expression of the power can only be uniform under a limited and constrained act, that is, only maintained in regular form by vigorous superintendence implying coercion of some and stimulation of others; consequently it cannot be maintained where strong causes stimulate to full exertion,

The defects of military arrangement as made according to superficial appearance are obvious, and the inconveniences thence resulting are of material importance. They would, it is presumed be diminished, (if not precluded), if persons destined for military service were selected with care, and placed in a military school at an early period of life, so that, the steps and paces being regularly trained to a rule of cadence, order would be so ingrafted in all the ostensible acts that military habit and custom would become, in some degree, a law of nature. Under a system of primary education of the kind suggested, the several parts of the military machine might be expected to correspond in action with each other, in so far as the

measure of the natural power admits of correspondence ;—and it may be presumed that an army, so trained and disciplined, while possessing uniformity of appearance externally, would also acquire mechanical correspondence in its internal movements, in as much as inured, through habits of exercise, to a given routine of daily action, its external act would be uniform ; and, as acting on a common object, a sentiment would be excited in common, and union would be cemented by association. To produce united action of bodily powers and sympathy of mental affections is the legitimate object of the tactician. It constitutes military education ; and it is important to military success. But, while important to success, the accomplishment of it is difficult to be effected in countries such as Great Britain, where the military force is composed of persons who have grown up to manhood without military instruction, even of persons who, before they are admitted in the military ranks, have acquired habits of acting different from the habits of soldiers. Where this is the case, and where an army is put together according to uniformity of external appearance rather than measure of actual power, a jarring and discordant movement must necessarily be the result. The discordance arises from failure of power in some, and from disposition in others to recur to early habits, if the superintending and controlling influence be weakened or removed. In a mass of men fortuitously collected, and presented to one object upon which it is a duty for every one to act, it is reasonable to suppose that some exceed when not restrained, that others fail when not impelled ; the movement of parts is thus discordant, and the general effect, it may reasonably be supposed, will be abortive. If there be any truth in what is here said,—(and it is plain sense which a child may comprehend), the most rational mode of military arrangement, as it is that which selects subjects for different purposes according to radical powers and fitnesses, and which so classes

them by companies or divisions that they act in the way which most corresponds with their natural exertions, so adjusted in disposition, at the same time, that the institutions of the future discipline evolve the energies of all to the greatest possible extent. If this rule be observed in dressing the ranks, the exerted act will accord throughout the whole fabric, in as much as the parts are put together according to the correspondence of their physical powers, and prepared to be animated in all their extent by one impulse. An army, organized according to this principle, exhibits a machine, the external symmetry of which may not please the eye, but the act of which, as united by inherent power, cannot fail to be impressive in battle. The parts joined by estimate of physical power, the temper of the parts corresponding by constitutional sympathy constitute an instrument, which, when it moves, moves correctly, and acts in union against multiplied impediments of whatever nature they may be.

As the military fabric may be constructed differently, that is, according to the size and figure of the parts, or according to actual power and activity; so the tactic, may be adjusted according to two modes of arrangement, viz. open, or close. In open order, the movements are free, but connected in a series and united with each other relatively;—the individual action is energetic, and, to a certain degree, independent. In close order, the parts are connected mechanically with each other for mutual support; but, as they are not necessarily and not ordinarily of the same precise power and temper, some are constrained, others are exerted unduly for the sake of maintaining superficial uniformity, in preparatory evolution as well as in actual conflict. In one, the individual retains the command of his bodily powers and mental energies; and, though under the direction of a head or military officer, he has his own perception of the object, and some latitude of discretion in the accomplishment of the purpose

which it is intended he should effect. In the other, the individual, reduced to the state of an automaton, is a mere part in complicated machinery. He has no perception of object, and no sensibility to impression, except through the impulse of the commander's voice. The joint act may be regular; and as such praiseworthy; it scarcely can be animated, heroic and great.—The American revolutionary war furnishes examples of what is here meant. The British troops, particularly the British light infantry, exhibited an example of the first. The spirit of the man was above the mechanical perfection of the soldier. The countenance was open, bold and intelligent, the figure erect and important, the air martial and determined. The auxiliary Hessians furnished an example of the second. The Hessians were auxiliary mercenaries; and, as such they were brought forward under disadvantages as compared with the British. The Hessians are among the best of German troops; and they generally did all that could be expected to be done by a hired and merely mechanical soldier. They were comparatively perfect in their tactic; and they were regular and mechanical in their movements. They were slow,—and they frequently lost opportunities of assuring their object by mere slowness. Where they adhered to the close order of their customary tactic, they were exposed to the destructive fire of the enemy; and, as firing by platoon, they expended their ammunition without destroying the enemy. Whether from difference of tactic, or from quality of subject individually, the writer does not pretend to determine, but it is certainly true that the Americans were less intimidated by the solid lines and close fire of the Hessians, than by the impetuous irregularity and rapid movement of the British light infantry; and it is further true that those corps which exceeded others in native impetuosity, but which were deficient in parade discipline, particularly the Scotch Highlanders, were the most feared of any. It is innate

individual energies of mind and body, classed according to the correspondence of condition, which constitute the perfection of an army. If there be defect in either, the machine is imperfect, and its operations cannot be calculated with confidence. Both are necessary ; but if both cannot be attained, energy is the least dispensable of the two :—the proofs are numerous in history.

The writer is aware that it will be deemed presumptuous, in a person who is not of the military profession, to speak decidedly respecting the best form of military tactic, or the best mode of animating an army after it has been formed. Opinions differ, and modes change according to caprices of fashion ; but the basis here assumed will in all cases, it is believed, prove to be a true one. The open order is evidently the order for movement, evolution and the use of fire arms ; the close order, the order for the direct charge and impulse of force—bayonet or pike. This is obvious to any one who considers things in their reasons ; but, however obvious to reason, the truth of the fact may be, it is doubtful in how far it has been understood and applied in practice according to principle. A volume of fire poured out from a solid line may be considered as the act of a mere machine. The machine has no distinct idea with respect to direction, consequently its act is an act at random—uncertain and comparatively harmless. Fire, as proceeding from ranks in open order, it is reasonable to believe will be effective, for it is independent, and will not be given by a skilful soldier except under a calculable chance of striking. If military arrangements, and the use of military weapons be analyzed and resolved to first principles, the author can hardly persuade himself, from the imperfect view which he has of war, that the principle has been well conceived, or that the practice has been in any degree guided by a just consideration of the reasons of things. To a person, who is not initiated into military mysteries, there appears something like contradiction in the case.

The tactician labours for the sole purpose of reducing man to an automaton. In an automaton, the act of mind does not exist. The physical organism is accustomed to execute implicitly another's will,—by signal, and without impression from the original object. It is admitted that obedience to the commander is indispensable to success in war; but it is contended, at the same time, that it is obedience to an impression of national duty that properly constitutes obedience. The impression passes through the commander as through an electric conductor; it does not originate from him as from a source. If this be so, we must suppose that the first quality of a national General consists, not in presenting himself, as himself, but as a mirror to concenter impressions, to reflect them on every the minutest part within the military circle, and thus to give one impulse and one animation to the whole of the military act. The acts of an army so animated may be supposed to be consistent and energetic,—for they derive from the source. This is illustrated by the history of barbarous nations, or self-taught peasantry, who combat, and even triumph, in numerous instances, over the refinements of the technical art and the contrivances of the mechanical Generals of the common school. The bond of union is strong where it proceeds from one source and acts on similar materials; it is weak and easily dissolved where it has no motive except that produced by fear of external force.

If union of power be the object which principally influences the tactician in constructing the military instrument, it is obvious to common sense that the first step in the proceeding consists in obtaining a correct knowledge of the active powers of the individuals who compose the instrument; not only by examining and measuring the height of stature, but by trying and estimating the power of exertion in all the ways in which powers can be employed in the practice of

war. The force and activity of troops, properly applied, decide the fate of battle; and for this reason, the degree of force and activity which exists in every individual of which an army is composed, ought to be known correctly at the time of enlistment, so that an estimate may be made of the extent to which the constitutional properties are capable of being improved by training and discipline. As this is the first object to be ascertained by persons who are appointed to select and approve recruits for military service, so it is of the first importance that it be well understood.

The formation of armies, at least the formation of regiments which are parts of armies, depends much upon the skill and diligence of adjutants. If this be so, the office of regimental adjutant is a most important one, and as such, ought to be filled by a man who is well versed in the science which belongs to it. The adjutant cannot clearly comprehend the principles and effects of movement without some knowledge of mathematics; and, as he ought not only to comprehend, but to explain to others the purpose and design of the manœuvres and movements that are prescribed in the elementary book of tactics, it is necessary that he possess a distinct and clear elocution. Besides mathematical knowledge and clear elocution, he ought to possess some knowledge of animal structure and of the laws of animal economy, in the view that he may be enabled to form judgment respecting the extent of the physical powers of individuals, and be thereby qualified to place every one in the part of the military fabric in which he ought to be placed. The adjutant may attain knowledge of his duty to a certain extent through formal education. The quality by which he reads the character of mind, a quality essential for persons who form and discipline troops, is the gift of nature; and, as extraordinary gifts of nature are rare, persons who are qualified to be useful adjutants do not often present themselves to

those who have the power of appointing them. The office is a most important one; and, if its importance were duly estimated, it would only be bestowed upon these who possess real merit, that is, science of tactic and the capacity of imparting their science to others. Next to the commanding officer, the adjutant is the most responsible military officer in a regiment. He is supposed to instruct the junior class of officers in the form and spirit of their duties; and, as he has to explain to them the purpose and design of manœuvres and movements, it is obvious that he requires a higher rank than that of subaltern in order that he may possess authority; and it is further fit that he be of a mature age so that he may have the chance of possessing discretion. If the duty of adjutant, as here defined, were assigned to a person holding the rank of second major; and, if it were bestowed only upon persons who are distinguished for knowledge of military tactic and acquaintance with the principles of military economy, it is probable that an impulse would be thereby given to many to cultivate science, as a channel through which they might attain a respectable station in the army—without other patronage than that which the simple merit of ability gives to them.

The first part of military preparation consists in improving the power of movement and action in the individuals who compose the army; and, as the perfection of that power is important to success in war, it is essential that the principle through which it may be improved be thoroughly understood. The individual is here considered as a part in a compound instrument; and, in order that the parts correspond in action and thus act to advantage, it is necessary, not only that they be placed upon a just balance with one another in the primary arrangement, but that they be tried, so that being known, they may be adjusted relatively according to temper and fitness of constitutional power in the instrument as applied to action. The

military figure is erect; and, when erect and well poised, it has dignity in its appearance and readines in the application of its power. The military positions are, or ought to be attitudes of perfection according to mechanical rule, so that there be a facility in centering and combining exertions for a military purpose. As this is a plain fact, it is important that the young soldier be well set up according to the military phrase, in common language, placed upon his haunches in such manner that all the joints and joinings of the different parts bear equally and fairly upon each other. The form of training, or setting up here suggested is not intended as a mere matter of moulding for the sake of pleasing the eye:—it is of positive use; and, in order that the use and end if it may be attained with facility, it is recommended that the young soldier be ordered to stand for one hour every day in contact with a perpendicular wall; and that, during this exhibition of posture, the joints of the body, and particularly the joinings at the haunches be tried and moved in all manner of ways, the positions for stability found out, and the parts most employed in military action, perseveringly practised in movement, so that a mode may be instituted which, in course of time, will grow into a habit strong as a law of nature.*

* To the haunches, as to the common centre of motion of the human figure, are ultimately referred all the movements performed in military tactic. As just poise is important to the correct execution of action whatever it may be, it is necessary that poise or balance be studied, understood,—and tried in all positions. It is clear that bodily action cannot possess compass, power and ease, unless the movement be made justly and correctly upon the haunches as on a central pivot. If the movement have not compass, power and ease; force and endurance will not be found in the military act. The human figure is erect, when man attains a certain point of growth and assumes locomotion: it is maintained erect, or it is moved from its erect posture by the

It is one of the labours of the tactician to make the soldier different in appearance as well as in reality from the common man ; but he is

action of the muscular flesh. The nearer the figure to perpendicular, that is, the more equally the various pieces of which the vertebral column consists bear upon each other, the more easily will the balances be preserved under movement. The erect position is maintained by the action of muscles ; which, as they act in succession, relieve each other, and, in consequence of such relief, the action though often repeated, is sustained with comparatively little fatigue. The spine possesses the power of a rotary motion in its own structure, even an obscure motion at its joinings with the haunches. The shorter muscular fibres preserve the balance in parts of obscure motion ; the longer ones effect locomotive or manual movements. In either case, if action be extended beyond its limits, or if it be continued for a length of time without remission, fatigue ensues and the contemplated act fails. The first case occurs under exerted labour ; the latter, under constrained positions. When the body is justly poised,—erect and duly balanced upon the haunches, locomotion is performed with ease ; exercise is supported with little effort comparatively, and the subject is, to a certain extent, prepared for military service. The efficiency of the military machine, the author is disposed to believe, best comports with the following bearing of individual parts ; viz. the heels on the same line, near to each other, but not joined, the toe pointed very little outward, the foot firmly planted, the knees straight, but not constrainedly so, the spine nearly erect, the belly compressed, the chest advanced—opened and expanded, the shoulders drawn back, the arms hanging at ease, the neck nearly erect, the countenance determined, as if bent on a purpose,—the eye fixed exclusively to a forward point. When the young soldier is brought into this position, the muscles, as thrown into a form of balanced action, give firmness to the fabric, an air of importance to the figure, and an internal sensation of consequence arising from the impression of acquired superiority. When the spine is erect, the stature is exalted, and a corresponding sensation of elevation is imparted to the mind. When the belly is compressed, the loins girt and firm, the body is comparatively strong. When the chest is advanced and expanded, the lungs act with freedom, and the body is refreshed by an extra accession of air. The heart then dilates with ease, and the whole frame is animated with life. The stern and determined spect of countenance, and the forward direction of the eye which im-

not to make him so by giving him a perpendicular and stiff figure, or a rude and ungracious manner. On the contrary, it is important to

presses the individual that the only path of the soldier is forward, belong to and constitute the military character.

In regard to the husbanding of animal power, it is reasonable to suppose that marching should be made with the least possible expenditure of material; and with this view, it seems to be enjoined by tacticians that the soldier slide over the ground with the least possible exertion. The truth, or reasonableness of the position, as a general principle, is not disputed; but it must be observed at the same time that there are circumstances, connected with difference of modes, which ought to be maturely and deliberately weighed before the elementary rule be considered as finally established. The step, which is animated and firmly planted, imparts a sensation of conscious importance to the mind of the person who plants it; and it is presumed that the sensation, which accompanies this species of exertion, gives a support to the endurance of toil more than equal to the sum of the power saved by sliding over the ground in a creeping manner. A soldier is proud and important in himself as he plants his steps with firmness and impression; and however desirable it may be to husband power in all military movements, and to form habits of steadiness as applicable to military action, it is also necessary to increase the impression of force, and to bear in mind that, when the movement is unnatural, even as restrained, irksomeness and early fatigue follow—and effect fails. Successions of action and rest, or alternate changes of positions are indispensable to the endurance of activity; and hence it is plain that a knowledge of the structure and active powers of the human frame deserves a minute consideration with tacticians, as a knowledge of great consequence to the right adjustment of positions, and the right direction of the movements of soldiers in the course of their training. If the foundation of the drill be not laid upon principles of science, the tactic produces weakness instead of strength. The principle of modern tactic, that is, the tactic of Frederick the second, king of Prussia, goes, if rightly comprehended by the writer, to extinguish, at least to obscure individual exertion of mind and individual exertion of body, for the sake of producing exterior uniformity.

The Spartan system of military institution differs from that of Frederick. It is more honourable to man's nature according to a true estimate of things; and it is infinitely more

entice him gradually to fall into, and to move in those attitudes of grace and ease which comprehend force, or the power of continuing action for a comparatively long time with little fatigue; and hence those exercises, which conduce to this purpose, deserve a minute and attentive consideration in a system of military training.

*And first:—*It is not unlikely that the proposition, which suggests dancing to be made a primary part of a soldier's education, will be treated with ridicule; but it will be so treated by those only who view things superficially. The instructions of the dancing master are calculated to give grace and ease to the movements of the human figure, and as such to increase the power of enduring action for a comparatively long time. But, while the art of the dancing master is

Dancing.

just. The Spartan institution studied to improve the powers of both body and mind, and to unite all the parts in action by the impression of a common object identified with the individual's existence and honour. The Spartan had mind and sentiment; but he was not for that reason refractory and headstrong. No Prussian soldier ever shewed a devotion to the most imperious command of his king, equal to the devotion which every Spartan shewed to the honour and interests of his nation. The motive of action was common to the Spartan army; the mode was even apprehended by the common soldier; the impression of duty conceived by the chief was transmitted to the soldier, condensed and animated by the genius of the leader, who considered himself only as the representative of the country. The author of the Spartan institution was a philosopher who studied and knew man in his intimate nature. He knew him to be susceptible of the sentiment of honour; and he held it to be his duty to unfold his powers and place him at a point of eminence where he received the force of it. The Prussian tactician was a pedant and a despot. He knew man only as a slave, and he only used him as an instrument to be acted on by fear.—There is sufficient evidence before the world to convince those, who are not obstinately prepossessed against conviction, that Frederick's principle has not a true base;—Frederick is notwithstanding the idol of the military of the present time

employed to discover such positions and attitudes of body as best concur with the easy performance of a given act; so the act itself expands, and perfects the capacity of parts, for the execution of general movement, to the highest point of attainment. In the act of dancing, all the joints and joinings of the body are moved or solicited into movement. The easy and graceful attitudes of the figure are discovered and exercised as a source of pleasure; the minutest fibres vibrate, and, where parts move and vibrate, their active powers expand, and, if not over exerted, they increase and improve under expansion. Hence the act of dancing is useful to the formation of a soldier, in as much as it improves the power of movement, increases the extent of the sphere of activity, and begets a power of enduring toil by an effect that is merely mechanical.

But, if the act of dancing improve the powers of the subject mechanically in the manner stated, it also acts by an internal operation on the principle which animates to exertion. It engages the mind by a charm peculiar to itself; and it thus beguiles the young soldier into the opinion that he is instructed in dancing for his own sake, his pleasure, or the accomplishment of his manners. To dance well is deemed an accomplishment. It adorns the man as a member of polished society; and, on that account, the art is generally cultivated by the young, and the practice of it is sometimes pursued with ardour, even with delight, by those of more advanced years. The act of dancing is useful to the military on general grounds; but its usefulness may be extended by studying and properly applying modes to purposes, so as to bring out the energies of the powers, and train the subject to habits of rapid transition through the circle of exerted movements, rather than to the feminine, slow and languishing attitudes, which have only ease and grace for their recommendation. The practice of dancing serves to extend the

compass of muscular action. It enables the individual to measure with precision the quantity of force requisite for the accomplishment of a given end ; and, in as much as it teaches the different members of an assembly to unite by cadence in joint action, it may justly be considered as an useful part of primary education in a system of military training. It is a common observation that persons, who dance well, ordinarily walk gracefully ; and it may be added that soldiers, who dance well, usually perform long marches with comparatively little fatigue. If we refer to history for the proof of this assertion, the proofs are numerous and decisive ; but it is needless to go further than to the experience of the present day and what is consistent with our observation. The Highlanders of Scotland are more addicted to dancing than any other portion of the inhabitants of Great Britain, and they are known to be the part of the British army which scarcely ever fails on the march—The French are equally addicted to dancing with the Highlanders of Scotland, and the French surpass every other military people on the continent in expeditious movement. The English are susceptible of a more firm and steady tactic than the French: they fight with equal energy and more resolution in the field, but they do not execute combined movements with the same promptitude and facility. It is not pretended that the Highlanders of Scotland, or the people of France derive the quality of marching and moving rapidly in cadence, solely from their habitual practice in dancing, but it is reasonable to believe that the practice of dancing contributes materially to give them this preeminence.

The act of dancing moves and exercises every part of the body, but acts more particularly on the powers of locomotion. The exercise of fencing, while it calls forth exerted action in every part, excites and strengthens more immediately the power of the arm. Fencing is a direct military exercise which sharpens the

Fencing.

faculties for the practice of war. It confirms the courage by accustoming the eye to look steadily on the semblance of a naked weapon ; and it gives confidence, to a master in the science, in the consciousness of skill. The attitudes, which belong to the positions of offence or defence, give just poise and balance to the body, exercise and improve the power of the loins, and tend to open and expand the chest. The practice of fencing increases the power of the arm and improves the facility of motion at the wrist ; and, while it extends and improves action generally, it furnishes the individual with the means of judging of the measure and extent of his own power.—If two hours were spent in fencing daily for six months, the principles of the science would be understood by a recruit of common capacity ; and, by occasional practice afterwards, the intelligent soldier would acquire confidence in his skill, and thereby enhance the importance of his character. Fencing sharpens the eye sight, increases active power in general, tries the temper, and teaches decision in seizing occasions for acting offensively with effect, or defensively with coolness and resolution. A knowledge to fence with foils, even to exercise the sabre and broad sword, is deemed a necessary accomplishment for all military men of the higher class. It is useful to the common soldier on account of his duty ; it ought therefore to be included among the essentials, in his military education, for the sake of its utility.

But, though a knowledge of fencing be useful, simply and solitarily, to the individual ; the military utility, which is an utility connected with tactic, lies in combining acts of offence or defence in bodies of men, so as to make an impression with joint and united force as the impression of a whole, or to resist in union as a solid mass. This is different from individual dexterity. An example of what is here meant presents itself in the history of the wars of the Romans with one another. We have reason to believe that the individual Roman

gladiator would have cut the individual Roman soldier to pieces, with little difficulty. There is evidence, in the authentic history of Tacitus, that a battalion of gladiators was inferior to a battalion of ordinary soldiers, in as much as they were inferior in the combinations of power which form union and give one impulse to a general act. It is believed—and not without grounds, that a single Asiatic horseman is an overmatch for a single European; yet it is not questioned that one squadron of European dragoons, independently of the quality of horses, may be led with confidence to charge two squadrons of the best horsemen in Asia,—apparently from the relative differences of acting independently, or forming union by common impression and for common purpose. In the same manner, French officers are generally better swordsmen than officers in the English army, even the French soldiers are more expert in the use of the sabre, and more practised in exercises with the bayonet than the soldiers of Great Britain; yet British troops, independently of physical power and the confidence connected with it, are observed to unite more readily to form impressive charges, or to repel formidable attacks with more firmness and resolution than the common soldiers of France. The Highlanders of Scotland, as feudal and warlike tribes, were familiar with the use of arms generally and individually, prior to the year 1745. One man was more or less expert than another, but they all possessed the power of combining readily in danger as by common sympathy, and of resisting in union to the last. The quality still adheres to them. The Highlanders made, and still continue to make the best united charges of offence, and present the closest union in the resistance of attack of any troops in Europe; and if this be so, the fact strongly points out the propriety of not only improving individual powers and individual exertions, but of studying the art of

combining the powers so improved to the production of one] general effect.

Marching. Dancing and fencing are considered as elementary parts of the education of young soldiers. Instruction in locomotion, so that the common gait of the clown be converted into the measured step of the soldier, is a direct and essential part in military training. The trouble of attaining this accomplishment is abridged by practising the exercises now adverted to, in as much as the limbs are thereby rendered pliant and capable of executing movements with facility. It is tactic which gives an army advantage over a multitude of men; and hence the military step, which is the base of tactic, ought to be fixed precisely, and practised rigidly—without change or deviation through all stages of service. A soldier is here supposed to move only in the military step; but, as the duties of soldiers demand movements of different velocities, the effect wanted will, it is presumed, be better attained through a more frequent repetition of the step, than by a change in the base of the measure. Union in action is the point on which depends the success of war; the chances left open to disunion ought therefore to be as few as possible. For this reason, common sense says that the military step ought to be confined to two forms, viz. a pace without constraint or exertion,—about three miles per hour; an exerted pace which, by a more frequent repetition of the step in a given time without change in the base of the measure, reaches a higher rate of velocity—probably four miles per hour. Few persons, as encumbered with arms and accoutrements, are capable of continuing long without fatigue at the exerted rate of marching, consequently it is only to be resorted to on urgent occasions, or to be employed as an interchange with the common step for the purpose of relief.

The capacity of marching* well is one of the most essential qualities of a soldier; but in order that it be attained in the requisite degree of perfection, it is necessary that the individual be trained to it by frequent and diligent practice. Three hours allotted every day for practice in various forms of marching; viz. common pace, exerted

* The length of the military pace differs, according to real or assumed causes, in different European services. In the British line, the measure of the common step, in the direct march, is thirty inches. A pace of thirty inches is a full step for a man of the height of five feet eight inches, well proportioned in all his limbs and walking without incumbrance. If this be so in fact, thirty inches must be considered as an extended step for those of lower stature, even for those of the taller stature who carry firelock, accoutrements and knapsack. If the step be extended beyond the easy compass of the constitutional power, early fatigue is the consequence. If the body be loaded with extra weight, every extended step implies an extra exertion, and extra exertion occasions exhaustion and fatigue. This is a fact within most men's observation and every man's comprehension; and hence it is obvious, in order that the act of marching be sustained with as little fatigue as possible, that the body be supported on a perpendicular bearing when under movement,—not thrown off its balance by an exerted extension of the step, particularly if it be loaded with extra weight. From this it is inferred that, where expedition is required, it is better to quicken the time than to extend the base of the measure.—The subject is important, and deserves the consideration of military judges; in the mean time, it is suggested that a space of twenty-seven inches is a sufficient length of step for soldiers of the battalion, who are supposed to move in close and compact order, and to preserve a correct line in movement. This can scarcely be done, even on the smooth surface of a parade, where the measure of the step occasions an extension approaching to exertion. Light infantry have a latitude in this respect which cannot be granted to battalion or grenadiers; for it is deemed necessary in all cases that a battalion soldier, whose value lies in the steadiness of his hand, and a grenadier, whose virtue lies in the power of his arm and in the compact order of his ranks, be brought to the point of attack with all possible fitness of condition;—and fitness, it is evident, does not consist with previous exertion.

pace, running easily or trotting, running with exertion or speed, marching or running on level ground, on broken or irregular ground, —stony, rocky and hilly, leaping ditches and hedges, and clearing all such impediments, or obstructions as can be supposed to occur in the field of battle, might be supposed, in no very long course of time, to bring a person of common activity and comprehension to a considerable degree of perfection. By practising the exercises here prescribed, the compass of power in the limbs would be extended, endurance strengthened, and important knowledge obtained of individual fitness for particular purposes of war.

The discipline of training for the march is supposed to be conducted under the eye of an intelligent person who has studied animal structure, who has acquired knowledge of its laws by observation, and who is familiar with military service from experience in actual war. It is presumed that the exercises of dancing, fencing, running, marching, &c. varied in mode and repeated for a given number of hours daily, will be sufficient to improve the powers of action in the course of six months, nearly as far as they are capable of being improved, furnishing the individual at the same time with the means of estimating his own force, of judging of his own capacity of endurance; and further, of giving information, to the superintendant of the training, respecting the materials which are to be placed in the military fabric, so that he may be enabled to organize according to a rule of effective power, and thus to allot the several parts to the services which best correspond with their capacities.

Economy.

The method of military training recommended in this place is calculated to extend and improve the powers of the body individually; but, in order that the execution of purposes be assured in all conditions and under all circumstances of service, it is expedient, even necessary, that foundations of economy and management, such as

preserve the powers of the individual in a state fit for action, be laid down at an early period, and maintained by rigorous discipline throughout, so that the military system, as organized on a true basis, may move with facility and correctness in all kinds and stages of service. One soldier is only a part in the military instrument as relative to its great office: every soldier is an independent part in himself as relative to his own functions. He must therefore, in order to be qualified to maintain his place in the artificial fabric, be instructed systematically—and according to uniform rule, to act separately and independently for himself in matters of personal care. The instruction on this head relates, in a more especial manner, to three objects; viz. 1st. Cooking, or dressing of provisions. 2nd. Cleaning, mending, and repairing clothing; and 3rd. Guarding the health against the injurious contingencies incident to military life.

1st. It cannot be expected that soldiers should be furnished with a regular apparatus of cooking utensils in the field. It is therefore a necessary part of primary education, that the young soldier be instructed in the best manner of adapting his means to his necessities; and, among others, it is necessary that he be taught the best and easiest method of dressing the raw provision which constitutes his ration, so as to obtain from it a savoury and wholesome nourishment. Broths, soups and stews are easily prepared, and imply the least waste of materials; consequently young soldiers ought to be carefully instructed in the best mode of preparing them. The acquisition of this knowledge is not difficult; but still it must be learned:—it is not in fact well understood in the British army.

The art of military cooking is not intricate, nor is the practice of it irksome, or degrading from the dignity of a soldier's character. The heroes of ancient Greece prepared their own dinner after they had fought the battle of the day; and, it is perhaps in the recollection

of many who have served in modern war, that few things are done with more pleasure and alacrity than putting fuel to the camp kettle after a long march. Where no more than five or six persons mess together, the dressing of the provisions is a common concern which gives a secret lesson of economy to every one, and at the same time engenders affection, similar to the affection which obtains among families. The union, which arises from such association, is useful; but it is not sufficiently encouraged in the present times, for the benefits of it are not sufficiently understood. The practice which now obtains of dressing provisions in a common kitchen, and above all, the hurried and disorderly manner in which the meal is served in large and crowded messing rooms, seems to have cut up the roots of social intercourse at table,—an intercourse which constitutes a great part of a soldier's happiness in camps and detached quarters.

Clothing.

2nd. Besides instruction on the subject of cooking, the young soldier ought to be taught in what manner he can best repair the damages which happen to his clothing and other equipment. Soldiers are not supposed to be tailors and shoemakers; but every soldier is supposed to repair, in a becoming manner, the ordinary damages which happen to his wearing apparel. This is soon and easily learned; and the execution of it, when learned, does not interfere with military duties. In order that an army be efficient by its own means, the soldier ought to be taught to depend upon himself for every personal concern. He ought for instance, to wash his own linen, to repair the slighter damages which happen to his clothing or his shoes, to shave himself, and dress his own hair; in short, to do for himself every thing that a man can do.

Care of health.

3rd. It is fit that a soldier be familiarised with the occurrences which are common in actual war, so that nothing be new to him in real service. He ought, for instance, to be accustomed to sleep in his cloak

or blanket,—dressed and accoutred ; to be prepared to march to a distant station at any hour of the night ; to be exposed occasionally to wind and rain, heat and cold ; so that the impression of such contingency be not novel, and as such not injurious to the health when it unavoidably occurs ; and further, it is proper that he be trained and instructed in the best mode of passing rivers by fording or swimming, —and without exposing his ammunition to damage. When wet, cold, hungry and fatigued, he ought also to be taught, and made to understand the means by which he can best secure his person from injury ; in short, he ought to be put in possession of the best remedies for every contingency which may, or can happen in military service ; and, with this view, he ought to be carefully prepared, by a course of training, to meet with indifference every thing which belongs to the military field.

When the rudiments of the discipline, instituted for the improvement of the mechanical power of the limbs, and the basis of economy and management necessary for the preservation of the health of the body, have been duly practised for the space of six months, the young soldier may be supposed to enter upon the more immediate business of his profession, viz. practical exercise in the use of arms. Arms. The causes and motives which render the soldier ardent in the pursuit of his profession ought to be carefully estimated by his teacher ; and, when estimated and known, they ought to be kept in active movement until habits be formed and confirmed by use. A love of arms, sometimes induces a young man to become a soldier and to prosecute his profession with ardour. But, in order that love of arms be placed on good foundations, it is necessary that the principle on which the arm is constructed, and the effect, which it produces when skilfully used, be fully explained to him, and proved to demonstration by experiment. It is thus proper that he be taught to know in what manner he can

best try and judge the temper of his sword, the correctness of the barrel of his musket and the mechanism of its lock. There is something in attachment to arms which engages the mind and precludes ennui; and, where there is no unusual attachment, the care, which is required to keep arms in order, furnishes employment, and as such is useful. The attention to the condition of arms here alluded to will probably be irksome at first; but, continued for a time, it forms habit, and habit begets attachment which finally produces pleasure. A soldier values his arms as his property; and a knowledge of their power and trustworthiness gives him confidence as a soldier, when he is opposed to the enemy. Confidence results from the skill which commands effect; but skill can only be acquired by knowledge of principle and daily practice in application. Every man is awkward, and most men are diffident in the use of fire-arms at the commencement of their military career;—many are more than diffident. The young soldier often draws the trigger of a loaded musket with symptoms of fear, similar to that of a man who puts a match to the train of a loaded mine. The case is new to him; for the customary mode of training in field days and firing blank cartridge gives no knowledge of the firelock as armed for war. It is then an instrument of death, and the inexperienced recruit is not always without apprehension that the explosion may recoil upon himself.

The young soldier, in proceeding to learn the use of the firelock as an instrument employed in war, is supposed to be previously instructed in forms of manual exercise, whether for show or utility. The real object of the soldier's study is the discomfiture of the enemy. The accomplishment of the object would appear to consist, in common opinion, in the superior rapidity of loading and firing in regularly measured time. This at least is the point which the drill chiefly labours;—the just direction of the fire which effects destruction

scarcely appears in the calculation. This is palpably an error. The justness of aim is the main and ultimate object of instruction; and as it is the object, which a rational system of military instruction might be supposed to inculcate, it is matter of surprise that it is so little cultivated. As the just direction of fire is of essential importance in war, it is fit that the principle, according to which fire-arms act, be well understood by the regimental instructor, and that the effect of the act be well and familiarly explained to the young soldier. The firelock is an instrument of missile force. It is obvious that the force which is missile ought to be directed with aim, otherways it will strike only by accident. It is evident that a person cannot take aim with any correctness unless he be free,—independent and clear of all surrounding incumbrances; and, for this reason, there can be little dependence on the effect of fire that is given by platoons or vollies, and by word of command. Such explosions may intimidate by their noise; it is mere chance if they destroy by their impression. If there be a general maxim in war, it consists in opening the ranks for the use of missile force, and in closing them for charge with the bayonet. If the destruction of the enemy be the object of a battle, the arrangements of modern tactic, and the drillings of the soldier seem to counteract the purpose. History furnishes proof that the battle is rarely gained by the scientific use of the musket: noise intimidates; platooning firing strikes only at random.

Besides what is now said, with regard to firing independently and with aim, or firing by word of command and general level, military men will decide, whether or not a line three deep can be so disposed as to fire with safety to each other,—and with impression on the enemy. It is probable that the front rank may suffer from the rear rank in the hurry and confusion of action; or, that the rear rank, avoiding the heads of those in front, may discharge its bullets in the

Ranks.

air. This is a question which the experienced soldier, who is a man of observation, only can determine; but other men may be permitted to judge of the principle according to which the aim in firing is to be directed. The ray of vision expands from a centre to a circumference. It inclines upwards in its expansion, and those objects, which stand above the level of the eye, are the objects which are most readily and most distinctly seen. As this is a principle in the theory of vision, we thence comprehend how the fire of a line of musketry does more execution as pointed from low to high ground, than where it is pointed from the height to the level; also, how the fire of the rank, which kneels, is generally more destructive to the enemy than that of the rank which stands upright; and, reasoning by a similar principle, it is plain in what manner greater destruction is to be expected from the firelock as brought up to the eye, in the manner that a sportsman covers a bird, than if brought down mechanically to a general level from the position of *recover*. It is probable that the presentation of a line of firelocks, directed rapidly and mechanically by platoons from *recover* to *present*, operates by appearance, and, acting upon a timid enemy, hastens his retreat. But be that as it may, there is reason to think that destruction, from the effect of fire, will be proportionally less in this case than in the other.—The subject does not appear to be much noticed by military men; but it deserves to be attended to, if the object in war be the destruction of the enemy by the just direction of the bullet, rather than his intimidation by noise and demonstrations of the regular and mechanical movement of the firelock in platoon firing.

Firing. The degree of perfection attainable by individuals in the art of firing has great latitude. Some remain inferior to others in spite of all their endeavours to excel. Few fire well without instruction, and without practice. The knowledge how to direct fire upon any given

point is a most essential part of the mechanical soldier's study ; consequently the office of giving instruction on that head, commands especial attention. As the knowledge of it is important to success, it will not be denied that the duty of instruction ought to be committed to persons, who are sufficiently master of science to explain the principle upon which perfection depends, who are capable of pointing out the right way of attaining it, and who are themselves capable of shewing by example the perfection to which the attainment may be carried. The young soldier judiciously treated, and with the example of instruction judiciously directed, becomes enamoured of his arms and ultimately of his profession. He perceives that he acquires knowledge ; and, in proportion as he acquires knowledge, he becomes confident in himself. He is thus rendered courageous by art, for courage of a certain description is the product of the practice alluded to.

It is almost superfluous to repeat that attainment of skill in the use of arms is an important object in war ; and, as such, an object to be prosecuted scientifically and steadily. With this view, it is suggested that during the period of military training, and after six months of previous education, three days in the week be set apart for the practice of firing ball cartridge ;—and that seven ball cartridges be allowed to each man for the consumption of the day. This implies some expence of money ; and, on that or other grounds, it is not likely that the suggestion will be attended to ; but, as the knowledge of firing with ball is the only part of training which forms a soldier expressly for his ostensible purpose, it is to be hoped that the higher powers of the state will consider the subject with its reasons, and institute such a system of military education in all its branches, as may attain the end for which an army finds a place among national establishments. It is not pretended to penetrate the reasons which influence the scanty supply of leaden bullets here complained of ; but

it is evident that it is not economical in the true sense of the word. In actions which are fought under common circumstances, one ball does not strike out of one hundred, or even a greater number; and, as it is known that one in three at least will strike within the circle of a man's body at the distance of one hundred or one hundred and twenty paces if directed by a hand of the requisite skill, it follows that one man, who is master of this part of his duty, is equal to thirty or more who are equally perfect in tactic and manœuvre, but who have not practised and learned the art of directing fire upon distant points with care and precision. If this be true, and it is capable of proof, the mode of training suggested in this place is demonstratively economical; for, judging by effect, it may be said to multiply the army throughout by thirty or a higher number. The advantage of skill over inexperience is striking in this particular; and it is presumed that, if twenty-one ball cartridges be fired under good instruction every week, for the space of six months, the proposed perfection will be attained by all such as have a good sight, a steady hand and a firm courage.

Besides the qualities of arms considered as arms, the acquaintance, which the soldier individually has with them, is of importance in assuring that precision in effect which constitutes superiority. In this manner, while the barrel of the musket is straight and proved to be true as well as strong, the lock ought to be perfect in all its parts, and easy in its movements; for it is obvious to common sense that undue force applied to the trigger disturbs the level, and thus affects the direction of the ball. But, in addition to the actual perfection of the arms, it is useful that the soldier be familiar with his musket and correctly acquainted with its properties. By long possession he becomes enamoured and fond of it as of a part of himself. He learns, by practice, the precise charge of powder which gives the just effect;

for, though two firelocks may be of the same apparent caliber, there is something in temper, not susceptible of measure or estimate by calculation, which considerably modifies results. Hence there is nicety in determining the true measure of the charge according to the temper of the piece, as well as according to distance and other circumstances of the object to be struck, that can only be ascertained by correct and actual experiment; experiment ought therefore to be applied to the case.

The execution of fire arms varies according to the nature of the ground and the presentation of objects at nearly equal distances. The first trials with fire arms are supposed to be made on level ground, and the first judgment on the effect is formed from such trial. This we infer from the mode of drilling that is commonly adopted; but such drilling furnishes only an imperfect illustration of the fact. Military actions do not always, not even ordinarily take place on level grounds; it is therefore proper that the soldier, in order to be properly instructed, be exercised in firing at objects on ground of varied form and aspect, such as those on which military combats may, or do occur. It is necessary for instance; that he ascertain the distance on the level plain, at which he can promise with certainty to strike the object at which he aims, that he ascertain the same effect as directed from a height to a level, or across a ravine or hollow way to another height. If he view all the forms and presentations of the object with a just eye, measure the distances and bearings correctly, and estimate the effect by knowledge previously gained by experience; as he is confident of his power and master of his act, he does not expend his ammunition unskilfully, or squander at random the means on which his own life and the success of the military enterprise depends.

The subject of directing fire is important, and it may be added, in illustration of its importance that eighty or a hundred thousand ball cartridges are often fired in the course of a military action, without killing or wounding more than five hundred men. In such case, (and such cases are not rare), it is evident that there is an expence of ammunition, without an effect commensurate to the expenditure. If the non effect arise from distance or position, the military officer in command commits an error. If the distance be just distance for action, if the enemy be duly exposed, and if the troops be carried into the field in a proper manner and the effect be such as is stated, it is evident that the soldier wants skill, or that he wants discipline and courage necessary for the direction of the skill which he possesses. Want of skill is always accompanied with hurry and confusion; and a soldier who wants skill, that is, who is not confident of producing a given effect by a discharge of his musket, has no calculation. He knows that he is in possession of an instrument of destruction. He is ignorant of its true value; he loads and fires in haste and confusion, in hopes of hiding himself under the cover of its smoke, or of drowning his fears under its noise. But as he has no skill, and, from want of skill, no precise object in view, the mind is blank and the act is in a manner void. In this case, the remedy against panic consists principally in the noise of the explosions—and that is precarious. On the contrary, the skilful soldier is confident of an effect resulting from his skill. He is master of himself on all occasions, and according to his position, and his bearings, he is almost certain of diminishing the number of the foe by every ball discharged; thus every discharge adds to security, both in his own idea and in reality.—If this subject be considered as it ought to be, the principal object of study in the training of troops will be bestowed on cultivating the art of firing

with just direction, rather than for attaining rapid explosion and exact correspondence in time by platoon or battalion. If it appear that eighty or one hundred thousand balls kill or wound no more than five hundred of the enemy, and, if it be demonstrable that fifteen hundred would have the same effect, if the soldier were brought into action properly, and if he correctly knew the power of his musket, it is obvious to common sense that every soldier ought to be scientifically instructed in an art which brings with it advantages of so great value. The degree of perfection here stated is presumed to be attainable, and it is economical in every point of view that pains be taken to attain it. It supersedes the necessity of number, as it gives the same result from skill as from a great multitude.

The soldier learns, by experience, that his greatest security and his best defence in battle lies in the use of his arms, employed with energy and directed by skill. Consciousness in the possession of skill is the best support of courage; for it brings conviction that the proper application of it rapidly diminishes the number of the foe. No defence, except what results from the skilful exercise of the musket, can be depended on by the battalion soldier in the open field. The attempts which are sometimes made, and which were very common at one period of the American war, to avoid the effect of fire by what is termed ducking, do not appear, when correctly considered, to be of any use on the head of safety, and they are pernicious by example in as much as they indicate and propagate fears. It is an essential part of military education to teach the soldier to look upon danger with indifference, while in the execution of his duty. The impression is important; but it only can be made properly where there is a belief that the condition is equal in advantages of position to that of the enemy, and that the skill in the use of arms is superior. In the

confidence of such opinion, the soldier attains courage artificially, for, calculating chances, instinctively as it were, he finds them in his favour.

Confidence, arising from skill in the use of arms, gives courage in the combat of the open field ; but, as the success of military actions does not rest wholly upon the use of fire-arms, the effect of other means, employed in battle, are also to be estimated and ascertained, whether for offence, or for the defence of particular positions. The destruction produced by fire-arms results from the skill of the individual soldier, and the fitness of the position chosen by the general for its application. The effect produced by bayonets and sharp weapons, though not independent of advantages from individual skill and military genius to direct application, depends principally upon courage and union of physical power. The individual quality for attack consists in boldness and impetuosity ; the technical quality in uniting force by art so as to amalgamate many into one. The individual quality in defence consists in physical firmness and courage ; the technical quality in uniting and cementing force by position. If this be so, it is proper that the soldier be trained carefully, and instructed scientifically in those exercises and forms of combination which are most formidable in attack, or most secure in defence ; and hence individuals ought to be furnished with opportunities of estimating and knowing the force and value of each other before they are put together for conflict in battle.

Artillery and
Cavalry.

The subject of training, in so far as it is here considered, relates only to infantry acting against infantry. In war, as now practised, the field of battle presents formidable ranges of artillery and numerous columns of cavalry of threatening appearance. These, as new, astonish and alarm, and thereby produce consequences different from what may be expected from their real value. In the presumption that

astonishment and dismay will result from the appearance of batteries of artillery and columns of threatening cavalry, it becomes a part of the tactician's office to place, before the eye of young troops, the best attainable view of what actually occurs, or may occur in war without risking an experiment which implies a positive danger. The effect of artillery is chiefly destructive where it sweeps the level surface of the plain, or where it is directed through a hollow way. In broken and irregular grounds, the noise occasions panic among the inexperienced, the actual destruction is comparatively small. The fact is demonstrable; and it is fit that it be demonstrated by experiment, so that the individual may possess knowledge on the subject, and not in ignorance of things be astonished in the day of trial. For this reason, it is recommended that example should be given of the effect produced, or that may be produced by artillery on grounds of different forms; and it would be further useful if instruction were given, respecting the best and most expeditious manner of carrying batteries, or of obtaining possession of field pieces which bear upon the lines or columns of an advancing army. Experiments of this kind cannot shew the exact truth; but they serve to throw some light upon the subject, for they may be so managed, as to accustom troops to move upon given points with correctness and precision under a semblance of hostile opposition.

Besides the noise and destruction occasioned by artillery, the threatenings of cavalry and the havoc which horses commit among broken lines, deserve to be justly estimated, known and carefully guarded against. It is a well ascertained fact that squadrons of cavalry, even of the best quality, have not force or courage to penetrate a hedge of bayonets well planted and well supported by the human figure. It has notwithstanding happened that corps, of what were esteemed good infantry, have been attacked, broken and

defeated by inferior numbers of dragoons; and this has even happened under circumstances where, according to the rules of war and good sense, dragoons ought not to have been capable of making impression. Such disasters happen not unfrequently: they proceed from ignorance, oftener than from cowardice; it is therefore proper and necessary that infantry soldiers be made acquainted with the extent of their own power when united by tactic and sustained by courage, and this can only be done by demonstrative example.

Movements.

Three days in the week are supposed to be set apart for firing of ball cartridge and practice in the use of arms; the other three, in laying the foundations of instruction on the head of complex movements, whether openly in the face of the enemy, or remotely, as it were, and under concealment. Complex movement is important in itself, as constituting a principal cause of the success of military operations in the field. But, in order that the instruction be comprehended clearly, without which it cannot be executed justly, it is necessary that the principle be explained, and the practice demonstrated to the young soldier, in all its forms, by a patient and intelligent master. If the principle upon which military operations depend be clearly comprehended, the execution will be learned easily; and, if care be taken to demonstrate utility, the exercise will be practised with alacrity and good will. In such case, the physical power is inured to a habit; and the mental conception, expanding and becoming interested in the corporeal act gives, in as much as it comprehends the purpose for which the act is to be undertaken, a comparatively sure effect.

If the principle, upon which military movements are made, be explained in a simple and intelligible manner to the recruit, it is presumed that, with the principle in view, the execution of evolution will be comparatively soon attained. It must however be always borne in mind that execution cannot be precise, unless it be effected

through a consistent basis, that is, unless the moving parts be arranged in the fabric according to exertions of power, as estimated and known by trial to correspond with each other. If this suggestion be attended to, the several parts of the regiment or corps, as they move according to a measured and known step, and correspond in power according to position relatively, unite in one exertion by a natural and instinctive act. In such case, effect will be primarily correct, so as not to require a retrograde, or shuffling of the feet to give uniformity of appearance to the order of the line.

A young man, prepared in the primary school for six months, practised in complex movements and firing of ball cartridge for six more, may be regarded as a person instructed in the first rudiments of his profession, consequently fit to be incorporated into a regiment, and classed in that regiment according to his respective quality or condition. A regiment may be considered as an army in miniature, complete in the formation and composition of its effective parts. As an army, it is necessarily formed to meet the ordinary presentations of an enemy with its own means; and, in this manner, it is supposed to be formed of four classes, as calculated to meet the more prominent objects in a military action, viz. riflemen—as marksmen; light infantry, allotted to desultory movements; battalion—or ordinary line, destined principally for the exercise of the firelock; and grenadiers of superior force and courage, reserved for close combat with the bayonet.

It is reasonable to suppose, as has been already observed, that more or less of fitness for the different purposes of the service will result from the manner of life of the individual, prior to enlistment. What is here supposed is generally verified by experience; but, besides the supposed qualification from previous habit, the quality of the individual himself must be individually examined and appreciated

prior to incorporation, so that the station allotted to him be that which best corresponds with his qualities—physical or moral. It is left to those, who are professedly of the military class, to fix the strength of regiments or corps, and to determine the proportion of the orders of which the corps consists. It might be deemed presumptuous in the writer to offer a suggestion on the subject; but, as military actions usually consist of different parts, and, as the nature of the action varies according to the scene on which it is fought, it is obvious that the number and the qualities of the classes ought to be well considered, so that they be suitably adapted to the circumstances of the service.

Rifle. Rifle—or marksmen form the first part of a regiment. They are useful on various occasions, especially in sieges and for the attack and defence of advanced posts or picquets. They act with advantage on rocky and broken grounds, in woods and covered places. They are, or they may be employed to feel the pulse of the enemy, to cover those who reconnoitre positions, to harrass and annoy, and occasionally to impede the progress of lines or columns in their advance to the scene of action. The instruction, which qualifies the soldier for this part of duty, consists in knowing the power and proper management of the rifle. The proper use of the rifle requires skill; and besides skill, the application of it requires such form of cover, as gives reasonable security from the impression of causes which agitate the frame and render the hand unsteady. But, besides position, or cover in approaching an enemy, the rifleman requires to possess, in his own person, a quick and discerning eye, address to conceal himself whether in advancing or retiring; and, together with address, the capacity of judging correctly of designs from appearances; hence while active, he must be intelligent, and he must also be prompt to decide in difficulty.

The light infantry, or second part of the regiment is prepared for closer combat, and a more honourable part in action than the rifleman. It occasionally meets the enemy with main force, though in a desultory and irregular manner. The properties of this class of soldiers, besides good wind and long endurance of exerted movement, connected with a light body and long fork, are correct and ready knowledge of the aspects of ground and position, a mind of enterprise, a bold and daring courage,—ardour in pursuit of glory. The instruction, which qualifies for the proper exercise of the duty, consists in expertness of executing movement and evolution, in firing correctly at objects under various forms of presentation.—The tactic of the light troops appears to be irregular; but it has its own rules of order. The light infantry advances rapidly and sometimes retreats precipitately. It occupies positions and maintains them for a given time and given purpose. In short, the duty of meeting all the irregular presentations of the enemy, of arresting his progress, and of thereby allowing the battalion to approach to the just point of attack without the necessity of accelerating its pace, devolves on this species of force; in other words, it covers the battalion from the impression of causes which occasion emotion disturb the steadiness of the hand, and consequently diminish the certainty of the effect from fire—the arm in which the battalion's power consists.

The battalion, which is the main body of the army and the power which is calculated to act principally by fire-arms, is supposed to be composed of persons who possess correct mechanical power of the hand, acquired in the occupations of individual manual labour. Hence the mass of artisans, as mechanibal in mind and body, is presumptively the fittest to furnish materials for this part of the military instrument.

Grenadier.

Besides riflemen, light infantry and battalion or fusileers, there is a description of force called grenadier, which is the reserve, or last resource of an army. Persons, who have given proof of resolute mind and powerful body, are alone the persons to be admitted into this class. The qualification consists in the possession of bodily power, and the indelible impression of a grenadier motto. "*Victory, or a grave in the field of battle:*"—the grenadier must be a soldier of service, not a lad who measures six feet.

Stratagesy, and
mock
demonstrations
of combat.

The elementary parts of the army having acquired the rudiments of military education separately and independently, and having been selected, classed and trained for the performance of military duties scientifically and systematically as here described, the institution of a system of exercise and movement, similar to that which is practised in actual war, is the next and last part in a system of mechanical training; and it is the part which, while it preserves all that has been done, digests the experience and acquirement into system, and brings it into form for practical use. It is proper that a regiment, (which is an army in miniature), be exercised frequently and perseveringly in all forms of evolution which occur in military action. Such exercises are useful; and, as they are always practicable, so they ought to be often practised. But further, where circumstances permit the meeting of different regiments, so as to form something like an army, it is especially necessary that a course of practice in compound movement be instituted on an extensive scale, with a view to extend the sphere and to perfect the effect of the military training. Regiments ought, for instance, to be tried and practised in marching at the different military paces on different kinds of ground, for the purpose of estimating capacities and ascertaining the extent of powers. When this has been done, and the powers are correctly known, the

military officer who, informed of the precise distance, the nature of the roads and the qualities of the ground on which he is to act, cannot be supposed to err, in calculating the time at which the several parts, moving on different lines in a combined operation, will reach their destination, as well as to form precise opinion of the power which they may yet retain for acting when the destination is attained. In conducting this plan of exercise and discipline, whether with one or many regiments, the troops ought to be thrown into all possible forms, and instructed in all modes of warfare that occur in attack, or in defence. They ought for instance to be accustomed to march at different paces, to change the pace at given times, to exhibit every mode of exertion which is called forth in war, and to combine all the powers correctly for a joint and just effect. Practice forms habit; and hence it is that, when the parts of an army have been put together according to natural correspondence in power, and accustomed to move in cadence on all occasions, the estimate of effect, as proceeding from the operation of an instrument that is justly balanced in all its parts, may be expected to be correct and uniform throughout. But, in order that the exercises and evolutions be well managed and well applied in execution, it would be useful that the soldier himself were convinced of the purpose for which they are instituted. Such conviction is important; and it might be impressed on the mind of the individual without much trouble, by exhibiting example demonstrative of effect. The proper management of demonstrative example requires discernment in the instructor; but, properly managed, it facilitates labour, and spares the necessity of employing measures which, without such demonstrative example, will still be defective. If the various causes which influence the conduct of man were rightly understood, and applied with discernment to subjects under military training, it would not be impossible,—perhaps not

difficult to render soldiers so perfect by education, as to perform all the military operations of which their physical powers are capable with perfect mechanical correctness, and with an effect subject to correct calculation. Such perfection may be attained; but it cannot be attained so as to be calculated upon, without practice on every variety of ground where military actions can be supposed to take place.

The requisite time for training the recruit to the practice of combined movement, as connected with practical warfare, cannot be supposed to be less than six months. Habit cannot be formed without time; and, unless habit be formed and firmly established, we cannot depend on the soldier as acting correctly under the various forms in which the enemy's force presents itself. The practice of evolution and movement, as before stated, may be, and ought to be performed regimentally; but besides regimental practice, it will be further proper that great bodies of troops be brought together on proper ground at stated times, for the sake of an extensive exercise of the duties which are necessary in the field, and in order to furnish opportunities of shewing examples of the various modes of attack and defence which are practised by contending armies.—It is such demonstration only as represents all the realities of a combat, except actual slaughter, that can be supposed to furnish this instruction. It places before the eye of the soldier an example of something similar to that which he must expect to see in the field; whence, in consequence of experience, he is less apt to be startled at noise and threatening aspects than he otherwise would be. The effects are different in actual war and in demonstrations illustrative of war; but the superficial appearances are similar, and surprise, as an effect of novelty, is diminished by such exhibitions. In order that the exhibition leave an useful lesson with the young soldier, it must be

often repeated, varied in form according to circumstances of ground, and conducted without any other correspondence between the opposing military officers, than the injunction to attack or defend certain positions in the field; such, as when secured, command advantages or assure victory. The practice alluded to accustoms the soldier to look at things in their different aspects, and to distinguish truth from its appearance. It teaches him also to estimate the importance of the purpose to be accomplished, and it moreover tends to improve his own ability in carrying it into execution. It serves farther to sharpen the genius of the officer; for, as the operations are supposed to be carried on without concert between parties, the mind is exercised in finding remedies for contingencies, and in finding them promptly. Hence a certain degree of proficiency in the art of war, at least a perfect correctness in the execution of all the parts of tactic and strategy, may be necessarily supposed to result from the mode of training and exercise now suggested.

The demonstrations, or mock engagements now alluded to, are not without their use in the manner in which they are usually conducted; but the example will be more instructive if it more nearly resemble the reality. The effect of fire-arms produces a given destruction in the field of battle; and hence, in imitation of reality, a proportion of the parts are supposed to disappear from the ranks in the mock engagements, as from the supposed havoc of the enemy's fire. The ranks being thinned by the apparent operation of an ordinary cause of destruction, a necessity is incurred, and an opportunity offered of reorganising what is left upon a corresponding basis of order. To reorganize the shattered ranks in the face of fire, and under a continually accumulating destruction, is the most important and the most difficult operation which occurs in war. To effect it properly commands the highest admiration; it marks the highest degree of prompt-

titude and self possession. It may be useful for the military officer to study, and to endeavour to ascertain the principle upon which the reorganization of shattered ranks depends. The cause is obscure; and it is left to the military officer to turn it in his own mind. The reorganization of broken lines under fire constitutes the highest effort of discipline, and gives the most convincing proof of military excellence; so, if the fire of the mock engagement do not apparently derange the ranks of the battalions, with the view of affording an opportunity of reorganizing for the sake of instruction, the effect is incomplete.—Such engagement does not in fact exhibit a correct representation of war, and it does not of course rank in the first degree of usefulness. It is an exhibition to amuse,—not an example to instruct.

If the ground, over which an army is destined to march in its route to the field of battle, be correctly known, the general who commands, and who is supposed to be duly acquainted with the relative powers of the troops in marching, is not likely to err in calculating the time of the rendezvous of the different columns at their proper stations; and further, if the nature of the ground upon which the combat takes place be rightly understood, the effect of fire-arms on grounds of different declivities and at different distances from the object being previously calculated and known, together with the capabilities of the different divisions for seizing advantageous positions and for maintaining them with obstinacy when seized, the calculation on the issue of the combat will seldom be erroneous. An army, on this supposition, is understood to be so organized as to be capable of acting upon a fixed principle. By ascertaining the effect of fire-arms at different distances and in different modes of direction, and, by practising evolution and movement so as to form the habit of bringing means to bear with precision and with all their

force on given points, the issue of a battle becomes a matter of correct calculation; for it follows a rule of science. Such science belongs to the military officer, and the correct application of it is supposed to constitute his principal study. An army may be sufficiently powerful in itself to effect a specified purpose; but, if the power be not applied to the proper point, it fails entirely, or it succeeds partially and by chance, where success ought to have been complete and certain as the result of systematic arrangement. Hence, in order to obtain full effect from just application, it is necessary that conditions and circumstances be carefully considered, that the character of the different classes of troops be justly estimated, placed in their proper stations, and applied with precision in the respective lines of their duty. Riflemen compose the first class of troops. Their mode of fighting is desultory and loose: they cover operations, harrass and annoy, rather than fight a battle. Light infantry is likewise ranked among the troops of demonstration. It seizes positions by rapidity of movement, maintains them by obstinacy and firmness of courage; and, in doing this, it covers or masks the execution of important general movements. Its services are preparatory of the great conflict, for it guards the line from annoyance until it arrive at its appointed station in all its fitness. This is necessary to be done; for, it must be always borne in mind that if the object in view be impression from the fire of musketry, as the fire must not be permitted to commence till the distance be point blank, so the force intended to operate by means of fire must not be permitted to quicken its pace, in advancing to its station. It is a physical fact, of which any man may try the truth that when the body is heated, the current of blood accelerated by running or other exertion, the heart beats high, the lungs pant for breath, and the power of the arm is weakened; consequently the act of the hand is wavering and unsteady, and the

direction of the fire is false. From this simple fact arises an important lesson for military persons; viz. that wherever the main action depends upon the fire of musketry, the line or column of troops destined for execution, ought to be led to its position at the slow pace of movement; and to this may be added that wherever troops are directed to advance in charge with the bayonet, or other weapon of close attack, the force should be husbanded, and the movement accelerated only in degree and for a distance, sufficient to give impulse, not to exhaust power.

The officer directs the application of his means to the proper point of attack; the soldier makes impression by his dexterity in managing his arms. Dexterity is acquired by careful and long practice. The consciousness of superior dexterity gives courage and confidence in action; viz. the courage and confidence which results from practice in actual war. The veteran soldiers of Alexander, denominated the silver shields, appear to have attained the highest degree of perfection, arising from this source of experience, which any soldiers ever attained. They were fierce and confident from superior skill; and, as such, they ruled the fate of battles. The successes of the Roman armies were highly distinguished; and those successes were produced in a great measure by the perfection which the soldiers attained in the use of arms. The military institution imperiously commanded daily practice in all forms of exercise; and the habit thereby acquired produced a correctness and union of action in the day of battle, which could have been no other way produced. Force was thus concentrated to be applied with impression on given points of attack, or to resist as one body in defence. The Buccaneers of America were irregulars and freebooters. They perhaps will not be allowed to rank in the military class; but, if such privilege be granted them, they may be adduced as an example of superior success from supe-

rior knowledge in the use of fire-arms. The Buccaneer wasted no ammunition. He was master of himself and confident in courage from superiority of skill. But in all military, ancient or modern, mechanical or irregular, Prussian or Buccaneer, it is experience that imprints character and imparts courage from knowledge, or consciousness of superiority in the art of applying power on given points at a given time. Such courage is cool and tempered; that of inexperienced troops is impetuous, blind, headlong and liable to mistake and failure. But, while these fail on many occasions, they also sometimes achieve unexpected things by impulse,—things which veterans would not attempt. Veterans act by knowledge, and act in rule; the inexperienced astonish by their boldness, and they sometimes succeed through ardour, contrary to the rules of military calculation.

PART IV.

INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL MOTIVES OF MILITARY ACTION.

SOME suggestions have been offered in the preceding pages concerning the mode of organizing recruits, with a view to form a military instrument of just mechanical connexion in all its parts. It is plain that the formation of the instrument must rest fundamentally on a true estimate of physical power individually, and that the act of it must be maintained scientifically by the application of a due impulse of motive to excite movement and cement union firmly and equally in all. Human action acknowledges two general motives as its source, viz. love or desire, fear or aversion. These primary motives, modified by the contingencies of human life, diverge into numerous channels and produce much diversity of action among the mass of human beings. Hence an army, which consists of a number of separate and independent individuals, differing in figure and form from each other, discording in temper, and variously susceptible of impression, can only be supposed to move harmoniously, and to act consistently by the stimulation of a principle of paramount force; such as absorbs in itself and directs to one point all the active powers and faculties of its

several parts. The proper management of this paramount principle of human action, viz. desire of one thing, and aversion from another, is a difficult part of the military officer's duty, in so far as regards application:—without genius, it cannot be well applied. It requires an intimate knowledge of human structure and human character in all its shades and bearings; and, as this is a deep and toilsome study it is unfortunately little prosecuted by men in power.

SECTION I.

THE causes which influence the character of military subjects are various. Some operate in early life through contingencies which produce habit; some through civil institutions or professed military education, which, acting on a basis of reason, generate a consistent system of conduct of more or less perfection and effect. The contingent causes which affect the military character derive from the following sources; viz. 1st. National character, as connected with pursuits of life, or state of social intercourse among the different members of the nation. 2nd. Character of the rival power on which the army acts, viz. high or low in military reputation. 3rd. Selection, and arrangement of the individual parts into corps or regiments according to physical power and moral sympathies, or by size and figure only as masses of brute matter. 4th. Form and character of tactic and discipline—as original or borrowed, that is, national, or imported from foreigners; and *lastly*, mode and character of service, as

calculated to condense and cement, or to divide and dissipate military energies.

National character:

1st. The semibarbarous stage of society, where man is distinguished for strength and vigour of mind, is the epoch in human history most fertile of military genius and warlike qualities. The fact assumed is indisputable—so evident indeed to observation that it is not necessary to adduce any proof of it. But, though proof of the general position be unnecessary, it will not be deemed impertinent to attempt to give an outline of the progress and changes of warlike character, as manifested at different times among the inhabitants of Great Britain. The subject is curious and interesting; and, if the author's powers were equal to the proper elucidation of it, it could not fail to be attractive and instructive to military readers. The English nation, either as principal or auxiliary, is oftener engaged in war than any other nation in Europe; and, if the almost continual wars between England and France for the last thousand years, the wars and conquests in Ireland,—the wars with Scotland prior to the union, the civil wars within the kingdom, whether factionary between different branches of the Royal House, or revolutionary between kings and people, the wars of conquest and colonization, trade and freebooting in the East and West Indies, in North and South America, and even in Africa be taken into the account, the English, if not regularly organised as a military power, is decidedly the first among fighting nations. The nation is ambitious of power, covetous of territory and spoil, covertly grasping the dominion of the world through a monopoly of trade and commerce. This may be deemed a libel:—an appeal to history proves it too literally to be a truth.

It does not belong to this place to enter into discussions which do not bear directly on causes of military preeminence; but, as a leading trait of character ingrafts itself on the habits and acts of every

individual of a nation, it is obvious to remark that the British are at present more distinguished for a speculative and complicated character of adventure, whether in agriculture, manufacture, traffick, stock-jobbing, or military enterprise than any other people in Europe. The nation, which is ambitious as a nation, has an insatiable desire of gain of money. Acquisition of money, directly or remotely, is the pursuit of all its members, the engine of activity to all, even to those of the highest station. The composition of society is different in England from what it is in most other European countries. In the greater part of the continent, there is only lord and vassal, or other servile instrument of luxury and pleasure. In England, the spirit of manufacture; trade and barter of all saleable commodities marks the national character; and, as that spirit requires a certain power of self disposal for its developement, the English, who possess that power, rush to every adventure which promises advantage. The mass of the nation is at present manufacturer and mercantile, working for gain of money direct; in former times, there was a class of persons, known by the name of *yeomen*, who were in some degree free and independent of servile pursuit. They were bold and manly in spirit, the bulwark of the country in times of danger, not the mercenary tools of an overflowing treasury. They are not yet extinct; but they are reduced to comparatively small numbers. These *yeomen* were, it may be presumed, descendants of Saxons and Danes. They lost the sovereignty of the soil at the Norman invasion; but they appear to have retained a national mind, and a sentiment of liberty beyond the common vassals of the kings, lords, or barons of the continent. Whether the sentiment of liberty belonged peculiarly to the Anglo-Saxon race; or, whether it arose, and acquired a constitutional form under the compact through which the settlements of the Saxons were formed in England, the yeomen and seafaring part of the community, who were

presumptively of a Saxon or Danish origin, may be regarded as the only part of the nation, which, until the revolution of the 17th century, had any idea of constitutional freedom founded on natural right.

The cause of the establishment of constitutional freedom among the English is a subject of important concern. The proper investigation of it is beyond the writer's ability, and he abstains from entering into it deeply; but he thinks he may venture to say that the associations formed by adventurers, such as the Saxons were, whether with a view to predatory inroad, or permanent settlement, may be considered as associations in which every part was functionary, efficient, and obedient to a primary law of the compact, consequently every part had a defined sphere and a limited portion of liberty. As a body of adventurers may be supposed to act under a law of order, constitutional restraint is common to all, that is, the right of arbitrary oppression is conceded to no one. It may thus be supposed that associated adventurers invade foreign territory, usurp the sovereignty of the soil and plant a species of freedom in the conquered country. Kings invade, conquer thrones; and, having obtained the sovereignty of the soil, engraft slavery on the mass of the people, whom they estimate as the spoil of the strong arm. The Saxon adventurers and the Norman conqueror furnish examples of what is alleged. William, a feudal and despotic prince, followed by a swarm of feudal vassals, landed on the English shores with a view to obtain possession of the crown, and thereby to command the allegiance of the people. He succeeded in his attempt by the issue of a single battle; and, having succeeded, he extinguished for a time the exercise of constitutional freedom in England. The Norman officers became feudal lords; the inferior soldiery feudal vassals. The Saxon population, which consisted of different migrations inhabiting different districts

of country, loosely connected with the central government, and apparently little interested in the fate of kings, submitted to the Norman invader with little resistance. The country was overrun. It was occupied, and treated as a conquered country; but still, in spite of the harsh spirit of Norman despotism, a portion of the Saxon race retained something of their constitutional independence; others regained it at after periods by purchase or other contingency. The class of Englishmen, styled yeoman, presumptively of Saxon origin, were conspicuous among the English people for a blunt and manly character. Agriculture was their occupation, hunting their pastime; their sports and amusements were rural, active, and warlike.—If they owed submission to a feudal lord, they were not abject slaves. The seafaring people, in whom it may be supposed there was a large mixture of Danish blood, were rude and boisterous as the element on which they lived; they were bold and hardy. The freebooting spirit of their ancestors long adhered to them; consequently they were ready for every enterprise of adventure connected with gain, or liberty. From such population, the crusades to the Holy Land, the auxiliary wars in France and Flanders against the tyranny of sovereign kings had, it may be presumed, many volunteers. The buccaneering expeditions to the Western hemisphere were numerous at one period of the English history; and, though they were not, strictly speaking, conducted, after the mode of authorised warfare among civilized nations, they strongly mark the character of the English people. They exhibited specimens of heroic enterprise, generosity and cupidity, firmness and dissipation that do not often present themselves in the history of mankind. There is reason to believe that the English soldier and the English adventurer of the chivalrous times was of a higher class than the agricultural peasant; who, in England as in other countries in Europe, was a simple serf until the middle of

the seventeenth century; when, electrified as it were by the equalizing impulse of Christian truth, he ceased to be a slave—and became a man. The dormant energies of the human mind were then called into activity through all ranks of people; and the spirit of individual independence, which characterized the epoch of the Commonwealth, though persecuted and oppressed at the restoration of the monarchy, was not entirely extinguished by strong exertions of despotism. The fund remained: it was brought out, and established in a chastened and constitutional form in the year 1668.

The wars of King William, Prince of Orange, were not of great lustre in the field; but they were interesting through the apparent generosity of the motive which produced and supported them:—those of his successor were brilliant beyond example. The Duke of Marlborough was superior as a genius in war; and the English were then soldiers worthy of their General. The military field was comparatively narrow under the Earl of Peterborough; but there was something of the generous and heroic in it which attracts attention and interests the mind. When the wars of Queen Anne terminated, the spirit of Marlborough and Peterborough being withdrawn from the army, the military course, instead of advancing, appeared to retrograde. The allurements of gain from manufacture and trade supplanted the ideas of national glory from conquest; and, as from that, or other cause, the ranks of the English army were chiefly filled by the outcasts of the English population, the English army was little distinguished in the field until the latter years of the war 1756. Whether this proceeded from inferior materials, inferior commanders, or want of national interest as respects the motive of the war, others may determine;—the fact is not equivocal.

The Scotch, particularly the Lowland Scotch, made part of the English army from the accession of James the First,—more directly and effectively from the time of the union;—they had their share of glory in the wars of Queen Anne. The Scotch were at this time considerably behind the English in what is termed civilization; that is, their fare was homely and their clothing coarse, their figure uncouth and their external condition of little variety. But, though homely and uncouth in appearance, the Scot possessed eminent qualities for contest on the military field. From the time of the reformation, at least from the time of the establishment of parochial schools, the Scotch had the advantage of a national education. This, as laid on the base of the Christian code, opened a view to the true condition of man as an individual, and produced a sentiment, in the lowest orders of the people, of the first value in regulating moral conduct, and in stimulating to exertion where the cause was deemed reasonable and just.

The Scotch Highlanders, different in origin, language and manners from the people of the Lowlands were, prior to the year 1745, nearly independent tribes who lived in a state of warlike and heroic barbarism. The chiefs were feudal lords with civil jurisdiction; the people were vassals, presumptively of the same blood with the lords. The jurisdiction of the chief was annulled after the year 1745; and the Highlander, from that epoch, became intimately incorporated with the British nation. The prominent feature of the Highland clans is warlike; and, as the chiefs were restrained from factious and domestic broils with each other, the people entered freely into the ranks of the British army in the war 1756; and carried off a large share of the renown of the successful campaigns—particularly in Canada. The Highland corps mustered strong in the American revolutionary war. The issue of the contest was not such as could

be called glorious to the British arms; but the fighting character of the English soldier was not tarnished,—and that of the Highlander, as more known, was better appreciated and more highly valued.

The Irish nation furnishes other, and, at present, very numerous materials for the British army. Ireland was attacked by England when it had no united government to defend it; and, in defect of organized means of defence, it submitted to an enterprizing and politic invader. The English became lords of the soil by force of arms. The native Irish were degraded to vassallage; and they have been kept in a state of depression, worse than ordinary vassalage, from the conquest to the present time. The feudal vassal of England and particularly of Scotland was often of the same race, and of the same blood with the feudal lord; mutual connexion and sympathy thus existed between them—The feudal lord was a conqueror in Ireland,—and he was regarded with aversion as an usurper. The English nation obtained liberty through revolution in church and state in the seventeenth century. The Scot obtained a scope and freedom of thinking through changes effected in the form of religion, and particularly through the establishment of parish schools, where the basis of instruction was laid on the Christian code, that is, on the sacred truth that the lowest of human beings is a man, and that the highest is not more. The Irish, notwithstanding the unsteadiness which apparently characterises their conduct, are kept, by management, under the influence of a bigotted priesthood in matter of religion; and, since the time of their submission to England, a jealous political surveillance watches narrowly, and treats, as rebellion, every expansion of mind which unfolds ideas connected with human rights and liberties. The native Irish have thus had as yet no reformation or revolution, similar to the political revolution among the English, or the religious reformation among the Scotch; and they have not thus been as yet furnished

with the opportunity of rising to their just place in the scale of national military importance. No one, who knows the Irish, will venture to say that their physical military properties are inferior to those of the other members of the United Kingdom; and, with acknowledged military properties, the proofs are numerous that they possess mental sensibility, which is, or may be made the base of moral virtues. Nature has planted the fund of excellence in the Irish organism; the operation of the commendable act is suppressed, or obscured through defect in the spring which moves the mechanism; or, it is driven into a wrong channel compulsively by irritations arising from ill judged severity. The Irish abound at present in the British army.—They are brave and cheerful in the field of battle; but they are soldiers bought to the service for a price, and, as such, cannot be supposed to be animated with national military spirit; nor can it be reasonably supposed that a genuine and native Irishman, (driven from the manor house of his ancestors to a hovel on the common, and even, in this age of liberality, refused admission to places of official trust on account of religion,) cordially participates in the glory of the nation which conquered him in an age of barbarism, and which still proscribes him in an age of civilization. It lies beyond the author's judgment to give opinion, whether or not restrictions are right and necessary in the case alluded to; but any one is competent to say that, until restrictions be removed, the Irish peasant cannot be of full value to the state of which he is nominally a member.

If the history of men and nations be carefully observed and scientifically analyzed, one outline of proceeding may be traced in all. In the period of youth, or emergence from barbarism, the mind is strong and the military acts are energetic. This is illustrated in the history of Great Britain. The era of the commonwealth may be considered as England's national youth; the wars in the reign of Queen Anne

afford a brilliant example of her manhood. The war of 1656, which brought the Scotch Highlanders, from predatory and factious warfare in their sequestered vallies, to systematic war in the open theatre of world, may be considered as the youth, or military emergence of the Highlanders. Their youth was vigorous, and they still remain in their manhood, notwithstanding the counteraction of the strong deteriorating causes to which they have been lately exposed. After the termination of the wars of Queen Anne, pursuits of manufacture, trade, commerce and aggiculture, as a direct speculation for gain of money, engrossed the activity of the population of England. Similar pursuits extended to the Southern division of Scotland after the termination of war of 1756. The improvement, as it must be termed in compliance with custom, progressed Northward; and the poorer classes of Highlanders were disturbed in the possession of their sequestered vallies by this rage for improvement. The Highland chiefs were now under no apprehension of hostility from one another; and, relieved from apprehension on that head, they seem to have found out that they would profit more by the fleeces of flocks of sheep, than by the devotion and prowess of military vassals. The vassal Highlanders were thus unhoused to make room for sheep, and forced by necessity to migrate to uncultivated America in search of a home, or to seek a precarious subsistence in the trading towns of the South by drudgery and servile toil. Born and bred among the mountains, where the spirit of war and heroism was ingrafted on the frame, the Highlander, not relishing or not possessing capacity for mechanic arts, became the lowest of labourers in luxurious cities, or, entering into the army, proved himself to be the best and bravest of soldiers.

The people of England, prior to the termination of the war in the reign of Queen Ann, and the people of Scotland, prior to the termination of the war 1756, appear to have been in that stage of society which, as emerging

from mental torpor, produces soldiers of the first character. From these periods downwards, the tide of activity has moved in another channel. Instead of the phantom of military glory, which at different epochs urged the English and the Scotch to the field of combat, the allurements of wealth, and the attempts to acquire it by speculation and adventure, rather than to earn bread by toil and patient industry, has engrossed all the desires and absorbed into itself all the energies of the man. A nation, as a whole, moves under the influence of one general and dominant passion; and, in conformity to the dictate of the prevailing passion, the temptation of bribes;—not the stimulus of national glory, fills the ranks of armies at the present time. The soldier is openly bought for a price. The officer sometimes purchases a commission in speculation of good interest for his money; or, he adopts the profession of arms, in the expectation of rising to rank and profit through the influence of his friends, not through the hard service of the field. The operation of money, where money is the master engine of the state, fills the ranks of the army with rapidity; and it often fills them with materials which act with energy in wars of aggression, where the hopes of spoil are before the eye and stimulate to exertion. The history of mankind proves to conviction that armies, composed of mercenary materials, are of small reliance in defence. It is patriotism which defends a country; and there are volumes of evidence before the public in proof of the fact, that wealth and patriotism do not dwell together. The labour of the mechanic may be purchased for money; the spirit of the patriot is beyond the touch of gold. It may even be added that, wherever a nation adopts the practice of filling the ranks of its army by purchase, whether at a foreign market, or at the market of outcasts from its own population, the foundations of its national decay are laid; and it may be predicted,

without the spirit of prophecy that, sooner or later, the national edifice will be a ruin.

Military character of the rival enemy.

2nd. That the rise and fall of military character is influenced by the warlike character of the opponent is a well founded position,—so obvious indeed that it does not require to be illustrated by much detail of history. The Romans were stimulated to exertion in the infancy of the republic by the formidable power of the expelled Tarquin. When the attempts of Tarquin failed, they were urged to proceed in the pursuits of military science by the preponderating force of the neighbouring states, which were jealous of their aspiring spirit. After the conquest of Italy and the termination of the second Punic war, the Romans had not, strictly speaking, a rival to contend with. The people, with whom they came into hostile contact, were factious republics, tyrannic despots with mercenary armies, or hordes of rude barbarians,—brave, but deficient in the complicated science of war, consequently not possessing that property of rival character which excites the military genius and supports the military name. The Romans studied tactic, or exercised themselves in the practice of arms after the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Italy; but, as it was for the purpose of extending dominion, not for resisting aggression that this was done, the impulse was uncertain, and the moral bond weak, in as much as it was converted from the defence of the native soil, to the acquisition of the soil and spoil of others.—The proceeding moves on the same base in all countries and among all conditions of men as it did among the Romans. The movement is an important one; but the progress of it is only noticed cursorily in this place—and that chiefly as it relates to the empire of Great Britain.

The French and English are rivals; and, as rivals, they quarrel and fight. They shake hands, draw breath for a longer or shorter

time, quarrel and fight again. The military glory of the French stood high towards the close of the seventeenth century. The ambition of the monarch, who then occupied the throne, was great, so great indeed as to aspire to the hope of subjugating the world to his will. The English were jealous; and, as they are at no time averse from war, they soon came into hostile contact with their rival. The English government was then new; at least it had been renovated, and it was in vigour. The republican spirit of the people was strong; and, as the sentiment which urged to war was generous, the pretensions of the French monarch, which were revolting to the republican spirit, were opposed with resolution and courage. The high military character of the French acted as a stimulus to English patriotism, and roused the national energies to a high point of exertion. From the termination of the successful war of Queen Anne, which defeated the views of French ambition, until the latter periods of the war 1756, the military spirit of the English was low, comparatively dormant. That of its rival advanced, as raised from depression to eminence by some scattered rays of genius among the military chiefs.

But though the military spirit of England was faint, during this period, it was not extinguished. The material of enterprize existed; and it was stimulated to exertion in the course of time by the arrogance of France. Success followed exertion, and glory followed success, in so much that the war 1756 closed with an increase of military reputation, and a positive balance of advantages on the English side. The stimulus, which acts on the spirit of troops as a consequence of the military reputation of the opponent, could not be supposed to exist in the war with the American provinces. The Americans had attained no name in arms, and had as yet no pretensions to military science, consequently all the military glory, which

could attach to success in the American revolutionary war, was no more than the glory of repressing the revolt of unskilful peasants.

The nations, which combined against the French in the year 1792, were in a somewhat similar predicament with the English at the commencement of the American war of 1775. The most of them stood high in military reputation, and all of them were perfectly drilled to military tactic. They calculated success on the presumption of their skill, and were not strongly stimulated to exert it by the military glory of their rival; for the French were then regarded as a revolted multitude,—ignorant of warlike science. They had been deserted by the class which deems itself born to the privilege of commanding armies; and they were thus considered to be an easy prey to the disciplined troops of the allied sovereigns. The case was put to trial and failed. The trial brought proof that the energy of spirit, which belongs to freedom, is of more value than the science of the tactic which moves under the impression of fear; and it proved moreover that the wisdom of an assembly of common men often defeats the wisdom of a council of kings. Genius and good sense are gifts of nature, and they are dispensed as freely to the cottage as to the palace. The annunciation of the fact will be deemed rude; the truth of it is strongly exemplified in the revolutionary war with France. Exclusive of the devoted patriotism which animated every Frenchman in that important contest, the light of genius beamed on many; and, it beamed with so much splendour on some, that tactic and discipline made more progress on a scientific and reasoned base in the first years of the republic, than it had done at any period of history from the early days of Rome. The military system, which gave success to the arms of republican France, seems, in so far as the question can be judged by a non-professional man, to be founded on an intimate knowledge

of the real nature of things, physical and moral. It had much resemblance to the system of the Roman republic—modified to circumstances—not servilely copied. It possessed its own spirit, and it acted always with the spirit of an original. Its success was unparalleled. At the close of the war in 1802, which was the last days of the republic, the military reputation of the French nation stood on a high eminence. Republican France was formidable in war, from union of object and energy of sentiment in the executive, not less than from form and manner of tactic. Imperial France was formidable; but it was formidable from causes of less stability, viz. perfection in mechanical tactic and military evolution, arrogant assumptions and political impositions on the part of a chief, who intimidated his selfish opponents with so much art that they were half conquered before the battle was joined. All the sovereigns on the continent submitted to Napoleon; and they would have remained in submission to a late period, had not the position of England, and the courage of the people opposed a barrier to his progress. England alone resisted Napoleon in his insolence; and her courage grew strong under resistance. The eminence of the rival excited her military exertion; and the eminence of the rival has actually been the means of adding to her military reputation; for it may be said, without offending truth, that the rival spirit of the soldier, rather than the military skill of the General, sustained the combat on the field of Waterloo. Great Britain gained no reputation from the first American war: she did not gain, nor could she be expected to gain any from the second. The enemy did not present himself as a military rival: success would have been no triumph, and defeat will pass into the page of history as a disgrace.

3rd. It is assumed as a primary position in human history that man is every where the same animal. It is obvious that one man differs from another in external appearance; and it is moreover true that

Arrangement by
tried power,
or by
appearance.

the shades of difference are so various and extensive, that there are perhaps no two individuals under the sun, who correspond exactly in the measure of bodily power in all its modes of application, or in the qualities of mental capacity in all the varieties of exhibition. Impetuosity and ardour, patience and self command are extremes of temper. Extremes are defects; for, as a soldier may be too impetuous, so he may be too patient of injury. Qualities are peculiar to individuals; and, as an army is an instrument consisting of many individuals, possessing peculiar tempers and different capacities of action, it is obviously the primary business of the tactician, to ascertain the kind and degree of the power or capacity of each, so that he may be capable of arranging them in their respective stations in such a manner that the fabric be not only uniform in its appearance, but, that it be so put together by its sympathies, that all separate parts unite harmoniously and correspond correctly in action for the execution of one purpose.

The physical properties of the human race which operate effectually in war indicate themselves to the observing eye: they are tried and ascertained by experiment to be true. The principle, through which troops are joined together, so as to produce a common and consistent act, is not easily estimated and applied. The quality in the tactician, who appreciates and applies to purpose with correctness, resides in an intuitive knowledge of human nature which belongs to some as a peculiar gift. It is not learned from written books; it is matured by study in the book of nature. It is to be remarked, and borne in mind that materials of similar nature unite harmoniously with each other, augment weight, and thereby augment power without changing quality; that materials of a heterogenous kind rush together when brought into contact, lose their radical distinction of character and produce a mean between extremes. If this law of nature be rightly

understood and applied to animated matter, particularly to the selection of human materials for the composition of armies, it follows, (if it be desired to form an army of the first excellence,) that, instead of mixing people of different nations promiscuously in one corps as chance or exterior semblance directs, the purpose will be better attained by classing them in their places according to nation, county or district of country. The human species possesses certain resemblances in physical constitution according to nation, more striking ones according to country: the resemblance increases, and the union becomes progressively intimate in proportion as the sphere of the circle diminishes. In this manner while an army, which consists of the subjects of one nation only, presents a more uniform and a more consistent external appearance than an army that is composed of various nations, so the movement of the parts may be supposed to have more of natural correspondence in the time of exerted action, than the movement of those that are thrown together promiscuously from various quarters of the globe. If advantages attach to national arrangement, as deriving from correspondence in physical power, they are still more conspicuous, as connected with the morals which derive from union of sympathies contracted by habits in early life.

As it is the ostensible object of the tactician to compose a structure, apable of acting with all its parts in union for the accomplishment of a given purpose, so it is obvious that the materials, which possess the nearest correspondence with each other in their radical properties, are preferably to be classed together for the formation of the fabric in question. It is evident, as already hinted, that men, who are arranged in armies by nations and in regiments by county or districts of country, have a physical connexion with each other from correspondence of power, arising from the climate which they inhabit, or produced by the customs which prevail in the country where they

dwell. The correspondence, alluded to, is a mechanical correspondence of physical powers produced by chance. It is loose in its connexions; but it is not without weight in its effect. But besides physical correspondence, there is often a more intimate connexion among the inhabitants of particular territories, arising from a sentiment ingrafted on the mind through certain forms of education, or through habits tacitly formed by the domestic occupations which principally prevail in particular districts of a given country. Men are bound to each other by a national tie,—by the tie of county, by the tie of township, and more intimately by that of a still smaller circle. The fact is obvious to the most superficial observer; and, as the effect may be, and often is of powerful operation in war, the forming of armies, or divisions of armies by nation, and regiments by county or district of country, obviously presents itself as the most eligible mode of organizing a military force, if it be intended that that force be more than the instrument of a sovereign for purposes of arbitrary rule.

If military materials be thrown together promiscuously, that is, arranged by no other rule except that of size or quantity of matter, as it is admitted that the individual parts possess different propensities and different powers of action, it is plain that the instrument composed of these different and independent parts has a tendency to act differently:—the parts are constrained to act on one object by stimulation or coercion only. In order to maintain the union contemplated by the tactician as the object of his training, one requires to be urged, another requires to be restrained, consequently the management is difficult, for, as the actual powers of exertion do not always correspond with the physical appearances, they are not always equally influenced to exert themselves by the impulse of the same internal motive. A military instrument, composed of heterogeneous parts as here stated, cannot well be supposed to attain the highest

point of excellence. Military excellence consists, as often hinted, in every part of the instrument acting with full force, acting from one principle and for one purpose; and hence it is evident that in a mixed fabric, composed of parts of unequal power and different temper, disunion is a consequence, if all act to the full extent of their power; or, if disunion be not a consequence, the combined act must necessarily be shackled, and, as such, inferior, the strong being restrained from exertion for the sake of preserving union with the weak.

The imperfection now stated necessarily attaches to regiments composed of different nations mixed promiscuously. It even attaches, in some degree, to regiments which are formed indiscriminately from the population of all the districts or counties of an extensive kingdom. This assumption, anticipated by reasoning, is confirmed by experience in the military history of semibarbarous tribes, which are often observed, without the aid of tactic as taught in modern schools, to stick together in danger and to achieve acts of heroism beyond the comprehension of those who have no knowledge of man but as a part of a mechanical instrument of war. The fact has numerous proofs in the history of nations; but it has not a more decisive one than that which occurred in the late 71st regiment in the revolutionary war of America. In the summer of the year 1779, a party of the 71st regiment, consisting of fifty-six men and five officers was detached from a redoubt, at Stone-ferry in South Carolina, for the purpose of reconnoitering the enemy which was supposed to be advancing in force to attack the post. The instruction given to the officer who commanded went no further than to reconnoitre and retire upon the redoubt. The troops were new troops,—ardent as Highlanders usually are. They fell in with a strong column of the enemy (upwards of two thousand) within a short distance of the post; and,

instead of retiring according to instruction, they thought proper to attack,—with an instinctive view, it was supposed, to retard progress; and thereby to give time to those who were in the redoubt to make better preparation for defence. This they did; but they were themselves nearly destroyed. All the officers and non-commissioned officers were killed or wounded,—and seven of the privates only remained on their legs at the end of the combat. The commanding officer fell; and, in falling, desired the few who still resisted to make the best of their way to the redoubt. They did not obey. The national sympathies were warm: national honour did not permit them to leave their officers in the field; and they actually persisted in covering their fallen comrades until a reinforcement, arriving from headquarters which was at some distance, induced the enemy to retire. Whether the attack made by this party was right or wrong, in a military point of view, does not concern the present question. The conduct in the act was heroic, and the authors of it had no skill in the tactic of military schools. The major part of them had been taken at sea on their passage to America, and had only been recently released from prison: the best part of them, in so far as regards manual and manœuvre, would have been sent to the awkward squad of a regiment of militia at the present day. The artificial lock-step was not known to them; but heroism of mind and social sympathy locked them together as one man in the hour of danger. They were only peasants of the Scottish mountains; but they rank in history with the Spartans who fought at Thermopylæ.

Besides the motives which may thus be supposed to influence the conduct of national armies and still more strongly that of county regiments in the field of battle, another benefit, and one of material importance may be expected to arise from adherence to the rule here advocated, viz. the preservation, even the improvement of the moral cha-

racter. If we look into the history of nations and study to comprehend its spirit, we cannot avoid seeing that the moral virtue of the soldier has a greater share in the permanent success of arms than his physical prowess; and further, that no stronger cause for good conduct exists among soldiers, than the hopes that the report of such good conduct will be conveyed to his native home,—to be known to the companions of his youth, whom he cherishes in idea as the friends of his old age. The majority of soldiers are emulous to do well that their parents may be honoured; they are fearful to do wrong, lest their parents should be disgraced. Such motive exists; and it operates so strongly on the Highlanders of Scotland that the feeling, connected with it, may be considered as a main cause of the uniform good conduct of Highland soldiers in every service where they have been employed.

In order that the military fabric be rendered as perfect as possible, viz. that the parts be selected and arranged according to the correspondence of physical powers, and that the act be cemented by sympathies which arise from habits of association in domestic life, it is important that the commissioned officers be natives of the kingdom, even natives of the county to which the regiments respectively belong, so as to be known and esteemed at their native homes. If an army, or a regiment be constituted according to this rule; and if it be animated by a congenial spirit in its officers, there is reason to conclude that its conduct will be uniform, correct and praiseworthy at all times. There is no reasonable expectation to believe that this will be the case, where the constituent parts are thrown together promiscuously, and where the officer, who is supposed to give the impulse to the national act, is a foreigner, or even a stranger in the county to which the corps belongs. A soldier, of whatever class or condition he may be, attains through training and discipline certain habits and qualities that are peculiar to his profession; he, at the

same time, retains peculiarities of his county or district of country implanted in youth, and so confirmed by long continued habit that as military education cannot altogether expel it, it now and then breaks through the covering of art and endangers the action of the artificial fabric. If the commissioned officer be not familiar with all the circumstances which belong to the soldier who is under his command, he is defective in one essential qualification for his office; and, if he have no previous knowledge of the predominant characteristic of the people of the county to which the corps belongs, he will not soon learn it, or he will not much study to learn it under a temporary attachment to a corps of strangers. This is self-evident; and it is not irrelevant on this occasion to remark that the active transfer among officers, from regiment to regiment, as it suits convenience or private purposes, is, in all points of view, an injurious practice to the real interests of an army, if the interests of an army be thought to consist in domestic happiness and good moral conduct. The officer is not likely to form attachment to a class of men from whom the strong hope of promotion already separates him in idea; and the soldier forms only a slender attachment to the officer, who, if he be a man of interest, wealth or even professional value, is not expected to remain long as a friend and protector of his concerns. Where men and officers associate long together, an intimacy is often formed between them as between the members of a family; and it is observed in such case that moral conduct is ordinarily correct, military conduct generally distinguished:—if the chief be worthy of command, the whole may be expected to be obedient and worthy of praise. Where the form of association alluded to exists, there is much happiness in military life; there is little, if any, where competitions for rank and promotion, out of time and out of place, through traffick with money, or influence from high connexion, characterize the service. In such

case, no man is satisfied with his condition. From change, desire of change and inability to effect it, jealousies and murmurings prevail throughout, and military life is rarely any other than a life of complaint and grievance,—internal rot under a splendid outside.

The suggestion of forming armies according to nation, and regiments according to county, that is, of strictly executing a plan which must have been contemplated at the time that particular regiments were named after particular counties, will probably be considered as a visionary suggestion in the present state of the British empire. The plan is not it must be confessed of easy execution, in as much as the basis on which it must be supposed to rest is undermined by the diffused intercourse which obtains throughout the kingdom; an intercourse which dissipates county feeling, and reduces national sympathies almost to nothing. The foundations of union are shaken by the existing state of intercourse, and the facility of execution is thereby counteracted. This must be admitted; but, with this admission a base is still felt—sufficient to support the fabric, if the case were brought to trial; but, as the idea is repugnant to the modern idea of military organization, there are small expectations that it will soon obtain it. Frederick the second, King of Prussia, is the model of imitation of most of the European sovereigns on the subject of military formations: Frederick was a conqueror, and his authority is high: it is however not an authority of trust, for it is counter to the law of Nature. Frederick, it is not denied, did much with an army of vagabonds, that is, with a mixture of all countries and classes: his successors did nothing, though their instrument possessed all its formal perfection. The revolutionary French were heroic as national soldiers in the first days of the republic. After their ranks were polluted by foreigners,—forced or mercenary, their

success was less distinguished, notwithstanding the skill, and the multitude of impositions practised by their boasted commander to attain it. This is recent, and may be considered as authentic historical fact. If admitted to be valid, it proves that there is something in the intimate connexion which subsists between clans, tribes, inhabitants of county or district of country, and even the pure blood of a nation, stronger than any influence that arises from the mere restraints of mechanical discipline imposed on the mass by the most consummate masters of military tactic. An army that is purely national, or a regiment that is put together by clan or county, may be compared to a wall,—rugged and unequal exteriorly, but united interiorly by a bond that is strong as Roman cement:—the pieces may be broken; the cement is not dissolved. An army, on the contrary, that is put together by exterior appearance, and without regard to national sympathies is like an edifice of hewn stone. Its outside pleases the eye; but, as it is without the interior cement of national feeling, its stability is not proof against violence. The first is an army of reality: its character rests on the strength of the national mind. The last is an army of imposition, an artificial instrument of fine workmanship for the pleasure of the eye, or the amusement of princes in the pass-time of shedding human blood.

Tactic--national
or foreign.

4th. The system of tactic, under which troops are trained for war, is another point for consideration in the estimate of military character,—and it is not an unimportant one. Independently of the relative value of different systems of tactic in their scientific merits, the simple circumstance that the mode is national, or borrowed from foreigners, appears to the writer to have more influence on ultimate effect than military men generally imagine. If military history be examined with care, there scarcely occurs an instance of a nation attaining to high military reputation under a borrowed system of

tactic. Austria and Russia may be regarded at present as imitators of the tactic of Frederick, the great king of Prussia. The physical properties of the Austrian and Russian armies are good, and the artificial arrangement of the tactic is scrupulously correct; but it will not be maintained by any one, who investigates causes and estimates effect, that either of these powers have attained the first station among military nations. They conquer; but where they do so, they overwhelm by weight and number, or they intimidate by impositions on ignorance. Wherever they are heroic, they forget the borrowed tactic and revert to the mode of their ancestors.

The Spartans, who stand in the first class of military nations, had their own military institution, tactic and discipline. The outline was strictly original; or it was so presented to the soldier that it was original in his idea,—and, as such, superior. Philip of Macedon, the next great tactician in the military field, knew the weakness of human nature and acted on it with advantage. He was a man of genius,—scientific as a tactician; and, where he did not invent, he arranged and so artfully incorporated the inventions of others, that his system presented itself to the soldier as something new. As new, it gave birth to a sentiment of pride, or self importance in those who filled the Macedonian ranks; and it, at the same time, acted on the opponent by intimidation as comprehending an effect not known. The Romans, at the earlier period of their history, arranged the order of battle on the same tactical base, and fought with similar arms as the nations with whom they contended. They established themselves on the banks of the Tiber; and they might have lived in security, after the expulsion of the kings, had not the ambitious spirit of the corporated aristocracy which ruled at Rome, and which, as a form of government, is progressive in its purpose of aggrandizement above any other, prompted the design of subjugating the entire world to its will,—an achieve-

ment not to be accomplished by a small force, without the invention of means more impressive in the work of destruction than those which then existed. The Roman citizen did not possess more physical courage, and scarcely so much physical strength as the people who were contiguous to Rome. The government of Rome possessed a deep and condensed ambition, with a military sagacity and decision in difficulty that scarcely has a parallel in history. The ambition of conquest laid the foundation of the design; military sagacity conducted the execution. The Romans, who were observing and sagacious as statesmen and warriors, noted those arrangements in tactic which are most impressive in attack; or which, as best united, are most repulsive in defence; the armour which best protects from injury, and the arms which act most effectively in the destruction of those who oppose. In consequence of knowledge resulting from observation of effect, the common mode of tactic and the common arms and armour of the time were changed for such as, judged by experience and the reason of things, best combine to give activity and solidity, that is force to impress, and power to resist impression. The Roman tactic and the Roman arms and armour, invented or adopted, (for the Romans, high as they were, did not disdain to borrow a hint, though they did not servilely copy a practice,) was so incorporated and united into a whole that it became national and peculiar. The reasons of things were studied so as to be understood; a practice was not adopted until it was demonstrable that it rested on a base of mathematical science. Exercise in arms was pursued by the recruit with the ardour that belongs to a national exercise; the knowledge to apply arms to the object with effect gave, when attained, preeminence to the soldier. The Roman soldier was formidable mechanically from knowledge in the use of arms abstractedly; he was moreover invincible, in the virtuous days of the republic, in the idea that he was a

Roman. The form of tactic was preserved, and it was practised in the Roman army after the spirit which originally animated it had fled, that is, after the Roman soldiers ceased to possess that spirit of the Roman citizen, which, urging to combat, united the different parts in action by sympathy of national impulse. The decline and fall of the Roman empire followed the decline of national interest in the individual. The history of it presents an instructive view of social organization, civil and military; and among other things, it proves to demonstration, if no other record existed in the world, that the mechanical tactic of civilized and enervated states is inferior, to what may be termed the instinctive tactic and vigorous impulse of rude and uninstructed barbarians. The proofs in history are numerous and conclusive; but there is not one more apposite and illustrative of the fact, than that which is drawn from the history of the Scotch in the year 1745. The Scotch Highlanders, prior to the year 1745, knew less of arts and sciences than perhaps any people in Europe. They had the instinctive military sagacity of the semibarbarous stage of society; but they had none of the common military science of civilized Europeans. They were badly provided with arms: they notwithstanding defeated the regular and experienced troops of the crown, both at Preston-pans and Falkirk; and there are grounds to believe, from the decided experiment that was made upon Barrel's regiment at Culloden, that they would have defeated them a third time had there been union in council and accord in action. They were placed by necessity or mismanagement under great physical disadvantages. Opinions were divided on the line of conduct to be pursued; and it happened here, as it might be expected to happen with an army composed of independent tribes, that some fought heroically, some lukewarmly, and some did not fight at all. The accomplishment of the object failed from defect of means and military

combination; but the experiment furnishes proof that national tactic, even if inferior in its own value, has advantages over that which is artificial and borrowed,—and learned by routine without comprehension of principle. The Scotch Highlanders are brave to a proverb; and they are distinguished for good conduct under every form of tactic and discipline to which they have been trained; but the writer is inclined to believe that they were more confident in themselves, consequently less resistible, as protected by the target and armed with the broad-sword, than they now are as armed with the firelock and bayonet.

It does not belong to this place to enter into discussion on the comparative merits of the different systems of military tactic, which have been adopted by different nations for defence or conquest. It is only meant to impress on the mind of the reader that national tactic, however defective in systematic science, uniformly carries with it advantages over that which is borrowed from the most perfect masters of the military art. If an independent nation enter itself as a scholar in a foreign school, it openly acknowledges a superior; consequently it does not retain that importance of character which is necessary to give to it, even in its own opinion, the tone of command. It possesses no original spirit; and hence whatever may be the superiority of Prussian tactic over other forms of tactic in its abstract merits, the nation which copies it servilely is only a copiest, and, as such, of secondary estimation. The act of imitation represses the effort of the original mind. The act, which is new and original, rarely fails to make impression, and impression is success, or the first step towards success in war. Acts of mere imitation are comparatively weak; and hence it is concluded that the improvements, or hints of improvement which are drawn from foreign sources, ought, in order to be useful, to be primarily resolved to their principles, incorporated,

but so disguised in their mixture with what is national that they not only appear to be, but that they be in reality essential and integral. If this be not done, the form that is borrowed may be perfect in appearance; the spirit which animates it will not be found in the operation.

The invention of gunpowder operated great changes in the practice of war, and influenced, in a material degree, the form of military tactic. Though military actions, prior to the era of this discovery, generally began with the missile, they rarely ended without the shock of actual force from lance, pike or sabre. At present the combats of the largest armies are often wholly decided by fire-arms; the bravest soldier thus fights under a hazard over which his individual prowess has no controul. When fire arms were first employed in war, they were employed with a view to inflict death upon the enemy, rather than to confound, astonish and intimidate by noise; consequently their powers were studied; and, being known, they were applied in practice to their real object. The Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus and Charles the Twelfth, the soldiers of Cromwell, the soldiers of Malborough, and above all the Buccaneers of the seventeenth century, who were indisputably the best practised soldiers in the annals of history, in so far as respects the just direction of the bullet from the musket, appear to have all acted on this idea. Frederick, King of Prussia, who is generally regarded as an oracle in the theory and practice of war, viewed the subject in a different light. If it actually was the intention of that great commander to destroy the enemy by the fire of the musket, rather than to confound by noise, and to cover movements by smoke, he mistook the case and miscalculated the effect. The fire of the Prussian battalions was close and concentrated, rapid and regular in time. It is obvious that the close and concentrated, the rapid and regular fire is not well

compatible with aim or just direction,—and it is by just direction alone that the destruction of the enemy is effected. This is a remark of common sense arising from common observation; and it is reasonable to conclude, from the best view which can be attained of the history of Frederick's battles, that musketry fire was chiefly employed as a decoy viz. to impose on fears, or cover purposes: the actual success depended on skilful movement, correct order in movement, and united vigour in close attack.

It would be deemed presumption, in a person who does not stand in the military list of the army, to offer opinion on the relative merits of the different systems of tactic which have been practised at different times by military nations. The writer wishes to avoid the imputation of presumption, he therefore abstains from the question, except in so far as the common faculties of common men may see and comprehend. The Spartan and Macedonian tactic was evidently a tactic of much perfection, both in the mechanical arrangement of the parts, and in the provisions which cement social sympathies; it was consequently distinguished for success. The Macedonian phalanx was strong, and in a manner impenetrable in position; it was not sufficiently active and applicable to the fluctuating conditions of war. The Roman armies were marshalled after a somewhat similar manner with the Spartan in the early days of the republic; but the Romans, who were a people of great military sagacity, though not of the greatest brilliancy of inventive genius, observed the results in war to be precarious where the combat was joined on irregular ground. Their sagacity led them to change, new model and invent; and, in prosecution of their idea of improvement, the continued line was changed into a line with intervals, and drawn up in three orders, viz. *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*. The arms were changed, viz. from spear and buckler, to sword, shield and dagger. The changes, that were thus

made in arms, armour and arrangement, produced a force, the best protected, the most active in offence, and, at the same time, the most condensed and firm in resistance of any form of force that has perhaps ever been brought together under military array. The Roman principle infers that the two first ranks,—the *hastati* and *principes* retire upon the *triarii*, when pressed or overpowered. Provision is made in the primary arrangement that this may be done without confusion, space being left between the files, and intervals between the divisions, that the coward may leave the field without disordering the ranks, and the good soldier, who only yields temporarily to overwhelming force, may find a place among the *triarii* to try his strength again and avenge his honour. If the arrangement be estimated according to the reason of things, it appears to possess great advantages. If the *triarii* be all men of determined courage; firm in their purposes under the threatening aspects of approaching danger, there are grounds to believe that they will be impregnable as a wall of iron, and ultimately turn the tide of battle from their front. The Roman order of tactic provides a new, a firm and compact line of resistance at different stages in retreat, particularly at the station of the *triarii*; and it scarcely can be expected that the enemy, who may be supposed to advance irregularly in confidence of victory, exhausted by exertion and probably spent by running, should make impression on troops who possess courage, whose vigour is unimpaired, and who are placed by their commander in a good military position. Men acquire courage in going on; they lose it in giving way. This is a known fact; but it is a fact equally known that active resistance, arising unexpectedly to the tide of success acts by surprise, and often strikes panic into those who advance in confidence of victory. In spite of all the drilling of the tactician, human nature is human nature still. Man remains susceptible of impression;

and unexpected things seldom fail to surprise and to disconcert. In this manner, the advance of the *triarii* from position—rushing furiously at the advancing enemy, who does not perhaps calculate on resistance, rarely fails to be decisive:—the proofs in history that it is so are without number. The Roman tactic formed the order of battle in such manner that the last stake rested on the *triarii* as fighting in position; yet in more common practice, the *triarii* advanced to support the *principes*. The preference of the one mode over the other depends on the character of the troops. If the *triarii* be all veteran of tried courage, insensible to the threatening aspect of an advancing enemy, the object is surer, and the issue more decisive if they keep their position, or only advance from it with joint impetus when they are near the point of being touched by the advancing foe. If the courage be doubtful, it is more eligible, as exposing less to risk, to support the *principes* rather than to allow them to retire.

The outline of military tactic is supposed to be laid on a basis of mathematical science ; the modes are varied according to the circumstances of the subject and scene. From the time of Gustavus Adolphus to the time of Frederic, the great object of the campaign seemed to consist in trials of skill in stratagesic movement, with a view to obtain advantages from position. The success of Frederick's battles and campaigns depended on the just order of tactic. By means of tactic, his force moved correctly to its object and acted with united impulse on vulnerable points. The American revolutionary war opened the view to another modification of military disposition, as applicable to the circumstances of the enemy and the scene of the action. The American peasant was better acquainted with the power of the musket as an instrument of destruction, than the best disciplined soldier in Europe ; and, as man usually has courage under the protection of the arm in the use of which he excels, the American

supported front fire at a reasonable distance with firmness and resolution. He recoiled at the approach of the bayonet; and, as his courage did not urge him to close attack, the British open order, which was sufficient for the resistance of the American close order, presented a less compact object for the destructive effect of fire arms, and was therefore adopted on justifiable, even on judicious grounds. The American value consisted in the fire of the musket; the British in charge with the bayonet; hence activity, impetuosity, with the terror arising from the appearance of bristling points of cold iron, were the chief causes of British success in the American campaigns.

5th. The nature of military service, considered abstractedly in itself, acts with power on the military condition; and, as the mode of service may stimulate energies and improve character, so it may undermine good habits, corrupt moral discipline, generate disorder and accelerate destruction. The Spartans, who must ever be regarded as the first of military nations, do not appear to have benefitted, either as soldiers or citizens, by the practice of foreign war. Devotion to the Spartan institution was strong at Sparta: it was distracted in foreign countries by a variety of contingent incentives to deviation, and it was corrupted, among others, by the spoils of the rich. The Athenians differed from the Spartans. They were more susceptible of transient impression, and more varied in character. As soldiers they were courageous in their native soil; they were active and energetic in the soil of the enemy. Their object was acquisition of territory and spoil, but they knew to cover their real object with art. While they extended their sphere, and consolidated the extension by policy, they often imposed on credulity, so as to obtain credit for encountering dangers for the sake of doing good to mankind. The virtue of the Spartan lay in constancy and firmness; that of the Athenian in promptitude and energy; hence, as a people constitutionally susceptible and rea-

Nature of
military service

dily adapting itself to circumstances, the Athenian, who improved in foreign war, particularly excelled in expeditionary enterprize.—The Roman troops had much resemblance to the Spartan in the early days of the republic. The soldiers were modest, brave, hardy and frugal, devoted to the honour of the Roman name, proud of the distinction which attached to a Roman citizen, scrupulous in faith, and more afraid of encroaching on the sacredness of an oath than of exposing life to destruction. This was the Roman character in the better days of Rome. It continued to be so until the second Punic war. During that war, and particularly after Carthage was humbled and no longer a rival, the Roman moral degenerated, and the military character experienced a change,—presumptively from change in the nature of the military service. The Roman arms were, from this period, principally directed against tyrannic despots, or against barbarian tribes. The troops of the former were mercenary and effeminate: the latter were courageous, but they were rude in manner, comparatively ignorant of arts, and limited in their views of war and general policy. Against such the Romans were for the most part successful; but their success depended more upon the genius and skill of the General, than upon the national spirit and animation of the soldier. Tactical arrangement and dexterity in the management of arms appear to have been carried to great perfection under Marius, Sylla, Cæsar and some other ambitious chiefs; but the perfection alluded to was an artificial and mechanical perfection, in as much as the soldier was the passive instrument of the General; or, if more than passive, he was stimulated to exertion by the inflamed and partial spirit of faction, or by avidity for spoil. Rome degenerated from a virtuous to a factious republic; and, by an easy and common transition, from a factious republic to an imperial despotism. The extension of the empire, which in those days was considered as vast, occasioned a division of the mili-

tary force into numerous and distant garrisons ; and, as garrisons are stationary, and as the spirit of war cannot remain stationary, it necessarily took the course of retrograde. The Roman soldiers were mercenary and mostly foreign. They were comparatively idle in the garrisons of subdued provinces. From idle they became dissipated ; from dissipated, licentious, and even mutinous :—they latterly usurped the sovereignty, and disposed of it at their pleasure.—The Romans, who, from a band of robbers, rose to be sovereign among nations through the influence of religion, laws and military virtues, sunk, through corruption and neglect of institutions, to the lowest point of degradation in the scale of human beings. The whole of the events of their long history are clear and explicit lessons to posterity. They are instructive ; but living nations rarely take instruction from the history of the dead.

From the fall of the Roman empire, until the discovery of gunpowder and the introduction of fire-arms among the instruments of destruction, there was much slaughter and carnage in hostile encounters ; but little military skill according to the ideas of ancient or modern warriors. The barbarians who inundated Europe, and dispossessed the Romans of their sovereignty, divided the soil according to their own views ; viz. according to a tenure of feudal service. The great lords and inferior cavaliers were men of courage ; and many of them it may be presumed possessed military genius. They were often at variance with one another ; and when they met in the field of combat, the inferiors were considered as a mass of men—to slay and to be slain. They were in fact often slain as cattle in cold blood ; for, if they had not the means of ransoming their lives, they were destroyed as not of value.—The picture of the human race was disgusting during this period,—not that the principle was different from what it is now, but that the act was covered with a thinner veil of

hypocrisy. Man, openly or covertly, is in a constant state of contention with his neighbours for sovereignty and dominion : here he acted without disguise; and, having overrun the land, he transferred the inhabitants as property, like the sheep and cattle of a farm. Such things are contrary to the fundamental law of nature. The God of Nature made individual man a part in a whole, not the slave of a fellow creature; yet, directly or indirectly, the practice of enslaving continues among Christians to the present day. The passion of aggrandizement is stronger than the sentiment of reason and justice; but, as the people are now more connected with one another, and have more knowledge of their own power than they had in former times, the purpose of aggrandizement requires to be accomplished through management and arts of deception, rather than by open force. It still is accomplished; and the present time furnishes proof, on a large scale, that power acts always on the same base,—acts blindly without generosity and without justice.

The reformation in religion and church discipline, moved by Luther and Calvin, and supported by sovereign princes as favourable to their temporal interests, gave, by opening a field for the exercise of the human mind, a new impulse to most of the sciences; and, among others, it acted conspicuously on the spirit and operations of war. The civil war, which for many years deluged France with blood, was connected with differences in religious opinion, and it was supported by the zeal and animation which attach to religious contentions. Many examples of brilliant military talent arose in the course of that long contest; but the principle of the military art experienced no material change. The passions of the opposing parties were inflamed; the rencounters were often furious, and the conduct, in so far as relates to courage, was heroic; but the mode was upon the whole the mode of barbarous times. The war, known by the name of

the thirty years war, opened a new view in the military art, or rather it tended to revive a view of that art as practised by the Greeks and Romans. This arose from necessity, or from science acquired through observation in varied experience. Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, was head of the protestant association. He was inferior in cavalry and cavalry equipment to his formidable opponents who consisted of the high blood of Europe. It is probable that, from this necessity, he was led to study, and to ascertain the primary properties of man in his simple state; and, in doing this, he discovered secondarily that certain modes of marshalling infantry are capable of rendering them impregnable to cavalry, in fact, superior to all other forms of military force. The thirty years war, as of long continuance, was also waged on an extensive theatre, and frequently carried into countries remote from the native country of the combatants. The necessities, which arose in a distant and often difficult scene, sharpened the faculties; and exercise in manœuvre produced mechanical improvement in conflict, independently of the principle which animated all the operations of the protestants in their long protracted campaigns. The soldiers, who followed the standard of Gustavus, considered the war as their own, viz. a war undertaken to establish civil and religious liberty against bigotry and tyranny,—not undertaken through royal ambition, or mercantile cupidity to round a territory, and to transfer the herd of population as an appendage of the conquered soil. Gustavus Adolphus was chief;—he stands solitary among princes, in as much as he risked his crown, and exposed his person in attempting to establish the freedom of the human mind on a basis of reciprocal equality among the members of the human race; in other words, on the basis the of Christian doctrine. In the protestant army, every part might be supposed to participate in the object of the war. The parts were adapted to their stations with

consideration of circumstances: discipline was correct, and exactness and precision in field operation followed correct discipline. The army, particularly the Swedish part of it, had no superior, perhaps no equal in moral conduct. It appears also to have been unrivalled in field movement and knowledge of the power of missile force,—properties which long adhered to it, and which produced acts under Charles the Twelfth exceeding credibility. Gustavus was great, Charles was a prodigy; but, among Generals, who, in modern times, have formed troops and carried them to distinction by means of science and service in the field, the French General Turenne holds the highest place. Common men, electrified by his sublime spirit, became heroes. They were rivetted to his fortune, in all their toils and difficulties by the singular amiableness and purity of his character: they had no second view. He was himself devoted to his country; a similar devotion ingrafted itself on his followers. The variety and activity of his campaigns sharpened the faculty of perception, and frequent practice in combat gave confidence in the use of arms.

The King of Prussia is ordinarily considered as the great master of military tactic; and it must be confessed that his campaigns were so managed in the seven years war, as to bring forth a high degree of executive perfection in the field. Few princes have gone to war with less warrantable pretexts than Frederic; but few have met with so many circumstances to engage the sympathies of troops to exertion. The Prussian military institution tends directly to debase the human mind, even to extinguish the faculty of thinking; but, in spite of all the rigour of that degrading discipline, contingences arose in the course of service, which excited moral sentiment in the soldier, and sometimes brought out energies that do not belong to the principle of the system on which Frederic acted. The King of Prussia was aggressor originally, and as such culpable; but the combination that was formed by

his powerful neighbours to punish, overwhelm and even to extinguish him, raised sympathies in his subjects, which covered his acts of injustice with the veil of forgiveness; which even generated affection for his person, and attachment to his cause. The address with which he contrived to carry his troops from one successful field to another, kept the eye on a forward point: the almost constant practice, in marching and countermarching, inured the soldier to habits which rendered the actual campaign an exercise of little fatigue comparatively, while confidence in the use of arms gave more desire than dread of battle. These circumstances were the cause of temporary success;—the effect was nearly worn out before the war was ended.

It is not easy to form a correct opinion respecting the effect of service on the troops which compose the British army, estimated as a whole. The British soldier is constitutionally good: the character is open and manly; the physical power is superior, and the mind is capable of being influenced, so as to act energetically on the subject before it; but the character of the service, which is for the most part desultory, precludes systematic perfection in arrangement, and scientific practice on the grand scale of stratagem. There are grounds to believe that military discipline, and promptitude in movement had attained to a higher degree of perfection under the command of the Duke of Malborough, than it had done before, or has since done notwithstanding the high praise that has been recently claimed on that head. The nation was then warlike, and it possessed a republican spirit. The object of the service was a high object, viz. the protection of Europe from the fangs of an ambitious prince. This idea, proclaimed in the wars of Queen Anne, made the soldier in some degree a party in the case. General liberty was the watch word; and that added to the character of the Commander, who possessed the impenetrability which belongs to original genius, captivated the mind and

secured devotion in all difficulties. Since that period the cause of most of British wars have been subordinate. Some of the wars have even been reluctant, as against the national will, the mode has often been desultory ; or, when prosecuted systematically, it has been so combined with operations of allies that the British perplexed, as obscured and shackled in the trammels of artificial tactic, have not always been equal to themselves. The troops of no nation meet the enemy with a better countenance than the English, and the troops of no nation maintain the conflict with more firmness where they engage on equal terms ; but no troops are less united, and less orderly when circumstances oblige their leaders to turn their back to the enemy. The instances in proof of the assertion are numerous—and some of them are recent.—The address of the Great Commander to officers commanding regiments, in the retreat from Burgos in 1812, must be regarded as a calumny of the British army, or it must be admitted that the British army has not yet attained a condition which is entitled to the name of disciplined.

The pursuit of great and systematic, or of partizan and desultory warfare, impresses the mind and forms the character of the soldier differently. In the first, the soldier, and even the inferior officer ceases to exercise thought or play of mind. He obeys a signal as a part of a machine, and performs all his acts in routine by word of command, without permitting himself to look at the cause, or to judge of the reason of what he does. In the latter, the object though presented through the commanding officer, makes its own immediate impression on the soldier, excites his act, and animates his effort beyond the measure of the act that belongs to the mere automaton. The first diminishes the man as an individual, in as much as it reduces him, from an independent and self governing being, to a subordinate part in an artificial instrument—limited and coerced in the powers of action by external

force. The second exalts and improves the man; in as much as it directs attention to objects which elicit the physical and intellectual powers to their utmost extent, thereby allowing every one to be in some degree a principal.

SECTION II.

BESIDES the conditions now mentioned, as contingently influencing the military character of troops, there are others, planned in science, and applied by system, to form the recruit for the direct purposes of war, that deserve notice in this place. The more prominent of these belong to the modes that are taken; 1st. to collect materials and to put them together; 2nd. to the terms of engagement, viz. limited or unlimited to time or place; 3rd. amount of reward or salary for daily service; 4th. the law under which the soldier lives, viz. as preventive of crime, or inflictive of punishment for crimes committed; and 5th. and lastly, the character of the person who commands; whether stimulative of good, or corruptive of what is good by infectious example.

1st. Military force may be considered under two points of view, viz. 1st. national,—intended only for national defence; 2nd. foreign or mixed—intended for aggression, or exterritorial conquest. It is consistent with the law of the Deity that man defend his sphere from encroachment; it is interdicted by the same law that he encroach on the sphere of others. National armies, for defensive war only,

Military force--
defensive or
aggressive.

can scarcely be said to have an existence at the present time. If the idea were in the contemplation of those, who recently formed governments for the south parts of Europe, it will not be suffered to attain a corporeal existence: opposed by the royal fraternity, it is more than doubtful that it ever manifest a practical act. The act contemplated assumes justice, or reciprocity of action and reaction as the ostensible ground of the proceeding; the act practised, whatever may be pretended to the contrary, assumes the extension of dominion by bargain or force, as the paramount object and incentive of political activity. This object is pursued with zeal and ardour; but, as it implies a direct violation of the law of reciprocal action and reaction among men, it ceases to be national, and cannot strictly speaking be accomplished by a national instrument. Patriotism, or national feeling belongs to defence of a common country—not to the aggression of the country of others; consequently the military instrument, which is destined for aggression, is the instrument of a robber who dignifies himself with the name of warrior. An army, formed of native subjects and held in union by a feeling of love of country, may be considered as a nation's strength and shield. An army formed of the refuse of nations, and held together by the bribe of money or the lure of spoil, is regarded as the strength of monarchs; it is the death of nations.

Armies are, or may be formed on two bases, viz. patriotic or mercenary; and, as the bases are opposite to each other, the one calculated to make a nation one and impregnable, the other calculated to make an individual of the nation great and formidable, it is not easy to combine, so as to assure defence of the nation and control of the sovereign, to whom the direction of the military force is committed. The greater number of sovereigns, to whom power has been given for national purposes, desire to maintain the power with which they

have been conditionally intrusted by force of arms; and, in that view, they fence themselves with armies of foreigners, or corrupted natives; who, becoming slaves of an individual, are alien to the country to which they belong, or in which they live. The introduction of foreigners into a sovereign's guard impeaches the fidelity of native subjects, insults their military value and betrays a purpose of offence against the nation itself. The act is covered by pretexts; but, covered as it may be, it indicates a desire to rule by the sword: it is in fact a distinct step to despotism. The desire of arbitrary rule attaches to all persons, perhaps, who have attained to sovereign power, in whatever manner they may have attained it; and, in order to assure it, they desire to possess the command of a military force, which has little connexion with the nation, consequently is disposed to fix its regards exclusively on the person who has the power of giving bread and bestowing rank. This feeling is natural to man, even to those who possess, according to compact, no more than a limited power delegated by national representatives for national purposes. It is in the nature of sovereignty, whether hereditary or elective, to place itself before the nation of which it is only the functionary; and, it may thus be supposed that it would consider itself to be impeded in its course, if the military force of which it has the disposal, were wholly native; for in such case, the national sentiment might naturally be supposed to prevail over the sentiment of attachment to the functionary who is only as one of themselves. In order therefore to damp, or extinguish national sentiment and local attachments, it seems to be the view of the military department of the present time, even in Great Britain, to mix English, Scotch and Irish, so as to sink national prejudices and amalgamate the whole into a common mass prepared to turn its eye to the military leader—not to the nation to which it belongs. An army so formed is fit only for offensive war;

and, as almost all the wars of Great Britain are offensive; that is, wars for conquest, or for maintaining conquest, the inconveniences of it are not so distinctly felt as the reason of the thing might seem to imply. The plan now adopted forms an army; but not an army of all the excellence of which the materials are capable; for, though it be not denied that British arms have been generally successful in the field, it must at the same time be admitted that the most brilliant acts, and greatest victories of the army are found in conditions, where the national honour stands on its own ground independently, or rather stands in opposition to the artificial arrangements intended to improve its condition:—the examples in proof are numerous.

Service, limited
or unlimited.

2nd. Men engage for military service in the present times for a limited term of years, or for the continuance of life. The first may, in some sense of the word, be called national soldiers. They preserve the right of resuming, at a given time, their place among their fellow citizens; and thus retain some portion of the personal liberty which belongs to man. The second are the soldiers of a sovereign. They forgo their national liberty; and, for a bribe of money, place themselves unreservedly at the disposal of an individual, whether to act for, or against the nation to which they actually belong. The British people pretend to be the only, or almost the only people in Europe who have ideas of constitutional liberty, and who know the value of possessing it. If the assumption be admitted, it may at the same time be added that, if they be actually free to dispose of themselves, no people in Europe give up the power of doing so, for a bribe of money, with so much readiness as the peasant, or artisan of the united kingdom. The peasant of other countries, even the vassal peasant of Germany, stipulates a term of years for carrying arms: the Briton, even now when there is an option of choice between limited and unlimited service, commonly accedes to the latter condition for a few pounds of extra bounty:

he thus places himself for life at the disposal of the military department, for purposes of which he is not permitted to form an opinion. The soldier of limited service may still be allowed to call himself a citizen. The soldier, whose service is unlimited in time and place, is a military servant as long as he is serviceable; and has moreover no option of choice in the kind of the service which he is to perform.

Military service, limited or unlimited to time or place, bears a different character and has a different value according to differing conditions, in states or kingdoms respectively. In states, surrounded by other states which are hostile or suspected of hostility, limited service, as serving to fill the country with men instructed in the use of arms, is, in every point of view, a desirable condition as a security against invasion. In this case, every native inhabitant is to be considered as a soldier; and, under the circumstances stated, he is a soldier trained and ready for defensive war at all times. In a country, such as Great Britain, the approach to the shores of which will be difficult, if not impracticable while the navy maintains superiority at sea; and which is moreover, guarded interiorly by a national and constitutional militia, the scheme of limited service, with a view to fill the country with men who have been trained to the use of arms, is comparatively little necessary as a measure of security; and if not necessary on that account, the adoption of it is inconvenient on others, particularly on account of service in foreign parts,—a service which much encumbers the British military machinery. On this ground, perhaps, a stipulation to the limit of service was not conceded to the British recruit until recent times; when, from urgent necessities, in want of voluntary materials, the scheme of temporary service was suggested as an expedient to lure the reluctant into the military ranks. It had some effect, but not much; for, as said before, the British peasant does not cal-

culate, or balance the difference of conditions with much care: he generally takes the direct bait. The condition of limited service did not therefore produce so great accession to the strength of the army as was expected; and, while it failed of the end that was contemplated, it became a cause of introducing a condition into the military ranks which tends to subvert the base of military organization: it thus did harm. Limited service, as already said, has a tendency to augment the defensive strength of the country, and perhaps to improve economical and moral habits among the people: unlimited service, which adds little to the defence of a country, has a tendency to dissipate national sympathies and corrupt moral character; for, as it separates the soldier from the mass of the people, it alienates him from the interests of his country, and thereby commits him to the will of a military commander as his lord and master for life.

Military pay.

3rd. The quantity of *pay* and the manner of applying it has, as might be expected, a material effect on the moral conduct, and even on the military character of soldiers. It is evident to common sense, that the pay of the soldier ought to be adequate to the procuring of every thing that is calculated to increase bodily power, and to maintain it in efficiency; and, as it is equally well ascertained in experience that more, than what is sufficient for the purpose, has injurious effects on health and morals, it follows by consequence that superfluity ought to be rigorously proscribed in the military system, if it be intended that its course be duly supported. It may be considered as a primary rule in military organization that the parts, of which the military instrument is composed, be put together according to a measure of power and capacity, and that every cause which has a tendency to alter the condition of the parts individually, among which may be reckoned inequalities in the rate of pay of the same class, be carefully avoided, as a cause leading to individual counteractions; and in con-

sequence of counteraction to the defeat of general purposes. A regiment, which is an army in miniature, consists of parts bearing different denominations, as destined to duties that are somewhat different :—it has for instance light infantry, grenadiers and battalion or fuzileers. Equality of condition among the parts, which bear one denomination and act on one military object, may be considered as one of the surest bonds of united effect in action. Grenadiers and light infantry, as liable to be differently employed from the subjects of the battalion, may perhaps be allowed some difference of pay without producing a disorganizing effect ; but, if there be difference in the amount of the pay of the individuals of the same battalion, whether by length of service, or any other cause which does not imply a difference of duty, there can be no hesitation in saying that the distinction is made in error, in as much as a difference of condition is arbitrarily introduced among the parts of a living and moving instrument, the value of which, as an efficient instrument, consists in activity and union of movement through all its extent. The rule alluded to is a recent innovation in the British service. It was suggested by the minister at war, and sanctioned by the legislature some years since, with a view to avoid the inconveniences, which might be expected to arise from the operation of the limited service bill, in corps that were stationed in foreign parts. The augmented pay was considered as a bribe in dry money to prolong service. It sometimes succeeded in doing this ; but the success was not attained on just grounds, either as respects the nation or the soldier. Military pay is given for service performed—not as a gratuity ; and, if the service be equally well performed by a soldier of three years standing as by one of twenty, there is a palpable incongruity in making a difference in the rate of hire. If there be incongruity on this head according to reason, there is inconvenience and actual evil according to experience

on another. It is a truth always to be borne in mind, that equality of condition among the parts of an instrument which acts for one purpose, is the true base of military organization ; and that, as the distinctions now adverted to are not connected with real value, they are ill judged distinctions and have a deteriorating effect on the discipline and final efficiency of armies. The pay of the first term of service is supposed to furnish every necessary that the soldier's condition requires : if it does not do so, there is error in the construction of the economical system. The extra pay of the second period gives superfluity ; and, as superfluity has no place in military arrangement, the extra, or superfluous pay is ordinarily applied to purposes which do not improve, but which on the contrary have a tendency to deteriorate the individual as a soldier. It may be remarked in this place that the soldier of the first period of service is seldom intoxicated, for he has not the means of being so ; the soldier of the second period may be expected, from the application of his extra pence, to be intoxicated at least once a week ; the soldier of the third, twice or oftener. It is not said that this is always the case : it will, it is presumed, be often found to be the case where facts are rigorously investigated. There is sufficient experience in the history of the British soldiery to prove, to the conviction of the most prejudiced, that every thing beyond correct measure is injurious, consequently that the additions, which have been lately made to the daily pay as gratuities for length of service, are additions which have been made injudiciously, in as much as they act in direct contradiction to the true principle of military organization. The British soldier is seldom a man of discretion in what regards himself. He has a propensity naturally or created artificially, by the bounty of the state, to strong drink. Strong drink, beyond a very narrow limit, intoxicates its subject ; and, as intoxication extinguishes judgment, errors and not unfrequently offences arise under intoxication

which, submitted to the decisions of court's-martial, are punished with stripes and disgrace; the nation's bounty thus becomes the soldier's bane. If the interest of the soldier be seen in a proper point of view, no unnecessary superfluity will be given to him for the indulgence of pernicious propensities while he acts as a soldier. But, as he has devoted his life, and spent the best of his days in a service considered as just and necessary in the view of the nation, he may be allowed to expect that the nation take measures to secure to him a comfortable retirement, when the stipulated term of service expires; or where he has been prematurely and permanently disabled by wounds or disease from acting as a soldier, or from earning his bread as a labourer. Chelsea College has been erected for the reception of the destitute and disabled military; and, without detracting from the praise which has been given, and which is due to the spirit of benevolence which suggested the measures which have been adopted on this head, the writer is humbly of opinion that things may be so modified as to increase the good intended to be done, without adding to the expense now incurred on account of doing what is done in that establishment. Though the soldier, who volunteers unlimited service at an early period of his life, cannot be supposed to have a very strong attachment to his country, his county or place of birth; yet there are perhaps few, to whom the recollection of home does not occur with more or less force, when the blood of youth cools and disappointments accumulate. The recollection is accompanied with a desire to revisit the native place, to associate with old friends and acquaintances, provided there be no internal reproach or disgrace attached to character, which forbids the expectation of esteem from fellow citizens. In the supposition, that the conduct of the disabled or superannuated soldier is pure and irreproachable, it is presumed that

it would be more acceptable to him, instead of being discharged with an annual pension—to be a wanderer in the world, or to be immured in Chelsea College for food and raiment, were he to be received into an asylum in his native county—not as a pauper, but as a public servant in honourable retirement. There is reason to believe that a cottage, on a common of the native county, would be a more agreeable abode to most Chelsea pensioners than the College in its best order of arrangement; for it is natural, and we believe it to be true that a soldier who has been born in a cottage, and who has spent the most of his time in a tent, a hut, or a wigwam, can with difficulty persuade himself that he is at home in a palace.

The execution of the plan proposed does not appear to be difficult in itself; nor does it appear to the writer that it would imply expense beyond what is now voted for Chelsea College and the pension list. The plan is simply this; viz. that a depot be formed in every county in England, Ireland and Scotland for the reception of disabled or superannuated soldiers, natives of the respective counties of the united kingdoms; that each person have a separate house, consisting of kitchen and bed room, or a kitchen and two bed rooms according to circumstances; a garden, for each, amounting to the sixth part of an acre; and pasture for a milch cow for every six persons.—If it be thought to be too great bounty to make this allowance extra of the pension, let the rent of the house and land be deducted from the amount of the annual payment in money. If this be done, no great expense will be incurred; and the soldier, will it is presumed still be the gainer, for he will be less dependent than he now is. If the proposition now made should obtain notice, it may be supposed that a good locality will be chosen for the depot, that the houses will be constructed in the best form of cottage construction, that the

superintendence of the depot will be placed under superannuated military officers, and that the whole establishment will be placed under the direction of the Governors of Chelsea College.

The execution of the plan proposed would not, as already said, be a work of great difficulty. There are crown, or common lands in most of the counties of the United Kingdoms, which might be obtained for the purpose and prepared for culture at small expense. The number of men, who have served twenty-one years in foreign parts, and who as such are entitled to claim a settlement, would not, it is presumed, be numerous. The number of those disabled by wounds and impaired health are at present considerable; but of the disabled, few are so totally disabled as to be incapable of cultivating, by their own labour, the land that is allotted to them for their portion, viz. garden and potatoe field. The employment of cultivating would serve to take off the ennui which attaches to idleness. The exercise would contribute to the preservation of health; and, as the disbanded soldier would then have a home, and something like a national reward in his cottage and garden, he would be regarded by the mass of the people as a person who had deserved well of his country; and, rendered independent as an acknowledgment of his service, he would be esteemed an honourable citizen—not an outcast supported by gratuitous bounty, as the money pensioner and the Chelsea pensioner hold themselves to be.

4th. A consideration of the political measures by which the crimes and offences of the military body have a chance of being diminished, a view of the constitution of the code of laws by which their offences are to be tried and judged, and an analysis of the modes and degrees of punishment inflicted on offenders, constitute essential points of investigation in a philosophical view of a military system. The subject is important. The proper exposition of it requires detail,—more

Military law.

detail than the writer can give to it; and, as it requires more knowledge of things than he pretends to possess, he touches it slightly, adverting simply to the general basis on which the enquiry may be supposed to be laid.

Preservative
of morals.

Ist. The people of Great Britain, particularly those of the south part of the kingdom, claim the privilege of disposing of themselves according to their will; and, as self important from the possession of that privilege, they yield to the propensities of the will, and not unfrequently violate the rules of discipline in civil as well as in military life, in a manner that requires, at least that meets with severe chastisement. It thus happens that the catalogue of offences is comparatively great among the civil part of the community of England, and particularly conspicuous among the military as brought into a comparison with that of most European nations. The civil inhabitant, as claiming independence, does not readily submit to regulations of preventive police; and, the military, as put in possession of arms before the moral education is sufficiently perfected, runs headlong into error, and incurs the penalties of the military law without knowledge or without reflection. The subjects of most of the European states, as vassals of a superior who is absolute in power and often arbitrary in his ordonnances, grow up under restraint, and abstain from excess through dread of punishment. They have not, when they enter the military ranks, to adopt a new rule of life; their course is, as it might be expected to be, equal, uniform and steady. The English, as born in the opinion that they are their own masters, act much under the influence of their own will; and so acting, they transgress the regulations of military law carelessly and capriciously, oftener than wilfully and deliberately. The regulations of the army are arbitrary regulations, in so far as respects the common peasant of England; and, as the peasant rarely knows them until he has attained

to man's estate, his habits are formed, and the restraint imposed on him is only a feeble restraint. He errs in forgetfulness, even sometimes in ignorance of the law under which he is supposed to live and act. If punished for errors committed in ignorance, it does not appear to the writer that he is punished justly. It is harsh, though it may not strictly speaking be unjust, to punish a soldier for forgetfulness; it is unjust and barbarous to punish him for ignorance. On this ground, the writer ventures to say that officers who take pains to drill recruits in all forms of manual and tactic, but who neglect to instruct, so as to make them understand the meaning and purpose of the articles of war, fail in their duty; and, in the strict sense of the word, become responsible for all the errors and punishments which are incurred by recruits who err in want of the information which they ought to possess. This is reasonable in common men's common sense; and, in order to obviate the inconvenience thence arising, it is suggested that officers of companies be directed to instruct the recruit in knowledge of the rules by which he is to square his conduct, and moreover that the officer in command know correctly that he thoroughly comprehends them. The measure proposed could not fail of assuring to every soldier such acquaintance with military law, as would be sufficient to preserve him from offending in ignorance, and thereby incurring punishment without in reality deserving it. But, useful as it might be that the officers of companies were held responsible for the soldier's acquaintance with the articles of war, with as much rigour as he is for the condition of his arms and necessities, the acquaintance alluded to, as in some manner attained through compulsion, would only be an acquaintance of secondary effect.

It is admitted that military discipline ought to be rigorous in its execution; but it is important that it have an active principle, that is,

that it move to what is good under a sentiment of moral duty, rather than be deterred from what is bad by fear of punishment for delinquency. This, it may be concluded, was the idea of government when chaplains were appointed to regiments, intended, it is presumed, to be present in the field and quarters, as instructors in moral duties and superintendants of moral conduct. The office of regimental chaplain has been lately annulled in the British service. It existed when the writer became acquainted with the army; but it had ceased to be useful before that time. No one will deny that it is better that there be no chaplain than that there be one of an inferior character. This was probably seen, and, in consequence of the discovery garrison or brigade chaplains were appointed to bury the dead, preach an occasional sermon, and thus to execute the ostensible, not the most important duty of a chaplain. The change might perhaps be considered as an improvement at the time; for the chaplaincy of a regiment had degenerated into a sinecure. It was bestowed by the favour of colonels, and the duty was done by substitute at a small salary,—or, it was not done at all. If done by substitute, it could scarcely be expected to be well done; for the duty of a chaplain, as an instructor and superintendant of morals, is in itself an original duty,—an office of the heart which cannot be deputed, much less bargained for as a job of common work. A man may be hired to read service over the dead; he cannot be hired to teach virtue to the living. There are few soldiers of the present day who are irrecoverably profligate. Many err; but they err in weakness, or in want of an enlightened director to point to what is right:—if they retain sensibility, they are not irreclaimable. This may be assumed as a fact; and if true there is room to believe that a chaplain of a devout character, who is at the same time zealous and firm in courage to do his duty under the ridicule and irony of the unthinking, would not

fail to influence, by his words and by his example, the moral conduct of the generality of soldiers;—and this to such extent that the military penal code would become nearly a dead letter. The office of regimental chaplain appears to the writer to be in itself a very important one; but it is one of very difficult execution. The military power is every where jealous of encroachment; and it is more than surmise that the interference of the chaplain, with the moral conduct of the soldier, would rarely be approved, or even permitted to pass without censure, or reprimand. Every act in the army is supposed to emanate from a military chief; but the order of the military chief cannot bring love and religion, from the heart of the chaplain, to the humble soldier in the ranks. Religion and science may be instilled by the congenial spirit: they are not to be driven in by the word of command; and we may safely pronounce that if the chaplain and surgeon of a regiment have no power of acting, except through the military channel, their services will only be of inferior value.

2nd. The military law of the army, as framed on a base of individual will and executed arbitrarily, is totally at variance with the law of England. The English criminal law assumes a base of justice, in as much as it implies that the humble, as well as the high is to be judged by his peers. Of this privilege the soldier is deprived. When he appears as a culprit before a regimental court-martial, he cannot therefore be supposed to have confidence within himself that he is to be fairly judged. The jury and judges, as men of a high class, have not it may be presumed the sympathy which belongs to the equal condition; and, as men formed like other men, they are not supposed to be exempt from prepossession and prejudice; consequently their decisions are liable to be biassed, particularly where the question lies between one of their own order and one of the humblest rank. It is

Spirit of
military law.

desirable, and it does not appear to be unattainable with security to military discipline, that the soldier be tried and judged by a law similar to that by which other subjects of the realm are tried and judged. If he have this privilege, he may be allowed to consider himself as a national soldier, or national functionary—not the servile instrument of an individual who acts according to his own will. According to the letter of military law, the commissioned officer is jury and judge in the soldier's case. The life and honour of a soldier are thus placed at the disposal of what cannot be called other than an arbitrary court; and, as the members of the court are bound together by official connexion, they may be supposed, at least they will be thought to be in combination against the offender if the charge be laid by one bearing a commission. There can be no confidence, in the present state of human things, that the decisions of a court of law will be just decisions where the jury and culprit are not of equal condition. On this ground, the soldier may be allowed to think doubtfully of the issue of his trial, where his accuser and his judge are of the same class of people, and of a class moreover which is different from his own, and which is disposed by its constitution to act arbitrarily, that is, to dispense favour, or exercise severity as a biassed judgment may suggest. This is a contingency of evil that ought to be guarded against; and, with hopes of obviating the chances of its occurrence, the writer ventures to submit, though with the almost certainty of giving offence, that soldiers should be jury in all cases which concern the soldier, the jury being so constituted that men of years and discretion only be admitted to that office. The essentials of the law of liberty would be preserved by this means; and the chances of insubordination in the inferior class would at the same time be effectually precluded. As things now are, the military law is made without the consent of the party

to which it particularly applies. It is executed without the party having a voice in its proceedings; and, as such, it can only be considered as an edict of power, and sometimes perhaps as an edict issued under prejudice. No valid argument can, it is presumed, be shewn, why the common soldier of England should not have a jury of his peers for the proof or refutation of a criminal charge:—he would then be a soldier worthy of a free country. The writer is not unaware that the proposition now made will be considered as subversive of the constitution of the army; he is bold to maintain that it is not incompatible with the constitution of a true military force; and he ventures to say that if it subvert what exists, it promises to substitute in its place what is legitimate in the true sense of the word, and effective in so far as regards national defence, in the highest attainable degree. The right of being judged by a jury of peers may be supposed to have a tendency to excite a sentiment of honour in the common man, and to ensure good conduct from principle, rather than from fear. The soldier, who has the privilege alluded to, would, it is presumed, be a valuable national soldier: he would not it is admitted be so fit as he now is for purposes of conquest in foreign countries, or so ready to devote himself to the will of a commander for purposes he does not comprehend, or which he can not in his conscience approve.—There are some, it is probable, who will be disposed to maintain that, if the condition now alluded to were granted to the common soldier, the soldier would in almost every instance escape from punishment. The case has not been tried, and no positive opinion can be given on the subject; but the probabilities are strong, from what is known of the human mind, that culprits would be judged severely, and more rigorously punished than they now are. If we seek for a reason the reason is easily found. If soldiers were constituted jury, the honour of the corps might be supposed to be in the keeping of the soldier,

and it is reasonable to suppose that he would study to keep it. As things are, the officer watches conduct, arraigns offence, and sits in judgment to award punishment. His office is an invidious one, and has not been assigned to him in knowledge of human nature: it directly counteracts the principle which renders the military instrument a whole, animated with one spirit, and united in action for a common—and constitutional purpose. It might be presumed, in the case supposed, that a sentiment of independence, essential to true honour would arise and possess a constitutional place in the mind of every soldier; in the case existing, the sentiment of honour is extinct; in planted on an artificial soil, it supports existence only by coercion. The soldier has no liberty to exercise his own mind; and, as no man can be great, or even good without exercise of mind, it is worthy of the consideration of the wise, to determine how much of that can be permitted to the soldier, without danger to the security of the sovereign authority.

Punishment

3rd. It is reasonable to believe that the constitution of the British military court-martial at least of the regimental court-martial might be changed with advantage to the soldier, and even with benefit to the nation. It is also reasonable to believe that the existing modes of punishment, as they are revolting to man's feelings and could not, without the evidence of ocular demonstration, have been supposed to have place in the institutions of Great Britain, might be altogether changed for other less disgusting, and not less efficacious means of securing good conduct. The English pretend to be the only free nation in Europe; but, notwithstanding this pretension, no people in Europe so easily part with their liberty, or so readily submit to corporal chastisement as the English, particularly as the English military. No one presumes to strike, the person of a man who carries arms in the service of the different

military powers of the continent. If any one deserve punishment, the punishment must be made according to rule. In the British service on the contrary, the soldier was, until lately if not at present, beaten arbitrarily by the officer,—a grey headed man not unfrequently by a beardless boy. This is held to be a reproach to the British service; and it must be confessed that it is not creditable to the nation. The practice insults the rights of man, and must be allowed to be particularly grievous and ill judged among a people who claim freedom as their inheritance. There is something like enigma in the character of the English on this head. The English pretend to be philosophers; but no nation in Europe acts more under prejudice and prepossession, or trusts so implicitly to direct force for effecting purposes, of whatever description they may be, as the English. Force is the ostensible engine in most of the operations of the people of Great Britain. The youth at school is driven to learn his task by force; the soldier is driven by force to acquire a knowledge of the use of arms. Deterred from doing wrong by force, or threatnings of force, he is punished with stripes on the bare back when he appears to forget himself. Courts-martial, and punishment of crime were in many British regiments, at no very remote period, almost the order of the day. Punishments were frequent, sometimes severe; and the manner of infliction, while it degraded the subject and revolted the common feelings of man's nature, was not calculated to act on the mind, so as to produce contrition and lead to change of conduct. There is not an instance in a thousand where the cat o' nine tails has made a soldier what he ought to be; there are thousands where it has rendered those, who were forgetful and careless rather than vicious, insensible to honour and abandoned to crime. It is invidious to remark on the institutions of the superior power,—and the writer does it with reluctance; but he cannot refrain from saying that the

constitution of the British military law is not laid on a base of science: it is not just, for it does not correspond with the general principle of the common law of the country. The observance of it is difficult, for it implies not only learning something new, but forgetting what has been learned, and, in some instances, grown into habit. But, while the observance is difficult, the mode adopted for the punishment of transgression is revolting to man's common sense of feeling, more revolting than the modes of punishment adopted in foreign armies, and less effective of purpose than it there appears to be. Whether from the influences of a systematic national police or other cause, the mass of peasantry on the European continent is careful of its conduct. Crimes are comparatively rare, and modes of punishment are comparatively less degrading. A threatening of force, repressive of irregularity, is all the motive to good conduct that operates in the British service; and, as the materials of the British army are collected fortuitously from all parts of the three kingdoms, put together promiscuously without regard to the dispositions and habits of the parts, the necessity of the application of force to preserve the exterior of order often becomes indispensable. In times not long past, regimental courts-martial were careless proceedings. They have recently attained a certain degree of solemnity by administering an oath to the members; and the sentences of the court are, it may be presumed, more carefully considered than they were prior to that regulation. The court is thus less objectionable than it was; it is not yet perfect as a court of justice. The moral character of the soldier is also improved of late years: it is not yet what it is capable of being made. It may be said with safety that there were regiments in the line not many years since, where corporal punishments within the annual period, exceeded the number of the days of the year; there are regiments at the present time where punishment

scarcely ever occurs. The persons who have wrought so great a change on the military body of the nation are valuable men in the true meaning of the word ; but they are not eminent, and thus must be contented with the reward which is within themselves. —Much might be said on the subject of British military law: it is an important subject. But the writer is not competent to the discussion of it; and enough has been said to shew that it requires revision, viz. revision founded on a basis that admits of measures decisive in their nature so as to assure subordination to command, and adjusted in their conditions so as to secure the right of citizen to the individual soldier.

4th. Besides the conditions now mentioned, which are calculated, Commanders. according to the mode of application, to improve, or to deteriorate the character of the soldier beyond that of the common citizen, the impression, which the military reputation of the Commander makes upon the mind of his followers, stands prominent among the considerations which influence the conduct of soldiers, not only in the field of war, but in private life. Rank, which is of no intrinsic value in itself, is here conditionally an engine of great power. The presence of the sovereign, or even of one of the royal house with an army in the field, rarely fails to give an extra impulse to the military mind, to confirm courage, by tending to fix the eye upon an individual who is considered as the nation's representative. This may be supposed to belong to the rank of kings and princes ; but, where there is no royal magic in the person of the commander, heroism and unshaken courage in dangers and difficulties, a reserved wisdom which does not expose purposes that ought not to be known, and a firmness of character which does not yield to importunities, of whatever kind they may be, are the points which strike the soldier's mind, and assure his attachment beyond all other causes which act on man. If the General expose his designs prior to forming his order of battle ; or, if he

change purposes from wavering within himself, the soldier, (and soldiers are ordinarily acute to perceive manifestations of weakness,) loses confidence, and, whatever may be the eminence of the commander's rank, commits himself to his guidance with reluctance. The military chief, in order to assure the success of his enterprizes, must be supposed to command the confidence of his followers; and he cannot be expected to command it without the possession of an original genius which cannot be penetrated or measured by common capacities. Different modes and combinations of quality, through which the General acts on the mind of the soldier, are superficially sketched in this place: the sketch is rude, and upon the whole imperfect; but it may lead to reflection on the subject.

Intuitive.

Of the numerous Generals who have attained eminence in the list of Commanders, some appear to have attained it by means of a pure, original and intuitive genius, such as gives boldness to design and promptitude to execution beyond the formal rules of art. Charles, the Twelfth of Sweden, appears to stand at the head of this class. Charles was successful by mere force of genius. Others appear to have succeeded by genius mixed with imposture. Alexander, king of Macedonia, is eminent in this class of commanders. His education was directed by the most scientific philosopher of the age in which he lived; and, as Alexander professed great attachment to his master, he may be supposed to have profitted by his instructions, and to have acquired knowledge in science by study. His genius in war was his own: he did not seem to know the extent of it; and he endeavoured to add force to it by imposture, that is, by assuming a descent from Jupiter Ammon. The Roman Sertorius possessed original genius for war and warlike enterprize, and he practised delusion on the credulity of his barbarian followers with a view to augment effect. The Russian Suwarrow possessed military genius

to considerable extent; but he did more by imposing on the simple mind of the Russian soldier than by his skill in tactic and evolution: he commanded devotion, by encouraging the idea that his acts were inspired acts, moving under the guidance of supernatural agency.—Where the intuitive genius of war combines with the passion of ambition in the mind of a sovereign, the march in foreign conquest is rapid, and the submission of the native subject is absolute. But, where this is so, the rapidity of the course generally precipitates in ruin:—instances of extraordinary exaltation are seldom of long duration.

2nd. Besides the condition of capacity now noticed as primary in the character of a military commander, the possession of science, or knowledge of men and fitness of things to each other, has on many occasions raised individuals to eminence as Generals, who did not appear to have warlike propensities in their younger years; and who did not assume the aids of fiction and imposture to add to the effect. The character of such is consistent with simplicity and modesty. The power consists in knowledge; and the skill is manifested in placing the object of desire before the eye, in such manner that the individual may see by his own powers of perception what he is to do; and, as may be supposed, do it with the energy which belongs to the knowledge which results from his own observation. Generals of this character study the nature and power of the instruments with which they act, as well as the nature and power of the instruments against which their attacks are directed. They know what they do; and they are not likely to compromise themselves by ignorance and rashness. If disaster occur, the General, who acts under this principle, finds a resource in the intimate knowledge which he has of men and things, in their physical and moral relations. Epaminondas, the Theban, stands at the head of this class among the ancients;

Knowledge of
men and things.

Xenophon, the Athenian, as may be collected from the retreat of the ten thousand, belongs to it; Count Turenne acted on the principle; his character was amiable, and he was a man within himself at all times.—The late general Moreau perhaps belonged to the same class: he was great in actual combat, intimating that he had knowledge of things in their own nature.

Genius and
experience.

3rd. There is a class of military commanders, or great captains, whose character is complicated and various; viz. such as are endowed by nature with rudiments of military talent, and who bring their talent to perfection by art, viz. by observation and severe study in the field of experience. Among these, the Carthaginian General Hannibal holds the first place in the writer's estimate of Generals. Hannibal was confessedly a man of original mind, and of great acquirement. His enterprize, in invading Italy in the manner he did, was the boldest that is found in history, and it was conducted, in all cases, by consummate skill and ability. He was devoted to the interests of his country. He was sagacious, and he seems to have been impenetrable in his purposes. It is reasonable to conclude that he was conciliating in manner—not tyrant in disposition; for it may be presumed that tyrant force could not have kept the mixture, of which his army was composed, in good humour through the difficulties to which it was sometimes exposed. The Carthaginian army was conquered at Zama; and Carthage sued for peace;—Hannibal cannot be said, in the strict sense of the word, to have been conquered. Scipio, his antagonist, was a captain of original genius. He was perhaps the most scientific of the Roman generals and the most amiable; he possessed the love of the soldiery through his goodness, no less than through the opinion of his superior skill. Cæsar, the first Roman emperor, was also a great captain, and a man of great powers of mind. He was ambitious of conquest to excess; and, as restrained by no tie of morality from the

pursuit of it, he surmounted external impediments by a courage and perseverance that has few examples in history. His soldiers were bound to him by the strength of his character solely.—Among moderns who have been eminent as commanders, no one seems to have attained the same elevation, in every thing connected with war, as John Duke of Marlborough. He was the bravest of soldiers when he was a young man, and the most successful of Generals in mature years. The comprehension of his genius was unparalleled among the Generals of the time: his command was absolute without harshness: his manner of imposing it was without imposture. Marlborough was great in the common meaning of the word—in the field and in the cabinet. He was modest and humble, religious without ostentation; and, unlike the generality of successful warriors, he seems to have retained, in his greatest elevation, sensibility to the human species. He did not appear to have delighted in war for the sake of military fame: he accepted the command of armies as a duty to his nation. He was a good man; but the deference which he paid to the will of his royal mistress, contrary to his own judgment, seems to be a blemish in his character.

PART V.

DISCIPLINE AND ECONOMY FOR THE FIELD AND QUARTERS.

WHEN troops are classed in corps by correspondence of moral sympathies, adjusted in the ranks by correspondence of physical powers, urged to action by a sentiment of honour, and supported in action by a sense of duty resting on moral obligation, they may be supposed to have attained to the highest point of military excellence which human beings are capable of attaining. The structure of the machine is then comparatively perfect; but, in order that it be preserved in a perfect state under all the contingencies that are incident to war, the principles of management, whether for quarters or for camp, require to be studied and understood, so that the practice which produces effect may be correctly adhered to in its minutest details. The just estimate of military economy depends on a knowledge of the constitution of the animal body; consequently the subject may be expected to be best explained by those who have studied animal structure scientifically, and who have seen animal powers tried and proved in a variety of situations in the course of military service.—The material points to be considered, in the detail of economical adjustment, relate to diet, clothing and exercise.

SECTION I.—CHAPTER I.

DIET.

A DIET, wholesome in kind and spare in measure, is essential to the preservation of health among all classes of men ; it is of the first importance among the military. The position, which is true in itself, rests on the basis of man's physical constitution as physically dissected ; but, true as it may be in principle, and important as it is in its practical consequences, the form of economy which inculcates a spare measure of diet has the semblance of poverty ; and poverty, though the best friend of man, is viewed with abhorrence by almost all the human race, and particularly by the English. Economy, or the exact measure of means to ends, preserves balance, maintains effective action and ensures prosperity in times and trials of difficulty. Its value is great ; but it is not known, and it cannot be seen by those who fix the eye on aggrandizement as the end and object of their being. A full habit is vulgarly supposed to constitute animal power ; and, as a full measure of diet fills the habit, full living presents itself, by inference, as the direct means of attaining a high portion of bodily strength. This is an English creed,—followed in practice, not orthodox in principle according to the law of Nature.

Advantages of
sparse diet.

It is argued by physiologists and physicians, men who ought to understand the structure of the human fabric and the laws which maintain its economy, that high living, at least a large allowance of animal food, increases physical force and supports the powers of exertion beyond other form of diet. The opinion is specious; but it is formed on partial grounds, and not radically true. The English consume animal food in a higher proportion than most European nations. The writer does not deny that the English are powerful men; but he sees no grounds to believe, in tracing the cause to its source, that their power arises from the quantity of animal food which they consume. The Spartans were abstemious,—restricted to a diet which the soldiery of the present day would consider as coarse in kind and stinted in measure; yet the Spartans were conspicuous for physical strength, and, morally, they were the most resolute military that ever appeared on the theatre of war. The Swiss occupied a high station among military nations in the days of their glory; yet the Swiss, while brave in the field and virtuous in the domestic circle, were homely and frugal in manner of living. The Highlanders of Scotland have some claim to be ranked with the Swiss and Spartans. Their virtues are known in war: their fare was coarse in the days of their heroism, and even now it is homely. Animal food rarely fell to the lot of the Scotch peasant, Highland or Lowland, till within these very few years; yet the Scot was always a good soldier, ardent in courage, and powerful in the close conflict of battle. The Irish peasant is not diminutive in size, and little, if at all, inferior in physical force to the peasant of England. He is moreover spirited and bold as a soldier,—not wanting in energy and effective action in the field, where his powers are suitably animated and judiciously directed; yet the food of the Irish peasant consists at best of potatoes and butter-milk. The fishermen on the coast, of Spain and

on the shores of the Mediterranean, live frugally. They subsist on the simplest food. They are notwithstanding so strong and sinewy, that the highest fed boat's crew in the English navy does not equal a boat's crew of Biscayen fishermen, or of Turkish watermen who live poorly, either in power or endurance at the oar.

The facts now stated are precise and of common notoriety. They furnish proof that a high measure of animal food and a large allowance of strong drink are not the radical causes which give strength to the human body. The Spartans and Swiss, as already observed, were strong as well as valiant; and, even now, the Scotch Highlander possesses a firm and elastic muscle, and a high quantity of physical force relatively to his size. The opinion given on this subject is believed to be correct in the true nature of things.—The writer is aware that the *Athletæ* of Greece were fed, and that the pugilist of England is at the present time fed differently from what is here recommended. This is admitted; and it is not meant to deny that the power of the ancient *Athletæ*, as well as the English pugilist is increased by diet, training and exercise. But though this be allowed; it is maintained at the same time that the *Athletæ* of Greece, though powerful and good wrestlers, were not good soldiers; and there are no grounds to believe, from what has been seen, that the champions of English pugilism are superior, perhaps equal to the peasant of the country for that species of courage and endurance of toil which constitutes military value. But, as it is proved incontestibly by the history of all military nations, both in ancient and in modern times, that the quantity of physical force best adapted to the purposes of war, may be derived from a plain and homely diet of comparatively small measure, so persons of experience, particularly such as have made experiment in their own persons, cannot refuse assent to the fact, that endurance of toil similar to military toil is better supported, under a diet that is light in kind,

and of a rather scanty measure, than under full meals of rich and solid food. If this fact be true, and the history of military service proves it every day, it follows by necessary consequence that, if it be desirable to render the condition of the military force stable and the effect of its service calculable, the diet will be measured and administered according to just quantity only, viz. such quantity as is found on trial to produce that species of power which endures toil, and which does not, by accumulating irritability, predispose the habit to explosions of disease.

Measure of
diet.

The kind and quantity of the daily ration of provisions, adjudged to be sufficient for the sustenance of the British soldier, is fixed by regulation. It would be deemed presumption to find fault with it. But, admitting the ration to be good in kind and justly measured in quantity, the writer thinks he may, without transgressing the limits which he has prescribed to himself in touching on military economy, venture to direct the attention of chiefs of regiments to a study of the proper mode of preparing it for the soldier's use; for it may be said without offence that, if the art of cookery be understood by the English nation, it is not generally well practised by the English soldiery.

Cooking
utensils.

The cooking utensils of the soldier, which, as they are to be carried by the soldier himself when he changes quarter or encampment, cannot be supposed to be either numerous or heavy. One camp kettle for a mess consisting of six persons—carried by the members in rotation,—or one quart canteen carried by the individual himself, if it be approved, (and as it is undoubtedly to be preferred) that the mess be cooked individually, a tin pint porringer, an iron spoon, a small knife and fork, a flask or canteen for water, comprise the soldier's table equipment for the field.—The equipment is sufficient for the purpose intended; and if it be so, those who command regiments

will, it is presumed, consider it to be a part of their duty to take measures to assure the proper application of it, that is, to assure the preparation of the raw material after a form that occasions little demand for drink, and is, at the same time, easy of digestion. In this view, soup, broth, stew, &c. with a large portion of vegetables, constitute the preferable form of pottage for a soldier's dinner. A large proportion of the vegetable material is desirable for the dinner mess; for it is observed that persons, who subsist principally on vegetable and farinaceous food, endure toil longer than those who subsist chiefly on the flesh of animals. They have not more,—perhaps not so much brute force, but they have more endurance of toil. If so, it is left to military men to judge, whether the possession of brute force, or the capacity of enduring toil for a comparatively long time is the preferable quality in war. In recommending a system of cookery for the use of the military, the reader will not suppose that epicurean refinement enters into the idea of the writer. The culinary art is simple, and soon learned, in so far as respects the soldier. The fundamental rule consists in boiling slow, and in roasting quick. The rule is plain, obvious and well approved; but it does not appear to be commonly known to English soldiers. The pot of the soldier almost always boils with fury: fuel is wasted,—and the mess is not so good as it might be.

There is not any thing of which we have knowledge equal to tea for breakfast. A breakfast of tea with bread and butter, or even bread without butter, enables a person to sustain the fatigues of war with more energy and endurance than a breakfast of beef-steaks and porter; but, as tea cannot be procured at all times, coffee, cocoa, milk or bouillon may be substituted in its stead. It is at all times desirable that the soldier breakfast before parade, before the commencement of exercise, or before the commencement of a march. If this

Breakfast.

be neglected, faintness sometimes ensues, and exertion fails from the mere craving of the stomach. Hence a morsel of bread and cheese put into the soldier's havre-sack, whenever there is expectation of a long march in the course of the campaign, might be regarded as an useful provision.—Besides what relates to breakfast and provision for the march, the writer is of opinion, (and the opinion is formed from mature consideration of the subject) that the evening, at least that portion of the day which remains after the termination of the march when troops are in the field, or after the performance of those exercises and amusements, which fill up the measure of the day during peace in quarters or cantonment, is the most suitable time for the dinner, or principal repast. It is important to the interests of military service that soldiers be restricted to two meals a day; and further that care be taken, in laying the basis of primary education, that every one be competent to dress in a suitable manner the raw provisions of which the ration consists. If the principle, according to which the application of heat acts on raw provisions for the improvement of their taste and nutritive qualities, be explained to the young soldier and rightly comprehended by him, he will know to vary the mode according to his means, and not complain that his meal is unsavoury, when his ration is good in kind and abundant in quantity,—a case which often happens with those who are young and uneducated, and which happens with almost all British soldiers in their first campaigns.

It were perhaps better that every soldier should employ himself in cooking his own provisions, in as much as the act serves to multiply the means which give interest to his life. But if this method be not adopted, and if soldiers be divided into messes of a given number of persons, it is proper that the business of cooking follow a *rostre* of fatigue among the different members of the company. One of the soldiers, the least smart in appearance, or least expert in military

manœuvre is often doomed to be perpetual cook. The practice is wrong, at least it is improper in the author's opinion that any one, who is thought worthy to bear arms, should be degraded to the office of perpetual scullion for his comrades. The duty of cooking in rotation, that is, of superintending the boiling of the pot, is not an irksome duty,—and it has moreover an useful influence upon morals: it serves to cement society, and to keep the heterogeneous mass of modern armies in something like family connexion.

It is a primary object, in the discipline of troops, to implant a senti-
ment of honour which stimulates to duty, rather than to impress a
sense of fear which forcibly restrains from doing wrong. This is a car-
dinal point in the system of military instruction; and, keeping this
point in view, the writer takes the liberty to suggest that, if the sol-
dier's mess consist of six persons under the superintendence of ser-
jeants and corporals, who sit as presidents of the mess in rotation, the
end proposed will, at least to a certain extent, be attained. The good
conduct of the private would not fail to be assured by the presence
of a respectable serjeant at the mess-table; and, as serjeants are, or
ought to be capable of instructing soldiers in their duties, the military
character might be supposed to receive improvement during this
social or convivial intercourse. The idea is not foolish; but the
writer is aware that it will be ridiculed, perhaps deprecated as sub-
versive of the tremendous rule of subordination inculcated in modern
discipline. A certain degree of familiarity is implied in the act of
persons eating together; and it probably will be pretended that a
serjeant cannot maintain authority among the men, if he be a
member, or even if he preside at the soldier's mess-table. If ser-
jeants are persons to be viewed only through fear, and revered only
through the authority of the cane, such might be the effect; but
this character does not belong to the nature of that officer's duty.

Mess-table.

A serjeant may retain, and a good serjeant will not fail to retain authority and respect at the table among young soldiers, on a similar principle and with a similar feeling as a father retains respect at the table of his children.—The relation is the same, or similar, where the military fabric is laid on a true base.

Drink.

The water of the brook is what the Creator of the universe has provided for quenching thirst both in man and beast. As it is the most common, it is the most convenient and most suitable drink for soldiers; for soldiers ought to be accustomed to eat and drink whatever is common and easily procured. If water be muddy and unpleasant to the eye, the addition of a small quantity of alum causes the mud to subside; and, while it does so, does not deteriorate the quality of the water as drink for man. If it be flat and mawkish, the addition of vinegar, while it makes it pleasant to the taste, improves its virtues as a beverage for persons who are destined to undergo military fatigues. The Romans, who studied the laws of animal economy with care, and who applied them in so far as respects the health and efficiency of the soldier with good effect, considered vinegar as an indispensable provision for their armies. The British nation, not less humane than the Roman; but less observant of the nature of things as they bear on the health of the military, has thought proper to decree the provision of a ration of rum for the use of troops on foreign service. The ostensible pretext for the measure was an alledged unwholesomeness of water. If water were always bad in foreign countries, and if there were no other way of correcting it but by the addition of rum, the measure adopted might be defended, notwithstanding the expence which it entails, and the evils which attach to the long continued use of ardent spirits. The first necessity does not exist. Water is as good in other countries as it is in England; and where water is good, it stands in no need of a corrective. If it be

less pure, and, if correctives be necessary, it has been stated what these are. Both of them are easily procured; one of them was tried, and its utility sanctioned by the wisest military nation in the records of human history.

A ration of rum was allowed to the British army in foreign parts under the pretext of a bad quality in water. The allowance was at first given as a bounty for a supposed purpose of utility. It is now claimed, and has lately been established as a right, where no cause of usefulness exists. The young soldier receives his allowance and consumes it,—not that he likes rum, or that he thinks it good for his health, but because he considers it to be his own, and because he is prohibited from disposing of it to others. The military character is tenacious of right and property; and through this spirit of tenaciousness, the young soldier drinks the liquor which he dislikes, rather than spill it on the ground, or suffer it to remain in the store. The dislike is overcome by perseverance. A habit is even formed, and a fondness is acquired for liquor, so as to engross the whole desires, and thereby convert the soldier into a drunkard and a sot of no positive value to the service. This is the plain fact: the history of the British army, particularly in the West Indies, furnishes too many proofs of its truth.

The soldier, who has been long accustomed to drink his ration of rum, in the idea that it conduces to the preservation of his health, often acquires such an insatiate desire for liquor, that he has no command over himself where the means of gratification are within his reach; consequently he ceases to be a man on whose services calculation can be safely made. The soldier who is under the influence of liquor is unruly, insubordinate, even mutinous. If intoxicated to excess, he is incapable of meeting an enemy in the field. He may present himself to be killed; for, as he cannot reason, he may not fear, but

Ration of rum.

he is useless as a soldier. The evil at this present time is of enormous extent. It is a serious evil, and ought to be remedied; but it requires courage to propose the remedy, and superior virtue and energy to carry it into effect. It is at all times an arduous task, sometimes a task scarcely practicable to eradicate habits of long standing. It might even be dangerous to attempt the retrenchment of the nation's bounty in the time of war—pernicious as it is; but, dangerous as it may be to attempt it, it is necessary that something be attempted and done, if it be desired to preserve the health of the soldier from destruction, and his morals from depravation.

It is an ungracious task, and perhaps it may be a dangerous undertaking, to bring measures under public notice which are sanctioned by the authority of the state, but which cannot be sanctioned by the reason of the philosopher. That attempt is now made; but it is not made offensively. It is an imperious duty of humanity to endeavour to preserve the human race from destruction; and, as it is the duty of a military physician to maintain the military in a state of calculable efficiency, the truth is here spoken at all risk of censure. The measure in question, viz. the allowance of a ration of rum for troops on foreign service, was ordered at random, and sanctioned by the legislature without the utility of it being rightly understood. It was not wise, or well founded in its origin; and, in observing its progress and its effect, it does not altogether correspond with the common notions of justice. The British soldier is supplied daily with a ration of rum, and strictly enjoined to mix it with water that he may not be hurt by it. The recruit, who enters the army with an aversion to strong drink, receives rum as a portion of his ration, and drinks grog by coercion. He swallows it with disgust when he first joins the corps. His taste is then natural, but it is liable to be vitiated; and it soon becomes so vitiated that,

according to a law which obtains in animal nature, the disagreeable thing becomes through repetition a gratification of high relish. This applies particularly to rum and tobacco; and, agreeable to this law of animal nature, a fondness for rum amounting to passion is gradually acquired by the young soldier. Where the desire is ingrafted by force so as to become a habit, prudence and even fear is feeble as a barrier to prevent indulging it. Liquor is sought for at all risks: intoxication follows gratification; and, under intoxication, the subject loses self command, forgets the laws of discipline, even commits crimes, while under the influence of liquor, from which in his sober senses his nature would recoil. He is punished for the crimes which he then commits; and of the punishments which occur in the army, nineteen out of twenty are connected with this cause. The case is a serious one—of sufficient importance to command a comprehensive and scientific investigation into its nature. The measure in question originated in humanity and kindness; but the reason of the thing was so little understood, and the practice has been so misapplied that, judged by its effect, the Cynic might contend that it had drawn its origin from an ingenuous system of cruelty; viz. seduction of tastes and appetites through the force of authority, and punishment inflicted on the offender for the facility of being seduced.

If it be admitted that a system of economy, viz. the rigid practice of sobriety and temperance, be essential to the prosperity of the army, the practice it is evident must begin with the commissioned officers, who are the moving parts of the machine. The officer may lead by example; he cannot drive by authority. If a General of high reputation in war, instead of courting popularity by a sumptuous table and high flavoured wines, had the resolution to cover a simple board with a plain repast, similar to the soldier's mess, and measured in quantity in proportion to the number of the guests, he would have

Example of
officers.

the merit of being a reformer ; and, if his example served to eradicate the national propensity to sumptuous living, which is the most prominent defect in the character of the English military, he would be regarded, and justly regarded by posterity,—not as a visionary reformer, but as a national benefactor of the first distinction. "The plain repast is sufficient for sustenance ; and a plain repast gives all the gratification, to the palate of an hungry and thirsty man, that a soldier ought to permit himself to receive ; and, while it does this, it leaves his organs, as not overwhelmed by turtle and claret, free for impressions of military glory and pursuits of military science.

Economy, that is, a just measure of means to ends, lays the foundation of individual and national prosperity : adherence to it alone ensures the permanence of happiness. Dignity of mind and real military virtue have no connexion with sumptuous living. The conqueror is ordinarily frugal and homely, viz. the bold barbarian emerging from savage life : the conquered is ordinarily rich, luxurious, and what is called refined ; that is, the creature of the appetites of corporeal sense. The Spartan nation was temperate and frugal. It was august in the assembly of nations, and warlike in the field of battle. The Spartan mess-room presented little furniture that was costly,—no service of plate and few silver or gilded utensils ; but it presented veteran heroes teaching lessons of warlike virtue to the youth,—an equipment of infinitely more value. The precedent is good ; and it is not difficult to be followed, if trial were made. Cleomenes, one of the Spartan kings, found at his accession to the sovereignty that, instead of Spartans of the school of Lycurgus, a degenerated race filled the military ranks, viz. men corrupted by the luxuries of Asia, and absorbed in the pleasures of the table. The moral virtue was lost, and even the military virtue was obscured. He meditated reform, and the first step in reform was the re-establishment

of the public mess and frugal meal. Cleomenes was plain in manner and frugal in expenditure at the mess; but no sovereign whose record stands in history was more dignified in mind; and no one,—not even Louis the Magnificent in all his grandeur, commanded a devotion equal to what was voluntarily given to this simple and meanly attired Spartan. The English military are perhaps more under the influence of the pleasures of the table than any other military in modern times; but they are not beyond the possibility of reform. It is reported of General Wolfe who, while a man of superior goodness, was perhaps the most perfect soldier of the age in which he lived, that the cook and butler did not much engage his attention. He never gave an elegant, and rarely an eatable dinner to persons of the *haut gout*. The Epicurean was disgusted, the soldier was regaled. General Wolfe's table was said to be an epitome of a Spartan mess-room. No one rose from it without having been furnished with the opportunity of carrying away a military lesson; and few left it without feeling an accession of military importance communicated to the mind by the impressive influence of a hero's spirit. The example was almost solitary. The career of General Wolfe's life was short: his virtues were notwithstanding of such force that the impression remained long with the 20th regiment, which he formed and at one time commanded.—The example of a frugal mess-table is not, the writer is aware, adapted to our present habits; but man is the child of imitation; and, if frugal regimen were the regimen of high authority and acknowledged military talent, simplicity of living might again become a fashion in the army. The young soldier, instead of exerting his genius in the improvement of a ragout, or the dressing and carving of a duck, might be forced to eat his ration of beef and bread in silence; and, instead of thinking it necessary to be intoxicated with

wine, might be led to imbibe the spirit of Wolfe and Cleomenes, and thus become a real soldier.

The pleasures of the table to which the military are generally addicted, and to which they devote much of their time in want of a professional pursuit, are ideal rather than real. If the day be spent in exercise in times of peace, or in marching and countermarching in times of war, the simplest fare—brown bread and boiled beef, are eaten with better relish than turtle and venison, after all the wetting the appetite can receive from the languid recreations of a luxurious city. A soldier eats that he may live and be able to perform his duty. There are many of the human race who pride themselves on the exquisite sense of the palate, which decides on the birth place of a partridge by the flavour of its flesh. This exquisite sense of taste may be a merit some where; it degrades and disgraces a soldier. The soldiers' duty implies toil, fatigue and often hunger; and most soldiers know, by experience, that hunger makes every wholesome food savoury. If this were rightly understood, actual war would rarely present a hardship on the score of eating. If a soldier meet, in the course of his campaign, with wood and water, beef and bread and a glass of brandy, he has no just cause to complain of hardship. He is not to calculate on two courses, a desert and variety of wines in the service of the field; and, as these luxuries cannot be commanded in war, they ought not, if we act wisely, be admitted in peace. Custom forms habit; and privation, through privation of things not essential, rarely fails to create chagrin. Superfluity and variety provoke the appetite, enlist the soldier under the banners of sensuality; and thereby undermine the foundation of the military virtues, which no observing man will deny consist in self denial.

It is a physical fact, well ascertained and obvious in its reasons,

that a course of high living increases animal irritability; and, in so doing, renders the stability of bodily health less secure. A course of luxurious living has a similar operation on the mind; and hence, while bodily exertion is desultory and uncertain in the high fed soldier, the character of the mind's action is capricious and unsteady; or the mind, wrapped up in 'itself, is exclusively selfish, or indifferent to causes of national good. The bravery of the luxurious, and of those who are pampered with high feeding, is ordinarily a partial and irregular manifestation of bravery, in as much as it proceeds from an impulse of vanity, a desire of spoil, or an incitement of lust. The votary of pleasure possesses only a weak constitutional courage. The habit is unduly irritable, and little capable of enduring fatigue: the temper is constitutionally sensual, and abhorrent from the privations and denials that are common to war. As it is evident, from an attentive consideration of the laws of animal organism, that the condition of mind and body resulting from a course of high living, and the condition of mind and body necessary for the exertions of military service are at direct variance with each other, it follows by fair inference that the custom of high living, now so common at military messes, ought to be positively interdicted by the nation which desires to be eminent in arms, or which is solicitous to maintain the eminence which it may have previously attained by its boldness and its courage. The luxurious and the high fed are less patient of military fatigues than others. Life has been with them a round of gratifications, and the desire of gratification is so engrafted in the habit that they are reluctant to encounter hardships, or to submit to privation without enormous bribes. They are dissatisfied and chagrined with homely fare: they despond and sink at the idea of privation; they even fail under circumstances of service, where the rude mountaineer feels no want and complains of no hardship. If this be

true, and its truth rests on a fundamental law of animal nature proved in numerous instances of experience to be correct, a rational policy, instead of studying to undermine the military character by allowances for a presumptuous table, might be supposed to direct its attention to the bill of fare of the officers mess table, viz. to the institution of simplicity and frugality, and the proscription of foods and drinks which are not calculated to produce firmness of physical power and steadiness of moral action. If there be truth and reason in what is here stated, the condition occasionally stipulated at the admission of young men into certain favourite corps of the army, viz. that a high sum be added annually to the pay—to enable the youth to live like a gentleman, that is, to dine at a table of two courses and drink wine according to his will, is not a wise one. It places the military character on the brink of destruction; for, if there be any thing like correct observation among men, it may be confidently asserted that, if high living be the life of the gentleman, it is the death of the soldier.

CHAPTER II.

DRESS, OR CLOTHING OF TROOPS.

NEXT to the feeding, the clothing of troops is the most important of the economical concerns which belong to armies; and it is one on which the attention of military commanders has been much employed in all ages of the world. The brilliancy of dress strikes the eye

agreeably, and entices multitudes to enter the military ranks; consequently military dress is purposely rendered attractive that it may act as a decoy for those who delight in finery. But besides the gaudiness of dress which, acting as a decoy, fills the ranks of the army with a multitude of the vain, the mere circumstance of uniformity, acting on the mind of a mass of people, however brought together, begets more or less of union in sentiment; hence the utility of uniform clothing for military force is obvious.

The warlike nations of Europe clothe their military differently in colour and form, according to the taste which predominates with the nation respectively. As the ultimate purpose of covering the body with clothes refers to protection from the inclemencies of weather; and, as utility, is or ought to be the end of human contrivances, it is evident that usefulness and convenience are, or ought to be the principle objects in view in contriving the habiliment of soldiers. The best fashion is that which best protects the body from the injuries of weather, and which least impedes the movements that are connected with military duties. Every one may judge of this;—and the wise will follow its own rule. The nation which imitates another nation, whether in clothing, accoutrement, or tactic, is only copyist; and, as copyist, it has no national importance. Pride of mind is the highest possession of a military people; hence it is evident that a nation, in adopting whatever may be useful in the tactic, accoutrement, or clothing of foreigners, should, in a manner, conceal from itself the source from whence the improvements are drawn. A hint may be borrowed without wounding pride, a system of practice cannot be adopted without confessing inferiority. It is thus that if a people, instead of incorporating and amalgamating that which is useful in the foreign with its own, professedly and servilely copy the whole of the foreign, and act on it as a principle, such people does

not stand, and cannot be supposed to stand in the first scale of excellence, even in its own estimation:—originals only, it may be asserted, are great in war.

As convenience and usefulness are the first points to be considered in adjusting military dress; and, as every person who is acquainted with military service may be supposed to be a judge of what is most suitable for his wants, it consequently is, or it ought to be preliminary to all proceedings on the subject of dress, that those, who have actually served in the field, and who know what is suitable for service, be the persons consulted on this occasion, in the view that what is most useful and most convenient be connected with what is least expensive. Expenditure is a material consideration in the estimate of all military nations; and among European nations, the Austrian appears to have joined the cheap with the useful more correctly than any other. All that is essentially necessary is provided in just and measured quantity for the Austrian infantry; but the rule obtains only with the infantry. Human ingenuity could scarcely contrive any thing more absurd than the equipment of Hussars. The gaudiness of the figure is at direct variance with the usefulness of the man. The power of exertion is encumbered, and the value of the soldier is diminished for the sake of amusing the eye with the phantastic appearances of a toy-shop. So numerous are the trappings, and so complicated are the parts of the Hussar dress that, unless an officer sleep in his clothes while in the enemy's country, his quarters may be surprized, and himself put to the sword before he can button his jacket, or be in a condition to assume his arms. It is open to every military power to adopt improvement, if it comprehend the principle on which the improvement rests: it is incumbent on every one, who values the independence and honour of character, not to copy fashion from strangers.

The dress of a soldier consists of different parts;—a few remarks

are here cursorily offered on the subject.—The soldier's coat ought to be fitted with care,—easy at the shoulder so as not, in any degree, to impede the motion of the arms, and wide in the body so as not to impede, even when closely buttoned the expansion of the chest. It ought not to reach lower than the middle of the thigh: all beyond is an unnecessary incumbrance of weight.—It ought moreover to be furnished with a large and convenient side pocket, in the manner of a sportsman's jacket. Coat.

Breeches and leggins were for a long time the dress of the British soldier; they are less eligible than the trowser and gaiter, or half boot. The trowser does not impede the motion of the joints in exercise, or occasion the least irksome pressure when the soldier sleeps in his clothes. Almost every person of the present time knows by experience that the pantaloons, or trowser is less irksome than breeches. It has no buttons; and it is sooner and more easily adjusted in the dark. This is a matter of some utility; for it is obvious that a soldier ought to be so dressed as to sleep in his clothes without inconvenience, or that the clothes ought to be so fashioned that he may put them on in the dark without embarrassment. The gaiter and sock are preferable to the leggin. The calf of the leg rarely suffers from cold; the feet, ancles and knees do. These therefore require to be doubly guarded; and, on this account, flannel socks, cloth gaiters, and a knee cap to the trowser, are particularly recommended for guarding the parts which are least capable of resisting cold, and which most require protection against injury. But while the tendinous parts, viz. the feet, knees and ancles are to be kept warm by additional clothing, the fleshy parts, particularly the calves of the legs which, as full of blood and thrown into action in locomotion, ought not, (as not liable to suffer from cold) to be confined by pressure so as to be impeded in their movements, or heated by covering so as to be solicited to throw out Trowsers, &c.

pimples.—Pimples, thus produced, often degenerate in sores ;—and to this cause, the sore legs, which so much annoy a certain description of soldiers, may in some degree be assigned.

Feet. The feet are an essential part of the person of the soldier ; their condition ought therefore to be particularly attended to by the officer. The casual wetting of the feet is frequently a cause of sickness to those who have been born and bred in towns, and carefully nursed in infancy. In such, the feet require to be guarded from chances of accident by means of socks and well fitted shoes of good manufacture. The flannel sock, or rather the cotton sock with a sole piece of milled flannel, is useful for this purpose ; for, while flannel preserves a more equal temperature of heat than linen or cotton, it, at the same time affords a better protection against the chances of blistering than socks of other materials. The good condition of the feet is so essential for the performance of military duties, that shoes, boots, or half-boots ought to be well chosen and well made ; that is, made of good materials for the sake of durability, and well fitted to the foot on account of ease and convenience to the wearer. The properties of a soldier's shoe, so formed as to correspond with the natural shape of the foot, consist principally in thick and firm outer soles, with an inner sole which has an obscure sliding motion—the quarter short and high, so that mud or sand do not easily enter, nor the tenacity of a deep clay easily drag it from the foot, the leather well tanned, and prepared, by means of oil and wax, tallow or other composition, to resist the entrance of water.

Hat. The military hat ought to be light and well manufactured—the crown deep, for the better defence of the head against the rays of a vertical sun, or against the stroke of an enemy's sabre.—A brim, even a broad brim is convenient on many accounts and very useful on some, particularly to shade the eyes from glare of light, and to protect the neck from rain.

The uniform of the British army has been altered of late years, and the fashion of several parts of the habiliment has not only been changed, but improved.—The shirt, though not a part of the ostensible uniform is a part of clothing which, as opinions are divided about the nature of the material of which it is to be made, cannot be passed over in this place without particular notice. Woollen stuff was worn next the skin by our unpolished ancestors; refinement substituted linen. The opinions of men fluctuate like the tides of the ocean; and flannel, an improved manufacture of wool, is again advanced in its original station. There are many, even physicians of eminence, who maintain that flannel worn next the skin is preservative of health, both in hot and cold climates; others contend that flannel, independently of its quality of increasing the susceptibility to impression, and consequently of favouring the action of the causes of disease, by receiving more readily, and retaining contagion more closely than linen or cotton, serves to propagate sickness in armies: it attracts and condenses, so as to engender a virulence in the morbid cause equal to that of pestilence. This is a bold assertion; but it is not altogether unfounded. The truth of it is strongly supported by what happened to the British army in the early part of the war 1793. The soldiers were then enveloped in flannel, either furnished by their own funds, or provided by the donation of the generous; yet notwithstanding all this care and foresight, sickness was great, and mortality was unexampled. It cannot be proved, nor would any one, it is presumed, pretend to say that flannel clothing was the primary cause of sickness on this occasion:—it was obviously a contingent one. Flannel readily attracts pollutions; and it does, on account of its colour, so soon discover their adhesion as bleached linen or cotton. This is an inconvenience; but, with this inconvenience, there are also advantages—and not unimportant ones. Flannel preserves more equally

Flannel.

than linen, the genial warmth of the parts which it covers. It absorbs more readily the excess of perspirations which occur in hot weather, or under severe exercise; and while it is agreeable to the wearer from this cause, it is conditionally preservative of that equal condition of circulation which is intimately connected with health. This one feels and judges by the feeling; but still, if all the circumstances connected with flannel clothing be considered in their full extent and bearing, the obvious benefits are more than counter-balanced by other contingencies that are not easily avoided. As it preserves an equal heat on the surface, so it preserves the skin soft and preternaturally sensible, exquisitely susceptible of impression, and easily acted on by causes which float in the atmosphere, and which have a tendency, by their action, to disturb the health of the subjects to which they are applied. If this be correct, its benefits are deceptive; and, though it must be admitted that it contributes to the preservation of the health of the valetudinary, it has a tendency to render valetudinary those who are naturally robust; hence it is injurious, rather than beneficial, as a general article of clothing for soldiers. It is, and must be considered in all cases as a fundamental maxim in military education, that the soldier be as far as possible removed from the valetudinary habit, even from the opinion that a valetudinary frame is compatible with his profession. The greater number of soldiers, as improvident and careless of their health, not unfrequently throw aside their artificial defences (particularly the flannel shirt) at the very time they most require it, viz. when they are in a state of rest, bathed in perspiration and susceptible of impression at every pore.

Care and
exposure.

The preservation of health is an important object to the members of civil society: it is particularly so to the military. There are two views according to which the subject is to be considered, viz. one to guard

against the impressions of noxious causes by adventitious defences; another, to fortify the constitution, so as to render it capable of resisting noxious impressions by its own internal force. The means which conduce to the first are only under the command of the higher classes of society in civil life; the means of the latter belong to every one—and they are particularly applicable to the condition of the military. The first, or system of artificial care is preventative of disease by avoiding exposures, or in blunting, by means of art, such influences as are disposed to act noxiously on the human frame. Flannel is preservative on this ground; but it, at the same time, renders the habit preternaturally susceptible to impression, and thereby predisposes to the explosion of disease when a morbid cause contingently strikes. The second, or system of exposure secures the continuance of health by resistance, that is, by inuring the body to bear a change of impressions without injury: it thus preserves it on a surer foundation than all the contrivances of care that ingenious physicians have suggested. It is a truth—obvious and of daily occurrence, that things which are new, or strange to each other, run rapidly into contact and produce new action, or new combination of action with one another. In this manner, it is observed that a person who is guarded carefully from external air, from vicissitudes of heat and cold, from wind and rain, and the whole train of common causes which act on animal life, is easily disturbed by slight incidental impressions; while another of similar original constitution, but who has been exposed for a course of time to the action of these causes in similar or superior degrees of force, suffers no material injury. This is an ascertained fact: it is the basis on which the training of the military, in so far as regards the preservation of health, ought to be laid.

It is left to physicians, who practice their art in civil life, to suggest the means of guarding, by adventitious aids, the irritable and delicate

Remedy.

citizen from the action of the external causes which disturb human health. It belongs to a wise military institution to form the soldier in such manner, as to be able to resist noxious impressions by his own internal power. This is an important object; but the attainment of it is difficult, and only in fact to be attained by familiarizing the subject with the various contingencies which occur in the field of service. The means, required for conducting the training here alluded to, are not expensive—or difficult to be procured; but they are revolting to the habits of the refined age in which we live. They enjoin privations, immediate pains and unpleasant exposures in the hopes of obviating remote consequences: as such, it is probable that they never will obtain a trial. The doctrine which inculcates the utility of exposing a soldier's body to wind and rain, and to alternations of heat and cold for the sake of familiarizing the habit to vicissitude, and of thereby obviating the injurious effects of what is new to the habit, is not likely to be well received. It implies an immediate suffering in the prospect of a remote contingent good. The discipline necessary to assure it is at the same time harsh, so harsh indeed that it will be considered by many as barbarous. It is notwithstanding useful, even necessary, if it be considered to be an object, worthy of a nation's study and attention to form an army capable of sustaining, with impunity, the various contingencies which belong to war. It is paradox, but at the same time true, that the excessive care which fosters a condition of body easily susceptible of impression from external causes, is more injurious to the health of an army, than habitual exposure to the action of those causes, as they present themselves in the ordinary course of military life. The assertion is not made at random. Irregular troops, who have the least protection from the inclemencies of weather, are usually the most healthy part of armies; and, if reference be made to a comparative state of health among

British soldiers, previously to their being furnished with flannel shirts, socks, great-coats and even blankets, the balance will not be found to stand on the side of the times of extraordinary care. Prejudices are however strong on this head—so strong that arguments will not gain a hearing, even the voice of experience will not command attention. The present suggestion for training a soldier to hardship, in order to make him fit for military duty, is so contrary to the sense of a luxurious people, that it will be deemed the gloomy vision of a barbarian of the dark ages, rather than the induction of accurate observation drawn from a wide field of experience. The voice of reason and experience, here, as in other things, is but a feeble voice ; and, as there exist but small hopes of carrying into effect such a fundamental system of military training, as is calculated to steel the body of the soldier against the effect of the hardships and contingencies which are common in war, we are compelled to trust to care. If this be admitted, it belongs to persons, circumstanced as the army physician is, to point out the mode of care which embraces the greatest number of advantages with the smallest number of inconveniences.

As the chief object of attention, in arranging a soldier's equipment, ought to be directed to convenience and usefulness, it follows that the clothing, while it defends the body from cold, should be so contrived as not to confine the free motion of the limbs by tightness, or to encumber exertion by clumsiness and superfluous weight. While a person is engaged in active exercise, whether in pursuing an object of duty or amusement, he is little liable to be acted on by causes, which, in other circumstances, are injurious to health ; hence soldiers, while actively employed, may be, or rather ought to be lightly clothed, for toil or labour is then easily sustained. When rest commences, susceptibility to impression returns ; and with susceptibility to impression, liability to disease. It is therefore safe, and it will be

useful that the soldier be provided with means—to be employed discretionally for his protection against the injurious action of causes, that occasionally present themselves in war, and that act with force when the body is in a state of rest. In order to give the command of these defensive means, the habiliments, as already stated, ought to be large and easy, and so fashioned as to button over the trunk of the body. But, besides the fashion of the coat here recommended, a cloak, or mantle, as better calculated than any other form of clothing to protect the body against impressions from cold when exercise is suspended and total rest commences, is an essential part of a soldier's equipment. It has advantages over the blanket and great-coat, in as much as it answers the purpose of both. A soldier, in the present times, carries a blanket for the sake of the warmth which it affords in the night: a great-coat is provided for the protection of himself and his arms from rain when on duty. A great-coat is not held to be sufficient protection against cold at night: a blanket is therefore provided for night covering, and hence two things are provided for a purpose which might be answered by one. A cloak, made in the form of the Portuguese cloak,—the cloth close and strong duffle, so as to be both light and warm, and manufactured by incorporating grease or oil with the raw material, so as to be little penetrable to wet, sufficiently long to cover the feet when the knees are bent, and provided with buttons and loops that it may be tucked up in marching, may be considered as sufficient defence against the cold of the night in the common circumstances of service. It defends the body from rain when on duty, and it does not encumber with unnecessary weight in travelling.—Such are the properties of the military cloak; and, viewed in this light, it is evidently the most useful provision that can be made to a soldier's equipment for the field.

The form and fashion of a soldier's equipment is supposed to be

such as is stated. The adjustment of the kind and quantity of articles, termed necessities, is a matter of importance and, as such, requires to be well considered. It is demonstrably proved, to the conviction of all persons who have served with armies, that superfluous baggage, that is, baggage beyond the most correct measure of utility, instead of bringing comfort to the possessor, is a cause of great annoyance and vexation. Provision of the means for a complete change of the smaller parts of dress in the event of being wet with rain, together with a cloak as a covering for the night, is all that a soldier requires for his comfort and the preservation of his health; and, as such, it is all that he ought to be permitted to possess. British soldiers are often encumbered with a load of necessities; and they are notwithstanding often in want of what is useful. The fact, though paradoxical, is true—and it is easily explained how it should be so. Where persons have not more than one change of raiment, the strong impression of necessity obliges them to prepare for the return of want; and, as the impression is strong, the first occasion of replenishing is generally embraced. Where there is variety and superfluity, the necessity does not present itself forcibly; and hence the dirty clothes are crammed into the knapsack, where they accumulate in quantity, without obliging the individual to recollect that they are not fit for use until they are washed. It thus oftens happens that a soldier, who has four or more shirts in his possession, has not one fit for use; while a soldier, who possesses no more than two, has generally one in his knapsack ready for the contingent occasion. This fact,—and it is not equivocal, proves the utility of placing a cause of necessity constantly before the eye of the soldier; for it is only under the impression of necessity that this thoughtless animal prepares for the contingency which belongs to his condition. The idea of relief from impending necessity brings with it a sensation of pleasure; and,

under this interchange of necessity and relief from necessity, life goes on actively and cheerfully;—it is in fact, in such interchange that the happiness of the soldier and of most other men consists.

The following is considered to be a full, but not a superfluous equipment for a soldier on service; viz. two shirts—linen, cotton, or flannel; two pairs of socks; two pairs of flannel or cotton drawers; two pairs of shoes; or one pair of shoes and one pair of half boots; one pair of short gaiters; one foraging cap as night cap; shoe brushes of small size—with blacking; one razor and strap; one brush for the hair; one square piece of soap; a sponge for washing the body, a towel for drying it; a pocket handkerchief; a frock or dressing gown of cotton cloth—to serve as a night shirt; a cloak of duffle or other suitable material; a knife and fork; a canteen for drink; and if every soldier is to be independent in himself, a small canteen for cooking the mess and carrying the dressed provisions. If the spare part of the raiment be put up, in a neat and compact manner in a case of oil skin so as to be secured from wet, and disposed in a havresack for easy carriage, the soldier will not be incommoded by bulk, nor incumbered by weight; and, while little loaded, he will, as possessing within himself every thing that is actually necessary for use, be at the same time independent of the accidents that happen to baggage waggons.

Variegated
ornament.

An army is a whole, supposed to be influenced by one motive, and moved in all its parts by one force to one connected act. As the ultimate end and object is one, the exterior aspect ought to be one also. In correspondence with the principle alluded to, it is customary that troops of one nation be clothed in one uniform manner. The uniformity of appearance conveys an impression of union and strength;—it even has a tendency to augment the real effect of force. This is obvious to our reason as implying utility; and it may be added at

the same time that, if dress be loaded with ornaments and encumbered with trappings, the coup d'œil of uniformity is broken, and the general effect of the impression is necessarily weakened. It is the union of power and energy of movement which strike the eye when the value of the military fabric is estimated; and, as man is the chief part of the exhibition, the countenance, or figure of the man is in all cases the object which attracts attention, whether for pleasure or intimidation; consequently artificial decorations, as obscuring the figure, are misplaced and misapplied in military *costume*.

In proportion therefore as the attire of a military body is gaudy and varied, the impression connected with union is divided, and effect, as now said, is weakened. But, independently of this consideration—and it is not an unimportant one, dress, which is loaded with ornaments, occupies a large portion of time for adjustment; and, besides the time wasted in an useless purpose, the means employed to clean and decorate, viz. pipe-clay for the clothing, grease and flour for the hair, actually pollute the skin, and obscure the genuine and manly expression of the countenance. Pipe-clay is employed to cover dirt. A soldier was until lately, notwithstanding an artificial crust of dirt, said to be clean if his clothes and facings were covered with pipe-clay; and the head was said to be well dressed, if the hair was matted with a paste of grease and flour. A common observer, who looked at the British army a few years back, would be disposed to say that military cleanliness was positive nastiness; and, as the pleasure, which arises from the sensations of personal cleanliness, is one of the greatest of which man's nature is capable, the soldier might then be considered as continually in penance. Where man is perfectly clean in person as freed from all exterior impurity, he may be said to live at every pore and to be animated in every fibre. On the contrary, where the skin is filled with ochre, or encrusted with

pipe-clay, the hair besmeared with grease and matted with flour, pleasure, even comfort is banished from the feeling. The individual is irritated by artificial encumbrances, and health itself suffers from annoyance. Nothing contributes more to preserve health than personal cleanliness; nothing impairs it sooner than artificial dirt; hence it is inferred that the military clothing, which requires to be encrusted with pipe-clay, in order to appear clean, is not a well contrived form of clothing. Pipe-clay does not clean: it only covers the appearances of dirt. Grease and flour, employed to form a matting of the hair, constitute a sacrifice to appearance at the expence of comfort. These are points which relate to health and agreeable feeling; but, putting these aside, the military effect, as relative to appearance, is totally misapprehended. Factitious ornament for the head, which obscures the countenance of the soldier, is at variance with a true military principle; in as much as it weakens impression, by attempting to render comely and alluring that which ought to be prominent, bold and stern. A steady, and even a stern countenance is the countenance of a soldier. It acts, on many occasions, with more impression on the ranks of an enemy than the fire of the musket; hence it ought not to be masked by powdered locks and millinery decorations.

It may be thought presumptuous to speak so positively on this subject; but it is difficult to refrain from saying, that fancy has led us astray on the subject of military dress. The impression of power from a military body consists in uniformity of parts; and, as uniformity best consists with simplicity, simplicity, by necessary inference, constitutes the fundamental rule to be kept in view in arranging the military habiliment. Health and vigour best consist with personal cleanliness; hence the assuring of personal cleanliness is an object intimately connected with the clothing of troops. Pipe-clay,

which is positive dirt as it relates to the human skin, is reasonably supposed to be injurious to health: grease and flour as incorporated with the hair, if not directly noxious to health, engender and feed vermin. The practice is the reverse of cleanliness; and the effect is not even pleasing to the eye. Man is never so attractive as when he is perfectly clean, both in his clothes and person. The hair, as washed with soap and water and dressed with a brush, gives satisfaction to the wearer; and the appearance, as cropped short or tied with a ribbon, is more pleasing to the eye and more becoming a soldier than a *frizzure* made up with grease and flour into a fantastic form; and it is less incommodious than a mass of hair, in form of a General's *baton*, appended to the back in a case of leather. This, if esteemed ornament, is felt by those who carry it to be an incumbrance.—Much of what is preposterous in military dress has been done away of late years in the British line; but, as taste is a fluctuating fashion, the absurdities may be again brought back; and for this reason they are adverted to in this place: the chief military power will, it is to be hoped, consider the reasons which mark inutility, or bad effects.

But while the inconveniences, connected with a gaudy and variegated military dress, are considerable inconveniences to the individual, the effect, resulting from the obtrusion of artificial trappings and vain ornaments, constitutes a radical and important interruption to military impulse. A sentiment of honour is the motive which urges a soldier to his duty; it is that which maintains him in his place in the day of trial. It is a simple motive, has only one form of action; and the progress of the act is forward and direct. This sentiment of honour, or pride of mind from consciousness of intrinsic worth, gives firmness to man's character, maintains him in the execution of his duty, and urges him to pursue his purpose even to the destruction of his life. It is a modest sentiment;—it acts in silence

and without boast. Vanity assumes its place: it does not execute its office. Vanity courts admiration, delights in applause, and calculates value by external appearance. If this be so, it is not a military quality; it is notwithstanding, by an unfortunate misapprehension of things, cherished by the military as the substitute of pride; and, from this misapprehension, ornaments of dress, feathers, lace, embroidery and gildings of the exterior are permitted to engross the faculties and fill the military mind with vain conceit. Where the soldier's thoughts are chiefly directed to the imagining of factitious dress for the sake of attractive appearance, he is induced to neglect the essential. This is a condition of man's nature; for the mind of man is capable of acting with energy on one subject only. The factitious and the real are not compatible with each other; and it may be added that those, who expect to make men brave by infusing into them the spirit of vanity and love of ornamental dress, proceed on a mistaken view of the causes which act on the mind of man. A love of dress enamours man of himself, for it makes him vain of appearance. It attaches him to life, for life's sake; for it supplies a material of selfish and solitary gratification, consequently it diminishes the radical fund of courage, and weakens the patriotic love of country. Vanity often leads to acts of enterprize; that is, it entices a man to enter the field of battle with a shew of courage; it is honour, or mental pride only which secures him from leaving it without disgrace.

Manufacture. The writer has thus stated his opinions concerning the form and fashion of military clothing. The opinions will be considered as presumptuous; they are notwithstanding true as founded on the reason of things. A few remarks are now to be added on the materials of which military clothing is made; and here the manufacturing character of the nation cannot meet with praise. The object of the manufacturer is gain of money; consequently the fundamental

rule of manufacture turns on producing a specious outside to captivate the eye of the purchaser, and a perishable interior texture to insure the necessity of a speedy return to the market. This is not an assumption; it is comprised in the nature of trade. It does not belong to the present subject to enquire into the cause of deterioration which now obtains in the quality; that is, in the durability of the wearing apparel of the English peasant. It is not pretended to say, whether it arises from the deep laid design of the manufacturer to increase consumption, or that it arises contingently from the employment of machinery and other processes of art which do violence to the nature of the material, crush its constitutional substance, and thus diminish its durability as exposed to friction from wearing. But be the cause what it may, the fact is certain that English broad cloth and English leather are less durable, and less serviceable at the present time than they were at the middle of the last century. With a great-coat and boots of the manufacture of 1760, a person might travel for half a day in heavy rain without being wet to the skin. With a coat of the manufacture of the present day, he is drenched to the skin by a summer shower, and his feet are wet by the dew which hangs on the grass of a summer's morning. English broad-cloth and English leather, though highly dressed to captivate the eye, are not in reality well manufactured for the benefit of the wearer. They are not durable: the cloth is not warm; and the material is so put together that it appears to attract, rather than to repel moisture.

The common manufacturer exerts his genius to produce a commodity of the flimsiest interior texture with the best exterior surface. The contractor for soldier's clothing exerts himself to go beyond the manufacturer for the common market,—and he generally succeeds; for soldier's clothing is inspected and approved by less competent judges than those who purchase for themselves. It thus happens

that from the bad quality of contract clothing and contract shoes, English soldiers are sometimes ill clothed on actual service, and almost always ill shod. The clothing of the troops of foreign nations is ordinarily of a better quality as to substance than that of the English. The shoes are of a better form and of a more durable material;—a circumstance which, exclusive of better primary education for war, gives foreign soldiers great advantages over English in protracted campaigns and harrassing services, carried on at a distance from the depôt of stores.

CHAPTER III.

EXERCISE---BODILY AND MENTAL.

It is a fact, disputed by no one, that idleness has a deteriorating influence on the military character, consequently it is important that idleness be banished from military life; and for this purpose, it is highly important that all the time of the soldier be occupied in the performance of exercises, such as add directly or collaterally to the efficiency of military power. The exercises, which are calculated to form soldiers for the practice of war, have been noticed in another place, and the advantages resulting from the practice of them have been pointed out at some length. The rudiments of instruction on that head are laid in the primary school; but, if it be intended that the effect of the instruction be subject to calculation in the field of

action, perseverance in practice is necessary even after individuals have been incorporated with their respective corps.

Dancing may be ranked among military exercises. It gives pleasure to the individual, and it is practised with pleasure for its own sake. It conduces to the improvement of military address, in as much as it conduces to the facility of combining movements in marching, in running, in halting, changing position readily and in order; hence the habit is important to the soldier's art, in as much as it communicates an idea of the manner by which parts separate and join, and, when joined, move in union so as to become irresistible in attack by united impulse. Fencing is an exercise directly military. It is practised with interest by the soldier, in as much as it illustrates different modes of defence, or teaches how to multiply and augment the power of the arm in offence.

The pleasure arising from exercises, of whatever kind they may be, is felt by the soldier as an individual gratification; or the usefulness of it is estimated in his reason, by the preeminence which it gives to him in the execution of his military duties. But, as military exercises cannot be supposed to occupy the whole of the time that a soldier is exempted from carrying arms, it is of consequence that the intervals be filled up by such amusements in the open air, viz. ball-playing, crickets, quoits, &c. &c.—as, while they gratify and please, improve the military powers, try endurance and give to the officer the opportunity of ascertaining, with accuracy, the extent of the powers of exertion of individuals—and collectively of regiments.

It is intended, in the system of discipline contemplated in this place, that a considerable portion of the soldier's time be occupied by a round of bodily exercises, such as are connected with conditions which occur in the practice of war. But, as bodily exercises cannot,

from the condition of our physical constitution, be continual, and as there ought not to be a pause of rest in the progress of military improvement, the parts of the discipline ought to be so disposed that, when bodily exercises cease, the exercises of the mind begin. The object is an important one; but it is little regarded in the present times. Military education rarely has a higher aim in view than to render the soldier submissive to command, and steady in movement as a part of a machine. If the culture of the mind obtain notice, it is only secondarily, viz. as directed to cherish a desire of dress for the sake of appearance, or to arrange a train of indulgencies for the gratification of appetites:—in this there is error. If vanity be the impulse to action, dignity of mind is obscured; and if appetite be indulged, the fund of military excellence is undermined. The subject, as now said, is an important one: but the principle, by which it is to be directed, does not appear to be understood, at least justly estimated by ordinary tacticians. If viewed according to the reason of things, the genuine military principle and many of the current practices of the day are in direct contradiction to each other. It is, or it ought to be the aim of military institution to render the frame of the soldier little sensible to the impression of the contingencies which arise in the fields of war, in the view that his health be little endangered by their unavoidable occurrence. This is common sense; it is not common practice. The system of care, ease and indulgence which grows into fashion daily, as calculated to increase the number of physical wants, to multiply and extend the reign of appetites and desires, runs counter to the military purpose. It fosters vanity and cherishes the gratification of sense through all the extent of the fabric, viz. from the head which orders, to the hand which executes. In a fabric so constituted, and so overcharged with in-

flammable materials, by the accumulation of cares and indulgences as the common military instrument is, the movements are irregular and the effect of the act is often void.

As it is the paramount object of military institution to reduce to order, and bring under command the movements of animal organism as stimulated to action by a variety of causes; so there is no effectual mode of doing it, except by implanting a sentiment in the mind, which absorbs into itself with a domineering force all the caprices and wanderings of corporeal sense. The foundation of the discipline, which effects this purpose, is supposed to be laid in the primary school of military education; the routine, practised by the formed soldier, is supposed to improve and confirm the effect of what was begun in early years. A man, or nation is most attracted by what most nearly concerns itself. The heroic acts of the Black Prince of England form the most brilliant, the most generous and the most interesting part of the English history. As such, they are best calculated to engender the heroic spirit in Englishmen; and, as a spirit of heroism is the only principle which ensures, at least which deserves success in war, a manual of achievements of that illustrious prince could not fail, if skilfully put together, to act usefully on the military spirit of the English soldier. A similar, and not less impressive impulse might be given to the Lowland Scot by the history of Sir William Wallace. The achievements of Wallace were intrinsically noble. His history cannot be read without emotion by any one who possesses the sympathies of human nature: it kindles the ardour of a Scotchman into a flame. The Highlander of Scotland is naturally enamoured of war and warlike achievements; and he so abounds with martial fire, that there is generally more occasion to restrain, than to urge him to combat by artificial excitement.

The traits of heroic character, which stand in the records of national history, may be employed with advantage to improve military education. They animate courage to acts of enterprize, and they cement action by a national bond of union, in as much as they place national glory on a point of elevation to which all eyes are directed. In this view, the heroics acts of Wallace and the Black Prince of England might be thrown together in such form, as to constitute a catechism for the British soldier, calculated to inflame the mind to military enterprize, and, what is of more value, to guide its course in the paths of military virtue. If the sentiment of heroism, so engendered, were stimulated into action by music, the act would be animated, united and irresistible. The songs of Tyrtæus, the language of which is ardent to excess, appear to have operated a strong effect on the soldiers of Sparta; and the hymn of the Marseillois, the tones of which seize the sympathies of the soul, and impel the whole movements of soul and body to one object, may be regarded as a grand instrument in the French revolution. In a word, it may be asserted that an army, the structure of which is adjusted by correspondence of physical power, the action urged by the electrizing influence of heroic leaders, and cemented by the cadence of national music in a national purpose, will be as a rock in the day of battle—not to be shaken, and as a torrent in its strength,—not to be withstood.

Utility of
exercise.

The effects of well adjusted exercises tend to perfect the mechanical union of the separate parts of armies: they improve and confirm the energies of the mind, and they contribute to the preservation of bodily health. It has been long observed,—and the maxim was known and well appreciated by the Romans, that perseverance in a routine of exercises, in the open air, serves to steel the body against the chances of disease, that exercise is, in fact, of more value to the

health of an army than an host of physicians. The observation, so well approved by the Romans, is verified in daily experience; but, though true and important in itself, it is not acted on systematically in the armies of modern Europe. The military exercises of the present day call forth no exertions, and excite no movements which try, extend and confirm the stability of bodily power. They embrace no sudden transitions from cold to heat, and from heat to cold, from rest to action, and from action to rest, familiarizing the individual with vicissitude. The Roman soldier who sweated daily, and who sweated profusely under toil, possessed comparatively little of that high charged irritability which explodes in disease on slight occasions; for, passing suddenly from cold to heat, and from heat to cold in the routine of daily exercise, the changes which occurred in actual war were not new, and, as not new, produced no injurious effect.—With the modern soldier, not inured in this practice by education, the trial cannot be made without danger.—The fibre is little elastic: the strong external impression forces the barrier of order, and disease follows as a consequence.

But, besides the influence of active exercise, which in a manner steels the body against the impression of the ordinary causes of disease, there are other personal cares and practices which contribute in a high degree to preserve health, even to improve the healthy condition. Among these, personal cleanliness is one of the most striking. The act of making the body clean affords the highest gratification of pleasure to animal sense of which man's nature is capable. It is accompanied with an accession of physical force and vigour; and it is not alloyed by vexation or remorse as a fruit of enjoyment. As the exercise of purifying the person has a tendency to increase physical power and to preserve bodily health, it will necessarily be one of the cares of a well considered system of military economy to assure to the

soldier the means of carrying the purpose into effect in the completest and most perfect manner. For that end, every soldier is supposed to be provided with a sponge and towel as a part of his necessaries; and, when so provided, it is supposed to be a custom not to be dispensed with on any occasion that he wash his body from head to foot every day,—preferably at noon when the day is at the hottest, or when the animal heat has been preternaturally increased by previous exercise. It is not necessary to be scrupulously exact in the wiping off the moisture; it is even useful that the subject move about and expose his naked body to the open air after bathing. Besides the general ablution here alluded to, the hair ought to be washed frequently with soap and water, or water and pot-ash, brushed and completely cleared of vermin. If, in addition to ablution, the skin were occasionally rubbed with oil as was done by the Greeks in ancient times, the health would be better protected against the injurious impressions of weather than it is or can be protected by a shirt of double milled flannel; and, while guarded on this point, it would also be guarded in a material degree against febrile contagions.—Among necessaries, a frock, or dressing gown of cotton cloth—to be employed as a night-shirt, cannot be otherwise considered than as an useful addition to the soldier's wardrobe. It is economical, as saving shirts and sheets; and it is salutary, as implying the necessity of exposing the body to the air in the act of dressing and undressing twice a day.

If the practices which are here described be duly executed, the body of the soldier will be perfectly clean, the sensations gratifying, the vigour improved to the utmost point of improvement,—health will even be secure comparatively. Where a form of discipline, similar to that now recommended, is regularly enforced, the application of moisture to the skin, in the incidental wettings inseparable from

field service, as not new or uncustomary, is little likely to be injurious; and as noxious causes, generated in the body and deposited upon the skin, are washed away by water; or swept away by currents of fresh air, contagious fever has no chance of being engendered in a barrack, or even of existing long in a barrack should it be accidentally introduced. In this manner, attention to personal cleanliness brings with it a numerous train of advantages to the soldier;—and, as personal purification is a radical part of the institutions of military economy, the execution of the duty ought, in the just reason of things, to be conducted under the eye of commissioned officers not less punctually than evolution in tactic, or training in the use of arms.

SECTION II.

BARRACKS, CAMPS AND TRANSPORT SHIPS.

THE proper accommodation of troops, in the field and in quarters, forms an important part in the economical arrangement of armies. Accommodation is of a two-fold nature, viz. houses or barracks for permanent stations; tents or huts for moving armies. The adjustment of the barrack department requires knowledge of the causes which act on human health. Protection from weather, by houses or tents, seems on the first view of things to be necessary for armies; but, useful, or necessary as they are thought to be, the protection is often connected with causes more pernicious to health than complete exposure to an inclement sky—in an inclement climate. Where many men are

collected together, and confined within narrow limits, the atmosphere of the confined circle is liable to be corrupted; and, as corrupted air is destructive of health, it is obvious to common sense that the fundamental rule, in adjusting accommodation for troops, consists, or ought to consist in combining protection from causes without, with security from contamination of causes that are within. With primary knowledge of the nature, and practical experience of the operation of the causes which act on the health of the human constitution, the object may be attained without much difficulty. Without such knowledge, the labour of the architect is misapplied and money is expended for no good purpose. We stumble from error to error on this head as well as on others, suffer destruction from disease, murmur, and blame the physical constitution of things when our own ignorance only is in blame.

CHAPTER I.

BARRACKS.

Importance of
barrack
construction.

THE site and construction of barracks, as permanent quarters for troops, must be allowed to be points of important concern to a military nation. If barracks be injudiciously placed, or badly constructed, health suffers. If health suffer, and life be lost from the operation of causes which derive from the bad position, or faulty construction of the soldier's dwelling, the military department is responsible to the

nation for a sacrifice of human life without necessity. The choice of position, as a remedy for this evil, is not obscure or difficult. It presents itself to common observation; but it unfortunately happens that men of high office often disdain to observe, and thereby to learn. They presume in self confidence to control the laws of Nature, and they are punished by the result for their presumption. The position of a barrack is sometimes commanded by circumstances which leave no option of choice to the architect. But, where this necessity does not exist, the barrack ought to be placed on a soil that is dry in itself, or that is capable of being made dry by draining, that is at a distance from swampy grounds, or the foul banks of large and slow moving rivers; and, while the position is such as stated, it is important that the building itself be sheltered from piercing winds by the interposition of rising grounds, shaded by trees which communicate freshness to the air, and that it possess the command of a perennial spring, or stream of running water, as essential to comfort—Such position is proper according to the best estimates of reason: it is convenient, and it promises well for health.

The means of guarding against the contamination of air, which results from accumulating a number of persons into narrow space, are uniformly to be kept in view in constructing a military barrack. The purity of air depends on ventilation; but the mode of assuring thorough ventilation does not appear to be well understood by the architects of military barracks, not even by the architects of military hospitals. The contrivances of the barrack architect permit heated air to escape and cold air to enter: but, as the air escapes, or enters vertically, no effective ventilation is produced by it in an apartment that is crowded with men, baggage and bedsteads. Ventilation, as the term imports, consists in a constant movement of the interior air; but such movement only deserves the name of ventilation which is

horizontal, so as to sweep every corner of the apartment in a full stream, and to carry whatever is offensive to an outlet,—an effect only to be assured by windows which reach to the level of the floor in the manner of Venetian windows. If barrack windows be constructed after the form alluded to, the air will not be easily contaminated, even though the apartment be crowded beyond the regulation. It is suggested that barrack windows descend to the floor: it is not meant that they be wholly of glass. The lower part, to the height of a man's head or higher, ought to be of wood,—to be opened for ventilation as a common door; the upper part of glass to admit light as a common window. If barrack windows be formed in this manner, the air of the apartment may be always preserved in purity in dry weather. When the weather is close, damp or foggy, ventilation is attempted, to be effected by artificial means, viz. by the strong heat of fire. Economy is the essence of military arrangement; and, in order that the smallest quantity of fuel may diffuse the greatest quantity of heat throughout the apartment, the fuel ought to be put into a low and open fire-stove, and placed at the centre of the room. If this be done, heat will be equally diffused; and, the air being moved equally by the rarifying influence of heat, the ventilation will be uniform and as perfect as it can be made by artificial means.

A barrack room calculated for twelve or fourteen soldiers, with a small apartment separated by a partition for a serjeant, is the size most consistent with the preservation of health, best calculated for enforcing the rules of discipline and for ensuring good conduct among the men. Where soldiers are thrown together in masses in one common apartment, they naturally collect in groups—often at the corners of the room. The air is contaminated in consequence of the accumulation at the least ventilated places; and irregular acts, as they are then more likely to arise, so they are detected with comparative

difficulty. Licentiousness, or vice springs up in the multitude merely as multitude; and the restraints of discipline, as weakened and embarrassed by the extent of the circle, produce no beneficial effect. This occurs often; and, from this it is comprehensible why a small apartment, as less exposed to such contingency, becomes preferable for the barrack accommodation of soldiers on account of morals as well as health.

It is an object of some importance to contrive the furniture of the barrack apartment, so that it do not impede movement in the interior air; for movement of the interior air is essential to the preservation of health. Where the floors of the apartment are of board, bedsteads are superfluous. If the soldier be furnished with a straw palliasse, he sleeps in safety and in luxury on a boarded floor. Every military officer who considers the reason of things will, it is presumed, study to inure the soldier, in peaceful times, to customs and practices which correspond as nearly as possible with what occurs in war. The soldier who has been accustomed to sleep on bedsteads and in sheets in commodious barracks, conceives it to be a hardship to lay himself down on a hard board without straw; and dangerous to sleep on the bare turf without a mattrass and a pillow. If such he hardship or danger it must happen in the field; and, when it does happen, the first trial gives dissatisfaction, occasions chagrin and probably the subversion of health. Bedsteads in barrack rooms, with boarded floors, are superfluous as furniture: they are injurious as luxury. A double tier of bedsteads, such as obtains in some barracks, or a double tier of platform, as obtains in most, marks an extreme ignorance of the nature of things. The contrivance contaminates the air by artificial condensation, favours the generation of the cause of contagious fever; and thereby tacitly and indirectly annihilates the army,—or renders it ineffective through disease artificially produced.

There are multitudes of examples in recent history in proof of the destructive effects of the practice alluded to ; but they make little, if any impression on those who rule :—there are proceedings in the affairs of men, upon which experience is not sufficient to teach wisdom, and this unfortunately is one of them. If no bedsteads existed in barrack rooms ; and, if no platforms were permitted to be erected for the purpose of a soldier's repose, perfect ventilation would be easily assured within the soldier's dwelling. If the palliasses, which are spread upon the floor at night, were carried into the open air in the morning in dry weather, or piled up in the corner of the room when the weather is wet and foggy, the area of the apartment being thus freed of incumbrance, nothing would present itself to interrupt ventilation or harbour impurities ; for whatever is offensive or noxious, as moved into the currents produced by the strong heat of fire, or by the counter-openings of doors and windows, could not be otherwise than conducted to an outlet and thence finally expelled from the interior of the apartment.

Besides palliasses with straw, sheets and blankets are the ordinary equipment of barrack apartments. If, instead of sheets or blankets, a soldier were provided with a dressing gown, or frock of strong cotton cloth, sufficiently long to cover the feet, he would, with the help of his cloak and the warmth of his comrade, sleep as warm as a soldier ought to be accustomed to sleep. When the soldier enters upon service, he has, or ought to have the same equipment as in quarters. When this is the case, he experiences only a small change of condition : he feels little chagrin and has little chance of suffering in his health. Nothing is new to him : he is taught to depend on himself for his personal comfort ; and, as he moves in the same channel in peace as he may expect to move in war, he knows neither luxury or want, is neither raised high in hope in the anticipa-

tion of indulgencies, nor depressed in spirit with the idea of accumulating hardships. It is this equality of temper which constitutes a soldier; it therefore becomes the duty of military institution to fashion the recruit, through a proper course of training, to attain it in such manner that he may endure, with impunity to his health and without chagrin to his temper, whatever occurs or may occur in the service of the field.

If barrack apartments be infected with contagions, nitrous fumigations and white-washing are common means employed to purify them; but they are not sufficient, if the cause be strongly fixed. A coating of hot varnish would, it is presumed, be effectual; but it is expensive, and has perhaps never been tried. In prevention of the adhesion of contagions, washing the floors and walls with soap and hot water, or water and potash (provided the walls be polished) twice a week in warm and dry weather, or dry rubbing daily with a hard and heavy brush in cold, damp and foggy weather, may be considered as sufficient security, where the construction of the house and its equipments are of a proper kind. Washing, or rubbing removes the noxious matter which adheres to the walls or floors, ventilation, by the proper management of a volume of pure air entering at the level of the floor by doors and windows in fine weather, or by the movement produced through rarefaction from the action of the strong heat of fire in damp and foggy weather, prevents the aggregation of noxious emanations from the animal body, or dissipates them when already aggregated and in a state of virulence.—Such is the sum of the writer's suggestions on this head. If the outline be filled up with due consideration; and, if the operations be carefully watched in practice, he ventures to say that fever, the product of bad air, will not arise in the quarter so treated, or if a contagious fever, arising from a remote source, be introduced contingently, it will not long exist. As things are, it is difficult to prevent the cause from being generated. When

generated, and, when generated and rendered virulent by condensation, it is scarcely to be eradicated without abandoning the barrack for a time, and destroying the parts of the furniture that are most susceptible of contamination.

CHAPTER II.

ENCAMPMENT.

THE manner of covering troops, while employed in the field, is a subject of not less important consideration than that of disposing of them in quarters. A necessity occurs in war on many occasions which leaves no option of choice in occupying posts of an unhealthy character; but there is unfortunately an authority, derived from example and the sanction of great names, which directs the military officer, when under no military necessity, to fix his encampment on grounds which are unhealthy in themselves, or which are exposed by position, to the influence of causes of ill health which are carried from a distance. Such advice proceeds from the desire to act on a presumption of knowledge which cannot be ascertained, rather than to act by the experience of facts which man is qualified to observe and verify. It is consonant with the experience of military people in all ages and in all countries, that camp diseases most abound near the muddy banks of large rivers, near swamps and ponds, and on grounds which have been recently stripped of their woods. The fact is precise, but it has been set aside to make way for an opinion. It was assumed,

about half a century since by a celebrated army physician, that camp diseases originate from causes of putrefaction, and that putrefaction is connected radically with a stagnant condition of the air. As streams of air usually proceed along rivers with more certainty and force than in other places, and as there is evidently a more certain movement of air, that is, more wind on open grounds than among woods and thickets, this sole consideration, without any regard to experience, influenced opinion and gave currency to the destructive maxim, viz. that the banks of rivers, open grounds, and exposed heights are the most eligible situations for the encampment of troops. They are the best ventilated; they must, if the theory be true, be the most healthy. The fact is the reverse. But demonstrative as the fact may be, fashion has more influence than multiplied examples of fact experimentally proved. Encampments are still formed in the vicinity of swamps, or on grounds which are newly cleared of their woods in obedience to theory, and contrary to fact. The savage who acts by instinct, or who acts directly from the impressions of experience, has in this instance the advantage over the philosopher, who, reasoning concerning causes which he cannot know, and acting according to the result of his reasonings, errs, and leads others astray by the authority of his name. The savage feels, and acting by the impression of what he feels, instead of fixing his habitation on the exposed bank of large rivers, unsheltered heights, or grounds newly cleared of their woods, seeks the cover of the forest, even avoids the streams of air which proceed from rivers, from the surface of ponds, or from lands newly opened to the sun. The rule of the savage is a rule of experience,—well founded and applicable to the encampment of troops, even of civilized Europeans.

It is, as now said, prudent, in choosing ground for encampment, to avoid the immediate vicinity of swamps and rivers. The air is there

noxious; but, as the influence of the air thence originating does not extend beyond a certain limit, it is a matter of some importance to ascertain to what distance it does extend; because, if circumstances do not permit that the encampment be removed out of its reach, prudence directs that remedies be sought and applied to weaken the force of its pernicious impressions. The remedies consist in the interposition of rising grounds, woods or such other impediments as serve to break the current in its progress from the noxious source. It is an obvious fact that the noxious cause, or the exhalation in which it is enveloped, ascends as it traverses the adjacent plain, and that its impression is augmented by the adventitious force with which it strikes upon the subject of its action. It is thus that a position, of three hundred paces from the margin of a swamp on a level with the swamp, or but moderately elevated, is less unhealthy than one at six hundred on the same line of direction on an exposed height. The cause here strikes fully in its ascent; and, as the atmosphere has a more varied temperature, and the succussions of the air are more irregular on the height than on the plain, the impression is more forcible, and the noxious effect more strongly marked. In accord with this principle, it is almost uniformly true, *cæteris paribus*, that diseases are more common, at least more violent in broken, irregular and hilly countries, where the temperature is liable to sudden changes, and where blasts descend with fury from the mountains, than in large and extensive inclined plains under the action of equal and gentle breezes only. By inference from this fact, it becomes an object of the first consideration in choosing ground for encampment, to guard against the impression of strong winds on their own account, independently of their proceeding from swamps, rivers, and noxious soils.

There is room for improvement in the manner ordinarily employed for covering troops from the inclemency of the weather during a cam-

paign,—perhaps the very base of the plan might be changed with advantage. In countries covered with woods, abundantly supplied with straw and other materials applicable to the purposes of forming shelter, it is upon the whole better to raise huts and construct bowers than to carry canvas. Great expense, and considerable inconvenience on the head of transport is saved in the first instance, by adopting that measure, and, what is of more importance, the service begets an interest to itself in all its stages. The individual is exercised by labour. His mind is employed in contriving and executing something for self accommodation; and he is furnished with a daily opportunity of renewing the pleasure. The mode of hutting, here recommended, effectually precludes the evils arising from contaminations of air which generate contagion; an evil, which often arises in tents, and is carried about with an army in all its movements in the field.

It stands prominent as a fact in military history that serious evils frequently arise in armies from the ravages of contagious fever; and, as contagion is a contingent evil, it is obvious to common sense that the chances which give rise to its action ought to be precluded with every possible care. It is proved by experience, in armies as in civil life, that injury does not often result from simple wetting with rain, where the person is fairly exposed in the open air and habitually inured to the contingencies of weather. Irregular troops, which act in the advanced line of armies, and which have no other shelter from weather than a hedge or a tree, rarely experience sickness, never at least the sickness which proceeds from contagion; hence it is inferred that the shelter of tents is not necessary for the preservation of health. Irregular troops, with contingent shelter only, are comparatively healthy, while sickness often rages with violence among those who have all the protection against the inclemencies of weather that can be furnished by canvas. The fact is verified in multiplied experience;

Protection in
the field.

and the cause of it is not of difficult explanation. When the earth is damp, the action of heat on its surface occasions the interior moisture to ascend. The heat of the bodies of a given number of men, confined within a tent of a given dimension, raises the temperature within the tent beyond the temperature of the common air. The ascent of moisture is thus encouraged, generally by a change of temperature in the tent, and more particularly by the immediate or near contact of the heated bodies of the men with the surface of the earth. Moisture, as exhaled from the earth, is considered by observers of fact to be a cause which acts injuriously on health. Produced artificially by the accumulation of individuals in close tents, it may reasonably be supposed to produce its usual effects on armies. The balances of health are disturbed by its immediate operation in the first instance; and, under its action, a process arises subsequently in animal economy, which engenders a material that acts upon other animal bodies, and disturbs the rule and economy of health through a long series of subjects. A cause of contagious influence of fatal effect is thus generated by accumulating soldiers in close and crowded tents under the pretext of defending them from the inclemencies of weather; and hence it is that the means, which are provided for the preservation of health, are actually causes of the destruction of life.

But though tents, as means of protecting troops against the inclemencies of weather, are more injurious than useful to health according to the ordinary construction and manner of adjustment; yet as habits, acquired by long custom, grow into prejudices which are not easily overcome, it would be time lost to attempt to prove the advantages that might be gained by discontinuing such protection. The argument would not be listened to, for the suggestion savours of barbarous life. In the refined stage of manners and military habits in which we now are, artificial protections are deemed indispensable, and tents must

perhaps on that account be always permitted to be an appendage of armies. But, if this must be submitted to in compliance with custom, it is the duty of the army physician to suggest the means of diminishing the mischiefs which arise from the use of means which are thus deemed indispensable. There are two causes which more evidently act upon the health of troops in the field than any other, viz. moisture exhaled direct from the surface of the earth in undue quantity, and emanations of a peculiar character, arising from diseased action in the animal system in a mass of men crowded together. These are principal—and they are important. Their noxious effects may be obviated, or rather the cause will not be generated under the following arrangement, viz. a carpet of painted canvas for the floor of the tent;—a tent, with a light roof as defence against perpendicular rain, or the rays of a vertical sun, with side walls of moderate height employed only against driving rains. To the first there can be no objection. It is useful, as preventing the exhalation of moisture from the surface of the earth: it is convenient and economical as it is always ready, and less expensive than straw. It may be cleaned every day with little trouble,—without any cost,—and it requires to be fresh painted only once a year. The other is practicable; but the application of it is connected with more trouble. It is a truth, established by incontrovertible experience, that health is most secure, vigour most permanent and most effective where man is employed daily in exercise; amusement and pass-time in the open air. The contact of the pure air conduces to health; and, as that cannot be doubted, a roof—to defend from perpendicular rain, is all that is necessary for a soldier's accommodation in the field. A roof, similar to that of a marquee, is liable to be overturned by strong winds; a tent, with close walls, is liable to be contaminated. The first is the lesser evil,—and even that evil may be easily obviated. If walls three feet in depth be provided

for the round tents at present generally provided for the accommodation of British soldiers, very little addition will be thereby made to the weight of carriage. The defence against wind and rain will be at command, and the air will not be liable to contamination; for the roof being lofty, and the walls only attached under strong wind, or driving rain, ventilation will not be impeded in its ordinary course.—With such protection from weather, wet ground and contamination of air, a soldier's health may be considered as secure under the continuance of a campaign of ordinary, even of protracted duration.

CHAPTER III.

TRANSPORT SHIPS.

TROOPS, particularly British troops, are often embarked in transport ships to be carried to distant stations, either for field service or garrison duty. It is commonly known that if men be embarked in wholesome ships themselves in perfect health at the time of embarkation—and without the seeds of disease lurking in their clothes or persons, they rarely suffer sickness even during long voyages, unless there be palpable defect in economical arrangement. On the other hand, if the vessel be unwholesome in itself, or if the persons embarked carry with them the seeds of disease, the latent germ, called into activity by heat, or other contingency incident to the condition of troops embarked, expands, multiplies, propagates widely, and even, in some instances, acquires a virulence which strikes on the sources of

life with the force of a pestilence. The ravages of contagious fever in hospitals and transport ships are often terrible. They were enormous during some periods of the war 1793; and, as the case is recent, it may be reasonably supposed that the memory of the losses then sustained is not yet obliterated. As the loss was so great on some occasions as in a manner to cripple the service, the minister at war, it is presumed, will not fail to institute an inquiry into the nature of the causes which occasioned it,—in hopes of finding a remedy against the occurrence of similar calamity at future times.—Whether such inquiry has actually been instituted, or what progress has been made in it, the writer does not pretend to know; but, as the causes are obvious, and, as they have fallen under his notice in the course of his official duty, he here endeavours to state with freedom, and in as plain a manner as he can, what they are.

In viewing this subject with attention, several points of material importance present themselves for consideration. 1st. The character of the ship as to wholesomeness, or exemption from infections. 2nd. Allowance of tonnage per man. 3rd. Height between decks. 4th. Equipment of bedding, arrangement for sleeping, &c. 5th. Divisions for sick and convalescent. 6th. General means and provision for washing and purifying, &c. &c.

1st. It is important to ascertain, by the clearest possible evidence, the character which a vessel destined for the transport of troops bears for wholesomeness, prior to engagement for service. Some vessels are unhealthy without suspicion of engrafted contagions. This occurs sometimes in new ships; and, as it then presumptively depends on some undefinable process in the seasoning of timber, it ceases in a course of time. But though nothing noxious exist in the condition of the timber, or in the condition of the hold, it notwithstanding happens that wherever fever has prevailed in any given vessel with such force

Health-charac-
ter of
Transports.

as to engraft its cause into the beams or lining, the common means of purification are not sufficient to eradicate it completely. For example, an infected transport, after undergoing a common purification, has often remained healthy for a length of time when employed as a carrier of merchandize; when again converted to a troop-ship, the infection has burst forth with violence and committed destruction. The fact is not doubtful; and the knowledge of it gives reason to believe that a vessel, which has been once thoroughly contaminated with the matter which produces fever, can scarcely be considered as safe, unless the decks and linings be removed, and all the surfaces, which were exposed to the contact of the noxious cause, be covered with a coating of hot varnish.

Tonnage. 2nd. *Tonnage per man*.—It is commonly known that a rule, relative to tonnage, is inferred in all embarkations of troops: it is also known that the rule is not positive, or correctly adhered to in practice in the British service. It varies arbitrarily according to distance and destination of voyage; and it is not clear that the latitude of variation, assumed in such case, is always directed by a correct knowledge of the nature of things. For example, a greater allowance of tonnage is made for troops that are destined for the West Indies, than for those which are destined to navigate European seas. The rule is mistaken. In a voyage to the West Indies, where the fineness of the weather entices the soldier to the deck, where the trade winds ventilate the ship completely, and where the warmth of the climate modifies animal action in a manner that does not easily consist with the generation of febrile infections, the tonnage may be reduced to the smallest scale without apprehension of injury on the score of health. On the contrary, in European seas, particularly in harbours and roadsteads in cold, damp and foggy weather, where the troops embarked are naturally inclined to cluster in groups for the sake of warmth, the air

stagnates and becomes impure; and, there being moreover few or no objects in such situations calculated to rouse the attention, the action of life becomes languid, so as to favour the rise of the process which generates the cause of fever. A crowded transport rarely fails to become sickly in such circumstances; and it is often observed that a contagious fever introduced by accident, or arising spontaneously among the inmates of such vessel, propagates itself widely, and commits destruction to a great extent in the very harbours and roadsteads of the kingdom. The latter end of autumn and beginning of winter, especially where the weather is close and damp, is the season of the year most favourable for generating and propagating contagious fever; and, if troops be then crowded in barracks, or accumulated in the 'tween decks of transport ships where accumulation is little admissible, the virulence of the cause often becomes extreme.

3rd. *Height between decks, and quantity of space for individual accommodation.*—There exists a rule, but it appears to be only loosely adhered to, of allotting a certain tonnage of shipping for the transport of a given number of troops. The largest allowance seems to be made for the longest voyages and the warmest climates: this is not uniformly right. The measure of quantity may be allowed to vary according to circumstances; but a fair proportion stands about two tons per man. If the arrangement of the space between decks be a proper one, this allowance may be supposed to be connected with sufficient space to permit every one embarked to move about with freedom. The quantity of the tonnage is the base upon which the calculation is ostensibly made in providing transport for troops; the measure of the space between decks is, in reality, that which requires to be principally considered, for it is that only with which the soldier is concerned. In a transport ship, intended to be fitted up with a double tier of berths, the height between the decks ought not to be

Between decks.

less than seven feet under the beam ; and that the soldier may have it in his power to lie at ease, not less than two feet ought to be allowed for the repose of his body.

Equipment

4th. *Equipment of bedding and arrangement for repose.*—Transport ships are usually furnished with bedding for the voyage, viz. a flock mattress and blanket. The bedding, so furnished, is not new in every instance ; and, if not new, there is no certainty that it is not contaminated with contagious matter. The instances of the mischiefs which have arisen from infected bedding are numerous and authentic ; and the writer has no hesitation in saying that the desire to save a few dirty blankets and half worn mattresses, has, on some occasions, destroyed military life to such extent that the price of it, at the lowest computation, might have equipped the transport with furniture of satin and velvet.—But, as it is expensive to furnish new bedding for every embarkation of troops ; and, as mischief has often arisen from using that which is impure, the writer believes that the evil may be evaded by allowing the soldier to sleep on board, as he is supposed to sleep on shore, that is, in his cloak,—with the addition of a cotton dressing gown as substitute for sheets. If the board be too hard, it may be covered with a blanket ; or a moveable cot frame of canvass may be substituted for the platform—and this at no great expence.—The whole cost of this equipment will not be equal to that of the mattress, for it will last longer, and the comfort will be great, all indeed that a soldier can desire.

It may be observed in this place that transport ships have been sometimes fitted up with hammocks instead of platforms. Where soldiers are accustomed to sea and able to manage themselves like sailors, the advantages are evident. The space between decks is convertible into a clear area, by the removal of the hammocks to the deck, and, as such, it is capable of ventilation and thorough purifica-

tion. This is desirable; but it is not always attainable; and, where attained, it is moreover observed that where soldiers are not accustomed to sea, and particularly where there are women and children on board, the 'tween decks of a transport ship, equipped with hammocks instead of platforms, exhibits a scene of great confusion and distress in stormy weather. There is here a positive and very serious inconvenience,—the advantage is only contingent. The moveable platform, whether of board or canvass, is therefore the more eligible mode of accommodating soldiers in their sleeping hours,—canvas simply, or board covered with a blanket.

5th. *Division for sick and convalescent.*—Though it is not prudent, Hospital. where there is option of choice, to carry soldiers on board of transport ships with marks of disease upon their persons,—such disease at least as has the chance of being communicated to others; yet, as this necessity sometimes occurs in the course of service, and, as diseases sometimes arise on board of ship which threaten danger to those who approach near them, the best remedy must be applied to the case that circumstances permit. The remedy consists in allotting a division of the vessel for the reception of the infected, viz. an apartment cut off, by a partition, from communicating with the berths of the healthy, so that the danger, if not entirely precluded, may be materially diminished. This division ought to be at the bow of the ship—under the forecastle; not as the best part of the ship for the purpose, but as the least obnoxious to others. The division for the sick is supposed to have a communication with the deck by its own hatchway;—one side allotted for those who are in a state of convalescence; the other for those who are recently attacked, and yet in danger. The soldier, who is in health, is not allowed extra bedding on board of transport ships; the soldier, who is sick, is on the contrary to be furnished with every thing which, adding to comfort, promises to promote

recovery, viz. a cradle or cot, hair matrass, sheets, blankets, sick dress and change of linnen.

Cleaning. 6th. *Provisions for washing, purifying, &c. &c.*—It will be useful, as economical of labour, that transport ships be furnished with a pump and *hose* at the bow of the vessel for the facility of conveying water to the deck. It will also be useful that they be furnished with fumigating apparatus and necessary materials for fumigation; and it is important that they be supplied with moveable fire-stoves for drying and purifying the air between decks in damp and close weather,—or after the decks have been wet by washing. Offal tubs, for the use of the different messes during meals, are indispensable for maintaining order and propriety between decks; and a common pantry, under lock and key, for the reception of such part of the dressed provision as is not consumed at the ordinary meal, cannot well be dispensed with. It is almost unnecessary to mention that there ought to be port-holes in the sides of the ship for each tier of berths, as large and as numerous as is consistent with safety to the vessel.—The air holes, cut in the decks of transport ships of late years, are inconvenient in various respects in a crowded ship, and they are in reality of little or no use in so far as respects ventilation, the purpose for which they were projected. They are formed on a wrong principle, in the same manner as air holes for ventilation in barrack buildings.

Besides the above there are other minor necessities, useful in preserving a correct economy in transport ships, which the occasion will best point out. The principal object in equipping vessels, destined for carrying troops, consists in assuring circulation and purity of air in the 'tween decks; and, in providing every kind of means that conduce to assure personal cleanliness among those who are embarked. The washing of the person is essentially necessary and always safe. Washing of the space between decks is to be permitted in dry

weather; or where the proper apparatus of fire-stoves is at command for drying up the moisture: moisture, in a crowded place, is demonstrably injurious to health, and ought therefore to be avoided.

A transport ship, equipped in the manner suggested and not more crowded than a judicious regulation admits, may be supposed to continue for several months a safe abode for troops that are embarked in perfect health. Experience proves this to be fact; but the fact is sometimes disguised by the difficulty which exists in discerning correctly the conditions connected with perfect health. Disease, or the seeds of disease lurk not unfrequently in persons, or in clothes, without being indicated by external signs; hence scrutiny, prior to embarkation, not only of the existing, but of the past condition, is necessary to give confidence in the measures adopted. Where the latent seeds of disease are introduced into a crowded vessel, they expand suddenly as animated by warmth, and acting with force, they propagate and spread to all within,—often destructively. To prevent this occurrence is important: it has scarcely as yet obtained attention.

Examination of
health at
embarkation.

Troops destined for embarkation may be considered as presented under three conditions: viz. 1st. In a state of perfect health in so far as respects exemption from actual disease, or suspicion of the cause of disease lurking in the habit. 2nd. In a state of apparent good health; but doubtful as to security, in as much as the subjects have been drawn from situations where reputed causes of disease exist in force. 3rd. In a state of actual sickness,—the disease—endemic, epidemic, or contagious fever.

1st. The first class of troops, destined for embarkation, is supposed to be drawn from well ventilated barracks, or from tents that have stood upon favourable ground in the early part of summer. The preservative precautions, necessary to be taken in this case, are few and simple. No danger is apprehended from the importation of

contagion, for no contagion exists in the quarter or encampment from which the troops are drawn: hence the chief care is directed to the institution of suitable rules of regimen—to be observed during the voyage. The diminution of the ordinary ration, where troops are embarked on board of transport ships, is a judicious regulation. It obtains it is believed in all cases; and it may be considered upon the whole as preventative of sickness; but if it should not be thought sufficient to prevent repletion, under a long continued state of inaction, a pint of salt water, or other purgative may be employed as auxiliary; and it may in fact be usefully employed once a week.

2nd. Much care, and in many cases much judgment is necessary for the effectual execution of the preventative plan of discipline which applies to the second case. It is supposed that no disease manifests itself at the time of embarkation; but, as it is known by experience, that if the human body be exposed to the influence of causes which arise from particular soils and situations, an impression is made on the habit and a secret operation results from the impression, which, taking root, advances by a regular but imperceptible process to developement at a given time. The developement may not be, and rarely in fact is completed before the expiration of seven days, a fortnight, a month, or even a longer period from the time of application. The endemic cause of fever is of this character. The material does not adhere to inanimate substances, consequently it is not conveyed by the medium of apparel to distant places. It appears to exert its first and chief action on the alimentary canal and its connexions; hence it is obvious that, preventative of its explosion, it should be primarily and principally attacked in the quarter where it chiefly resides. In this view, emetics and purgatives are among the most useful of the medical aids employed in prevention. These, viz. an emetic and purgative soon after embarkation, followed by the judi-

ous use of stomachic bitters, a measured and correct regimen of diet, viz. a ration of provisions diminished in quantity, well cooked and good in quality, presents itself as a direct remedy to obviate a great deal of the evil which so frequently arises from the promiscuous embarkation of troops in the circumstances alluded to.

3rd. The arrangement of means for the prevention of the diffusion of disease on board of ship requires much consideration, and can only be carried properly into effect under the direction of a discerning medical officer. The circumstances of service sometimes compel military officers to order the embarkation of troops, when they are not in health. Danger is to be apprehended from the measure. The extent of the danger ought when known, to be stated by the medical officer to the officer commanding, and stated in such terms that if error be committed, it may not be committed in ignorance. Nothing short of imperious necessity can justify the proceeding alluded to ; for, without foresight of what is to happen, and great exertion to counteract the ordinary course of things, the introduction of contagious fever into a transport ship is calculated to produce, and in many cases actually has produced great destruction of military life. Wherever a fever, possessing the character of contagious, prevails among troops whether in quarters or in camp, it may be assumed as a truth that the clothing of such troops is not free from the seeds of disease ; consequently that such clothing cannot be introduced into the 'tween decks of a transport ship with impunity. If this be so, it follows in the true reason of things, and it is consistent with the strictest rules of economy, that the woollen part of the apparel, the proper purification of which is little to be depended upon, be thrown into the sea. It avails little to bathe, wash and purify externally, even to exterminate the contagion in its first operation by emetics and purgatives, if the cause be again applied to the skin through polluted garments.

—The writer is aware that a proposition which recommends the destruction of infected clothing, whether the property of the colonel, the soldier, or the state, will startle those who form the army estimates. Those calculate the cost of dead matter; but, if any among them estimate the value of the living man and the value of the materials which destroy his health, and strike a balance between the value of an old coat and the life of an effective soldier, he would not, it is presumed, consider the proposition as extravagant. If one must be sacrificed, it is needless to say which is the least expensive.—The money value of men who died in hospitals and transport ships of late years, from diseases engendered in unwholesome dwellings, and propagated to others by infected clothing, exceeds all calculation. It was a melancholy loss; for it was a loss which might, and which ought to have been avoided. In all cases therefore, where troops are embarked from infected barracks, infected camps, or from infected hospitals, it will be found, in summing up the final account, to be a rule of radical economy to destroy every the minutest article of the woollen clothing that is in their possession:—without such precaution, the other means adopted for the preservation of health will not be of avail.

Remark. Where troops are embarked with all the precautions here stated, their health may be considered as secure during a long voyage, if proper regulations be adopted in the interior management. The chief causes of the sicknesses which occur on board of ship arise, from corruption of air in consequence of over crowding, from stagnation of air in consequence of defective means of ventilation, or excessive dampness, from torpor in consequence of defective excitement of animal power, from too great fulness in consequence of over feeding, or from degenerated nutrition in consequence of errors in

the mixture of food. The corruption of air from over-crowding is obviated by adhering to a proper regulation respecting tonnage, and by dividing the complement of troops into three watches, so that one division be always on deck, employed in exercise for amusement, or in exercise that belongs to duty. Ventilation is promoted, and corrupted air is rectified by nitrous fumigations, by the heat of fire carried in stoves to different parts of the ship, or by the counter-opening of port holes in fine weather. Damp, or exhaling moisture is hurtful to the health of those on whom it strikes; hence the introduction of wet clothing between the decks of a transport ship is to be expressly forbidden, the injunction rigidly enforced. For instance, those who are on guard, if wet with rain or sea water while on deck, are not to be permitted to go below until they put off their clothing; and, that this may be done without inconvenience, cloaks or great coats for the watch are to be considered as a necessary provision for troops embarked.

The exercises which contribute most to the preservation of health cannot be pursued to extent on board of ship; but such as are practicable ought to be practised with diligence. Of these, fencing, cudgelling, dancing and sparring are the principal. Certain portions of time ought therefore to be allotted to the practice of each; and care ought to be taken that the soldier practise with exertion, so that the circulation of the blood be driven to every part of the exterior with such force as to occasion a warm and general perspiration throughout. The effect of washing the surface of the body with cold water, particularly with cold salt water is then beneficial. It imparts vigour to animal life and serves in an eminent degree to confirm animal health. But, besides the benefits to be derived from the mere practice of bodily exercise, the proceeding may be so directed as to produce an impression on the mind of more importance than even bodily health.

National songs, of simple expression and martial character as sung in chorus by the mass are powerful in this view; and they deserve a place in the routine of discipline ordered to be practised by troops embarked. But useful as these means are, simply in their own nature, the effect is imperfect unless it be consecrated by an hymn to the Deity at the close of the day. The hymn sanctifies; it renders the soldier invincible, in as much as it contributes to plant the opinion of his military duty on the base of religion. The ordinary attention and cares of officers have a military purpose in view; they may consequently be considered as proceeding from an interested motive. The discipline, which leads a soldier to a nearer view of his Creator, is felt by the soldier as a kindness conferred upon himself; and it is ordinarily acknowledged by him with gratitude as such. The impression of religion is the highest and surest pledge of courage in all cases of difficulty. This is an important truth; and it may be assumed as a fact that, as the soldier, who possesses that paramount sensibility to the Deity which constitutes religion, cannot be made the servile instrument of an outrageous despot, so a just sovereign may calculate on his duty by the duration of his life.

The evils consequent to a full diet, in a state of inaction, were known to those who went before us; and they were, in some degree, averted by a diminution of the ration of provisions where troops were embarked on board of ship. The change of the species of the provisions in the different days of the week, seems also to imply that the subject had been considered with care, and arranged under the guidance of a principle of science. The Dutch, of all European nations, have formed a table of sea diet with the greatest judgment: the English, under the influence of the national prejudice that high feeding gives the highest portion of physical power, err the most.

The proper management of troops in transport ships is an impor-

tant concern ; but the outline of the arrangement is only given in this place. Instances of the advantage of knowledge and attention over ignorance and neglect on this head are numerous. It has happened, and it happens often that, of two men similarly circumstanced in all things, one preserves the troops under his command, through knowledge, care and attention, in a state of perfect health during a long voyage, another, from want of knowledge, or through indolence, permits disease to arise, to extend itself, and to infect the mass. If such difference in capacity and diligence exist between military men; it ought to be known; and, if known, we must regret that it is not always appreciated. Those who are capable and diligent are those only who ought to be placed in charge of transport ships. The trust is an important one ; but, in ordinary circumstances, it is little regarded as an useful one, for military value belongs, in common opinion, to the art of applying the instrument, not the art of keeping it in a state fit for application.

SECTION III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE MARCH OF THE TROOPS.

THE proper care and management of troops in the field is an object of important concern to the success of the campaign. It is important; but the execution is difficult, for it requires minute attention on the part of the officer to maintain all the parts of it in correspondence

with each other, and thereby to assure an efficient act at the point of conflict. The march cannot be properly conducted without correct previous arrangement of the parts of which the army is composed, and the parts can only be correctly arranged by those who know private conditions in their minutest relations. It is a part of the duty of the superior officer to obtain correct information, concerning the nature of the roads on which the troops he immediately commands are ordered to march, and also to obtain as distinct knowledge as he can of the nature of the ground on which they are destined to fight. Without knowledge of roads,—not merely distance, but the number and nature of impediments which may be expected to arise in the route, there can be no precise calculation of time, or estimate of efficient power when the march is accomplished and the point of attack gained. The officer who commands in chief forms his plans, and adjusts the order of his movements in the idea that all the parts in his instrument are perfect and capable of effective action. He supposes that they are: it is the duty of subordinate officers to assure the truth of what he supposes. In assuming this as a position, it is indispensable, in order to be certain of effect, that the state of health among the troops be examined rigidly by a medical officer; and further, that the condition of the feet and all other things connected with the useful power of the soldier be examined and ascertained to be serviceable by a military officer of the company, prior to the commencement of the route.

Feet, &c. The feet of a foot-soldier demand particular attention from the military officer who confides in the correctness of movement for the accomplishment of purposes. As soldiers suffer pain and fail in their duties from a neglect on this head alone, it is necessary that the officer know, by actual observation, that they are in fit condition, viz. that they are without blisters, the toes without corns, the flesh not pierced by the

growth of the nails ; and that the shoes, while strong and durable, correspond to the foot by their form or fashion. Besides the inspection of the feet, there are other of the soldier's concerns which require to be examined and properly adjusted before the march commence. British soldiers can rarely be left to their own discretion in matters which require foresight. For this reason, it is the duty of the officer to know, by actual observation, that every man of his immediate company is furnished with what is fitting for his purposes ; and, in the first place, that the articles termed necessities, while they do not exceed the proportion which is strictly useful for the wants, be so arranged for carriage as to be of the least possible inconvenience to the person who carries them. If they do not exceed the schedule proposed above, the incumbrance from weight will be inconsiderable ; and, if they be disposed in a havresack hung over the shoulder like a sportsman's pouch, the cloak hanging diagonally over the other, the balance will be equal and the individual will not be incommoded by them, either on the march or in action.

Where calculations are made for the attainment of a given purpose, a precise measure of means is indispensable. The study of measure is therefore important. It is unfortunately oftener judged by the eye than by correct experiment ; hence the equipments of the soldier, termed necessities, are multiplied capriciously with the view of adding to his comfort. The case is mistaken. There is more value at market in six clean shirts than in one. There is not more of personal comfort, and if there be not more comfort, there is inconvenience from the possession of quantity. A knapsack crammed with necessities, so as to load a foot soldier like a pack-horse, oppresses by its weight, consequently consumes a part of the power which is intended for, and ought to be reserved for military exertion. Super-

fluity of baggage is a common error in the British service; and the usual manner of disposing of it for carriage is not moreover well contrived. A full knapsack rolls upon the back like a billet of wood; and shoulder straps gall the skin, if the whole weight of the pack bear upon the shoulder. To remedy the rolling of the pack and the galling of the shoulders, the shoulder straps are joined by a belt across the breast. The remedy is worse than the evil it is intended to remedy; and it is worse for this reason, that few persons are aware of the mischief which it occasions. The pressure of a cross belt confines the free motion of the chest and impedes respiration. Whatever impedes free respiration increases the heat of the body beyond the just temperature. It is thus that a person, who joins the shoulder straps of his pack by a belt across the breast, is oppressed with heat and pants for breath,—frequently without adverting to the cause which occasions the increase of heat and oppression. On the contrary, where the pack is supported wholly by the shoulder straps, though the shoulders may be galled, the respiration is free, and the body is less liable to be over heated.

The error now stated, with others which obtain in the equipment of foot soldiers, deserves the consideration of the tactician. It proceeds from the presumption of judging of fitness by the eye, instead of being guided by the knowledge which results from experience in trial. The remedy is obvious; but, whether the radical remedy be applied or not, it is the duty of the commissioned officer, when troops are in the field, to know that the necessaries of the soldier, such as they are, be well arranged for the convenience of carriage, and that the soldier himself do not undertake the march without suitable preparation, viz. without repast, whether tea, coffee or soup; without bread and cheese in his havresack and vinegar in his canteen, prefer-

ably to rum, which is the allowed ration of British troops on foreign service.

When a soldier has been prepared in the manner stated, he proceeds on the march—and marches at precisely the same pace in all parts of the column. As soldiers are supposed to be arranged in companies according to powers of exertion; and, as there must necessarily be some variety in the effective power of companies, it is obvious to common sense that the least effective companies ought to be placed in front, the movement being there least embarrassed. The rate of the slow pace is three miles per hour; the rate of the exerted pace four. These paces are to be changed at stated intervals only, time and distance being measured exactly by an officer who leads at a justly regulated step. If this be not done with care, a precise effect cannot be expected in combined movement; and hence it happens that by the neglect, or by the transgression of this fundamental rule of order, the military purpose is defeated or less completely executed than it might be.

Various contingencies arise in the course of a march which oblige individuals to leave the ranks. The act of leaving the ranks is unmilitary in appearance; and reprehensible irregularities not unfrequently follow the practice of it. In order, therefore, to remove all shadow of pretext for the occurrence of such necessity, it will be proper that a general halt be made for five minutes at the end of the first hour, so that every one may, during the interval, adjust those personal concerns which require adjustment. The march of the first hour is supposed to be performed at the slow pace, that of the second at the accelerated. The column halts for fifteen minutes or more at the end of the second hour; and, during the halt the individuals of the column are supposed to recline, or assume a horizontal position, for

it is only in the recumbent posture that the limbs experience the full benefit of rest. When fifteen minutes have expired, the march is resumed at the slow pace. When the hour is completed, the column halts five minutes for purposes of personal adjustment;—and, at a given signal, resumes its course at the accelerated pace. In this manner, a journey of fourteen miles is performed in the space of four hours and twenty-five minutes, including the time allowed for halting; and, if the march be conducted in the manner proposed, no person, it is presumed, who is fit to be admitted into the military ranks, will fail in performing it. A distance of fourteen miles is a common days march for troops on ordinary service. Circumstances sometimes occur which require that the distance be lengthened, even that it be doubled. The exertion will not, it is believed, bear hard upon well formed troops, if due care be taken in adjusting the primary arrangement, and due consideration employed in directing the subsequent steps of the march. For example, it is understood that a halt for the space of one hour take place after the performance of the first part of the allotted march, and, that the shoes, socks and trowsers, or breeches and leggins be then taken off, the feet, legs and thighs washed, or bathed in cold water, if the nature of the halting ground supply water in sufficient quantity for that purpose. If water be deficient, the lower extremities may be rubbed with a wet towel and exposed to the cool air. Such is a simple expedient only; but it restores vigour and capability of exertion equal to some hours of rest. If hunger or faintness be felt by any one, a crust of bread with a morsel of cheese, washed down by tea, or vinegar and water, with which every soldier is understood to be provided, is sufficient to remove it. The march is to be resumed at the expiration of an hour; and, with the observance of the rules prescribed, the distance,

it is presumed, will be performed with ease in the calculated time, if care has been taken in the primary arrangement to separate the weak and inefficient parts from the sound and effective.

The arrangement and transport of baggage, as connected with the march of an army, is another of the matters which requires to be adjusted with knowledge and foresight. If a soldier be equipped in the manner suggested, he is independent in himself, as carrying all things on his own person for which he has immediate occasion.—But, when an army advances in expectation of meeting the enemy, it is necessary that its baggage and incumbrances be brought together and follow in the rear, properly arranged so as to move without confusion, and so conducted as to arrive at the place of destination in due time. The baggage of a fighting army consists of tents &c. undressed provisions of the day, persons who are indisposed by sickness, women and children. These proceed in the rear under military escort, the pace calculated so as to correspond, according to a proportional rule, with the movements of the military columns. It is necessary that the column of baggage observe the most exact discipline and the most exact order on the route, otherwise the expectation of the soldier will be disappointed, perhaps the military plan will be disconcerted by neglecting things essentially necessary, but which do not strike at first sight as being of importance.

PART VI.

OUTLINE OF A SCHEME OF MILITARY ARRANGEMENT FOR COLONIAL POSSESSIONS, PARTICULARLY FOR THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THE WEST INDIES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW OF SERVICE IN TROPICAL CLIMATES.

Sickness from
change of
climate.

MILITARY service implies change of place and condition. Change of place and condition implies the occurrence of disease ; for disease, according to common observation, arises as the effect of new impression made upon animal organism by the application of new or foreign causes. The change, and the consequent disease happens under military service every where ; it happens more frequently and more remarkably in the foreign than in the native soil. In this manner, the natives of Europe, or of the higher latitudes of North America, suffer sickness under migration to the torrid zone. Sickness, and mortality from sickness is there proportionally high,—considerable

among colonists, sometimes enormous among the soldiers that are sent from Europe for the protection of colonies. If this be so, and if life be considered as a possession of value in a national point of view, the loss of life resulting from the military protection that is given to commercial adventurers in foreign climates, and to foreign war for sake of conquest, is a serious loss in the balance of national accounts. Man is the operative instrument through which the nation, as a corporate body, attains to power and obtains wealth, consequently if the health and life of man be not husbanded with care, the accumulating operation of the state, termed conquest, stagnates in defect of operative instruments, and the nation becomes bankrupt through its ambition, avarice and carelessness. If this be so,—and it is self evident, it is reasonable to suppose that an investigation into the principles, which regulate the balances of health among the military, will not be thought superfluous by the wise economist. The case is important, and the sovereign power will be false to its own interest, if it do not apply a remedy when furnished with proof that a remedy is attainable, and particularly when informed that it is not difficult of attainment.

Auxiliary to the investigation in question, the writer takes the liberty of stating a view of the subject as it has resulted from a wide field of experience. Excess of irritability, constitutional or contingent, constitutes the quality of habit which most favours the invasion of acute disease. Irritability is augmented by heat; and heat, acting on moisture, produces expansion, or increase in the volume of animal structure. The habit of the native of northern latitudes expands rapidly in consequence of the action of the increased heat of tropical latitudes. Expansion is a physical effect of heat; and, while confined within limit, has an animating operation, implying an accession to the power of life. But, while this is admitted on one

Author's view.

part, it is evident on another that if the effect of the force, which produces the expanding act, be obstructed in its channel by accident, the barrier, which limits the movement of action and reaction in its natural routine, is violated, the customary course of things is subverted, and a train of movement commences in a new circle—constituting what, in common language, is termed disease. Excess of stimulation from heat produces expansion,—and produces it suddenly. If the expanded fluid find issue by a common outlet, the health sustains no material injury. If the outlets be obstructed, the customary action of health is subverted, and the effect terminates in one or other of the forms of febrile irritation to which the human constitution is liable. Febrile irritation constitutes diseased action: diseased action is generally a creative process disposed to terminate in organic destruction, ultimately to occasion the death of the system. Expansion from heat, is obviously a predisposing cause of acute disease; and it is obvious to man's common sense that this cause is comparatively strong in tropical climates. It is fully ascertained by experience that persons of a full, robust and athletic habit, of a tense and rigid fibre which does not easily yield to impulses which violate structure, are more liable to fevers, particularly to such fevers as are violent and dangerous than those of a spare habit, even than those who are valetudinary and of a delicate and lax texture. Febrile irritation is rare where the skin is open and perspirable; where the bowels are lax, where diarrhea is considerable; or where pimples, boils and eruptions appear on the skin, particularly where they appear on the legs, degenerate into sores and ulcers of more or less malignity. Evacuation is thus preservative of health; suppression of evacuation, on the contrary, is productive of disease, and often productive of fever of the most aggravated kind.

As excess of heat and moisture is an ostensible cause of the fre-

quency of acute disease in tropical climates, it is evident that, with a view to prevention, the impressions of such causes should be avoided as far as possible; or, that the irritability upon which the cause acts should be lowered artificially, so that a given force of irritation do not produce the subversive effect it would otherwise produce. The balance of the healthy action of the system may thus be preserved by reduction of the heat and moisture of the climate, or by blunting the susceptibility of subjects to common irritations.

The influence of heat acting on moisture constitutes the obvious physical cause of expansion; the excess of expansion, as forcing the barrier of organic harmony, is the obvious cause of febrile irritation. This cause usually abounds in low grounds, in rich and fertile soils, on the banks of slow moving rivers, near stagnant waters, swamps and ponds. It usually exists in a higher proportion near the sea coast than in the interior, in as much as the shore is the reservoir of the inland country, the depot of its moisture and its riches. The interior is, for the most part, elevated; and it is cool in proportion to its elevation. The surface is dry; or if not dry in itself, its moisture circulates so briskly, from declivity of position, that the health of the European is comparatively secure from injury.

The question under consideration is important in itself; and it claims the particular attention of the military officers of the state from its intimate connexion with military health. It is not altogether easy to estimate, so as to form precise opinion on the subject, but some light will be thrown upon it by tracing the gradations of febrile disease according to variations of locality. The rule which influences salubrity in the tropical climate is nearly the same in all the islands in the West Indies; that is, it rests on the same base, though it varies occasionally through circumstances of accident, viz. force of cause, or mode of application. The endemic of the West Indies may be

considered as a fever of periodic movement, modified in character—from intermittent, mild and regular, to a form so concentrated, and with movements so complicated and obscure that the type cannot be distinctly traced. The endemic is remitting, or intermitting in the native inhabitant, in persons who are assimilated to climate by long residence, and commonly in all descriptions of persons in wet seasons and on swampy grounds. In strangers, who are natives of northern latitudes, who are young in years, strong and athletic in form, full in habit, rigid in fibre, who are crowded in quarters, or who live in a circumscribed atmosphere, especially in dry weather, the form is continued, the symptoms concentrated, the course rapid, the fatal termination within the fifth day.

The endemic fever of the West Indies is usually of an aggravated form near the sea coasts, particularly in vallies between mountains, in the vicinity of swamps, foul grounds, the oozy banks of rivers or brooks. It is comparatively mild, and ordinarily assumes a periodic type, viz. remittent or intermittent at the distance of a few miles interior, especially in mountainous districts, at least behind the first ridge of mountain. Diarrhea and ulcer of the legs are there common:—the latter is often in a manner epidemic in the dry season. On the central ridge of the larger islands, febrile disease is rarely seen.—Slight diarrhea, or boils and eruptions terminating in ulcers on the legs are almost the only complaints which occur among the military who occupy the higher stations.

Such is the outline of gradation in the endemic fever according to locality. The intensity of the disease preserves a ratio with the heat of the atmosphere and the stagnant moisture of the soil. The form is modified by a multitude of contingent causes, viz. force and direction of winds, protection from, or direct exposure to sources of noxious exhalation. If this be fact,—and it is well ascertained by many years

of experience, it can scarcely be supposed that Government will refuse to take advantage of the informations attained through unprejudiced observation, so as to form, from these informations, a disposition of quarters so arranged as to secure from harm the health of the military which is destined to serve in tropical and unhealthy countries. The subject nearly concerns the nation, in as much as it affects the health and lives of the soldiers who are purchased with the nation's money. The balance of advantages, derivable from the preservation of the health of the military on foreign stations, is demonstratively great on the bare ground of economy ; but great as it may be, there is no authentic evidence before the public that proper steps have been taken to give it effect, notwithstanding the promise, and confident assertion, which the minister for the war department made to the House of Commons in the year 1807. It was then asserted that the matter had been scientifically considered and that no means would be neglected that gave promise of diminishing the evil. The House rested satisfied in confidence of the minister's word,—and sickness pursued its course.

It may be observed, in this place, that prospects of advantage or convenience in matter of trade and commerce generally rule arrangements in colonial settlements, at least in sugar colonies ; and, as the produce of the soil is a commodity intended to be transported to a foreign market, the facilities of transport, viz. conveniences for export and import, decide the choice of position with the first settler. Corresponding with this view, towns ordinarily arise upon the sea coast, in bays and creeks, or near the mouths of rivers, for the sake of harbour and other contingent accommodations. The military, destined to serve in the colonies, is stationed for the ostensible protection of the town or the sea-port, whether the seat of government, or the depot of the marketable commodity, consequently the troops, as

stationed in the vicinity for the purposes specified, are frequently condemned to dwell in situations where causes which subvert health, which even rapidly destroy life, abound to excess. This is the fact; and with this condition of the fact fully exposed, it may be thought not to be unworthy of the parental cares of the State to examine the subject with care, for the sake of ascertaining, whether or not it be possible to unite defence and protection, with such disposition of military force as is consistent with the preservation of health.—It is positively true, (proved to demonstration in numerous instances—but proved by accident—not by avowed experiment) that European troops may be so stationed in the islands of the West Indies, as to retain their health nearly as perfectly as they could be expected to retain it in their native country.

The air of the interior and mountainous parts of the larger of the inter-tropical islands is comparatively cool and pleasant, and not unfriendly to the European constitution. There are numerous instances where European soldiers have remained for seasons, and there is presumption to believe that they might have remained for a long life without sustaining injury on the score of health, if they had been permitted to remain at an interior station. No one will pretend to say that such a disposition of the military force, as assures the continuance of health, is not a desirable object; but it is not always an attainable object as things are.—Where not fully attainable by means which are within the sphere of military comprehension, it is necessary to bring all available assistances from the resources of the medical art to give aid to the purpose. It is the duty of Government,—and it will be the pleasure of a paternal one, to meet the evils which cannot be avoided—and to combat them with the skill of science. It has been repeatedly stated that excess of heat and moisture is a prominent cause of febrile disease in tropical countries. It acts by an expansive power, forces the

limits of order and harmony in organic structure, forces its way by the skin or bowels, forms depositions in the interior, or, in failure of that, produces general febrile irritations. If the European soldier be exposed to its influence in the course of his duty, it belongs, as now said, to the military officer to counteract its operation; and, as a military officer can scarcely be supposed to possess knowledge of the means by which the counteraction is to be effected, it belongs to medical science to instruct him on that head.

The security of health, under exposure to strong causes of disease, depends upon the stability of the power of resistance in the individual habit. The power of resistance consists in this case in irritability of a comparatively low scale; in other words, in a slow susceptibility of expansion through stimulation by heat and moisture. The condition so defined is attained, 1st. by diminishing the quantity, and by changing the quality of diet; 2nd. by artificial evacuation, preventative of repletion; and 3rd. by such occupation of mind and body, as maintains animal action efficiently in the constituted channels of health in spite of the impression of the contingent causes that are calculated to subvert it.—Abstinence, occasional depletions and active exercise are the means.

The case has been tried, and proved on many occasions that persons who live abstemiously in tropical climates, who live chiefly on vegetable and farinaceous foods which furnish a less heating nutriment than the flesh of animals, not only escape sickness, but preserve health, vigour and activity unimpaired, while those who live fully and fare sumptuously suffer signal sickness and die in great numbers. This is frequently exemplified in war. Prisoners, as furnished with a measured ration of diet, chiefly bread and rice, rarely experience sickness, at least, they are in a manner exempted from the sicknesses which depend on climate. The fact was proved in

St. Domingo in the war 1793.* From this fact and others similar, we are warranted to conclude that vegetable diet, at least diet, with a comparatively large proportion of the vegetable material, is best calculated for the security of health in hot countries. Besides diet on a low scale—and chiefly vegetable, sobriety, or temperance, in the use of malt and spirituous liquors, is justly reckoned among the number of preservative means. The ration of rum, as already observed, is a pernicious bounty to the British soldier. It is rarely serviceable on the score of health immediately, and it is pernicious in its consequences through the habits which the continued use of spirituous liquors engenders. But, though this bounty has been the cause of incalculable evil to the army, it is not denied that there are occasions where a small glass of pure rum may be useful, even as preservative

* A detachment of British soldiers was captured at sea on the passage to St. Domingo in the year 1796, and carried into Cape François. The ration given to them was chiefly rice with salt herrings, and occasionally a small allowance of raw spirit. The prisoners were sometimes employed to load and unload ships.—They did not suffer in their health; at least, they did not lose one of their number while they remained in captivity. Their comrades, who were within the British lines, suffered great sickness during this period and enormous mortality. The prisoners were sent to Cape St. Nicholas Mole after six months detention, alert, active, animated and cheerful. They entered immediately upon the British ration, and in six months, nearly one half of them were numbered with the dead.—Illustrative of the principle here contended for, it is mentioned, on the authority of a person of veracity and a party in the case, that between fifty and sixty British officers (prisoners) were allowed to live at Pointe à Petre in Guadaloupe on parole. They had plenty of provisions, meat, drink, and money. In four months, thirty-two only remained alive. They had been, prior to that time, confined upwards of twelve months in hulks in the harbour of Pointe à Petre on a scanty allowance of food, often not exceeding six ounces a man per diem :—none of them died during that period.

of health. It invigorates the functions of the stomach, particularly where the food is vegetable or farinaceous. The fact is admitted, and the explanation of it is consistent with just views of animal economy. But if it be granted that a small glass of rum, given as a stimulating liqueur, may be serviceable for the purpose stated, it does not follow that rum mixed with water, vulgarly grog, is useful as a diluting beverage. Water is the true diluent, or quencher of thirst, and it is the most suitable as it engenders no desire to drink beyond utility. The fabricated liquor engenders a desire for more; and, as it entices to drink where there is no real thirst, it confirms the subject in habits which diminish his value, destroy his life; and thus punish, in conformity with the universal law of Nature, the ingenuity, if it be so called, which contrives indulgencies for artificial appetites and superfluous cravings.

2nd. Besides measured diet, viz. abstinence in eating and temperance in drinking, there are other means which, diminishing the volume of the fluids, may be considered as preventative of the explosions of disease. These are subtractive, viz. blood letting and purging. It is proper to be remarked in this place that there are times of repletion, or what may be termed periods of irritability, occurring at intervals apparently connected with the phases of the moon—new or full, and more or less connected with a disposition to febrile explosion through a cause we do not comprehend, but which appears to be connected with fulness or irritability; hence it is obvious that purgatives, viz. calomel and jalap, or calomel followed by a solution of purging salts, administered on the third day preceding the full or new moon, bid fair to prevent accessions of fever through the effect of depletion, or by directing the accumulated irritability to an outlet. The day on which the purgative is exhibited is necessarily a day of abstinence; and there is sufficient evidence in the writer's experience,

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if not in that of others, to prove that if the practice suggested be justly suited to the case, the rage of sickness will be thereby moderated in sickly times, particularly among Europeans recently arrived in tropical latitudes. The practice is useful; the management of it must be left to persons of the medical profession; the reason of it may be apprehended by military men of common understanding.

Exercise.

3rd. It is a common observation that occupation of mind and body, implying exertion to an extent sufficient to act with impression upon animal structure, acts preventatively of sickness in all countries, and particularly among Europeans in tropical latitudes. The opinion is heterodox. It is notwithstanding true; and the truth of it receives illustration from the history of planters, particularly the younger planters who spend the greatest part of the day under the rays of a scorching sun superintending the field labour of slaves. The young planter may be said to work hard; and he is comparatively healthy. Soldiers who remain in barracks, who pass the hours in indolence and ease, or in drunkenness and revelry, suffer severely, —and die in great numbers. If it be permitted to draw an inference from the fact as it relates to the planter, occupation and exercise under the noon day sun, instead of being hurtful, are here salutary to the human constitution. The fact contended for is distinct and clear. The explanation of it may be referred to a double cause, viz. to the reduction of fulness and irritability in consequence of perspiration, or to constrained action, analogous to the action of health, viz. such as gives a condition to the habit which renders it little susceptible of contingent morbid impressions. Planters are healthy under active and daily employment; soldiers are healthy and vigorous, under active military service. If the military service be of such a character as to embrace daily exertions of activity for six days, or for six months

the troops rarely experience sickness during the period of exertion. The cessation of labour, or the return to rest is almost uniformly followed by the explosion of disease. The sickness which occurs in this case is usually ascribed to preceding toils. In this there is error; and, as it is an error of consequence to the interests of military service, the foundations of it ought to be examined, so that the case be thoroughly understood.

It was said before that if active service continue for six days, or if it continue for six months, general sickness rarely makes its appearance until the service terminate and the troops resume a state of rest. It then soon begins, particularly where to rest is added full living. This fact is frequently exemplified in experience; but, with this fact in view, it is important to remark that sickness rarely appears among those who, though they have undergone the toils of the campaign, do not remit their activity when the campaign is over. If this be true, rest,—not labour is the cause of sickness. As the fact is undeniable, the explanation of it may be comprehended by those who permit themselves to think and reason. The animal body fills rapidly in a state of rest where it is fully fed; and, if there be no evacuation by a natural or artificial outlet, the habit, as surcharged with irritable materials, is liable to be disturbed in its movements by slight and contingent causes of irritation, that is, health is liable to be perverted by the impulse of causes which would not otherwise be felt. This is often exemplified under the embarkation of troops in transport ships in hot weather, particularly where the troops have been recently imported into tropical latitudes. The fact was strikingly exemplified in the late war in St. Domingo on several occasions.* It was there

* It will here be proper to state some distinct examples of the fact.—Two companies of the 69th regiment of foot, which had been at Cape Nicola's Mole for about three

observed that soldiers, who had lived in the open air, and had the liberty of moving about in open air while in quarters, sickened in one, two or three days after embarkation, as if they had been

months without experiencing any material sickness, were embarked in a transport-ship to be sent to St. Marque, towards the end of May. The weather was hot and calm, and the passage was tedious, that is, from four to five days. When the 69th arrived at its destination, upwards of thirty men, out of ninety, were on the sick-list:--the disease was of an aggravated kind, and the mortality was great in proportion to the number of the sick. The York Hussars, a corps of five hundred, and in so far as appearance goes a corps of *élite*, landed at Cape Nicola's Mole about the end of May in a state of the highest health. It made an excursion into the interior, and assisted at the capture of Bombardo-polis. It remained a fortnight or three weeks at or near Bombardo-polis; and, about the end of June, it was sent to St. Marque as its allotted station. The corps had no sick at the time of embarkation: by the end of the third day, near one half was indisposed, and, by the end of the first week, one hundred was numbered with the dead. The weather was calm and excessively hot: the transports were crowded, and the disease was mortal almost beyond example. Detachments were sent at other times from Cape Nicola's Mole to other stations in the island: they rarely made the passage without experiencing great sickness and great proportional mortality. This applied chiefly to troops recently arrived from Europe, viz. such as had been landed and had spent some time on shore in camp or barracks. The occurrence gave a suspicion that there was contagious pestilence in the transports. Experiment was made to ascertain the fact; and it was clearly proved that no personal contagion existed in the case, the result being similar whether the ships had carried troops or not on former occasions.—The circumstances now stated were more striking at St. Domingo in the year 1796 than on any other occasion within the writer's observation; but they were not peculiar to that season and climate. It was generally observed that, where troops were embarked from camp or quarters in high health and vigour, the sick-list suddenly increased, and the malady moreover usually assumed a more concentrated character than it had among those who lived on shore. On the other hand, where sickly and exhausted subjects were embarked on board of ship in tropical climates, the state of health manifested more or less improvement in most cases.

struck with a breath of pestilence,—one third, even in some instances one half of the number embarked, fell down in less than a week. There was here no suspicion of febrile contagion; and there existed no assignable cause of disease, except the rest and ennui which are inseparable from confinement in a transport ship, combined with a condition of atmosphere heated artificially by accumulation, and, to a certain extent, deprived of its vivifying principle by the breath of many persons crowded into small space. This extraordinary sickness occurred only in the hot months of the year, and in those persons who had been for some time on shore: the mortality, in some instances was dreadful,—the fatal course rapid beyond example. The fact is correctly stated; and it is here stated, in order that something may be learned from it for guidance on future occasions. Proper foresight as connected with knowledge of causes would, there is reason to think, have obviated the effect, if not entirely, at least to a certain extent.—A low and measured diet, artificial evacuation by bleeding or purging, exercise to excite perspiration, and so directed as to engage the mind in an interesting pursuit would, it is conceived, have been effectual in prevention.

CHAPTER II.

DETAIL OF A SCHEME OF COLONIAL MILITARY ARRANGEMENT.

THE general laws which influence the health of the military in tropical countries are common to latitude; they are modified occasionally by circumstances of locality. If the law which influences health be

Military defence

common, the principle, by which the military defence is to be directed, is common also. The islands of the West Indies are mountainous; for the most part clothed with woods, and intersected by bold and deep ravines. To penetrate the interior without opposition is difficult, with opposition from an enemy impossible. The coasts are indented with bays; and the facilities for landing are numerous. If the landing be effected, (and it can scarcely fail of being effected, if the measures be well laid and the execution well conducted,) the communication of troops, as dispersed in posts at the different accessible points on the coast, is liable to be interrupted or cut off, consequently the defences of the island may be expected to fall in detail. This is a reasonable supposition, and even a fact proved in experience. But if, instead of intrusting the defence of an island to detached posts at accessible points on the sea coast, or to a work of regular fortification covering the capital, which is usually the aim of an enemy as the seat of government and a depot of marketable property, magazines were placed in citadels on well chosen sites in the interior, and a certain number of troops disposed at well chosen posts which command the roads or passes which lead to the citadel, the troops, as supposed to be energetic, active and organized according to a sound principle for the practice of war, and so stationed as to secure communication with one another for joint operation, it is fair to infer that a portion of defensive force would gain the points threatened with attack before a landing could be effected, at least before the means of maintaining it could be secured by works of art. The debarkation of a hostile force, which is conveyed through the seas in many ships, cannot be made by surprise,—without great error, negligence or treachery on the part of those who are appointed to observe. If the enemy's force be discovered at a distance, the attempt to land will probably be defeated. But if it be not seen, and if the landing be made good, the

conquest is still remote:—the difficulties and embarrassments in fact only begin. It is not denied that an enemy, who temporarily commands the seas, may land on almost any of the islands in question, and so far prevail as to destroy towns, to ravage and burn plantations:—to make and ensure a conquest, under the circumstances stated, is a Herculean labour requiring greater talent and perseverance than falls to the lot of ordinary Commanders. The difficulties are numerous and formidable; and it is not a random assertion to say that one thousand soldiers, inured to climate, masters in the desultory mode of warfare, disposed advantageously in positions for defence, and assisted by the ravages which disease commits upon strangers, will actually effect, in the course of six months, the destruction of five thousand of the best drilled troops of Europe, who have European habits and act according to the principles of European warfare. If this be so, and it will not be disputed by those who are acquainted with the scene of action, it may be inferred that the greater number of the islands in the West Indies are impregnable, if they be defended according to the principle here suggested. If defended by forts, erected at the accessible points of the sea-coast, or by regular works constructed for the protection of the capital, there are few of them that offer a prospect of long resistance.

The islands in the West Indies are exposed to invasion from foreign enemies; they are further exposed to insurrection from slaves. Doubts may arise concerning the propriety, or the practicability of trusting the chief defence against foreign invasion to a military force stationed among the mountains of the interior, no doubt can arise, concerning the propriety and advantage of placing such force in the fastnesses and passes of the mountains, as security against domestic insurrection. Revolt among negroes is not likely to occur in towns where white men are numerous and watchful. If it occur on sugar estates

in the plain, it may be speedily crushed by a force descending from the mountains. If it originate among the mountains, it must always be formidable; and it will only fail to be successful through the small number, or insufficient skill of the revolted.

The alteration, in the general plan and principle of disposing the military force in the West Indies here suggested, is not fanciful. It may be adopted with advantage, both on the head of health and military effect. The efficiency of health is obviously of great importance for assuring the success of military undertakings. But, though the possession of health be evidently important to success in war, the subject, as already said, has not yet obtained a scientific consideration with the members of the Cabinet. Sickness has been great of late years, and mortality has been sometimes enormous; yet the public does not know that any plan of science has been projected by the State for diminishing the calamity. We all know that no measures have been attempted to be carried into effect which look to that object with a reasonable prospect of success. The features of the country, as they indicate effect on health, are rarely regarded in the manner of disposing of troops; even military features do not always command the choice of military stations. Convenience, ease and the facilities of accommodation for trade, which is the polar star of British policy, condemn soldiers to the scourge of disease,—apparently sometimes without a necessity.

The sea coast of the islands in the West Indies, particularly near bays and creeks, where the shores are foul and muddy and the air moist, is unfriendly to the health of Europeans. Such however is usually the station of military force. The swamp, or vicinity of the swamp is not eligible. It is therefore to be avoided; but if the necessities of service require that it be occupied, every care ought to be taken in the construction of quarters, so that the influence of the noxious

cause, to which the situation is naturally exposed, be as much as possible diminished:—the following are the principal points of consideration that bear on that head.

1st. That the position be protected by the interposition of woods, or rising grounds from the force of winds which blow over swamps, or which, descending from the mountains through gullies and ravines, strike the body with a forcible and injurious impression. If no interposition of this kind exist naturally, within the limit that is destined for the erection of the barrack, it is important that it be planted artificially. A high wall, or a line of spreading trees placed at the noxious quarter, furnishes an obvious defence against the progress of the enemy in question; but it is scarcely, if ever, resorted to. On the contrary, it is customary to cut down the woods for some distance around the site of houses, habitations, barracks or towns in the West Indies,—under the idea of thereby assuring a free circulation of air. The idea is founded in error. Nothing is more grateful than the shade of trees in scorching climates; nothing more refreshes and more effectually purifies the air than the breathings of green foliage; and nothing more completely absorbs the noxious qualities of the soil than the material which is applied to the nutriment of trees and plants. Hence, as the shade of trees is both grateful and healthful in itself, barracks for troops, in order to possess the advantages of a cool shade and protection from noxious and piercing winds, require to be sheltered by an avenue, or double row of wide spreading trees judiciously placed at the exposed points.

Artificial
defences against
disease.

2nd. That the mode of constructing barracks, for the convenience and health of troops, be scientifically considered in all countries is plain to every man's apprehension; it is of main importance that the principle be understood and acted upon in the West Indies. Barracks, in order to be habitable in that country, ought to be raised.

Mode of
constructing
barracks.

from the ground on brick pillars—to the height of three feet or more, so as to be thoroughly ventilated underneath. It is advisable that the West India barrack consist of one story only, and that the roof, while lofty, be double, that is, that there be an interior lining of canvass or board, at a sufficient distance from the outer roof to leave an interval for ventilation—and thereby to lessen the influence of the vertical sun in the interior of the dwelling. Besides a double roof, every barrack building ought to be constructed with piazzas or balconies in front and rear,—ten or twelve feet in width, furnished with jalousies, painted green as most grateful to the eye, and so well joined as to exclude strong currents of wind and driving rains. A barrack-room for twelve men, with an apartment at the extremity of the rear balcony for a non-commissioned officer, is the most eligible size for the comfort and benefit of the troops. But, if it be preferred to lodge twenty-four men under the same roof, an apartment ought to be left at each extremity of the balcony for a non-commissioned officer, as a provision necessary for maintaining discipline and order among the troops within.

The hammock is perhaps the most convenient of the contrivances for the soldier's repose that has yet been adopted by economists. It may be furnished, if not at less, at least at an expence not exceeding that of a platform or guard-bed. If it be made into net-work, in the manner of the Indian hammock, the soldier, when furnished with the raw material, might be instructed with very little trouble to prepare it for himself; and, as the accommodation thus provided arises from the labour of his own hands, he may be supposed to have pleasure in keeping it in a proper state of repair, exclusive of the formal order which compels him to do so.—If the net hammock be not easily procured, strong cotton cloth is the best substitute:—it is preferable to sacking on account of lightness.

The accommodation and arrangements, here projected, are suited to the condition of troops assembled in considerable numbers at strong and central stations. Where small parties are dispersed among the interior mountains, huts calculated to contain seven persons, viz. six soldiers and a corporal, or six soldiers and a serjeant, are capable of furnishing more domestic comfort than the larger barrack; and, on that account, they constitute the preferable mode of accommodation for all forms of detachment. A lofty hut, the floors raised on pillars so as to be ventilated underneath, or erected over a floor of well made terrace, and covered with a thick roof of thatch, piazzas in front and rear wattled with branches of the cocoa nut tree for the purpose of intercepting the glare of the sun's rays, may be considered as a comparatively pleasant dwelling in a hot country:—it is in all respect a safe one on the score of health, as raised on pillars, or as erected over a terrace floor.

The selection of stations in the West Indies, and the mode of quartering troops imply questions of important consideration for the chiefs of the war department. Loss of military life from disease has been great at all times in that country; in the late wars it was prodigious. If the subject be viewed correctly and without prepossession, the loss, sustained on these occasions will be found to have been principally owing to mistake, that is, to inattention to truths furnished by experience for the choice of healthy positions.

The writer is aware that exigencies of military service sometimes command the sacrifice of the health of armies; but these exigencies, he ventures to say, occur seldomer in reality than they do in superficial appearance. The preservation of the health of the soldier is indispensable to the preservation of the conquests which fortune or courage achieves. If genius conquer, prudence preserves: the health of the army, as the preserving instrument, ought therefore to be a pri-

mary consideration of the state. The character which a country, or district of country bears relatively to health, is known to the native inhabitant by practical experience: the healthy and unhealthy aspect is cognizable by medical observers through rules established in science. The general question respecting the healthiness of localities is thus open for judgment. The means of obtaining information on the subject are not abstruse or difficult; but they are rarely resorted to. Human life suffers, and must be expected to suffer in war. It is sacrificed on too many occasions to ignorance and inattention, to indolence and desire of indulgence. No one, who is acquainted with the subject, will venture to say that the British nation was niggardly in the provision of medical means for the use of its armies in the late war. No one will venture to maintain that the lights of science were generally employed to give effect to the application. The nature of the causes which act on health are not correctly understood by the generality of mankind; and it is scarcely to be expected that those who command armies, who dedicate their time to perfect the tactic of troops, in anticipation of the effect which arises from tactic in the conflict of battle; or, that those who administer government, and who, to manage with dexterity, devote their time and study to find out the propensities and passions of those who hold the strings of the national purse, which is the omnipotent engine in all the national operations, can, or will take the trouble to penetrate deeply into the study of an abstruse science like that of health. It is a study of value; but it is not accompanied with the external splendour or political distinction which men covet. It requires great labour—and some talent to attain even the first principles of knowledge on the subject; and, as correct knowledge is attained with difficulty, those who possess power, not submitting to be instructed by those who have no power except

what may arise from the force of reason, follow their fancies, consequently err in the course which they pursue. Such is the fact on the present subject. It is not however a fact which attaches to one nation only;—it is common to all the European nations that have founded colonies in the West Indies. The situation of the greater number of forts or barracks, whether erected by the English, French, or Danes is not favourable to health; or, if otherwise, it is so by accident only. The nature of the causes, which act on the health of the animal system, has either not been known, or not regarded by those who formed military establishments in the colonies; and disregard of the nature of those causes has, in the writer's opinion, occasioned an enormous loss of human life. It is the imperious duty of the physician to seek for a remedy against evils of urgency; and, if the remedy be discovered, it is not to be considered as a mark of enmity to the State to say in plain terms what it is. A remedy does exist; and it is presumed, on good grounds of fact and argument, that it would not be an inefficacious one if experiment were made to ascertain the conditions of its application. It implies no new provision, no great expense of money; and, in military service, it is always at command. It consists merely in knowing what we are to do before we begin to do it, viz. that, previously to the erection of forts, barracks, or even the cantonments for troops, an official and professional survey be instituted by a commission of military and medical officers for the purpose of ascertaining the advantages and disadvantages of position relatively to health and defence. The measure is obvious and plain; and if it were adopted and executed, scientifically and systematically, by persons who are competent to execute, the greater part of the evils now complained of would cease to exist.

Besides the suggestions now offered, relative to the disposition and accommodation of European troops in tropical climates, the writer

takes the liberty of cursorily noticing some changes and modifications in dress, which he conceives to be convenient and suitable for the soldier during his service in hot countries, whether in quarters or the field. It is obvious that, as the temperature of the air is higher in the West Indies than in Europe, all the articles of clothing ought to be of a comparatively light texture. The hat, for instance, ought to be light,—formed with a high crown and broad brim, as affording shade to the eyes, and protection to the brain-pan against the vertical rays of the sun. The cloth of the coat ought to be coarse kerseymere, camblet or fustian; the trowsers strong brown linen, dowlas or cotton—large and loose, thereby securing the legs against the bite of flies and mosquitoes, and leaving the motion of the joints free and unconfined. The shoe ought to be well chosen,—strong and well-fitted; the sock—cotton or flannel; the gaiter—short, and so applied as to deny the passage of dust or sand to the foot. A dressing gown of cotton cloth is sufficient covering for the night in places near the sea-coast. It serves the purpose of shirt and sheets, and even blanket unless in the interior mountains in the cooler months of the year. It may be worn at all times when the soldier desires to be at ease. The dressing gown is an economical and safe provisionary article of clothing against cold. The cloak is necessary for night duty. It may be made of light duffle, or strong cotton cloth. The days are hot: the nights often disagreeably cold and piercing, particularly near mountains intersected by ravines, hence a cloak, which is easily assumed as a protection against cold, is a highly useful part of a soldier's dress in a hot country. A person is little sensible of the impressions of cold when he is actively engaged in exercise; and, for this reason, it is proper that the soldier, while employed on military duty or engaged in amusement during the day, be as nearly naked as decency or duty permit; for, if the body be cool, toil is endured

with comparatively little fatigue. The dressing gown and the cloak, —with which the soldier is supposed to be provided, furnish the means of guarding against cold when exercise ceases and the frame becomes easily susceptible of impression as an effect of inaction; or of guarding against the breezes of the night or morning, which are sometimes disagreeable and contingently injurious. The effect of the land wind, particularly as descending through deep ravines, or passing over arid plains, pierces and constricts the surface of the unprotected body, and apparently gives rise to fever or dysentery. This effect is common, and, as the means of guarding against it are obvious, it may be supposed to pass into the standing orders of a regiment, that a soldier, not on *duty*, assume the dressing gown at a certain hour in the evening, and that the soldier, on *duty*, assume the cloak when the land winds begin to blow.

A spare and exactly measured diet is justly regarded as preservative of health in all countries, but particularly in tropical climates. The fact is proved so clearly in history that it would not be adverted to in this place, did not those who are esteemed the most enlightened of the English nation maintain a contrary opinion, viz. an opinion that, as animal powers are principally to be increased by feeding, so the noxious effects of a burning climate are principally to be resisted by what is termed good living. This doctrine, which is in a manner peculiar to ourselves, is carried into practice among the military in the West Indies with correct observance and with confidence of good effect. The British ration for troops is every where a high ration; and it is here augmented by an extra allowance of rum. The effects of the climate are held to be debilitating; and good living, as just now observed, is recommended as the direct remedy for giving strength, that is, for increasing the power of resisting causes of disease. The doctrine, though the doctrine of physicians, is not

founded on truth ; at least, the salutary effect of it is not supported by a knowledge of what happens to Britons, who die in greater proportion in the West Indies than the people of other countries, at least than those who live sparingly, and who eat sparingly of animal food. The Spaniards and Portuguese suffer little sickness comparatively ; and they experience little comparative mortality in the least healthy of the tropical settlements. The French themselves escape better than the English. The French live sumptuously ; but they cook skilfully, and the vegetable material preponderates in their mess :—their acute diseases are usually less rapid, and less fatal than those of the English.—Such is the simple fact. A laboured illustration in proof is superfluous ; for, if there be any truth in experience, and, if any knowledge be as yet attained respecting the laws of animal economy, it may be pronounced to be one of the laws of the best authority, that abstemious living is preservative of health in hot countries more expressly than in others. If this be admitted, it follows that such scale of diet be fixed for troops in hot climates as is most suitable to the condition ; and that, when fixed by rule, the rule be rigidly adhered to in practice. A full diet of animal food is not necessary for the execution of the most effective military services ; on the contrary, those who never eat meat, or who eat sparingly of meat, support toils with facility under which those who are highly fed immediately sink. The matter of fact is undeniable :—it is ascertained by multiplied experience, and the explanation of it accords with our best views of the nature of animal structure.

If it were permitted to apply the knowledge attained through experience to practical use, the first step in the messing regulation would, it is conceived, be a diminution in the quantity of animal food, perhaps the total abstraction of it for two days in the week, savoury and wholesome preparations of the vegetable and farinaceous articles

of diet being substituted in its place. It is customary to carry out soldiers early in the morning for exercise in the West Indies; and; as it is not proper to enter on exercise fasting, lest the stomach become faint from emptiness, a cup of strong coffee, with a crust of bread, is recommended as precautionary on this occasion. It is proper that the morning exercises be continued for the space of three hours, varied in all possible ways that service can present; and it is proper that the soldier, returning from the field to his apartment, take off his clothes, wash his body all over, put on his dressing gown, recline for half an hour, and then repair to the breakfast table. The material of the breakfast is coffee, cocoa, or tea, yam, plantain, or bread—with an occasional addition of fruit;—the hour of breakfast ten. The dinner or principal meal is supposed to consist of soups or stews, roots and vegetables bearing a high proportion to the meat, which is only added to give a relish to the mess—not to fill the stomach by its quantity. The mess ought to be well seasoned and well cooked, palatable and digestible,—not unlike the common pepper-pot of the coloured inhabitants. The evening, when the duties of the day are finished, is the most proper time for making the principal repast. Water, as observed above, is the best drink for the soldier in the West Indies; but a small glass of rum as a liqueur, or a cup of strong coffee is useful after dinner: it assists the powers of digestion, it ought therefore to constitute an article in the diet.—The expense of messing according to the arrangement here proposed, would not amount to the expense of the present ration; it would thus have economy for its recommendation: the mode of cooking renders it grateful to the palate and easily digested by the stomach.

Exercise is useful generally in preserving health; it is useful in this view even in tropical climates. Planters, who may be said to work hard, experience good health comparatively, even soldiers are healthy

when actively employed: they suffer where they remain immured in barracks, in ease and apathy. This effect of activity, in preserving health, is strongly illustrated in the history of the buccaneers, even in the history of the first colonial settlers. But, as the period is remote, and the record may not be considered as authentic, an example is adduced in this place, ascertained by evidence on which the writer is warranted to rely. French soldiers, natives of France, previously to the revolution of 1789, formed all the great roads, and constructed all the aqueducts which convey water, through the plains of St. Domingo, for the irrigation of the cultivated lands. In the execution of a work, which required long and continued labour, they were exposed to the sun for the whole day as labourers are in Europe. They toiled; they sweated under toil, and were brown in colour as Mulattoes. They experienced little sickness while so employed. When they returned to the towns—to idleness and ease, or to revelry and good living, they suffered from sickness and died in numbers like the soldiers of other nations. From this testimony, and it is of good authority, the value of exercise, even of hard labour is proved decisively to be preservative of health; and on this ground, it is suggested that a train of such exercises, as are calculated to be useful on this head be digested systematically, and rigidly enforced in practice through all ranks and conditions of the army.*

* To what is stated of the labours of the French soldiers in the island of St. Domingo, the writer is enabled to add some facts which occurred, among the soldiers of the British army in the windward and leeward islands, at different periods of the late war. The second battalion of the Royal Scotch regiment was sent to garrison the island of Tobago in the year 1803. There was at that time, a swamp, windward of Fort King George, which was of an offensive kind, and supposed to be the cause of

The writer is aware that the opinions of the military, and even the opinions of the generality of physicians are adverse to the suggestion

great sickness to the troops. The commanding officer, who would appear to have been a man of some decision and good sense, took upon himself to drain it by the labour of the men. The corps had recently arrived from Europe and was susceptible of disease, as new comers usually are. The work was undertaken, executed in a short time, and health suffered nothing in doing it;—it was even said to have been good during the continuance of the labour. It was reported, at Head Quarters, that the health of the Royal was endangered by exposure to labour and fatigue in the hottest hours of the day. This was not the fact; but it was thought it must be the fact, for the reason of things was not understood at Head Quarters. The labour of the corps was suspended; and, as a measure of care, the barracks were ordered to be shut during the heat of the day:—the hospitals were soon filled with sick.

A barrack was built at Beau Soleil in the island of Guadaloupe in the year 1812, and first occupied by the 25th regiment of Foot. The barrack was erected on a healthy site, and, as a contract barrack, it was not badly constructed. But, though finished in the common manner of barrack building, many things were wanting for comfort and convenience when it was opened for the reception of the 25th. It happened fortunately that the officer, (Lieut.-Col. Light) who at that time commanded the regiment, was no amateur in engineering, and not without knowledge on a subject which he pursued with more than common ardour. He undertook to improve the condition of the quarters; and, by the labour of men, and without any expence to government, he actually rendered the barracks at Beau Soleil the most commodious of any in the windward or leeward command. The work, as now said, was done without expence to the public, and the doing of it was a high gratification to the soldiers themselves: they were more than usually healthy and cheerful during the time they were thus employed.

A large and magnificent barrack was erected near St. Ann's Castle, Barbadoes, in the year 1806, on a site that could not be approached, except through ground that was literally bog in the wet season of the year. The inconvenience was considerable. It is not certain that the health did not sometimes suffer from the feet being wet; it is obvious that the barrack was kept clean with difficulty. The soldiers, who occupied

now made; for he is not ignorant that it was proposed, and that the practice was actually adopted of attaching a certain number of black

this superb quarter, were desirous of making a road by which they might go to, and return from their duties without wading through the mire. The proposition did not accord with the view of the Commander of the Forces; and permission was not obtained until the year 1814, when the then Commandant ascertaining, from the chief medical officer, that the labour necessary in making a road would not be injurious to the health of the troops, gave leave to commence the work in compliance with the request of the soldier himself. It was undertaken with alacrity and executed with cheerfulness. The sick reports of the garrison are in proof that the troops were never more healthy, between 1812 and 1815, than they were while they were thus employed. They never appeared to be more happy and satisfied: they even seemed to be thankful that they were permitted to do something for themselves,—for their convenience and their comfort.

The facts now stated, which are of perfect authenticity, may be considered as evidence that the European soldier is capable of sustaining ordinary labour in the West Indies, without incurring risk of injury to health from the heat of the climate. If this fact be established,—and it is not equivocal, Government may perhaps think itself warranted to erect barracks, or to execute other work to which the labour of the soldier is competent, without unnecessary fears on the score of health; and, as the work may be done without direct expenditure of money, it is difficult to see by what means the question can be longer evaded. The writer ventures to say, by fair induction from fact, that if the soldier in the West Indies, instead of being restricted from labour, were permitted to do for himself whatever he is capable of doing, his health would suffer less than it now does, the mind would be more occupied, there would be more satisfaction, and fewer of those causes of temptation which, in idleness, lead him into error. In countries, where the materials for erecting huts abound, the soldier is capable, with very little assistance from professed artizans, of erecting his own dwelling:—he has done so on some occasions, even in the West Indies. The 13th regiment of Foot was put into huts on Bouillè height, soon after the capture of the island of Martinico in the year 1810. The huts, as of flimsy structure (nearly wigwam) had frequent occasion for repair. The labour connected with repair, viz. cutting and

men to European regiments in quality of pioneer, for executing the common drudgeries of a soldier's duty. The proposition sounds well in theory. It fails in practice; and a just view of things will

dragging the materials from the woods, while it gave employment and a species of exercise which apparently contributed to the preservation of health, gave an interest in what was done or doing, for the work done brought comfort to the person who did it. The soldiers of the 13th regiment formed an attachment to their dwellings, because they were kept in repair by their own labour; and, while they were thus attached to the dwelling, they formed a more intimate society with one another in the small domestic circle than is common in spacious barracks. They were delighted to dwell in huts, evidently so much delighted that had they been ordered to remove from them to the most magnificent and best equipped barrack in the command they could not have concealed their chagrin. The soldier is at home in a hut:—he is like a dog in a royal kennel in a palace-like barrack. The huts on Bouillé height were placed on the lee, under the summit of the ridge. As such they were screened from the direct impulse of exhalation from the Lamentin swamps. The occupants, though they had their tours of duty at Fort Edward and other exposed places about Port Royal, were not upon the whole unhealthy.—When the regiment embarked for Canada, it left only one sick man in hospital.

The inferences, which may be drawn from the facts now stated, are important inferences, if preservation of health and saving of public money be objects of importance to the State. The soldier is capable of constructing his own dwelling at little expence in most of the islands in the West Indies, for there materials of all kinds abound. He will be gratified by being permitted to do it: his health will be preserved, and his efficiency, as a soldier, will be improved by the labour or exercise connected with the execution. If work done without expence, and without accounts of expenditure, be more desirable than formal accounts and cart loads of vouchers, it may be thus attained. It is unnecessary to say more: the fact is demonstrable, but it is an invidious fact for it trenches on the power of the Treasury, which moves and controuls the movement of the political machine in all its extent through the direct influence of expenditure, formally but not always honestly, vouched.

shew that it cannot do otherwise than fail. A soldier, who is exempted from such drudgeries as relate to the care of his person in times of peace, cannot well be expected to be effective in time of war. The endurance of military toil in all its forms, even cooking, carrying water and cleaning the barrack, are comprehended in a soldier's duty. A soldier ought therefore to be accustomed to do those things, and all other things which belong to military service in tropical as well as in temperate climates. His physical powers are equal to it; and his value is diminished in proportion as he is exempted from doing it. But, in order to inure the soldier to climate, and to render him fit for all services besides military duties, a train of amusements, such as crickets, quoits, bowls, fives, &c. ought to be practised daily in the open air, under the shade of trees and occasionally in the sun. When persons are intently occupied in exercise, they run no risk of being hurt by cold. On such occasions therefore, the soldier ought only to be covered by a shirt and trowsers; for, being lightly clothed, he longer endures toil. After a certain continuance of exercise, he is supposed to recline for the sake of rest; and, after refreshment by rest, it is recommended that he wash his body with cold water, as the means of invigorating and fortifying the frame against the effects of vicissitude. The practice now recommended may seem strange. It will probably be deemed barbarous; but it is known by experience that it is not dangerous, and most of those who have experience of it confess that it is pleasant. It is proper that the greatest part of a soldier's time be occupied by military duties, military exercises, amusements and sports in the open air—in the West Indies equally as in Europe. When these cease, or cannot be practised, it is recommended that military instruction, so digested as to be embodied into national songs, accompanied with martial music which strikes upon a key of warlike sympathy, immediately commence.

By this routine of discipline, the body will be rendered equal to the sustaining of toils and fatigues in the field, the mind will be exalted in courage, animated with the spirit of enterprize, and stimulated to persevere in the military course by a thirst for glory. But, besides the routine now suggested as necessary for perfecting the military character, a portion of the soldier's time may be usefully allotted to the cultivation of a kitchen garden for the benefit of the mess: The exercise implied in this labour conduces to the preservation of health. The object interests, as it adds to domestic comfort.—It may be presumed that a soldier newly imported from Europe, and treated in the manner recommended, will be soon reconciled to his condition, and easily conducted into the way of finding satisfaction in a country that had been regarded by him with aversion.

Practical war submits itself to be modified, in some degree, by the feature of the country in which it is carried on. The islands in the American seas and those parts of Europe which have been the more common theatres of war, as different in aspect from each other, necessarily require different modification in the manner of conducting military operations, whether for defence or aggression. The interior of the greater number of the West India islands is mountainous, intersected by ravines, and so barred by passes in various places as to be defensible by a small force against a numerous host. The scene is broken and irregular; the mode of warfare must of course be adapted to the scene. Personal activity, exertion, knowledge and ready intelligence are here the requisite qualities of the soldier: the mechanical machine can rarely be applied in force. The objects are individual objects; and, as such, demand the exercise of individual judgment. A general knowledge of ground, an estimate of the value of position, and an intimate acquaintance with the power of fire-arms individually, constitute the basis on which the soldier's

education is to be laid. With a view to open his mind to a proper comprehension of it, he ought to be accustomed to traverse mountains and plains, woods and open grounds, ravines and difficult passes; and, in doing this, led to remark the nature of the fastnesses which give security in defence, or the weaknesses in strong holds which give openings for attack. The infantry soldier is here the efficient part of the army, the firelock, armed with the bayonet, the principal instrument of offence. It is therefore fit that the soldier know its powers at all distances and in all directions,—a knowledge which can only be attained through practical experiment. The mechanical tactic of the Prussian school has no place in the wars of the West Indies: West Indian warfare must of necessity, from the features of the country, be war of the irregular and partizan character. The Buccanier of past times, not the automaton of Frederick the Second, is the model of imitation for a soldier destined for service in the West Indies,—the mind bold, adventurous, ready in danger, the body healthy, vigorous and patient of toil.

As the defence of the British possessions in the West Indies is an important object to the interests of the nation, it deserves to be considered on a broad basis, estimated in all its relations for economy as well as for security. The expense of life, according to the existing plan of management, is enormous; and the defences, without a decided superiority at sea, are not of such a nature that dependence can be placed on them. The ravages of disease come suddenly; and they sometimes rage so enormously that the island, which is in safety to day, may be nearly unprotected in the short period of three months. This is a contingency—and it is not one of rare occurrence. It arises from the condition of new troops transported to a new climate, a condition aggravated by the system of arrangement which is now acted upon. It may be assumed as a truth, the stability of which no one

who knows the subject will venture to contest, that a force of one thousand men, inured to climate, stationed in the interior and central parts of the country, and trained to the proper mode of West Indian warfare, will produce, at most seasons of the year, more effectives for action, than five thousand recently imported from Europe, stationed on the sea-coast, and equipped in all the splendour of European magnificence. If this be well founded, it would be more eligible, as economical of men, and effective of sure purpose, to constitute a military force expressly for the defence of the islands. If the suggestion were adopted, it would not be difficult to give an interest to the service above any interest that can possibly attach to it in its present condition. The duty of garrisoning the West Indian islands is the most irksome duty which falls to the lot of the British soldier. It is sometimes assigned as a punishment; and, as it implies privation of country, holds out no prominent object of glory, and presents little else than the prospect of an inglorious death from disease, it may not without reason be considered as such. As things now are, the service is disliked and the sovereignty of the islands is not secure. If a military force of the description alluded to were formed expressly for defence, proportioned in strength to the extent and importance of each island in itself, but disposable among those that are contiguous, in the event of contingent dangers threatening any one in particular, the defence of one and the whole would be better secured than it now is; and the duty would be less irksome, in as much as it might be connected with causes which generate attachment to the soil.

In order to give interest to a system of colonial military defence, it is obvious that some other allurements, besides that of daily pay, ought to be connected with the service. A small lot of land, sufficient for garden stuff and common provisions, with some conveniences for

rearing stock, &c. could scarcely fail to create attachment to the soil which is committed to the soldier for defence, and which he then might be supposed to defend on other ground than that of a mere mercenary. The property in land, in the case under view, would be considered as feudal property, attached to actual military service,—not commutable, or transferable. The proposition is not visionary. It is not impracticable, not even difficult to be practised; but it is liable to degenerate, or become void in its effect, by being perverted from its original purpose through the influence of seductive appetites. Propensities are inherent in man and the desire is likely to become strong with many, in the case proposed, to leave the military path for the sake of farming and becoming rich. This, it is admitted, is an inconvenience; but it is not an irremediable one. It belongs to a judicious and energetic colonial Government, a zealous and patriotic military Commander to limit the propensity, without extinguishing the object of utility connected with attachment to the soil. It is supposed that, under the proposed scheme of arrangement, the commissioned officer has his farm or peculium as well as the soldier; but it is implied, in the condition, that he cultivate the use of arms and the science of his profession for the sake of his duties, more than his field or his farm for the sake of his profits;—in short, the military character is prominent, the farming character subordinate. With a soldiery so constituted, stationed in the interior fastnesses of the country, effective, alert, and aided by the professed planters who are secondarily instructed in the use of arms, the military service can scarcely fail to be animated; while the islands so protected will be, in a manner secure against foreign attack or domestic insurrection.

The observance of correct and rigid economy is an object of the greatest importance towards success in war. Without correct economy, there is no security for the continuance of health; and without

the possession of vigorous health there is no dependance on the results of military operations. The medical history of armies holds out a dismal picture of human misery. Armies were crippled, almost annihilated by artificial diseases in the late war, viz. by contagious fevers, proceeding from corrupted sources of recruiting, and gaining strength from ignorance of the principles which conduce to the preservation of health, or from indifference and negligence in applying them to the occasion. Such losses are melancholy, because they proceed from errors. The errors are not always reprehensible, for they proceed from ignorance and misapplied care, as often perhaps as from indifference and neglect. A contagious fever is an accident of frequent occurrence among the masses of armies which appear on the warlike theatre of Europe, but it does not necessarily belong to military service, even in Europe. Wherever it exists, it proves the operation of economical error, and it proves it so unequivocally that the writer is confident to maintain that, if true principles of economy be thoroughly understood and acted upon with energy, no contagious fever will arise spontaneously among troops :—if introduced surreptitiously, it will not make progress. Soldiers are selected from the healthy part of the community. Reason says that they ought to be more healthy than the mass of the people ; it is not so in fact. The cause of sickness does not consist in actual hardship, for that is rarely to great extent ; or, where it does occur, it rarely affects the health. It oftener has its source in indulgencies, in excess in eating and drinking, in apathy, in the contaminated air of crowded quarters, in change and novelty of circumstances, viz. the impression of new or contingent causes applied to the organs of susceptible subjects, that is, to subjects that have little bodily activity or mental exertion. Armies are destroyed in European countries by contagious fever, the product of sloth, or of air corrupted by accumulating a number of persons in

tents or quarters: they suffer in tropical climates through the irritation of a heated atmosphere to which they are not inured. The simple change of climate acts on health in some shape or other, either for improvement or deterioration. The occurrence of disease under the change, arises principally from ignorance of the causes of prevention viz. from not avoiding what is noxious, even sometimes through mistaken care, from adding things that are noxious to the permanent heat of the climate. Instead of abstinence which is practically useful, as preservative of the order and harmony of animal movement, full living is gravely recommended as augmentative of the power of resistance:—experience proves it to be destructive.—The writer abstains from further remark on the subject, but takes leave to say, and he says it confidently that, if the rules here suggested be duly understood and correctly applied, mortality among European troops in the West Indies would little, if in any degree exceed mortality among soldiers in Europe, even in its healthier districts: as things are it is prodigiously great.

SECTION V.

SUGGESTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF A BOARD, FOR FORMING AND MAINTAINING THE MECHANICAL ECONOMY OF ARMIES IN EFFICIENCY.

IN viewing the subject of military economy in its real and important connexion with the welfare of armies, it strikes the writer as a measure of obvious utility, that a Board, consisting of officers of high

rank, distinguished respectively in the walks of science, and at the same time acquainted by experience with military service in its minutest details, even with the humble condition of the soldier, be appointed to form an economical plan and to superintend its movement in all its branches. It is evident that the foundations of economical arrangement, in order to be sure, must be laid upon principles of science, and that these are only of dependence as drawn from a correct knowledge of the physical powers of the animal body. In this view, the rules, which are formed for the regulation of diet, clothing and exercise, in order to be applicable to all conditions, must be simple, convenient and complete, nothing wanting, nothing superfluous, and every thing in its place. This can only be done by those who know the service of the ranks, and who have moreover the properties of an analyzing mind capable of bringing things together, and of arranging them by their true principles. The principles are supposed to be common to the constitution of human nature, the practice of them maintained by rigorous surveillance, so that the instrument be always ready and in a fit state for application. Application belongs to the chief Commander, responsibility of fitness for purposes, to the Board alluded to.

A Board, constituted as here suggested, cannot fail of being useful in preserving an army effective for the field. If it does its duty, it assures the efficiency of all the parts, by maintaining a system of correct economy. But though the organization be correct, and the economy faultless, the military act will not be eminent, unless it be animated by a military spirit, and a military spirit cannot be infused, except by the presence and prominent genius of a military chief. A General of genius, paramount in originality and force, animates the operations of an army with one impulse. The prominence of his character acts as a mirror to the lowest order in the ranks: every one

views himself through the splendour of his Commander, assimilates in idea with his excellence, and, presumptively superior in opinion, becomes so in reality. Hence it is not the dry mechanical prudence of the plan of battle, so much as the animating spirit of the leader which gives the pledge of success in war:—the labours of the Board may, in a manner, secure from failure; it is the genius of the Commander which gives victory.

Good soldiers abound in all nations which cultivate the art of war; original military genius is of rare occurrence. No power of industry can give it, and no one can define the path in which it moves. The genius, which plans and executes the conquest of kingdoms, is an original and first impression from the hand of Nature. It cannot, as now said, be acquired by art; it is capable of being improved by study in the book Nature, that is, by knowledge of men and things. It makes its appearance most commonly in the semibarbarous periods of society, or in times of convulsion, when man reverts to the natural energy of man, the mind to its original freedom. The spirit which knows not to submit, which retires from no danger because it is formidable, as it is the soul and spirit of a soldier, marks the existence of genius. Military genius is a brilliant, but dangerous quality. Through means of it, power is acquired, and the road is opened to tyranny. Where tyranny builds its throne, genius, at least judgment is extinguished. By a wise provision of the Creator which guards the independence or primary condition of the human race from annihilation, tyranny and talent cannot long inhabit the same mansion. The man of genius who, in his ambition, acquires power by force of arms, endeavours to constitute himself a sovereign in the empire of the Deity. He exacts homage from his equals; and, obtaining it, conceives himself to be a god. He is in fact a tyrant,—and he is not wise. The first step in his course is violence, and every succeeding

step is error—directly or indirectly: he proceeds in confusion, and moves with precipitation to destruction. This has been the history of conquerors, individually and nationally, from the first records of history, and it will continue to be their history until man learn to know himself, that is, until he learn that the wisdom of man consists in moving in his own sphere, his courage in maintaining that sphere against encroachment. It is ignorance and folly which urge man to encroach on the sphere of others;—the act brings its own punishment. Instead of adding empire to empire, the only victory in this world is a victory over man's self, that is, a subjection of animal passion to the law of the Creator, which consists in action and reaction in reciprocity through all relations.

APPENDIX.

REMARKS ON THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF ARMIES, SUBMITTED TO MILITARY OFFICERS FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION.

IT would be a superfluous labour to go into any length of detail, in attempting to prove the value of the soldier's health for assuring success in war. The fact is evident; but, evident as the fact may be, the manner of giving it effect is complicated and difficult, and not perfectly understood by those who are ordinarily entrusted with the command of armies. It therefore will not be impertinent to put before the military reader, an outline view of matters which relate to that subject, and which require the military officer's attention.

MEDICAL STAFF.

THE preservation of the health of soldiers in the field and in quarters is attained, to a certain extent, by a rigid observance of those forms of discipline and economy which are under the direction and surveillance of military officers. Care on these heads goes far in prevention; but, in spite of all the care that has, or perhaps that can be given, diseases arise occasionally among troops; and, when they do arise, the speedy removal becomes an important, and an

indispensable part of the duty of those who are entrusted with military command. The removal of disease, it is evident, must be effected by the prompt application of medical skill; consequently care ought to be taken, by the chiefs of the State, that the skill be of the first quality, the superintending authority holding itself responsible that it be promptly applied, that is, that it be applied at the first signs of indisposition. It will not be disputed, by those who have experience in war, that there occur few diseases in military life which may not be arrested by means of art, applied with skill at an early period, and that there are few which do not imply danger if left to themselves or feebly treated. For this reason, it is suggested that a sufficiency of competent medical assistance be placed in the regimental circle, which is the first integral part of an army, and that in which the medical art has the best chance of manifesting its power. The arrangements, for the execution of this purpose, are supposed to proceed from the chiefs of the war department; and, as these are liable to commit error from not understanding the subject in its primary principles, the author ventures to obtrude a few remarks which have occurred to him on that head in a course of long experience. He believes that they may be useful, and, from the experience which he has had, he does not think that they are presumptuously obtruded in this place.

It is required, in the first place, that the medical staff of the army be sufficient for every form of duty which is likely to arise in war; but it is proper at the same time that it be more than sufficient; for superfluity here, as in other things, corrupts and vitiates the execution of duty. A surgeon and an assistant-surgeon may be deemed equal to the care of the health of a regiment of seven hundred, even of one thousand men in most parts of Europe in times of peace and in contiguous quarters. A surgeon and two assistants is not more than

sufficient in times of war in Europe, and scarcely sufficient, either in peace or war in tropical and unhealthy climates. The duty of accompanying the regiment into the field of battle, so as to be near when it enters into action, has not as yet perhaps been very carefully considered. It is now proposed that it should be assigned to the senior of the Assistants with a mark of distinction—honorary or substantial as may be thought fit. Where three or more regiments are formed in Brigade, and placed under the command of a General officer for field service, a Staff-surgeon, with three Hospital-assistants, is supposed, by the present scheme, to be added in extra aid, and, as of senior rank, to be placed in superintendence of the medical concerns of the Brigade. He is supposed to have power and means to open Hospitals for the reception of such cases of disease, as require longer time for cure than could be calculated on in Regimental-infirmaries, which must be understood, while in the field, to be establishments prepared at all times to be broken up at an hours notice. Where armies are thrown together in large bodies, in what is called Division, a physician, with a given number of hospital-assistants, is supposed to be appointed to the superintendence of its medical concerns, invested with power to establish Hospitals, for the reception of such sick and wounded as cannot be properly accommodated in Brigade-hospitals or Regimental-infirmaries. Physician is the highest name in the medical profession; and, as medical officers are supposed, in the present case, to have served in every medical rank from Hospital, or Regimental-assistant upwards, the physician must be held competent to judge of execution, qualified to superintend and direct every medical and surgical measure which concerns the troops which are thus collected into a Division. When a large force, consisting of several divisions under their respective Generals and Physicians, is brought into the field for actual war, and placed under a General-in-chief, a

person bearing the name of Physician-general, is supposed to be appointed to correct, superintend, and bring the movements of the whole concern into one view, so as to be easily comprehended by the Chief Commander, and appreciated properly in his calculations.

As the health of troops is a matter of the greatest importance to the success of war, health officers may be justly considered to be an important part of an army. As medical officers are important in their stations, it is presumed that care will be taken, in the primary selection, that no one be admitted into the class of Assistant-surgeon, who is not fit for the office, and that no one, who actually is in the service, will be moved, from a lower to a higher rank and more responsible duty, without some public evidence that he is competent in professional knowledge, and worthy in moral character for the promotion intended. If a medical officer be professionally skilful and morally correct, he is entitled, as he is eminently useful in his vocation, to a respectable place of rank in the military fabric. The medical officer claims to himself the rank of gentleman, and the respect which is due to a man of science. Rank is every where the gift of power. The rank of the medical staff of the British army did not appear to be distinctly defined at the commencement of the war 1793: it was considered at a subsequent period, and the basis of it was laid on just and reasonable grounds. The Assistant-surgeon was allowed to enter a regiment with the rank of Lieutenant; the Surgeon was classed with Captain, and took rank according to the date of his commission. The first steps are fair and reasonable; but, beyond that, nothing is defined: it scarcely can be said that there is a gradation. The Assistant-surgeon does not enter the army until he has completed a course of education which, besides time, may be supposed to imply an expence of money, not short, if not beyond the price of an Ensign's commission. He serves five, ten, even fifteen

years or more before he attains the rank of Surgeon while; the Ensign, who entered the corps at the same time has a chance to be Major, even Lieut.-colonel—without purchase or proof of extraordinary talent. If this be so, the medical officer of the British army has some cause to complain that he is not sufficiently regarded. It is obvious, to every man's common sense and reason, that a step of rank is virtually implied in every step of promotion which takes place in the military machine, which is constructed by a rule of science; and, as there is no precise and distinct rank in the medical staff of the British army beyond the rank of Surgeon, we are obliged to say that the medical department is not respectfully treated. If the officers of the medical staff were advanced in rank by a just and legitimate rule of gradation, the Staff-surgeon would class with Majors, the Physician with Lieut.-colonels, and the Physician-in-chief with Generals—viz. with the Quarter-master and Adjutant-general. The proposition will be deemed presumptuous; but it is not so in fact. The rank accorded to the medical officer does not injure, or even interfere with the military. Rank is of no intrinsic value in itself to a man of science; but the opinion connected with the rank makes an impression on the soldier which aids materially in giving force to medical authority, and consequently to medical utility. The soldier is accustomed to view things superficially, to estimate and judge by the exterior only; for, as he is not permitted to reason and resolve to principle, the science of the medical art is less regarded by him than the authority of the rank under which it is applied to him. For this reason, we venture to assert that if the medical officer stand, in what may be called a degraded rank in military estimation, the usefulness of the medical art will lose much of its value as applied to a military subject.—The matter now under view is of some consequence to the interests of the army; and it is not, it is presumed, beneath the dignity

of the higher powers of the state to consider it, if it be held to be a national concern to arrange the various departments of the army on a basis of justice and truth. Those who hold high official stations, and particularly those who wield the sword, are stongly disposed to depress men of science; and, among others, the medical department, which is a department of science, has been degraded of late years, at least barred from rising to a rank suitable to its importance. But be this as it may, the history of our most brilliant campaigns will not permit our most celebrated Generals to say that nothing is due to the medical staff, where that staff is allowed to act according to its judgment.—The latter periods of the Peninsular war bear irrefragable testimony of medical value.

HOSPITALS.

It does not belong to this place to go into detail on the constitution and management of Hospitals. It is sufficient to state a few points of fact, with which the military officer, who superintends the execution of medical duty in a corps or in an army, ought to be acquainted, so that he do not commit himself to error through ignorance, when he issues orders on matters which concern the health arrangements of troops.—The chief property of a military Hospital consists in ventilation and the means of assuring warmth in winter, or coolness in summer, or in hot climates. Ventilation and coolness follow the mode of construction, viz. lofty roof, and windows that descend to the level of the floor in the manner of Venetian windows. A temperate, and, in many cases, a warm atmosphere is condusive to the cure of disease, and particularly to prosperous convalescence; and, as warmth is thus useful, it is to be assured in cold and damp weather by

open fire-stoves placed near the centre of the apartment, flues being carried from thence to the corners of the ward and along the side walls, so that every part within the precinct be under the influence of artificial heat. Height of roof is a property of great importance in a house that is appropriated to the reception of the sick of armies; for, the air being contaminated by the breathings of a crowd of people in confined space, the disease is aggravated, and mortality is multiplied to an extraordinary extent. It was often proved, in the history of the late war, that more human life was destroyed by accumulating sick men in low and ill ventilated apartments, than in leaving them exposed in severe and inclement weather at the side of a hedge or common dyke. It is fit that the military officer mark this fact and bear it in mind; and it is also fit that he bear in mind, that churches and palaces are less proper receptacles of military sick than barns, hovels and open sheds.

DUTY IN THE FIELD.

THE medical department of the British army is now so arranged that it would be superfluous, and perhaps impertinent to go into any detail on the subject of management. It will not however be improper to bring a few points of fact under the notice of military officers, on which they may reflect; and, in reflecting, look at the principle of the arrangements recommended so as to give to them cordial aid in execution. It will not be disputed that medical and surgical assistance is of most value where it is most promptly applied; and, for this reason, it is understood that the military officer consider it to be his duty to know that the Hospitals are well and suitably equipped for the reception of sick; viz. the Regimental Infirmary for

all manner of indispositions, which do not promise to be of longer duration than ten days or a fortnight, for example fevers, flesh wounds in the upper parts of the body,—all such cases in fact as may be transported in waggons without injury, when the necessity of changing the position occurs; the Brigade Hospital, for the reception of such sick or wounded as cannot be expected to be well in the course of a fortnight, or cannot be moved with safety on every occasion of necessity; and finally, the General Hospital of the Division, for complicated diseases and complicated wounds which require complicated treatment and medicated diet.

It is proper, as observed above, that an Assistant-surgeon attend close in the rear of a battalion when it moves forward to action, so as to be ready to give assistance wherever it may be wanted. The suggestion is not foolish; on the contrary, it is of obvious utility, in as much as it serves to give confidence to soldiers and even to officers, many of whom are unhappy from apprehensions on the head of hemorrhage. Besides the presence of a Surgeon with the line while under fire, the Quarter-master of the Regiment, with the pioneers and band furnished with light-bearers, may, or rather ought to be stationed in the rear at such a distance from the field that, a view of what happens being distinctly seen, those who are wounded may be instantly removed without the range of shot. The execution of the duty proposed in this place requires little provision of means, and it implies little expence of money, for the pioneers and greater part of the band do not take part in a regular military action. It is imperious on the score of humanity that wounded men be removed from the field of battle with as little delay as possible, and, if that be admitted, the mode proposed is the simplest, and promises to be the most effectual of any that can be devised. It is dangerous to leave the

office of removing the wounded from under fire to the care of their comrades. The eye of the soldier, while in action, is supposed to be directed to a point in front, and it is important that it be constantly directed to that point and steadily fixed on it. It is therefore wise, even necessary, to preclude the operation of every cause which can furnish a pretext of giving it a lateral direction. The feeling of humanity, which prompts the soldier to give assistance to a comrade or officer who is wounded, as it gives a colourable pretext for turning the face from the enemy, commences retrograde; and retrograde commences fear, which, once it makes impression, is difficultly staid from going on. One firelock is withdrawn from the line by the wound of the soldier, another by the impulse of humanity, and a third perhaps by the infection of example. This may happen, and, if it do happen, the battle may be lost by the operation of causes which might, and which ought to have been precluded. If the proposition here made be adopted, and it is of obvious utility that it should, it is understood that the Regimental and Brigade medical staff furnished with the means of performing surgical operations, of dressing and refreshing the wounded, and of conveying them, with every requisite care, to the Hospital appointed for their reception, be stationed, by a confidential person of the military staff, in a safe and not distant position from the field of action. It is sufficiently proved, in the experience of Army Surgeons, that wherever operations are to be performed on the wounded, pain and suffering are saved, even the chances of recovery are improved by the operation being performed without loss of time. The subject is an important one: it demands the serious consideration of the higher authorities if it be desired that the military instrument, as well as being scientifically formed, be scientifically preserved from unnecessary loss.

ECONOMICAL ARRANGEMENT.

THE economical arrangements of the medical department of the British army have been changed of late years, and so much improved that it is not necessary to go into any detail on the subject. It is now seen, and satisfactorily proved that the sum of money which feeds a soldier in Barracks is sufficient to feed him, and furnish him with necessary comforts in Hospital. The medical department occasions, in such case, no expence to the State, beyond the salary of medical officers, medicines, lodging and some extra equipment of furniture. The subject is an important one; and it is fit that the military officer consider it in all its extent, so as rightly to comprehend the principle through which the operation of so great economy, (as compared with past times,) has been accomplished. But, besides the mere economical detail of expenditure, which the military officer ought to comprehend as he must certify to its truth, the spirit which directs the management and discipline of Hospitals ought to be fully within his view. The visits of the military officer to the sick in Hospital are, for the most part, acceptable to the soldier: they rarely fail, when they are made in kindness, to operate favourably on the mind, often to alleviate sufferings, almost always to excite the grateful feelings of the heart, consequently to improve the moral character of the man, and thereby to improve his military qualities.

THE END.

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